Haney v. Social Security Administration Commissioner

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

WESTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS

FORT SMITH DIVISION

TERI HANEY PLAINTIFF

vs. Civil No. 2:22-cv-02009

KILOLO KIJAKAZI DEFENDANT

Acting Commissioner, Social Security Administration

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

OF THE UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Teri Haney (“Plaintiff”) brings this action pursuant to § 205(g) of Title II of the Social

Security Act (“The Act”), 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (2010), seeking judicial review of a final decision

of the Commissioner of the Social Security Administration (“SSA”) denying her application for a

period of disability and Disability Insurance Benefits (“DIB”) under Title II of the Act.

Pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and (3) (2009), the Honorable P. K.

Holmes, III referred this case to this Court for the purpose of making a report and recommendation.

In accordance with that referral, and after reviewing the arguments in this case, this Court

recommends Plaintiff’s case be REVERSED AND REMANDED.

1. Background:

Plaintiff filed her disability application on July 30, 2019. (Tr. 15). Plaintiff alleged

disability due to headaches, anxiety, fibromyalgia and chronic fatigue. (Tr. 44, 189). Plaintiff’s

application was denied initially and again upon reconsideration. (Tr. 15).

Plaintiff requested an administrative hearing on her denied application, and this hearing

request was granted. (Tr. 98-151). A hearing was held on April 29, 2021. (Tr. 36-60). At this

hearing, Plaintiff was present and represented by counsel, Davis Duty. Id. Plaintiff and Vocational

Expert, (“VE”) Nicole King testified at this hearing. Id.

On May 26, 2021, after the administrative hearing, the ALJ entered a fully unfavorable

decision denying Plaintiff’s disability application. (Tr. 15-30). The ALJ determined Plaintiff met

the insured status of the Act through December 31, 2022. (Tr. 18, Finding 1). The ALJ also

determined Plaintiff had not engaged in Substantial Gainful Activity (“SGA”) since March 1,

2017. (Tr. 18, Finding 2).

The ALJ then determined Plaintiff had the following severe impairments: fibromyalgia,

osteoarthritis of the bilateral knee, obesity, depression, and anxiety. (Tr. 18, Finding 3). The ALJ

also determined Plaintiff did not have an impairment or combination of impairments that met or

medically equaled the requirements of any of the Listings of Impairments in Appendix 1 to Subpart

P of Regulations No. 4 (“Listings”). (Tr. 19, Finding 4).

In this decision, the ALJ evaluated Plaintiff’s subjective complaints and determined her

Residual Functional Capacity (“RFC”). (Tr. 22-28, Finding 5). First, the ALJ indicated she

evaluated Plaintiff’s subjective complaints and found they were not entirely credible. Id. Second,

the ALJ determined Plaintiff had the RFC to perform light work, but could occasionally stoop,

kneel, crouch, crawl, and climb ramps and stairs; could never climb ladders, ropes, or scaffolds;

could never be exposed to unprotected heights or hazardous machinery; and could occasionally

interact with the general public. Id.

The ALJ then evaluated Plaintiff’s Past Relevant Work (“PRW”). (Tr. 28, Finding 6). The

ALJ determined Plaintiff was unable to perform her PRW. Id. However, the ALJ found there

were jobs in the significant numbers in the national economy that Plaintiff could perform. (Tr. 29,

Finding 10). With the help of the VE, the ALJ found Plaintiff could perform the representative

occupations of (1) housekeeper with approximately 850,000 jobs in the nation, (2) laundry

classifier with approximately 41,000 jobs in the nation, and (3) garment sorter with approximately

205,000 jobs in the nation. Id. Based upon this finding, the ALJ determined Plaintiff had not been

disabled at any time from March 1, 2017, through the date of the decision. (Tr. 29, Finding 11).

Plaintiff sought review with the Appeals Council. (Tr. 1-6). The Appeals Council denied

this request. Id. On January 12, 2022, Plaintiff filed a Complaint in this case. ECF No. 1. Both

Parties have filed appeal briefs. ECF Nos. 14, 16. This matter is now ripe for consideration.

2. Applicable Law:

In reviewing this case, this Court is required to determine whether the Commissioner’s

findings are supported by substantial evidence on the record as a whole. See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g)

(2010); Ramirez v. Barnhart, 292 F.3d 576, 583 (8th Cir. 2002). Substantial evidence is less than

a preponderance of the evidence, but it is enough that a reasonable mind would find it adequate to

support the Commissioner’s decision. See Johnson v. Apfel, 240 F.3d 1145, 1147 (8th Cir. 2001).

As long as there is substantial evidence in the record that supports the Commissioner’s decision,

the Court may not reverse it simply because substantial evidence exists in the record that would

have supported a contrary outcome or because the Court would have decided the case differently.

See Haley v. Massanari, 258 F.3d 742, 747 (8th Cir. 2001).

If, after reviewing the record, it is possible to draw two inconsistent positions from the

evidence and one of those positions represents the findings of the ALJ, the decision of the ALJ

must be affirmed. See Young v. Apfel, 221 F.3d 1065, 1068 (8th Cir. 2000). It is well-established

that a claimant for Social Security disability benefits has the burden of proving his or her disability

by establishing a physical or mental disability that lasted at least one year and that prevents him or

her from engaging in any substantial gainful activity. See Cox v. Apfel, 160 F.3d 1203, 1206 (8th

Cir. 1998); 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(1)(A), 1382c(a)(3)(A). The Act defines a “physical or mental

impairment” as “an impairment that results from anatomical, physiological, or psychological

abnormalities which are demonstrable by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic

techniques.” 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(3), 1382(3)(c). A plaintiff must show that his or her disability,

not simply his or her impairment, has lasted for at least twelve consecutive months. See 42 U.S.C.

§ 423(d)(1)(A).

To determine whether the adult claimant suffers from a disability, the Commissioner uses

the familiar five-step sequential evaluation. He determines: (1) whether the claimant is presently

engaged in a “substantial gainful activity”; (2) whether the claimant has a severe impairment that

significantly limits the claimant’s physical or mental ability to perform basic work activities; (3)

whether the claimant has an impairment that meets or equals a presumptively disabling impairment

listed in the regulations (if so, the claimant is disabled without regard to age, education, and work

experience); (4) whether the claimant has the Residual Functional Capacity (RFC) to perform his

or her past relevant work; and (5) if the claimant cannot perform the past work, the burden shifts

to the Commissioner to prove that there are other jobs in the national economy that the claimant

can perform. See Cox, 160 F.3d at 1206; 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)-(f). The fact finder only

considers the plaintiff’s age, education, and work experience in light of his or her RFC if the final

stage of this analysis is reached. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 416.920 (2003).

3. Discussion:

In her appeal brief, Plaintiff claims the ALJ’s decision is not supported by substantial

evidence in the record. ECF No. 14 at 10-18. Specifically, Plaintiff raises the following arguments

for reversal: (1) the ALJ erred in the RFC determination, (2) the ALJ erred in the evaluation of

medical opinions, (3) the ALJ erred in considering her subjective complaints of pain, and (4) the

ALJ erred in the hypothetical asked of the VE. Id. Upon review, the Court finds the ALJ did not

fully consider her subjective complaints when evaluating her disability. According, the Court will

only address this issue for reversal.

In assessing the credibility of a claimant, the ALJ is required to examine and to apply the

five factors from Polaski v. Heckler, 739 F.2d 1320 (8th Cir. 1984) or from 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529

and 20 C.F.R. § 416.929.1 See Shultz v. Astrue, 479 F.3d 979, 983 (2007). The factors to consider

are as follows: (1) the claimant’s daily activities; (2) the duration, frequency, and intensity of the

pain; (3) the precipitating and aggravating factors; (4) the dosage, effectiveness, and side effects

of medication; and (5) the functional restrictions. See Polaski, 739 at 1322.

The factors must be analyzed and considered in light of the claimant’s subjective

complaints of pain. See id. The ALJ is not required to methodically discuss each factor as long

as the ALJ acknowledges and examines these factors prior to discounting the claimant’s subjective

complaints. See Lowe v. Apfel, 226 F.3d 969, 971-72 (8th Cir. 2000). As long as the ALJ properly

applies these five factors and gives several valid reasons for finding that the Plaintiff’s subjective

complaints are not entirely credible, the ALJ’s credibility determination is entitled to deference.

See id.; Cox v. Barnhart, 471 F.3d 902, 907 (8th Cir. 2006). The ALJ, however, cannot discount

Plaintiff’s subjective complaints “solely because the objective medical evidence does not fully

support them [the subjective complaints].” Polaski, 739 F.2d at 1322.

1 Social Security Regulations 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529 and 20 C.F.R. § 416.929 require the analysis of two

additional factors: (1) “treatment, other than medication, you receive or have received for relief of your

pain or other symptoms” and (2) “any measures you use or have used to relieve your pain or symptoms

(e.g., lying flat on your back, standing for 15 to 20 minutes every hour, sleeping on a board, etc.).”

However, under Polaski and its progeny, the Eighth Circuit has not yet required the analysis of these

additional factors. See Shultz v. Astrue, 479 F.3d 979, 983 (2007). Thus, this Court will not require the

analysis of these additional factors in this case.

When discounting a claimant’s complaint of pain, the ALJ must make a specific credibility

determination, articulating the reasons for discrediting the testimony, addressing any

inconsistencies, and discussing the Polaski factors. See Baker v. Apfel, 159 F.3d 1140, 1144 (8th

Cir. 1998). The inability to work without some pain or discomfort is not a sufficient reason to find

a Plaintiff disabled within the strict definition of the Act. The issue is not the existence of pain, but

whether the pain a Plaintiff experiences precludes the performance of substantial gainful activity.

See Thomas v. Sullivan, 928 F.2d 255, 259 (8th Cir. 1991).

In the present action, the ALJ did not comply with the requirements of Polaski. Instead,

the ALJ based her credibility determination almost entirely upon the fact that Plaintiff’s subjective

complaints were not supported by her medical records. (Tr. 22-28). In her opinion, the ALJ

summarized Plaintiff’s medical records and discounted Plaintiff’s subjective complaints because

they were not supported by the objective medical records:

After careful consideration of the evidence, the undersigned finds that the

claimant’s medically determinable impairments could reasonably be expected to

cause the alleged symptoms; however, the claimant’s statements concerning the

intensity, persistence and limiting effects of these symptoms are not entirely

consistent with the medical evidence and other evidence in the record for the

reasons explained in this decision.

(Tr. 23).

Indeed, in this opinion, the only non-medical evidence the ALJ considered was Plaintiff’s

daily activities. (Tr. 24). This involved only a limited discussion of Plaintiff’s daily activities. Id.

Based upon this review, the Court finds the ALJ’s assessment of Plaintiff’s subjective

complaints was improper. See Polaski, 739 F.2d at 1322 (holding a claimant’s subjective

complaints cannot be discounted “solely because the objective medical evidence does not fully

support them [the subjective complaints]”). Accordingly, because the ALJ provided an

insufficient basis for discounting Plaintiff’s subjective complaints during the relevant time-period,

this case must be reversed and remanded.

4. Conclusion:

Based on the foregoing, the undersigned finds that the decision of the ALJ, denying

benefits to Plaintiff, is not supported by substantial evidence and recommends it be REVERSED

AND REMANDED.

The Parties have fourteen (14) days from receipt of this Report and Recommendation

in which to file written objections pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). The failure to file timely

objections may result in waiver of the right to appeal questions of fact. The Parties are

reminded that objections must be both timely and specific to trigger de novo review by the

district court. See Thompson v. Nix, 897 F.2d 356, 357 (8th Cir. 1990).

ENTERED this 14th day of February 2023.

Barry A. Bryant

/s/

HON. BARRY A. BRYANT

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE