Christian Calderon v. Kevin Hixon

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8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

9 CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

10 WESTERN DIVISION

11 CHRISTIAN CALDERON, ) No. 2:24-cv-08206-DMG-JDE

)

12 Petitioner, ) ) ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE WHY

13 v. ) ) THE PETITION SHOULD NOT BE

14 KEVIN HIXON, Warden, ) ) DISMISSED

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15 Respondent. )

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16

17 I.

18 INTRODUCTION

19 On September 3, 2024,1 Christian Calderon (“Petitioner”), a state prisoner

20 proceeding pro se and seeking to proceed in forma pauperis, constructively filed

21 a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus by a Person in State Custody under 28

22 U.S.C. § 2254, challenging his 2017 conviction. Dkt. 1 (“Petition” or “Pet.”).

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1 Under the mailbox rule, “a legal document is deemed filed on the date a petitioner

25 delivers it to the prison authorities for filing by mail.” Lott v. Mueller, 304 F.3d 918,

921 (9th Cir. 2002). In the absence of evidence to the contrary, courts have treated a

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petition as delivered to prison authorities on the date the petition is signed. See

27 Roberts v. Marshall, 627 F.3d 768, 770 n.1 (9th Cir. 2010). Here, the undersigned

affords Petitioner the benefit of the mailbox rule and deems the Petition “filed” on

28 September 3, 2024, the date corresponding to the signature date of the Petition.

1 The Court reviewed the Petition under Rule 4 of the Rules Governing

2 Section 2254 Cases in the United States District Courts (“Habeas Rules”) and

3 finds it appears to suffer from several defects, rendering it subject to dismissal.

4 II.

5 PROCEDURAL HISTORY

6 In 2016, a Los Angeles County Superior Court jury found Petitioner

7 guilty of first degree murder, four counts of assault with a semiautomatic

8 firearm, and one count of shooting at an occupied vehicle. The jury also found

9 true sentence enhancement allegations. Pet. at 2 (CM/ECF pagination);

10 People v. Cordero, 2018 WL 2011609, at *2 (Cal. Ct. App. Apr. 30, 2018) (as

11 modified).2 On January 4, 2017, the trial court sentenced Petitioner to 89 years

12 to life in state prison. Pet. at 2.

13 Petitioner appealed the judgment of conviction to the California Court of

14 Appeal. Pet. at 2. In an unpublished decision dated April 30, 2018, and as

15 modified on May 21, 2018, the court of appeal vacated all enhancements

16 imposed and remanded the matter to afford the trial court an opportunity to

17 correct certain enhancements and to reconsider the firearm enhancements. The

18 judgment was affirmed in all other respects. Cordero, 2018 WL 2011609, at *9;

19 Appellate Courts Case Information (“Appellate Courts”) at

20 https://appellatecases.courtinfo.ca.gov. Petitioner’s Petition for Review was

21 denied on August 22, 2018. Pet. at 3; Appellate Courts. Petitioner did not file a

22 petition for writ of certiorari in the United States Supreme Court. Pet. at 5.

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2 Pursuant to Rule 201 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, the Court takes judicial

25 notice of relevant state court records available electronically. See Holder v. Holder,

305 F.3d 854, 866 (9th Cir. 2002) (taking judicial notice of opinion and briefs filed in

26

another proceeding); United States ex rel. Robinson Rancheria Citizens Council v.

27 Borneo, Inc., 971 F.2d 244, 248 (9th Cir. 1992) (courts “may take notice of

proceedings in other courts, both within and without the federal judicial system, if

28 those proceedings have a direct relation to matters at issue” (citation omitted)).

1 On January 23, 2019, Petitioner filed a federal habeas petition in this

2 Court, challenging the same 2017 conviction. See Calderon v. Robertson, Case

3 No. 2:19-cv-00498-DMG-JEM (C.D. Cal.), Dkt. 1. That petition was

4 ultimately dismissed without prejudice on September 9, 2019 for failure to

5 prosecute and comply with court orders. Id., Dkt. 19, 22-23.

6 Meanwhile, Petitioner was resentenced. Petitioner contends that his

7 “resentencing proceedings became denied” “[a]round May of 2022.” Pet. at 8.

8 It is unclear whether Petitioner is referring to the resentencing hearing

9 following the remittitur or a separate hearing regarding a petition for

10 resentencing under Cal. Penal Code § 11790.95. The superior court’s online

11 docket does not reflect any hearings in May 2022. See Los Angeles County

12 Superior Court (“Superior Court”) at https://www.lacourt.org. Based on the

13 superior court’s online docket, at the latest, all resentencing proceedings

14 concluded by June 16, 2022. Id. Following resentencing, Petitioner did not file

15 an appeal. Pet. at 8.

16 Thereafter, Petitioner collaterally challenged his conviction by

17 constructively filing a habeas petition in the Los Angeles County Superior

18 Court on or about July 23, 2023. Pet. at 25-33. That petition was denied on

19 September 20, 2023. Id. at 56-57. Next, petitioner constructively filed a habeas

20 petition in the California Court of Appeal on or about October 11, 2023. Id. at

21 59-65. The appellate court issued a summary denial on November 8, 2023. Id.

22 at 67. Petitioner then constructively filed a habeas petition in the California

23 Supreme Court on or about November 22, 2023, which was denied on April

24 10, 2024. Id. at 14-23, 68. Additionally, Petitioner filed one or more petitions

25 for resentencing pursuant to Cal. Penal Code § 1170.95 in the Los Angeles

26 County Superior Court. See Superior Courts.

27 / / /

28 / / /

1 III.

2 PETITIONER’S CLAIM

3 Petitioner raises a single ground for relief, asserting: “Does Petitioner

4 have a federal due process/state created liberty interest claim -to remand in

5 light of recent state high court case decisions, concerning insufficiency of

6 evidence regarding malice aforethought element[?]” Pet. at 6. Petitioner

7 contends that over a year after his resentencing proceedings concluded, the

8 California Supreme Court “began deciding a range of cases specifically

9 addressing the h[ei]ghten[ed] standard of culpability to find an actual killer

10 guilty of ‘First Degree Murder,’” citing People v. Schuller, 15 Cal. 5th 237

11 (2023); In re Lopez, 14 Cal. 5th 562 (2023); and In re Ferrell, 14 Cal. 5th 593

12 (2023). Id. at 8. Petitioner asserts:

13 First, in Lopez, supra, the primary point conceded was the

14 understanding that the “gang-murder special circumstance” did not

15 “establish the elements of first degree premeditated murder under

16 either a direct perpetrator or an aiding and abetting theory” (14

17 Cal.5th at p. 586). While, in-addition, in Ferrell, supra, the State’s

18 High Court denounced any findings of fact that would establish

19 that Penal Code § 12022.53(d) would encompass “the definition of

20 implied malice” (14 Cal.5th at pp. 603-605). While, also in

21 Schuller, supra, the Attorney General or prosecutions role is to

22 prove the absence of any affirmative defenses that would negate an

23 element of malice from a charge crime (15 Cal.5th at pp. 259-261).

24 Id. He argues these cases addressed “the very same Penal Code §§ 188, & 189

25 that Legislators amended with AB1437/775, regarding the changes to the

26 imposition of malice afterthought,” creating “changes that warrant Petitioner

27 to seek it’s liberty interest in the application of proving that Petitioner had

28 harbored the degree of malice to find [him] guilty to First Degree Murder.” Id.

1 at 9. Petitioner maintains that “although [he] did file a Senate Bill 1437

2 petition in 2019, that was denied on June of 2022[,] [i]t was not until the

3 California Supreme Court decided Lopez, supra, Ferrell, supra, Brown, supra,

4 and Schuller, supra, that Petitioner’s argument became ripe to file petitions

5 within the State Court, requesting relief on the basis that malice afterthought

6 was never proven to sustain the First Degree Murder conviction.” Id. at 10.

7 IV.

8 DISCUSSION

9 Pursuant to Rule 4 of the Habeas Rules, the Court must review the

10 Petition and, if it plainly appears from the Petition and any attached exhibits

11 that Petitioner is not entitled to relief, the Court must dismiss the Petition. The

12 Petition appears subject to dismissal for at least three reasons: (1) the Petition

13 is untimely; (2) Petitioner has not clearly set forth his ground for relief; and (3)

14 Petitioner appears to assert a non-cognizable claim.

15 A. The Petition Is Untimely

16 District courts are permitted to consider, sua sponte, whether a petition

17 is untimely and to dismiss a petition that is untimely on its face after providing

18 the petitioner with the opportunity to be heard. Day v. McDonough, 547 U.S.

19 198, 209-10 (2006); Wentzell v. Neven, 674 F.3d 1124, 1126 (9th Cir. 2012).

20 Because the Petition was filed after the effective date of the Antiterrorism and

21 Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (the “AEDPA”), it is subject to the

22 AEDPA’s one-year statute of limitations, as set forth at 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d).

23 See Soto v. Ryan, 760 F.3d 947, 956-57 (9th Cir. 2014). Title 28, United States

24 Code, Section 2244(d)(1) provides:

25 A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to an application

26 for a writ of habeas corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the

27 judgment of a State court. The limitation period shall run from the

28 latest of–

1 (A) the date on which the judgment became final by

2 the conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time

3 for seeking such review;

4 (B) the date on which the impediment to filing an

5 application created by State action in violation of the

6 Constitution or laws of the United States is removed, if the

7 applicant was prevented from filing by such State action;

8 (C) the date on which the constitutional right

9 asserted was initially recognized by the Supreme Court, if

10 the right has been newly recognized by the Supreme Court

11 and made retroactively applicable to cases on collateral

12 review; or

13 (D) the date on which the factual predicate of the

14 claim or claims presented could have been discovered

15 through the exercise of due diligence.

16 Ordinarily, the AEDPA’s limitation period runs from the date on which

17 the judgment of conviction “became final by the conclusion of direct review or

18 the expiration of the time for seeking such review.” 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A).

19 Petitioner was resentenced on June 16, 2022, at the latest. Because he did not

20 appeal from resentencing, his judgment became final 60 days later, on August

21 15, 2022. See Burton v. Stewart, 549 U.S. 147, 156-57 (2007) (per curiam)

22 (observing that petitioner’s limitations period did not begin to run under the

23 AEDPA until both his conviction and sentence became final by the conclusion

24 of direct review or the expiration of time for seeking such review); see also Cal.

25 R. Ct. 8.308(a) (“[A] notice of appeal . . . must be filed within 60 days after the

26 rendition of the judgment or the making of the order being appealed.”);

27 Barragan v. Koenig, 2018 WL 6004049, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 16, 2018)

28 (finding that petitioner’s judgment became final, and the AEDPA limitation

1 period commenced, 60 days after the time to file an appeal expired), accepted

2 by 2018 WL 6003840 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 15, 2018). The AEDPA limitation

3 period expired one year later on August 15, 2023.

4 To the extent Petitioner may contend he is entitled to a later trigger date

5 based on recent California Supreme Court authority, this contention is without

6 merit. Petitioner does not claim he was impeded from filing his federal petition

7 by unconstitutional state action and thereby entitled to a later trigger date

8 under Section 2244(d)(1)(B). “[C]hanges in state law” are not “impediments”

9 as contemplated by Section 2244(d)(1)(B). See Torres v. Johnson, 2015 WL

10 5025524, at *2 (C.D. Cal. June 1, 2015) (citing Shannon v. Newland, 410 F.3d

11 1083, 1087-88 (9th Cir. 2005)), accepted by 2015 WL 5031940 (C.D. Cal. Aug.

12 24, 2015); see also Castro v. Johnson, 2023 WL 8143909, at *4 (C.D. Cal.

13 Sept. 29, 2023), accepted by 2024 WL 130149 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 10, 2024).

14 Similarly, Section 2244(d)(1)(C) only applies to newly recognized rights by the

15 United States Supreme Court. See Dodd v. United States, 545 U.S. 353, 357-

16 59 (2005) (analyzing similar provision under 28 U.S.C. § 2255); Castro, 2023

17 WL 8143909, at *4 (explaining that 2244(d)(1)(C) “only applies to newly

18 recognized rights by the United States Supreme Court and does not apply to

19 new rights recognized by a change in state law”); Guerrero v. Rackley, 2018

20 WL 1305635, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 12, 2018), judgment entered by 2018 WL

21 1305055 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 9, 2018). The state supreme court cases cited are

22 matters of state law, and as such, Petitioner is not entitled to an alternate

23 trigger date under Section 2244(d)(1)(C). Finally, under Section 2244(d)(1)(D),

24 the statute of limitations runs from the “date on which the factual predicate of

25 the claim or claims presented could have been discovered through the exercise

26 of due diligence.” The “factual predicate” in Section 2244(d)(1)(D) does not

27 encompass mere changes in state law. See Shannon, 410 F.3d at 1088-89 (“If a

28 change in (or clarification of) state law, by a state court, in a case in which [the

1 petitioner] was not a party, could qualify as a ‘factual predicate,’ then the term

2 ‘factual’ would be meaningless”); Castro, 2023 WL 8143909, at *4.

3 Thus, Petitioner’s conviction became final on August 15, 2022, and the

4 AEDPA’s limitation period expired one year later on August 15, 2023. As

5 noted, Petitioner did not constructively file his Petition until September 3,

6 2024. Thus, absent tolling, the Petition appears untimely.

7 The burden of demonstrating that the AEDPA’s one-year limitation

8 period was sufficiently tolled, whether statutorily or equitably, rests with the

9 petitioner. See, e.g., Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 418 (2005); Zepeda v.

10 Walker, 581 F.3d 1013, 1019 (9th Cir. 2009); Miranda v. Castro, 292 F.3d

11 1063, 1065 (9th Cir. 2002). For the reasons discussed herein, Petitioner has not

12 demonstrated he is entitled to sufficient tolling to render his Petition timely.

13 1. Statutory Tolling

14 “A habeas petitioner is entitled to statutory tolling of AEDPA’s one-year

15 statute of limitations while a ‘properly filed application for State post-

16 conviction or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or

17 claim is pending.’” Nedds v. Calderon, 678 F.3d 777, 780 (9th Cir. 2012)

18 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2)). Statutory tolling does not extend to the time

19 between the date a judgment becomes final and the date the petitioner files his

20 first state collateral challenge because during that time there is no case

21 “pending.” See Cross v. Sisto, 676 F.3d 1172, 1179 (9th Cir. 2012).

22 Here, Petitioner collaterally filed a state habeas petition in the Los

23 Angeles County Superior Court on or about July 23, 2023, which was denied

24 on September 20, 2023. Pet. at 25-33, 56-57. Since that petition was filed

25 within the AEDPA’s one-year limitations period, Petitioner is entitled to

26 statutory tolling for the period in which it was pending. Petitioner

27 constructively filed his next state habeas petition in the California Court of

28 Appeal on or about October 11, 2023. That petition was denied on November

1 8, 2023. Id. at 59-65, 67. Because this petition was filed within a reasonable

2 time, Petitioner also is entitled to gap tolling for the period of time between the

3 denial of his first state habeas petition and the filing of the second habeas

4 petition. See Robinson v. Lewis, 9 Cal. 5th 883, 901-02 (2020). Likewise,

5 Petitioner is entitled to statutory tolling while his second state habeas petition

6 was pending in the California Court of Appeal. Thus, Petitioner is entitled to

7 statutory tolling from July 23, 2023, the date upon which his first state habeas

8 petition was constructively filed, to November 8, 2023, when his second state

9 habeas petition was denied. Thus, the limitations period was extended by 108

10 days, to December 1, 2023.

11 However, Petitioner is not entitled to statutory tolling for the period

12 between the denial of the California Court of Appeal habeas petition and the

13 subsequent denial of his state habeas petition in the California Supreme Court.

14 The California Supreme Court denied the habeas petition, in part, because it

15 was untimely. Pet. at 68. Since the state supreme court rejected the petition on

16 the ground of untimeliness, it was not “properly filed” under Section

17 2244(d)(2). See Pace, 544 U.S. at 417 (“Because the state court rejected

18 petitioner’s [post-conviction] petition as untimely, it was not ‘properly filed,’

19 and he is not entitled to statutory tolling under § 2244(d)(2).”); Lakey v.

20 Hickman, 633 F.3d 782, 786 (9th Cir. 2011) (as amended); Thorson v. Palmer,

21 479 F.3d 643, 645 (9th Cir. 2007). It makes no difference that the superior

22 court denied the petition on alternative grounds. See Carey v. Saffold, 536 U.S.

23 214, 225-26 (2002); Bonner v. Carey, 425 F.3d 1145, 1148-49 (9th Cir. 2005),

24 amended by 439 F.3d 993 (9th Cir. 2006). Further, the Court is precluded from

25 second-guessing the correctness of the superior court’s timeliness

26 determination. See Rudin v. Myles, 781 F.3d 1043, 1054 (9th Cir. 2015) (a

27 federal court is “not at liberty to second guess” a state court’s untimeliness

28 determination). Thus, Petitioner is not entitled to statutory tolling from the

1 date the California Court of Appeal denied his second state habeas petition

2 through the date the state supreme court denied his third state habeas petition.

3 2. Equitable Tolling

4 In addition to statutory tolling, the AEDPA’s one-year statute of

5 limitations is subject to equitable tolling in appropriate cases. See Holland v.

6 Florida, 560 U.S. 631, 649 (2010). In order to be entitled to equitable tolling,

7 the petitioner must show both that: (1) he has been pursuing his rights

8 diligently; and (2) some extraordinary circumstance stood in his way and

9 prevented his timely filing. Id. The “threshold necessary to trigger equitable

10 tolling [under the AEDPA] is very high, lest the exceptions swallow the rule.”

11 Bills v. Clark, 628 F.3d 1092, 1097 (9th Cir. 2010) (citation omitted). A court

12 may grant equitable tolling only where “‘extraordinary circumstances’

13 prevented an otherwise diligent petitioner from filing on time.” See Forbess v.

14 Franke, 749 F.3d 837, 839 (9th Cir. 2014). Consequently, as the Ninth Circuit

15 has recognized, equitable tolling will be justified in few cases. Spitsyn v.

16 Moore, 345 F.3d 796, 799 (9th Cir. 2003) (as amended).

17 Here, Petitioner has not asserted any facts that might warrant equitable

18 tolling, or otherwise shown that some extraordinary circumstance prevented

19 him from timely filing his Petition. To the extent Petitioner may contend that

20 the recent state law warrants equitable tolling, such change in law does not

21 constitute the requisite extraordinary circumstance warranting equitable

22 tolling. See Shannon, 410 F.3d at 1089-90 (rejecting contention that the time

23 between petitioner’s conviction and a state court decision clarifying state law

24 should be equitably tolled); Stroud v. Madden, 2020 WL 5055858, at *6 (S.D.

25 Cal. Aug. 27, 2020) (rejecting contention that change in state law justified

26 equitable tolling). Accordingly, equitable tolling does not appear to render the

27 Petition timely.

28 / / /

1 B. Other Defects

2 The Petition suffers from at least two other defects.

3 First, Petitioner has not clearly set forth his claims for relief. Habeas

4 Rules 2(c) and 4 require a statement of all grounds for relief and the facts

5 supporting each ground, facts pointing to a real possibility of constitutional

6 error, and show the relationship of the facts to the claim. See Habeas Rule 4,

7 Advisory Committee Notes to 1976 Adoption; Mayle v. Felix, 545 U.S. 644,

8 655 (2005); O’Bremski v. Maass, 915 F.2d 418, 420 (9th Cir. 1990) (as

9 amended). Allegations in a petition that are vague, conclusory, palpably

10 incredible, or unsupported by a statement of specific facts, are insufficient to

11 warrant relief, and are subject to summary dismissal. See, e.g., Jones v.

12 Gomez, 66 F.3d 199, 204-05 (9th Cir. 1995); James v. Borg, 24 F.3d 20, 26

13 (9th Cir. 1994); Hendricks v. Vasquez, 908 F.2d 490, 491 (9th Cir. 1990). Here,

14 as noted, Petitioner raises a single claim, ostensibly an insufficiency of the

15 evidence claim, relying on recent state court cases. However, he fails to

16 provide any facts in support of his claim or explain how the recent state

17 supreme court cases are applicable to him. Petitioner’s failure to clearly set

18 forth the legal and factual bases for his claim renders the Petition subject to

19 dismissal on this additional ground.

20 Second, it is unclear whether Petitioner claims he is entitled to

21 resentencing under Cal. Penal Code § 1172.6 (previously numbered as Cal.

22 Penal Code § 1170.95) as he repeatedly references Senate Bills 775 and 1437.

23 To the extent Petitioner alleges he is entitled to resentencing under Section

24 1172.6, such claim is not cognizable on federal habeas review. A district court

25 may entertain a petition for writ of habeas corpus filed by a person in state

26 custody only on the ground that he is in custody “in violation of the

27 Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a);

28 Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 68 (1991) (“In conducting habeas review, a

1 federal court is limited to deciding whether a conviction violated the

2 Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.”). “[I]t is not the province

3 of a federal habeas court to reexamine state-court determinations on state-law

4 questions.” Waddington v. Sarausad, 555 U.S. 179, 192 n.5 (2009) (quoting

5 McGuire, 502 U.S. at 67-68). Matters relating to state sentencing are governed

6 by state law and generally are not cognizable on federal habeas review. See

7 Lewis v. Jeffers, 497 U.S. 764, 780 (1990) (“federal habeas corpus relief does

8 not lie for errors of state law”); Sturm v. Cal. Adult Auth., 395 F.2d 446, 448

9 (9th Cir. 1967) (per curiam) (“a state court’s interpretation of its statute does

10 not raise a federal question”); Moore v. Chrones, 687 F. Supp. 2d 1005, 1040

11 (C.D. Cal. 2010) (“A challenge to a state court’s application of state sentencing

12 laws does not create a federal question cognizable in federal habeas review.”).

13 Federal district courts have repeatedly held that “a state court’s allegedly

14 erroneous denial of resentencing” under Cal. Penal Code § 1172.6 “does not

15 raise an issue cognizable on federal habeas review.” Walker v. Cal. Supreme

16 Ct., 2022 WL 11337927, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 13, 2022), accepted by 2022

17 WL 11269388 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 13, 2022); McCavitt v. Covello, 2022 WL

18 17813204, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 12, 2022), adopted by 2023 WL 2602019

19 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 22, 2023); Carter v. Montgomery, 2021 WL 2044499, at *11

20 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 12, 2021) (“[A]ny entitlement to resentencing [under Senate

21 Bill 1437] is strictly a matter of state law to which this Court must defer”)

22 accepted by 2021 WL 2042723 (C.D. Cal. May 13, 2021); see also Bradshaw v.

23 Richey, 546 U.S. 74, 76 (2006) (per curiam) (“[A] state court’s interpretation of

24 state law . . . binds a federal court sitting in habeas corpus.”).

25 A state court’s misapplication of state law may rise to the level of a due

26 process in certain limited circumstances. Richmond v. Lewis, 506 U.S. 40, 50

27 (1992). But Petitioner cannot “transform a state-law issue into a federal one

28 merely by asserting a violation of due process.” See Langford v. Day, 110 F.3d

1 |} 1380, 1389 (9th Cir. 1997) (as modified); see also Cole v. Sullivan, 480 F.

2 ||Supp. 3d 1089, 1097 (C.D. Cal. 2020) (finding that petitioner failed to raise a

3 || “due process” claim by alleging erroneous application of state sentencing law

4 ||to find petitioner ineligible to be resentenced under Section 1170.95). Here, the

5 || Petition vaguely references “federal due process/state created liberty interest.”

6 || However, Petitioner’s allegations do not facially reflect the real possibility of

7 federal constitutional error. Petitioner’s cursory reference to the Fourteenth

8 || Amendment is insufficient to transform a state-law issue into a federal one. See

9 || Langford, 110 F.3d at 1389. Thus, to the extent Petitioner seeks resentencing

10 || under Section 1172.6, Petitioner has failed to allege a cognizable claim.

11 V.

12 ORDER

13 For the foregoing reasons, the Petition is subject to dismissal. Petitioner

14 ORDERED TO SHOW CAUSE in writing, by no later than thirty (30) days

15 || from the date of this Order, why this action should not be dismissed under

16 || Habeas Rule 4 for the reasons stated above. If Petitioner disputes that this

17 || action is untimely, he must explain clearly and in detail why it is not untimely

18 provide any available competent evidence that establishes the timeliness of

19 || this action.

20 Alternatively, instead of filing a response to the instant Order, Petitioner

21 ||may request a voluntary dismissal of this action pursuant to Federal Rule of

22 || Civil Procedure 41(a). The Clerk is directed to provide a Notice of Dismissal

23 || form. However, the Court warns any dismissed claims may be subject to the

24 || statute of limitations under Section 2244(d)(1).

29 Dated: September 27, 2024 if de,

26

27 he ee

28 nited States Magistrate Judge

13