Eldridge v. Social Security Administration Commissioner

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

WESTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS

FAYETTEVILLE DIVISION

CANDY DAWN ELDRIDGE PLAINTIFF

vs. Civil No. 5:23-cv-05066

COMMISSIONER, SOCIAL

SECURITY ADMINISTRATION DEFENDANT

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

OF THE UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Candy Dawn Eldridge (“Plaintiff”) brings this action pursuant to § 205(g) of Title II of the

Social Security Act (“The Act”), 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (2010), seeking judicial review of a final

decision of the Commissioner of the Social Security Administration (“SSA”) denying her

application for Supplemental Security Income (“SSI”) under Title XVI of the Act.

Pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and (3) (2009), the Honorable Timothy

L. Brooks referred this case to this Court for the purpose of making a report and recommendation.

In accordance with that referral, and after reviewing the arguments in this case, this Court

recommends Plaintiff’s case be REVERSED AND REMANDED.

1. Background:

On August 24, 2018, Plaintiff protectively filed her disability application. (Tr. 97).1 In

this application, Plaintiff alleges being disabled due to a broken back with rods, a torn rotator cuff

in her left shoulder, muscle spasms in her right leg, narrowing in her neck, and depression. (Tr.

1 The docket numbers for this case are referenced by the designation “ECF No. ___.” The

transcript pages for this case are referenced by the designation “Tr” and refer to the document

filed at ECF No. 8 and the supplemental transcript filed at ECF No. 9. These references are to

the page number of the transcript itself not the ECF page number.

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335). Plaintiff alleges an onset date of August 28, 2015. (Tr. 97). This application was denied

initially and again upon reconsideration. Id.

Plaintiff had two administrative hearings. (Tr. 39-67, 775-801). The second administrative

hearing was held in Fort Smith, Arkansas on May 10, 2022. (Tr. 775-801). After the second

administrative hearing, the ALJ entered a fully unfavorable decision denying Plaintiff’s

application. (Tr. 15-30). This decision was entered on August 22, 2022. Id. In this decision, the

ALJ found Plaintiff had not engaged in Substantial Gainful Activity (“SGA”) since August 24,

2018, her application date. (Tr. 21, Finding 1). The ALJ found Plaintiff had the following severe

impairments: degenerative changes of the cervical spine; remote back surgery; disorder of the left

shoulder; adjustment disorder with mixed anxiety and depression; pain disorder; and personality

disorder. (Tr. 21-22, Finding 2). Despite being severe, the ALJ also determined Plaintiff did not

have an impairment or combination of impairments that met or medically equaled one of the listed

impairments in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1 (“Listings”). (Tr. 22-24, Finding 3).

In this decision, the ALJ evaluated Plaintiff’s subjective allegations and determined her

Residual Functional Capacity (“RFC”). (Tr. 24-28, Finding 4). Specifically, the ALJ found

Plaintiff retained the following RFC:

After careful consideration of the entire record, the undersigned finds that the

claimant has the residual functional capacity to perform light work as defined in 20

CFR 416.967(b) except the claimant can only occasionally reach overhead with her

left upper extremity and cannot have more than occasional contact with co-workers,

supervisors, and the general public.

Id.

The ALJ evaluated Plaintiff’s Past Relevant Work (“PRW”) and found Plaintiff had no

PRW. (Tr. 28-29, Finding 5). The ALJ also determined whether Plaintiff retained the capacity to

perform other work existing in significant numbers in the national economy. (Tr. 29-30, Finding

9). The VE testified at the administrative hearing regarding this issue. Id. Based upon that

testimony, the ALJ found Plaintiff retained the capacity to perform the following three

occupations: (1) office helper with approximately 40,000 such jobs in the national economy; (2)

photocopy machine operator with approximately 30,000 such jobs in the national economy; and

(3) office cleaner with approximately 90,000 such jobs in the national economy. (Tr. 30). Because

Plaintiff retained the capacity to perform this other work, the ALJ determined Plaintiff had not

been under a disability, as defined by the Act, from August 24, 2018 (application date) through

August 22, 2022 (ALJ’s decision date). (Tr. 30, finding 10).

Plaintiff requested the Appeals Council’s review of the ALJ’s unfavorable disability

determination. On February 28, 2023, the Appeals Council declined to review the ALJ’s disability

determination. (Tr. 1-6). On April 28, 2023, Plaintiff filed the present appeal. ECF No. 1. The

Parties have filed appeal briefs. ECF Nos. 11, 15. This case is now ready for decision.

2. Applicable Law:

In reviewing this case, this Court is required to determine whether the Commissioner’s

findings are supported by substantial evidence on the record as a whole. See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g)

(2010); Ramirez v. Barnhart, 292 F.3d 576, 583 (8th Cir. 2002). Substantial evidence is less than

a preponderance of the evidence, but it is enough that a reasonable mind would find it adequate to

support the Commissioner’s decision. See Johnson v. Apfel, 240 F.3d 1145, 1147 (8th Cir.

2001).As long as there is substantial evidence in the record that supports the Commissioner’s

decision, the Court may not reverse it simply because substantial evidence exists in the record that

would have supported a contrary outcome or because the Court would have decided the case

differently. See Haley v. Massanari, 258 F.3d 742, 747 (8th Cir. 2001). If, after reviewing the

record, it is possible to draw two inconsistent positions from the evidence and one of those

positions represents the findings of the ALJ, the decision of the ALJ must be affirmed. See Young

v. Apfel, 221 F.3d 1065, 1068 (8th Cir. 2000).

It is well-established that a claimant for Social Security disability benefits has the burden

of proving his or her disability by establishing a physical or mental disability that lasted at least

one year and that prevents him or her from engaging in any substantial gainful activity. See Cox

v. Apfel, 160 F.3d 1203, 1206 (8th Cir. 1998); 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(1)(A), 1382c(a)(3)(A). The

Act defines a “physical or mental impairment” as “an impairment that results from anatomical,

physiological, or psychological abnormalities which are demonstrable by medically acceptable

clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques.” 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(3), 1382(3)(c). A plaintiff

must show that his or her disability, not simply his or her impairment, has lasted for at least twelve

consecutive months. See 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A).

To determine whether the adult claimant suffers from a disability, the Commissioner uses

the familiar five-step sequential evaluation. He determines: (1) whether the claimant is presently

engaged in a “substantial gainful activity”; (2) whether the claimant has a severe impairment that

significantly limits the claimant’s physical or mental ability to perform basic work activities; (3)

whether the claimant has an impairment that meets or equals a presumptively disabling impairment

listed in the regulations (if so, the claimant is disabled without regard to age, education, and work

experience); (4) whether the claimant has the Residual Functional Capacity (RFC) to perform his

or her past relevant work; and (5) if the claimant cannot perform the past work, the burden shifts

to the Commissioner to prove that there are other jobs in the national economy that the claimant

can perform. See Cox, 160 F.3d at 1206; 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)-(f). The fact finder only

considers the plaintiff’s age, education, and work experience in light of his or her RFC if the final

stage of this analysis is reached. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 416.920 (2003).

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3. Discussion:

In her appeal brief, Plaintiff raises the following four arguments for reversal: (A) the ALJ

erred by fully and fairly developing the record; (B) the ALJ erred in performing the PRT at Step

Two; (C) the ALJ erred in assessing her credibility; and (D) the ALJ erred in assessing her RFC.

ECF No. 11 at 1-21. Upon review, because the Court finds the ALJ erred in assessing Plaintiff’s

subjective allegations, the Court will only address the third issue for reversal.

The Court notes that in assessing the subjective allegations of a claimant, the ALJ is

required to examine and to apply the five factors from Polaski v. Heckler, 739 F.2d 1320 (8th Cir.

1984) or from 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529 and 20 C.F.R. § 416.929.2 See Shultz v. Astrue, 479 F.3d 979,

983 (2007). The factors to consider are as follows: (1) the claimant’s daily activities; (2) the

duration, frequency, and intensity of the pain; (3) the precipitating and aggravating factors; (4) the

dosage, effectiveness, and side effects of medication; and (5) the functional restrictions. See

Polaski, 739 at 1322.

The factors must be analyzed and considered in light of the claimant’s subjective

allegations of pain. See id. The ALJ is not required to methodically discuss each factor as long as

the ALJ acknowledges and examines these factors prior to discounting the claimant’s subjective

allegations. See Lowe v. Apfel, 226 F.3d 969, 971-72 (8th Cir. 2000). As long as the ALJ properly

applies these five factors and gives several valid reasons for finding that the Plaintiff’s subjective

allegations are not entirely reliable, the ALJ’s determination of subjective allegations is entitled to

2 Social Security Regulations 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529 and 20 C.F.R. § 416.929 require the analysis

of two additional factors: (1) “treatment, other than medication, you receive or have received for

relief of your pain or other symptoms” and (2) “any measures you use or have used to relieve

your pain or symptoms (e.g., lying flat on your back, standing for 15 to 20 minutes every hour,

sleeping on a board, etc.).” However, under Polaski and its progeny, the Eighth Circuit has not

yet required the analysis of these additional factors. See Shultz v. Astrue, 479 F.3d 979, 983

(2007). Thus, this Court will not require the analysis of these additional factors in this case.

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deference. See id.; Cox v. Barnhart, 471 F.3d 902, 907 (8th Cir. 2006). The ALJ, however, cannot

discount Plaintiff’s subjective allegations “solely because the objective medical evidence does not

fully support them [the subjective allegations].” Polaski, 739 F.2d at 1322.

When discounting a claimant’s subjective allegations of pain, the ALJ must make a specific

determination regarding that claimant’s subjective allegations, articulating the reasons for

discrediting the testimony, addressing any inconsistencies, and discussing the Polaski factors. See

Baker v. Apfel, 159 F.3d 1140, 1144 (8th Cir. 1998). The inability to work without some pain or

discomfort is not a sufficient reason to find a Plaintiff disabled within the strict definition of the

Act. The issue is not the existence of pain, but whether the pain a Plaintiff experiences precludes

the performance of substantial gainful activity. See Thomas v. Sullivan, 928 F.2d 255, 259 (8th

Cir. 1991).

In the present action, the ALJ discounted Plaintiff’s subjective allegations for legally-

insufficient reasons:

After careful consideration of the evidence, the undersigned finds that the

claimant’s medically determinable impairments could reasonably be expected to

cause the alleged symptoms; however, the claimant’s statements concerning the

intensity, persistence and limiting effects of these symptoms are not entirely

consistent with the medical evidence and other evidence in the record for the

reasons explained in this decision.

(Tr. 26). Indeed, although the ALJ mentioned “other evidence,” he did not explicitly provide what

“other evidence” was involved in that determination. Based upon this review, and in light of this

limited assessment, the Court finds the ALJ improperly discounted Plaintiff’s subjective

allegations without properly considering the Polaski factors and based upon her medical records.

See Polaski, 739 F.2d at 1322 (holding a claimant’s subjective allegations cannot be discounted

“solely because the objective medical evidence does not fully support them [the subjective

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allegations]”). Accordingly, because the ALJ provided an insufficient basis for discounting

Plaintiff’s subjective allegations, this case must be reversed and remanded.

4. Conclusion:

Based on the foregoing, the undersigned finds that the decision of the ALJ, denying

benefits to Plaintiff, is not supported by substantial evidence and recommends it be REVERSED

AND REMANDED.

The Parties have fourteen (14) days from receipt of this Report and Recommendation

in which to file written objections pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). The failure to file timely

objections may result in waiver of the right to appeal questions of fact. The Parties are

reminded that objections must be both timely and specific to trigger de novo review by the

district court. See Thompson v. Nix, 897 F.2d 356, 357 (8th Cir. 1990).

ENTERED this 11th day of October 2023.

Barry A. Bryant

/s/

HON. BARRY A. BRYANT

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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