Evidence qualifies as Brady material if 18 its production would “undermine confidence in the outcome of either 19 the defendant’s guily plea or trial.” (internal quotation marks 20 omitted)(emphasis added)
How later courts described this case
- Evidence qualifies as Brady material if 18 its production would “undermine confidence in the outcome of either 19 the defendant’s guily plea or trial.” (internal quotation marks 20 omitted)(emphasis added)
- “We have held in no uncertain terms that 19 Brady’s requirement to disclose material exculpatory and 20 impeachment evidence to the defense applies equally to prosecutors 21 and police officers.”
- “Brady suppression occurs when the government 14 fails to turn over even evidence that is ‘known only to police 15 investigators and not to the prosecutor.’”
- “Under Brady, the 18 government must disclose information favorable to the accused that 19 is material either to guilt or to punishment.”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
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8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
9 CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
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11 CHRISTOPHER MEZA, ) Case No. EDCV 23-01379 DDP (SHKx)
)
12 Plaintiff, )
) ORDER DENYING OFFICER DEFENDANTS’
13 v. ) MOTION TO DISMISS
)
14 DANIEL QUIDORT, )
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15 Defendants. )
___________________________ )
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17 Presently before the court is Defendants Daniel Quidort and
18 Trent Tunstall (collectively, the “Officer Defendants”)’s Motion to
19 Dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint. Having considered the submissions
20 of the parties and heard oral argument, the court denies the motion
21 and adopts the following Order.
22 I.Background
23 In 2016, Plaintiff Christopher Meza and the mother of his
24 child, Defendant Tanya Karakesisoglu (“Karakesisoglu”), were
25 engaged in a custody dispute. (Complaint ¶¶ 1, 18.) During the
26 course of that dispute, Meza alleges that Karakesisoglu threatened
27 to accuse him of rape if he did not agree to her custody demands.
28 (Id.) On September 20, 2016, Karakesisoglu suggested that Meza
1 meet with her late at night at her office to discuss a matter
2 pertaining to their son. (Id. ¶ 2.) Meza alleges that
3 Karakesisoglu “pretended to be scared” for video cameras, then went
4 to Meza’s house with him and had consensual sex. (Id. ¶ 3.)
5 Karakesisoglu then sent Meza text messages stating that she wanted
6 to resume a romantic relationship with him. (Id. ¶ 4.) When Meza
7 declined, Karakesisoglu reported to the Huntington Beach Police
8 Department that Meza had kidnaped and raped her. (Id.) Meza was
9 arrested shortly thereafter and charged with several felonies,
10 including kidnaping, forcible oral copulation, and making criminal
11 threats. (Id. ¶ 18; Defendants’ Request for Judicial Notice, Ex.
12 A.)
13 The Officer Defendants investigated Karakesisoglu’s
14 allegations against Meza. (Compl. ¶ 20.) Meza alleges that the
15 Officer Defendants examined Karakesisoglu’s phone and discovered
16 exculpatory evidence, including search results and text messages
17 about rape and kidnaping from September 19, the day before Meza met
18 with Karakesisoglu. (Id.) Karakesisoglu allegedly also asked the
19 Officer Defendants what effect the criminal charges against Meza
20 would have on the custody dispute. (Id.) Nevertheless, Meza
21 alleges, the Officer Defendants did not share any of this
22 information with prosecutors, and prevented Meza from obtaining
23 information from Karakesisoglu’s phone. (Id. ¶ 21.)
24 Meza filed a motion in Orange County Superior Court seeking,
25 among other things, all data gleaned from Karakesisoglu’s phone.
26 (RJN, Ex. B.) Meza argued that he was entitled to the phone
27 information under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1973). (RJN, Ex.
28 C). On December 8, 2017, the court denied Meza’s motion, finding
1 “a limitation of consent on behalf of the victim,” and that
2 “disclosure of anything beyond that is a violation of her right to
3 privacy.” (RJN, Ex. D at 11.)
4 On August 24, 2021, Meza was convicted of misdemeanor false
5 imprisonment pursuant to California Penal Code § 237 after entering
6 a People v. West plea.1 (Compl. ¶ 8; RJN, Ex. D.) As part of
7 that plea, Meza admitted that he “willfully and unlawfully and
8 knowingly violated the personal liberty” of a person with whom he
9 was in a dating relationship. (RJD, Ex. D at 3.) All other
10 charges against Meza were dismissed. (Compl. ¶ 8.)
11 On July 23, 2023, Meza filed his Complaint in this Court,
12 alleging a cause of action against Karakesisoglu for malicious
13 prosecution and against the Officer Defendants for “Deliberate or
14 Reckless Suppression of Evidence in Violation of the Fourteenth
15 Amendment and 42 U.S.C. § 1983.” The Officer Defendants now move
16 to dismiss the Section 1983 claim against them.
17 II. Legal Standard
18 A complaint will survive a motion to dismiss when it
19 “contain[s] sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a
20 claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
21 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)(quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550
22 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). When considering a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a
23 court must “accept as true all allegations of material fact and
24 must construe those facts in the light most favorable to the
25 plaintiff.” Resnick v. Hayes, 213 F.3d 443, 447 (9th Cir. 2000).
26
1 The California Supreme Court has described a plea purusant
27
to People v. West 3 Cal.3d 595 (1970) as “a plea of nolo
contendere, not admitting a factual basis for the plea.”
28
In re Alvernaz, 2 Cal. 4th 924, 932 (1992).
1 Although a complaint need not include “detailed factual
2 allegations,” it must offer “more than an unadorned,
3 the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at
4 678. Conclusory allegations or allegations that are no more than a
5 statement of a legal conclusion “are not entitled to the assumption
6 of truth.” Id. at 679. In other words, a pleading that merely
7 offers “labels and conclusions,” a “formulaic recitation of the
8 elements,” or “naked assertions” will not be sufficient to state a
9 claim upon which relief can be granted. Id. at 678 (citations and
10 internal quotation marks omitted).
11 “When there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court
12 should assume their veracity and then determine whether they
13 plausibly give rise to an entitlement of relief.” Iqbal, 556 U.S.
14 at 679. Plaintiffs must allege “plausible grounds to infer” that
15 their claims rise “above the speculative level.” Twombly, 550 U.S.
16 at 555-56. “Determining whether a complaint states a plausible
17 claim for relief” is “a context-specific task that requires the
18 reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common
19 sense.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679.
20 III. Discussion
21 A. Heck bar
22 As an initial matter, Plaintiff’s Section 1983 claim does not
23 appear to be barred by Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994). See
24 Guerrero v. Gates, 442 F.3d 697, 703 (9th Cir. 2006) (“Under Heck
25 v. Humphrey, a [plaintiff] cannot recover damages in a § 1983 suit
26 if a judgment in favor of the plaintiff ‘would necessarily imply
27 the invalidity of his conviction or sentence . . . unless the
28 plaintiff can demonstrate that the conviction or sentence has
1 already been invalidated.’”) (quoting Heck, 512 U.S. at 487.); see
2 also Hunter v. Idaho, No. 1:19-CV-00113-DCN, 2020 WL 4340525, at *7
3 (D. Idaho July 28, 2020) (discussing applicability of Heck bar to
4 non-prisoners). The crux of Plaintiff’s claim against the Officer
5 Defendants here is that they withheld exculpatory evidence from
6 prosecutors and from Plaintiff, including statements Karakesisoglu
7 made to the Officer Defendants and, in particular, “exculpatory
8 evidence that was on Ms. Karakesisoglu’s phone,” including text
9 messages from Karakesisoglu to Plaintiff. (Compl. ¶¶ 21, 23.) In
10 essence, Plaintiff contends that the Officer Defendants withheld
11 Brady material. See United States v. Hanna, 55 F.3d 1456, 1459
12 (9th Cir. 1995) (“Brady material is any evidence material either to
13 guilt or punishment which is favorable to the accused, irrespective
14 of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution. . . . The
15 Brady rule encompasses impeachment evidence as well as exculpatory
16 evidence.” (internal citations omitted)); see also United States v.
17 Lucas, 841 F.3d 796, 807 (9th Cir. 2016) (“Under Brady, the
18 government must disclose information favorable to the accused that
19 is material either to guilt or to punishment.”) (internal quotation
20 marks omitted)).
21 Generally, “a Brady claim, when successful postconviction,
22 necessarily yields evidence undermining a conviction: Brady
23 evidence is, by definition, always favorable to the defendant and
24 material to his guilt or punishment.” Skinner v. Switzer, 562 U.S.
25 521, 536 (2011). Although Plaintiff was never convicted of any
26 felony charges, all of which were dismissed, he was convicted of
27 misdemeanor false imprisonment after pleading no contest. The
28 question, then, is whether Plaintiff’s Brady claim here “would
1 necessarily imply the invalidity of [that] conviction.” Lemos v.
2 Cnty. of Sonoma, 40 F.4th 1002, 1006 (9th Cir. 2022) (en banc)
3 (emphasis original). That question requires an analysis of “which
4 acts formed the basis for the conviction.” Id. And where, as
5 here, “the conviction is based on a guilty plea, we look at the
6 record to see which acts form the basis for the plea.” Id. At
7 this stage of proceedings, the record of the state court criminal
8 proceedings is sparse. Plaintiff has represented to the court,
9 however, and Defendants do not appear to dispute, that the knowing
10 violation of Karakesisoglu’s personal liberty underlying the false
11 imprisonment conviction involved an interaction between Plaintiff
12 and Karakesisoglu in an elevator at her office, before
13 Karakesisoglu went to Plaintiff’s house. (Compl. ¶ 3.) Any Brady
14 violations regarding Karakesisoglu’s consent, or lack thereof, to
15 sex that took place at Plaintiff’s house would therefore be
16 immaterial to the elevator interaction, which appears to have been
17 videotaped, that took place at a different location earlier in the
18 evening. Accordingly, a successful Brady claim here would not
19 necessarily imply that Plaintiff’s false imprisonment conviction is
20 invalid, and thus the Heck bar does not apply.
21 B. Statute of Limitations
22 The Officer Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s suppression of
23 evidence claim should be dismissed on statute of limitations
24 grounds. Generally, the statute of limitations for § 1983 cases
25 brought in this district is two years. Jones v. Blanas, 393 F.3d
26 918, 927 (9th Cir. 2004). And, in general, a claim accrues “when
27 the plaintiff knows, or should know, of the injury which is the
28 basis of the cause of action.” Fink v. Shedler, 192 F.3d 911, 914
1 (9th Cir. 1999). Accordingly, the Officer Defendants contend,
2 Meza’s suppression of evidence claim began to accrue in 2017 when
3 he brought his Brady motion in state court, and therefore fell
4 several years outside the statute of limitations when it was filed
5 in 2023.
6 There are, however, exceptions to the general rule of claim
7 accrual. In Heck, for example, the Supreme Court held that a §1983
8 claim based upon “an unconstitutional conviction or sentence does
9 not accrue until the conviction or sentence has been invalidated.”
10 512 U.S. 477, 490 (1994); see also Trimble v. City of Santa Rosa,
11 49 F.3d 583, 585 (9th Cir. 1995). More recently, the Supreme Court
12 has clarified that, in situations analogous to malicious
13 prosecution, similar principles apply even where a plaintiff has
14 been acquitted. McDonough v. Smith, 588 U.S. 109, 119 (2019). In
15 McDonough, the Court applied the “favorable termination” accrual
16 rule to a plaintiff who, after being acquitted of a criminal
17 charge, brought a §1983 claim based upon alleged fabrication of
18 evidence. Id. at 113. Analogizing to common-law malicious
19 prosecution claims, the Court explained that the delayed accrual
20 rule “is rooted in pragmatic concerns with avoiding parallel
21 criminal and civil litigation over the same subject matter and the
22 related possibility of conflicting civil and criminal judgments.”
23 Id. at 116-18.
24 Here, the Officer Defendants assert that the standard two-year
25 statute of limitations, and not the “favorable termination” accrual
26 rule, applies because this is a suppression of evidence case rather
27 than a fabrication of evidence case, and therefore McDonough is
28 inapt. (Reply at 9.) This is a distinction without a difference.
1 As the Court explained in McDonough, the “accrual analysis begins
2 with identifying the specific constitutional right alleged to have
3 been infringed.” Id. at 115. Although the Court assumed without
4 deciding that a fabrication of evidence claim arises under the Due
5 Process Clause, so too would a suppression of evidence claim.
6 Comparing fabrication of evidence claims to malicious prosecution
7 claims, the Supreme Court observed that “[a]t bottom, both claims
8 challenge the integrity of criminal prosecutions undertaken
9 ‘pursuant to legal process.’” McDonough, 588 U.S. at 117 (quoting
10 Heck, 512 U.S. at 484). The same is equally true of a suppression
11 of evidence claim, and indeed, Plaintiff has also alleged a
12 malicious prosecution claim against Karakesisoglu. Accordingly,
13 the favorable termination rule, and not the more generally
14 applicable two-year statute of limitations, applies to Plaintiff’s
15 § 1983 claim. Because that claim did not accrue until the felony
16 charges against Plaintiff were dismissed in 2021, the claim was
17 timely filed.
18 C. Collateral Estoppel
19 Plaintiff’s Complaint alleges that the Officer Defendants
20 obtained exculpatory information from Karakesisoglu’s phone and
21 then recklessly failed to turn that information over to
22 prosecutors. (Compl. ¶¶ 22, 37.) In the underlying criminal
23 proceeding, Plaintiff sought all data obtained from Karakesisoglu’s
24 phone, pursuant to Brady. (Request for Judicial Notice at 14.)
25 The state court denied the motion. The minutes of the motion
26 hearing state only that the “Court finds that a limitation of
27 consent on behalf of the victim [sic]. Consent to disclosure of
28 anything beyond that is a violation of her right to privacy.” RJN
1 at 36. Here, the Officer Defendants contend that this denial of
2 Plaintiff’s Brady motion bars his current suppression of evidence
3 claim under the doctrine of collateral estoppel. (Mot. at 10-11).
4 The doctrine of collateral estoppel bars re-litigation of an
5 identical issue in a subsequent action when the issue was (1)
6 actually litigated, (2) to a final judgment on the merits, (3) by
7 or against the same party or its privies, after (4) a full and fair
8 opportunity to litigate. Kendall v. VISA U.S.A., Inc., 518 F.3d
9 1042, 1050 (9th Cir. 2008); see also Hydranautics v. FilmTec Corp.,
10 204 F.3d 880, 885 (9th Cir. 2000). Of these, only the identity of
11 issues is in dispute here. The Officer Defendants argue that the
12 issues presented in the Brady motion and here are identical:
13 whether the Officer Defendants were constitutionally obligated to
14 turn over the data obtained from Karakesisoglu’s phone.
15 Plaintiff’s opposition is largely unresponsive to this
16 argument, focusing instead on the nature of the relief sought
17 rather than the issue being litigated. (Opp. at 14.)
18 Nevertheless, on the current record, this Court cannot conclude
19 that the issue actually decided by the state trial court was
20 identical to that here. Although the state court ultimately did
21 conclude that the prosecution was not obligated to produce the
22 phone information to Meza, the court’s sparse minutes provide
23 little detail into its reasoning, particularly with respect to any
24 Brady issues. The minutes, for example, give no indication whether
25 the court ever decided whether the information sought qualified as
26 Brady material in the first instance, whether or how the court
27 balanced any Brady concerns against other interests weighing for or
28 against production, or whether the court addressed the Officer
1 Defendants’ roles in obtaining and sharing, or withholding, the
2 phone data.2 Plaintiff is, therefore, not collaterally estopped
3 from bring the suppression of evidence claim alleged here against
4 the Officer Defendants.
5 D. Plaintiff’s entitlement to Brady material
6 Lastly, the Officer Defendants, citing United States v.
7 Ruiz, 536 U.S. 622 (2002), contend that Plaintiff’s Section 1983
8 claim fails as a matter of law because Plaintiff was not entitled
9 to Brady material unless and until he went to trial, and therefore
10 the Officer Defendants were not required to disclose Brady material
11 prior to Plaintiff entering his plea. It is well-established in
12 this circuit, however, that Brady applies even prior to the entry
13 of a guilty plea.3 See, e.g., United States v. Gamez-Orduno, 235
14 F.3d 453, 461 (9th Cir. 2000) (“The suppression of material
15 evidence helpful to the accused, whether at trial or on a motion to
16 suppress, violates due process.”); United States v. Lucas, 841 F.3d
17 796, 807 (9th Cir. 2016) (Evidence qualifies as Brady material if
18 its production would “undermine confidence in the outcome of either
19 the defendant’s guily plea or trial.” (internal quotation marks
20 omitted)(emphasis added)); see also Smith v. Baldwin, 510 F.3d
21 1127, 1148 (9th Cir. 2007); United States v. Overton, 24 F.4th 870,
22 878 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 143 S. Ct. 155, 214 L. Ed. 2d 51
23 (2022). Indeed, otherwise, “prosecutors may be tempted to
24
25 2 Although Plaintiff’s Complaint here alleges that the Officer
Defendants shared only limited data with prosecutors (Compl. ¶ 6),
26
his Brady motion sought, and suggested that prosecutors were in
possession of, “the fully imaged phone.” RJN at 11.
27
3 For this reason, the Officer Defendants are not entitled to
28
qualified immunity.
1 deliberately withhold exculpatory information as part of an attempt
2 to elicit guilty pleas.” Sanchez v. United States, 50 F.3d 1448,
3 1453 (9th Cir. 1995).
4 Courts, including the Ninth Circuit, have hewed to this
5 principle even post-Ruiz.4 See, e.g., Parker v. Cnty. of
6 Riverside, 78 F.4th 1109, 1113 (9th Cir. 2023); United States v.
7 Delemus, 828 F. App’x 380, 381 (9th Cir. 2020) (unpublished
8 disposition); Overton, 24 F.4th at 878; United States v. Sheikh,
9 No. 2:18-CR-00119-WBS, 2020 WL 2940868, at *2 (E.D. Cal. June 3,
10 2020). The Officer Defendants were not free to ignore their Brady
11 obligations simply because Plaintiff had not yet gone to trial.
12 See Tennison v. City & Cnty. of San Francisco, 570 F.3d 1078, 1087
13 (9th Cir. 2009) (“Brady suppression occurs when the government
14 fails to turn over even evidence that is ‘known only to police
15 investigators and not to the prosecutor.’”) (quoting Youngblood v.
16 West Virginia, 547 U.S. 867, 869–70, 126 S.Ct. 2188, 165 L.Ed.2d
17 269 (2006) (per curiam))); Gantt v. City of Los Angeles, 717 F.3d
18 702, 709 (9th Cir. 2013) (“We have held in no uncertain terms that
19 Brady’s requirement to disclose material exculpatory and
20 impeachment evidence to the defense applies equally to prosecutors
21 and police officers.”); Poulos, 2022 WL 17072884, at *9 (“The duty
22
4 Not all courts have followed this approach. See Poulos v.
23
City of Los Angeles, No. CV 19-496-MWF (AFMX), 2022 WL 17072884, at
*6 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 30, 2022) (collecting cases). But, as the
24
Poulos court explained, “a rule disclaiming any duty of
investigators to disclose exculpatory information already in their
25
possession prior to a plea deal would pose far too great a risk
that investigators might withhold exculpatory information from
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prosecutors as part of an attempt to elicit guilty pleas from
potentially innocent individuals.” Id. At *9. The idea that,
27
consistent with such a rule, a defendant could be forced to go to
trial on the basis of evidence that investigators knew to be
28
fabricated would eviscerate Brady.
to disclose exculpatory evidence to prosecutors is not only
2} inherent in any investigator’s job responsibilities, but it is
central to achieving the very objective of the Due Process Clause,
which seeks to ensure that a miscarriage of justice does not occur
5]/— a risk that this case demonstrates exists not just for trial
convictions but also for guilty pleas.”) (internal quotation marks
7H omitted).
IV. Conclusion
9 For the reasons stated above, the Officer Defendants’ Motion
10} to Dismiss is DENIED.
11 IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: September 10, 2024
13 SS
DEAN D. PREGERSON
14 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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