Nichols v. Social Security Administration Commissioner

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

WESTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS

FORT SMITH DIVISION

MATTHEW NICHOLS PLAINTIFF

vs. Civil No. 2:22-cv-02136

COMMISSIONER, SOCIAL

SECURITY ADMINISTRATION DEFENDANT

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

OF THE UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Matthew Nichols (“Plaintiff”) brings this action pursuant to § 205(g) of Title II of the

Social Security Act (“The Act”), 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (2010), seeking judicial review of a final

decision of the Commissioner of the Social Security Administration (“SSA”) denying his

applications for Supplemental Security Income (“SSI”), Disability Insurance Benefits (“DIB”),

and period of disability under Titles II and XVI of the Act.

Pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and (3) (2009), the Honorable P. K.

Holmes, III referred this case to this Court for the purpose of making a report and recommendation.

In accordance with that referral, and after reviewing the arguments in this case, this Court

recommends Plaintiff’s case be REVERSED AND REMANDED.

1. Background:

On January 31, 2019, Plaintiff protectively filed his disability applications. (Tr. 10). 1 In

these applications, Plaintiff alleges being disabled due to rheumatoid arthritis, fibromyalgia, bad

1 The docket numbers for this case are referenced by the designation “ECF No. ___” The

transcript pages for this case are referenced by the designation “Tr” and refer to the document

filed at ECF No. 11. These references are to the page number of the transcript itself not the ECF

page number.

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discs in his back, and cysts in his heck and spine. (Tr. 234). Plaintiff originally alleged an onset

date of September 15, 2018. (Tr. 10). These applications were denied initially on September 5,

2019, and these applications were denied again on reconsideration on January 7, 2020. (Tr. 10).

After these denials, Plaintiff requested an administrative hearing, and this hearing request

was granted. (Tr. 33-78). Plaintiff’s administrative hearing was held on November 12, 2020, and

this hearing was held in Russellville, Arkansas. Id. Plaintiff was present and was represented by

Meghan Gallo at this hearing. Id. Plaintiff and Vocational Expert (“VE”) Montie Lumpkin

testified at this hearing. Id. At this hearing, Plaintiff testified he was thirty-eight (48) years old

on his alleged disability onset date. (Tr. 40). Such an individual is defined as a “younger

individual” under 20 C.F.R § 404.1563(c) and 20 C.F.R. § 416.963(c). Id. The ALJ determined

Plaintiff had at least a high school education and had completed a semester in college. (Tr. 40-

41).

On June 3, 2021, after the administrative hearing, the ALJ entered a fully unfavorable

decision denying Plaintiff’s applications. (Tr. 7-30). The ALJ found Plaintiff met the insured

status requirements of the Act through June 30, 2023. (Tr. 13, Finding 1). The ALJ determined

Plaintiff had not engaged in Substantial Gainful Activity (“SGA”) since September 15, 2018, his

alleged disability onset date. (Tr. 13, Finding 2).

The ALJ determined Plaintiff had the following severe impairments: rheumatoid arthritis,

degenerative disc disease of the cervical spine, degenerative disc disease of the lumbar spine,

dorsalgia or back pain, degenerative joint disease of both hips, chronic pain syndrome, obesity,

left-sided radial styloid tenosynovitis, insomnia, gastroesophageal reflux disease, major depressive

disorder, and unspecified anxiety disorder. (Tr. 13, Finding 3). Despite being severe, the ALJ

also determined Plaintiff did not have an impairment or combination of impairments that met or

medically equaled one of the listed impairments in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1

(“Listings”). (Tr. 13-15, Finding 4).

In this decision, the ALJ evaluated Plaintiff’s subjective allegations and determined his

Residual Functional Capacity (“RFC”). (Tr. 16-21, Finding 5). Specifically, the ALJ found

Plaintiff retained the following RFC:

After careful consideration of the entire record, the undersigned finds that the

claimant has the residual functional capacity to perform light work as defined in 20

CFR 404.1567(b) and 416.967(b) except he can occasionally climb, stoop, kneel,

crouch, and crawl. He can frequently, but not constantly, reach, handle, and finger

bilaterally. He can perform work where interpersonal contact is routine, but

superficial. He can perform work where tasks are no more complex than those

learned by experience, with several variables and use of judgment within limits. He

can perform work where the supervision required is little for routine tasks, but

detailed for non-routine tasks.

Id.

The ALJ evaluated Plaintiff’s Past Relevant Work (“PRW”). (Tr. 21-23, Finding 6). The

VE testified at the administrative hearing regarding this issue. Id. Based upon that testimony, the

ALJ found Plaintiff retained the capacity to perform his PRW as a jailer. Id. The ALJ also

considered whether there was other work Plaintiff could perform. Id. The VE also testified

regarding this issue and found Plaintiff retained the capacity to perform the following occupations:

(1) investigator/dealer accounts (light, unskilled) with approximately 10,255 such jobs in the

national economy; (2) furniture rental consultant (light, unskilled) with approximately 60,382 such

jobs in the national economy; and (3) counter clerk/photo finishing (light, unskilled) with

approximately 1,732 such jobs in the national economy. Id.

Plaintiff requested the Appeals Council’s review of the ALJ’s unfavorable disability

determination. On June 28, 2022, the Appeals Council declined to review the ALJ’s disability

determination. (Tr. 1-6). On August 24, 2022, Plaintiff filed the present appeal. ECF No. 1. The

Parties have filed appeal briefs. ECF Nos. 13, 15. Plaintiff has also filed a reply brief. ECF No.

18. This case is now ready for decision.

2. Applicable Law:

In reviewing this case, this Court is required to determine whether the Commissioner’s

findings are supported by substantial evidence on the record as a whole. See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g)

(2010); Ramirez v. Barnhart, 292 F.3d 576, 583 (8th Cir. 2002). Substantial evidence is less than

a preponderance of the evidence, but it is enough that a reasonable mind would find it adequate to

support the Commissioner’s decision. See Johnson v. Apfel, 240 F.3d 1145, 1147 (8th Cir.

2001).As long as there is substantial evidence in the record that supports the Commissioner’s

decision, the Court may not reverse it simply because substantial evidence exists in the record that

would have supported a contrary outcome or because the Court would have decided the case

differently. See Haley v. Massanari, 258 F.3d 742, 747 (8th Cir. 2001). If, after reviewing the

record, it is possible to draw two inconsistent positions from the evidence and one of those

positions represents the findings of the ALJ, the decision of the ALJ must be affirmed. See Young

v. Apfel, 221 F.3d 1065, 1068 (8th Cir. 2000).

It is well-established that a claimant for Social Security disability benefits has the burden

of proving his or her disability by establishing a physical or mental disability that lasted at least

one year and that prevents him or her from engaging in any substantial gainful activity. See Cox

v. Apfel, 160 F.3d 1203, 1206 (8th Cir. 1998); 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(1)(A), 1382c(a)(3)(A). The

Act defines a “physical or mental impairment” as “an impairment that results from anatomical,

physiological, or psychological abnormalities which are demonstrable by medically acceptable

clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques.” 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(3), 1382(3)(c). A plaintiff

must show that his or her disability, not simply his or her impairment, has lasted for at least twelve

consecutive months. See 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A).

To determine whether the adult claimant suffers from a disability, the Commissioner uses

the familiar five-step sequential evaluation. He determines: (1) whether the claimant is presently

engaged in a “substantial gainful activity”; (2) whether the claimant has a severe impairment that

significantly limits the claimant’s physical or mental ability to perform basic work activities; (3)

whether the claimant has an impairment that meets or equals a presumptively disabling impairment

listed in the regulations (if so, the claimant is disabled without regard to age, education, and work

experience); (4) whether the claimant has the Residual Functional Capacity (RFC) to perform his

or her past relevant work; and (5) if the claimant cannot perform the past work, the burden shifts

to the Commissioner to prove that there are other jobs in the national economy that the claimant

can perform. See Cox, 160 F.3d at 1206; 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)-(f). The fact finder only

considers the plaintiff’s age, education, and work experience in light of his or her RFC if the final

stage of this analysis is reached. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 416.920 (2003).

3. Discussion:

In his appeal brief, Plaintiff raised the following three arguments for reversal for reversal:

(A) the ALJ erred at Step Four by failing to resolve an apparent conflict between the VE’s

testimony and the DOT; (B) the ALJ denied him a full and fair hearing and failed to fulfill his

burden at Step Five; and (C) the ALJ erred by failing to meet his burden at Step Five. ECF No.

13 at 4-21. Upon review, because the Court finds the ALJ erred in assessing Plaintiff’s subjective

allegations and in assessing his RFC, the Court will only address this issue.

The Court notes that in assessing the subjective allegations of a claimant, the ALJ is

required to examine and to apply the five factors from Polaski v. Heckler, 739 F.2d 1320 (8th Cir.

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1984) or from 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529 and 20 C.F.R. § 416.929.2 See Shultz v. Astrue, 479 F.3d 979,

983 (2007). The factors to consider are as follows: (1) the claimant’s daily activities; (2) the

duration, frequency, and intensity of the pain; (3) the precipitating and aggravating factors; (4) the

dosage, effectiveness, and side effects of medication; and (5) the functional restrictions. See

Polaski, 739 at 1322.

The factors must be analyzed and considered in light of the claimant’s subjective

allegations of pain. See id. The ALJ is not required to methodically discuss each factor as long as

the ALJ acknowledges and examines these factors prior to discounting the claimant’s subjective

allegations. See Lowe v. Apfel, 226 F.3d 969, 971-72 (8th Cir. 2000). As long as the ALJ properly

applies these five factors and gives several valid reasons for finding that the Plaintiff’s subjective

allegations are not entirely reliable, the ALJ’s determination of subjective allegations is entitled to

deference. See id.; Cox v. Barnhart, 471 F.3d 902, 907 (8th Cir. 2006). The ALJ, however, cannot

discount Plaintiff’s subjective allegations “solely because the objective medical evidence does not

fully support them [the subjective allegations].” Polaski, 739 F.2d at 1322.

When discounting a claimant’s subjective allegations of pain, the ALJ must make a specific

determination regarding that claimant’s subjective allegations, articulating the reasons for

discrediting the testimony, addressing any inconsistencies, and discussing the Polaski factors. See

Baker v. Apfel, 159 F.3d 1140, 1144 (8th Cir. 1998). The inability to work without some pain or

discomfort is not a sufficient reason to find a Plaintiff disabled within the strict definition of the

2 Social Security Regulations 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529 and 20 C.F.R. § 416.929 require the analysis

of two additional factors: (1) “treatment, other than medication, you receive or have received for

relief of your pain or other symptoms” and (2) “any measures you use or have used to relieve

your pain or symptoms (e.g., lying flat on your back, standing for 15 to 20 minutes every hour,

sleeping on a board, etc.).” However, under Polaski and its progeny, the Eighth Circuit has not

yet required the analysis of these additional factors. See Shultz v. Astrue, 479 F.3d 979, 983

(2007). Thus, this Court will not require the analysis of these additional factors in this case.

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Act. The issue is not the existence of pain, but whether the pain a Plaintiff experiences precludes

the performance of substantial gainful activity. See Thomas v. Sullivan, 928 F.2d 255, 259 (8th

Cir. 1991).

In the present action, the Court finds the ALJ did not provide sufficient reasons for

discounting Plaintiff’s subjective allegations. In his opinion, the ALJ discounted Plaintiff’s

subjective complains for the following reasons:

After a careful consideration of all the evidence and from the opinion evidence as

considered, the claimant’s reported symptoms are not found to be fully consistent

with the record. Further, the totality of the evidence supports the residual functional

capacity assessment set forth above.

(Tr. 21).

Based upon this review, the Court finds the ALJ improperly discounted Plaintiff’s

subjective allegations based upon his medical records. See Polaski, 739 F.2d at 1322 (holding a

claimant’s subjective allegations cannot be discounted “solely because the objective medical

evidence does not fully support them [the subjective allegations]”). Accordingly, because the ALJ

provided an insufficient basis for discounting Plaintiff’s subjective allegations, this case must be

reversed and remanded.

4. Conclusion:

Based on the foregoing, the undersigned finds that the decision of the ALJ, denying

benefits to Plaintiff, is not supported by substantial evidence and recommends it be REVERSED

AND REMANDED.

The Parties have fourteen (14) days from receipt of this Report and Recommendation

in which to file written objections pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). The failure to file timely

objections may result in waiver of the right to appeal questions of fact. The Parties are

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reminded that objections must be both timely and specific to trigger de novo review by the

district court. See Thompson v. Nix, 897 F.2d 356, 357 (8th Cir. 1990).

ENTERED this 27th day of April 2023.

Barry A. Bryant

/s/

HON. BARRY A. BRYANT

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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