Stanford v. PDW-Birmingham

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

SOUTHERN DIVISION

LASHRONDUS STANFORD, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. Case No.: 2:23-cv-147-AMM

)

PWD – BIRMINGHAM, )

)

Defendant. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION ON DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR

SUMMARY JUDGMENT

This case is before the court on a motion for summary judgment by defendant

PWD – Birmingham, LLC (“PWD”). Doc. 37. For the reasons explained below, the

motion is GRANTED.

I. BACKGROUND

These are the undisputed material facts construed in the light most favorable

to plaintiff Lashrondus Stanford:

“PWD is a subsidiary of Pella Corporation that sells and services Pella

branded windows and doors.” Doc. 38-2 ¶ 1. PWD hired Ms. Stanford on December

30, 2019, as a Service Coordinator. Doc. 38-1 at 8–9, Dep. 28:12–15, 30:4–6. Her

duties included creating repair quotes for windows and doors, greeting customers,

verifying warehouse product, and acting as an office assistant. Id. at 9, Dep. 30:10–

32:17.

A. Ms. Stanford’s Testimony Regarding Allegedly Discriminatory

Actions After May 6, 20221

PWD promoted Dave Smithey to Sales and Installation Manager in May or

June 2021, which made Mr. Smithey Ms. Stanford’s supervisor from that time until

her termination in July 2022. Doc. 38-2 ¶ 1. Ms. Stanford testified in her deposition

that Mr. Smithey “stopped taking [her] calls” at some point during her employment.

Doc. 38-1 at 37, Dep. 145:1–4. Ms. Stanford also testified that Mr. Smithey

instructed her and Heather DeCastra—a former Senior Service Coordinator—to no

longer contact a help line. Id. at 37–38, Dep. 145:16–146:17; id. at 46, Dep. 179:16–

180:23.

Jeremy North was the Acting General Manager of PWD at the time of Ms.

Stanford’s termination. Id. at 21, Dep. 80:5–9. Ms. Stanford testified in her

deposition that Mr. North “talk[ed] over [her]” and “treat[ed] [her] like [her]

opinions [did not] matter.” Id., Dep. 80:14–23.

B. Ms. Stanford’s Testimony Regarding Allegedly Retaliatory Actions

Heather Kalt was a Subsidiary Human Resources Business Partner at PWD

during Ms. Stanford’s employment. Doc. 38-3 ¶ 10. Tracey Gerelds was a Human

1 As discussed infra Section I.D, claims that accrued before this date are time-

barred. Nonetheless, Ms. Stanford testified about numerous allegations of racial

discrimination that occurred before this date, including other employees playing

country music, Doc. 38-1 at 15, Dep. 54:12–55:4, and making the temperature too

cold in the office, id. at 54, Dep. 210:2–211:8.

Resources and Office Coordinator at PWD during Ms. Stanford’s employment. Doc.

38-3 at 8.

Ms. Stanford testified in her deposition that she met with Ms. Kalt and Ms.

Gerelds on March 30, 2022. Doc. 38-1 at 48, Dep. 186:15–21. Ms. Gerelds was

present in the room, and Ms. Kalt was on a phone line. Id. at 45, Dep. 175:3–11. Ms.

Stanford testified that during this meeting, Ms. Kalt told her that “‘[w]e know you

contacted outside’ -- ‘an outside entity about the incident.’ Meaning she told me she

knew I had contacted EEOC.” Id. at 44–45, Dep. 173:21–174:5. Ms. Stanford

testified that she had her first contact with EEOC in March 2022, but she did not file

a charge of discrimination with EEOC at that time. Id. at 47, Dep. 183:3–9.

According to Ms. Stanford, she did not tell anyone at PWD that she had contacted

EEOC, and she did not have any knowledge that EEOC told PWD that she had

contacted EEOC. Id., Dep. 183:10–18. Ms. Stanford reaffirmed that Ms. Kalt did not

specify what outside entity she was referring to, and Ms. Stanford did not ask her

what she meant by that statement. Id., Dep. 184:22–185:11. Ms. Stanford testified

that she “knew what [Ms. Kalt] meant” because she “didn’t go to anyone else.” Id.,

Dep. 185:3–18. Ms. Stanford testified that neither Ms. Kalt nor Ms. Gerelds took

action against her after the meeting. Id. at 49, Dep. 190:17–191:1, 192:18–193:1.

C. Problems with Ms. Stanford’s Employment at PWD

Alyssa Boyd was a Customer Service Representative with PWD until she left

her job on February 4, 2021. Doc. 38-3 ¶ 13. Mr. Smithey declared that during Ms.

Boyd’s exit interview, she stated that she was “resigned from PWD due, at least in

part, to Ms. Stanford’s behavior in the workplace.” Doc. 38-2 ¶ 2.

Jasmine Collins-Hall was a Service Coordinator at PWD from February 2021

until January 2022. Doc. 38-3 ¶ 14. In July 2021, Ms. “Collins-Hall lodged a

complaint against Ms. Stanford, alleging hostile work environment.” Id. ¶ 3. Ms.

Collins-Hall complained that when she assigned work to herself and to Ms. Stanford

according to the alternating process that Ms. Stanford had demonstrated for her, Ms.

Stanford became “upset and said ‘[y]ou are not my manager and can’t tell me what

I have to do.’” Id. at 9. Ms. Collins-Hall also complained that Ms. Stanford

“refer[red] to her as ‘little girl,’” even after Ms. Collins-Hall had previously asked

Ms. Stanford to refrain from doing so. Id. PWD took no action against either Ms.

Stanford or Ms. Collins-Hall at the conclusion of its investigation. Id. at 8. “When

Ms. Collins-Hall resigned in January of 2022, however, she indicated during her exit

interview form that one of the reasons for her resignation was her co-workers—

specifically noting that ‘working with [Ms. Stanford]’ was the thing she liked least

about working for PWD . . . .” Id. ¶ 3.

Collin Naylor worked as a Service Technician at PWD during Ms. Stanford’s

employment. Doc. 38-2 ¶ 3. “In February 2022, [Mr.] Naylor and Ms. Stanford both

reported concerns of disrespectful communications toward them from the other.”

Doc. 38-3 ¶ 4. “Neither Mr. Naylor nor Ms. Stanford accused the other of race

discrimination or discrimination on the basis of any other protected trait.” Id. PWD

investigated both complaints but did not discipline either Ms. Stanford or Mr.

Naylor. Id. PWD sent an email to all Birmingham employees regarding proper email

etiquette. Id. “Neither Mr. Naylor nor Ms. Stanford reported any further concerns

about the other following the March 17, 2022 email.” Id.

Heather DeCastra was a Senior Service Coordinator at PWD in 2022. See id.

¶ 5. “On June 27, 2022, Ms. DeCastra complained to [PWD] about alleged bullying

and violations of her privacy by Ms. Warner[]”—who was a Showroom Coordinator

at PWD. Id. ¶ 6. “Ms. DeCastra alleged that Ms. Warner had accessed Ms.

DeCastra’s personal information in [PWD’s] systems and shared that information

with Ms. Stanford.” Id. And “Ms. DeCastra claimed that Ms. Warner had made

remarks about her appearance.” Id. Ms. DeCastra resigned from PWD before it

completed its investigation into her complaints. Id. Mr. Smithey declared that Ms.

DeCastra identified “Ms. Stanford’s behavior in the workplace” as one of her reasons

for leaving PWD. Doc. 38-2 ¶ 2.

Based on the results of the investigation of Ms. DeCastra’s complaint, PWD

decided to discharge Ms. Warner. Doc. 38-3 ¶ 6. Christa Carene—the Senior Human

Resources Manager for Sales Subsidiaries for Pella Corporation—travelled to

Birmingham in July 2022 to terminate Ms. Warner. Id. ¶¶ 1, 6. But “Ms. Warner quit

before [PWD decisionmakers] met with her to deliver the separation.” Id. ¶ 6.

Ms. Carene testified that while she was in Birmingham, she met with Mr.

Smithey and Mr. North “to discuss the continued turnover in office staff, including

the need to now find a replacement for [Ms.] DeCastra.” Id. ¶ 7. According to Ms.

Carene, she, Mr. Smithey, and Mr. North “had concerns that PWD had gone through

a series of service coordinators during Ms. Stanford’s tenure, each of whom had

expressed concerns involving, at least in part, Ms. Stanford’s behavior in the

workplace.” Id. Therefore, Ms. Carene, Mr. Smithey, and Mr. North decided to

terminate Ms. Stanford. Id.; Doc. 38-2 ¶ 5.

Ms. Carene and Mr. Smithey testified that they decided to terminate Ms.

Stanford for the reasons set out in her separation letter. Doc. 38-2 ¶ 5; Doc. 38-3 ¶

7. That letter provided that “[i]t has been observed and reported to management that

your interactions with team members are not positive.” Doc. 38-1 at 127. It further

stated that “[y]our interactions do not encourage collaboration and team building nor

do they promote an interactive, productive work environment.” Id. And although

PWD “coached [Ms. Stanford] in the past on these and similar issues,” PWD did

“not see[] significant improvement.” Id.

Ms. Carene and Mr. Smithey also testified that race was not a factor in their

decision to terminate Ms. Stanford, nor did they discuss race when they made the

decision to terminate her. Doc. 38-2 ¶ 5; Doc. 38-3 ¶ 7. Ms. Carene and Mr. Smithey

state that they did not consider time or attendance-related issues when they decided

to terminate Ms. Stanford. Doc. 38-2 ¶ 5; Doc. 38-3 ¶ 7. Ms. Carene and Mr. Smithey

further say that they had no knowledge that Ms. Stanford had contacted EEOC when

they decided to terminate her, and that they first found out that she had contacted

EEOC when they became aware of this lawsuit. Doc. 38-2 ¶ 5; Doc. 38-3 ¶ 7.

D. Procedural History

Ms. Stanford filed her charge with EEOC on November 2, 2022. Doc. 1 at 6.

On February 7, 2023, Ms. Stanford filed this lawsuit. Id. at 1. Ms. Stanford asserts

claims under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq.,

(“Title VII”) and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. §

621 et seq. (“ADEA”). Id. at 3. Specifically, Ms. Stanford asserts claims for

termination, failure-to-promote, retaliation, and age discrimination. Id. at 4.

On March 8, 2023, PWD filed a partial motion to dismiss, arguing that all of

Ms. Stanford’s claims pre-dating May 7, 2022, should be dismissed as untimely.

Doc. 5. The court granted that motion and dismissed Ms. Stanford’s claims pre-

dating May 6, 2022, including her claims of failure-to-promote and age

discrimination, with prejudice as time-barred. Doc. 17 at 4.

On February 29, 2024, PWD filed a motion for summary judgment. Doc. 37.

Ms. Stanford filed a “Request to Dismiss Motion for Summary Judgment.” Doc. 40.

The court will construe Ms. Stanford’s filing as her response to the motion filed by

PWD. The motion for summary judgment is fully briefed. Docs. 37, 39–41.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

A party moving for summary judgment must establish “that there is no

genuine dispute as to any material fact and [that] the movant is entitled to judgment

as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A fact is “material” if it could “affect the

outcome” of the case. Furcron v. Mail Ctrs. Plus, LLC, 843 F.3d 1295, 1303 (11th

Cir. 2016) (cleaned up). A material fact is in “genuine” dispute if “the evidence is

such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Id.

(cleaned up). In deciding a motion for summary judgment, the court’s function is not

to “weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter but to determine

whether there is a genuine issue for trial.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S.

242, 249 (1986). “[T]he evidence of the nonmovant is to be believed, and all

justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his favor.” Tolan v. Cotton, 572 U.S. 650,

651 (2014).

Additionally, “[p]ro se pleadings are held to a less stringent standard than

pleadings drafted by attorneys and will, therefore, be liberally construed.”

Tannenbaum v. United States, 148 F.3d 1262, 1263 (11th Cir. 1998). Nonetheless,

courts require pro se litigants “to conform to procedural rules.” Albra v. Advan, Inc.,

490 F.3d 826, 829 (11th Cir. 2007) (cleaned up).

III. ANALYSIS

A. Non-Discharge Racial Discrimination Claims

“Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 outlaws employment discrimination

because of ‘race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.’” Tynes v. Fla. Dep’t of Juv.

Just., 88 F.4th 939, 943 (11th Cir. 2023) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1)). “To

prove a claim under [Title VII], a plaintiff can use direct evidence, circumstantial

evidence, or both.” Id. at 944.

“Discrimination claims brought under Title VII may be pursued under a

‘single-motive’ theory—in which the employee alleges that unlawful bias was ‘the

true reason’ for an adverse employment action . . . .” Phillips v. Legacy Cabinets, 87

F.4th 1313, 1321 (11th Cir. 2023) (quoting Quigg v. Thomas Cnty. Sch. Dist., 814

F.3d 1227, 1235 (11th Cir. 2016)). Or a plaintiff may employ “a ‘mixed-motive’

theory—in which she alleges that bias was simply ‘a motivating factor’ for the

adverse action, ‘even though other factors also motivated the practice.’” Id. (quoting

42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m)).

“In order to survive summary judgment, a plaintiff alleging intentional

discrimination [under Title VII] must present sufficient facts to permit a jury to rule

in her favor.” Lewis v. City of Union City, 918 F.3d 1213, 1220 (11th Cir. 2019) (en

banc). “One way that she can do so is by satisfying the burden-shifting framework

set out in McDonnell Douglas[]” for single-motive cases. Id. “A plaintiff can also

present direct evidence of discriminatory intent, . . . or demonstrate a ‘convincing

mosaic’ of circumstantial evidence that warrants an inference of intentional

discrimination . . . .” Id. at 1220 n.6. Additionally, a plaintiff “employee can succeed

on a mixed-motive claim [under Title VII] by showing that illegal bias, such as bias

based on sex or gender, ‘was a motivating factor for’ an adverse employment action,

‘even though other factors also motivated’ the action.” Quigg, 814 F.3d at 1235

(quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m)).

1. McDonnell Douglas

To establish a prima facie case of discrimination under McDonnell Douglas,

a plaintiff must show “(1) that she belongs to a protected class, (2) that she was

subjected to an adverse employment action, (3) that she was qualified to perform the

job in question, and (4) that her employer treated ‘similarly situated’ employees

outside her class more favorably.” Lewis, 918 F.3d at 1220–21. The plaintiff may

also satisfy the fourth element by demonstrating that “he was replaced by a person

outside his protected class.” Maynard v. Bd. of Regents of Univs. of Fla. Dep’t of

Educ., 342 F.3d 1281, 1289 (11th Cir. 2003).

“A plaintiff asserting an intentional-discrimination claim under McDonnell

Douglas must demonstrate that she and her proffered comparators were similarly

situated in all material respects.” Phillips, 87 F.4th at 1322 (cleaned up). A similarly-

situated comparator generally “will (1) have engaged in the same basic conduct as

the plaintiff; (2) have been subject to the same employment policy, guideline, or rule

as the plaintiff; (3) have been under the jurisdiction of the same supervisor as the

plaintiff; and (4) share the plaintiff’s employment or disciplinary history.” Id.

“If the plaintiff succeeds in making out a prima facie case, the burden shifts

to the defendant to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its actions.”

Lewis, 918 F.3d at 1221. “The defendant need not persuade the court that it was

actually motivated by the proffered reason, but need only present evidence raising a

genuine issue of fact as to whether it discriminated against the plaintiff.” Alvarez v.

Royal Atl. Devs., Inc., 610 F.3d 1253, 1265 (11th Cir. 2010).

“Finally, should the defendant carry its burden, the plaintiff must then

demonstrate that the defendant’s proffered reason was merely a pretext for unlawful

discrimination, an obligation that merges with the plaintiff’s ultimate burden of

persuading the factfinder that she has been the victim of intentional discrimination.”

Lewis, 918 F.3d at 1221 (cleaned up). “To show pretext, [Mr. Williams] must

demonstrate ‘such weaknesses, implausibilities, inconsistencies, incoherencies, or

contradictions in the employer’s proffered legitimate reasons for its action that a

reasonable factfinder could find them unworthy of credence.’” Alvarez, 610 F.3d at

1265 (quoting Combs v. Plantation Patterns, 106 F.3d 1519, 1538 (11th Cir. 1997)).

The plaintiff cannot “recast an employer’s proffered nondiscriminatory

reasons or substitute [her] business judgment for that of the employer.” Id. (quoting

Chapman v. AI Transp., 229 F.3d 1012, 1030 (11th Cir. 2000) (en banc)). So long

as the employer proffers a reason “that might motivate a reasonable employer, an

employee must meet that reason head on and rebut it, and [she] cannot succeed by

simply quarreling with the wisdom of that reason.” Id. at 1265–66 (quoting

Chapman, 229 F.3d at 1030).

PWD argues Ms. Stanford cannot succeed under the McDonnell Douglas

framework because she cannot “show a similarly situated coworker who was treated

more favorably.” Doc. 39 at 22. Ms. Stanford does not identify in her pleadings any

co-worker who she alleges that PWD treated more favorably. In her deposition, she

testified that PWD was “good to [her], but [PWD was] better to [Ms. Boyd], and

[PWD] treated [Ms. Collins-Hall] better.” Doc. 38-1 at 30, Dep. 115:22–116:1. Both

Ms. Boyd and Ms. Collins-Hall left PWD before May 6, 2022, Doc. 38-3 ¶¶ 13–14,

and therefore any claims based on this alleged disparity in treatment would be time-

barred. Ms. Stanford also testified that Dave Forehand—the Sales Manager—treated

Ms. Warner better than he treated her. Doc. 38-1 at 52, Dep. 202:2–10; id. at 54,

Dep. 212:1–12. Although Ms. Stanford does not provide a date for these allegations,

they all occurred when Ms. Collins-Hall worked for PWD, meaning that claims

based on those allegations would be time-barred as well. See Doc. 38-3 ¶ 14.

Because Ms. Stanford does not identify a viable comparator, her non-

discharge discrimination claims cannot survive summary judgment under the

McDonnell Douglas framework.

2. Convincing Mosaic

“[A] ‘convincing mosaic’ is a metaphor, not a legal test and not a framework.”

Berry v. Crestwood Healthcare LP, 84 F.4th 1300, 1311 (11th Cir. 2023). “A

‘convincing mosaic’ of circumstantial evidence is simply enough evidence for a

reasonable factfinder to infer intentional discrimination in an employment action—

the ultimate inquiry in a discrimination lawsuit.” Tynes, 88 F.4th at 946.

“[A] plaintiff may establish a convincing mosaic with evidence of (1)

suspicious timing, ambiguous statements, and other bits and pieces from which an

inference of discriminatory intent might be drawn; (2) systematically better

treatment of similarly-situated employees; and (3) that the employer’s justification

is pretextual.” Poer v. Jefferson Cnty. Comm’n, 100 F.4th 1325, 1337 (11th Cir.

2024) (cleaned up). “Employees are not limited in the kinds of circumstantial

evidence they may present.” Berry, 84 F.4th at 1311.

Ms. Stanford testified that PWD never disciplined her for attendance issues,

Doc. 38-1 at 56, Dep. 218:5–219:16. Ms. Stanford offers no evidence concerning

how her perception that others at PWD behaved as though her work was subpar was

connected to race. See id., Dep. 219:17–220:19. The only evidence (that is not time-

barred) that Ms. Stanford offers of alleged discriminatory treatment is her testimony

that Mr. Smithey “stopped taking [her] calls,” and “told [her] that [she] could no

longer contact . . . a help line,” id. at 37, Dep. 145:1–20, and that Mr. North “talk[ed]

over [her]” and “treat[ed her] like [her] opinions [did not] matter,” id. at 21, Dep.

80:10–23.

Ms. Stanford’s testimony falls well short of creating anything resembling a

convincing mosaic of discrimination. Ms. Stanford fails to show how any of the

alleged discriminatory treatment that she received was due to her race. Accordingly,

Ms. Stanford does not offer “enough evidence for a reasonable factfinder to infer

intentional discrimination in an employment action—the ultimate inquiry in a

discrimination lawsuit.” Tynes, 88 F.4th at 946.

Ms. Stanford testified that Mr. Smithey instructed Ms. DeCastra—a white

employee—to stop calling the help line as well. Doc. 38-1 at 38, Dep. 146:5–16. At

bottom, Ms. Stanford’s testimony regarding Mr. Smithey comes down to her

assertion that Mr. Smithey “didn’t stop [Mr. Naylor] and [Mr. Campbell] from all of

that stuff that they were saying to me,” which is a time-barred allegation. Id., Dep.

147:16–148:2. Even if her claims based on that testimony were not time-barred, Ms.

Stanford testified that Mr. Naylor did not speak about race or use any racially

derogatory terms, id. at 21–22, Dep. 81:22–82:22, and that Mr. Campbell’s only

reference to race was his statement to Ms. Stanford that he was not a racist, id. at 32,

Dep. 124:4–11.

No reasonable factfinder could find in favor of Ms. Stanford on her non-

discharge discrimination claims because her case entirely relies on her unsupported

assumptions and speculation that employees at PWD treated her differently because

of her race. See Tynes, 88 F.4th at 946. She does not back up that claim with any

evidence but asks the court to make inferences in her favor. “But inferences in favor

of a plaintiff can be based only on evidence—not on speculation.” Martin v. Fin.

Asset Mgmt. Sys., Inc., 959 F.3d 1048, 1058 (11th Cir. 2020). Because Ms. Stanford’s

evidence does not create a convincing mosaic of discrimination, her non-discharge

discrimination claims cannot survive summary judgment on that basis.

3. Mixed-Motive

“[T]he mixed-motive theory does not depend on proof of a single, ‘true

reason’ for an adverse action . . . .” Phillips, 87 F.4th at 1327 (cleaned up). A plaintiff

asserting a Title VII claim under a mixed-motive theory must offer “evidence

sufficient to convince a jury that: (1) the defendant took an adverse employment

action against the plaintiff; and (2) a protected characteristic was a motivating factor

for the defendant’s adverse employment action.” Id. (cleaned up). At the summary-

judgment stage, “the court must determine whether the plaintiff has presented

sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to conclude, by a preponderance of the

evidence, that her protected characteristic was a motivating factor for an adverse

employment decision.” Quigg, 814 F.3d at 1239 (cleaned up).

In Muldrow v. City of St. Louis, the Supreme Court clarified that so long as

the plaintiff can “show some harm respecting an identifiable term or condition of

employment,” that is enough to establish an adverse employment action. 144 S. Ct.

967, 974 (2024). The harm need not be “significant,” and “terms or conditions . . .

covers more than the economic or tangible.” Id. (cleaned up).

Ms. Stanford’s non-discharge discrimination claims cannot survive summary

judgment under a mixed-motive theory either because she offers no evidence to

support her claims that race was a motivating factor in her alleged mistreatment. As

discussed above, see supra Section III.B.2, Ms. Stanford has failed to provide any

evidence that PWD employees discriminated against her based on her race.

Therefore, no reasonable jury could conclude that race “was a motivating factor” for

the alleged adverse employment actions at issue. Quigg, 814 F.3d at 1238 (cleaned

up).

Because Ms. Stanford has not developed evidence that anyone at PWD

considered or cited her race in their treatment of her, the court GRANTS judgment

in favor of PWD on her non-discharge discrimination claims.

B. Ms. Stanford’s Discharge Discrimination Claim

Ms. Stanford’s discrimination claim based on her discharge from PWD meets

an identical fate because she fails to establish how her discharge was connected to

her race.

Ms. Stanford makes no effort to identify a comparator for purposes of a

McDonnell Douglas analysis, so the court analyzes her claim through use of the

convincing mosaic metaphor and under a mixed-motive theory.

1. Convincing Mosaic

Because “the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to [Ms. Stanford],

would [not] allow a reasonable jury to infer that the employer engaged in intentional

[discrimination],” Ms. Stanford cannot establish a convincing mosaic of

discrimination. Berry, 84 F.4th at 1310. Ms. Stanford offers no evidence or argument

to rebut the reason PWD offered for her termination: that her “interactions with team

members [we]re not positive. [Her] interactions d[id] not encourage collaboration

and team building nor d[id] they promote an interactive, productive work

environment.” Doc. 38-1 at 127. Because Ms. Stanford’s offers no evidence that

PWD discriminated against her based on her race by terminating her, her claim

cannot survive summary judgment on this basis.

2. Mixed-Motive

Ms. Stanford also cannot establish that race was a motivating factor in PWD’s

decision to terminate her. PWD offered uncontroverted evidence from all

participants in Ms. Stanford’s termination that they did not consider race when they

decided to terminate Ms. Stanford. Doc. 38-2 ¶ 5; Doc. 38-3 ¶ 7. The record

establishes that no one brought up race during the termination meeting. Doc. 38-1 at

21, Dep. 78:19–80:9; id. at 42, Dep. 163:8–165:19. Ms. Stanford does not offer any

evidence to create a genuine issue of material fact with the evidence offered by

PWD. Therefore, she cannot prevail under a mixed-motive theory of discrimination

based on her discharge from PWD.

The court GRANTS judgment in favor of PWD on Ms. Stanford’s claim of

racial discrimination based on her discharge.

C. Ms. Stanford’s Retaliation Claim

The retaliation provision of Title VII prohibits an employer from

“discriminat[ing] against” an employee because she “opposed any practice” made

unlawful by Title VII or “made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in” a Title

VII proceeding or investigation. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–3(a). “To establish a claim of

retaliation, [a plaintiff] must prove that she engaged in statutorily protected activity,

that she suffered an adverse action, and that the adverse action was causally related

to the protected activity.” Jefferson v. Sewon Am., Inc., 891 F.3d 911, 924 (11th Cir.

2018). To establish causation, a plaintiff must prove “that the protected activity was

a but-for cause of the alleged adverse action by the employer.” Id. (cleaned up). In

other words, “a plaintiff must prove that had she not complained, she would not have

been” subjected to the alleged discriminatory action. Id. A plaintiff may prove a

retaliation claim under the McDonell Douglas framework or using the convincing

mosaic metaphor. See Yelling v. St. Vincent’s Health Sys., 82 F.4th 1329, 1337–38

(11th Cir. 2023). “[T]he mixed-motive framework does not apply to Title VII

retaliation claims.” Id. at 1338.

PWD contends that the lapse of time between Ms. Stanford’s protected

activity of contacting EEOC and her termination severs any causal link between

those two events. The Eleventh Circuit has held that “in the absence of other

evidence tending to show causation, if there is a substantial delay between the

protected expression and the adverse action, the complaint of retaliation fails as a

matter of law.” Thomas v. Cooper Lighting, Inc., 506 F.3d 1361, 1364 (11th Cir.

2007) (“A three to four month disparity between the statutorily protected expression

and the adverse employment action is not enough.”); Brown v. Alabama Dep’t of

Transp., 597 F.3d 1160, 1182 (11th Cir. 2010) (holding that in the absence of other

evidence establishing causation, “[e]ven a three-month interval between the

protected expression and the employment action—the briefest interval we face

here—is too long.”). Ms. Stanford testified that she contacted EEOC in March 2022.

Doc. 38-1 at 47, Dep. 183:3–6. PWD terminated her on July 22, 2022. Id. at 127.

Based on the Eleventh Circuit caselaw, the lapse of time between Ms. Stanford’s

protected activity and her termination tends to preclude her claim as a matter of law.

Although Ms. Stanford does not make the argument, the court considers

whether her claim should survive the lapse in time because she offered other

evidence of causation: Ms. Stanford testified that Ms. Kalt confronted her about

going “to an outside entity.” Id. at 47, Dep. 184:12–21 (cleaned up). But Ms.

Stanford offers no evidence that the decisionmakers in her termination had any

knowledge that she contacted EEOC. In the Eleventh Circuit, “the plaintiff must

generally show that the decision maker was aware of the protected conduct at the

time of the adverse employment action.” Brungart v. BellSouth Telecomms., Inc.,

231 F.3d 791, 799 (11th Cir. 2000). “That requirement rests upon common sense[]”

because “[a] decision maker cannot have been motivated to retaliate by something

unknown to him.” Id.

According to Ms. Stanford, Ms. Kalt was the one who confronted her about

contacting an outside entity, and Ms. Gerelds was present for that conversation. Doc.

38-1 at 44–45, Dep. 173:18–174:5. It is undisputed that Mr. Smithey, Mr. North, and

Ms. Carene decided to terminate Ms. Stanford from PWD. Doc. 38-3 ¶ 7; Doc. 38-

2 ¶ 5. Ms. Stanford also does not dispute Ms. Carene’s declaration that Ms. “Gerelds

did not participate” in discussions regarding Ms. Stanford’s termination, Doc. 38-3

¶ 7, or Mr. Smithey’s declaration of the same, Doc, 38-2 ¶ 5. Both Ms. Carene and

Mr. Smithey also testified that Ms. Kalt was not involved in these discussions

because she was no longer an employee of PWD at that time. Doc. 38-3 ¶ 7; Doc.

38-2 ¶ 5. Additionally, Ms. Carene and Mr. Smithey averred that they had no

knowledge that Ms. Stanford had contacted EEOC until they became aware of this

lawsuit—long after they had terminated Ms. Stanford. Doc. 38-3 ¶ 7; Doc. 38-2 ¶ 5.

Ms. Stanford offers no evidence to create a genuine dispute of material fact on this

issue.

And even if Ms. Stanford produced evidence that established that the

decisionmakers who terminated her knew that she contacted EEOC—which, to be

clear, she did not—she failed to produce any evidence that tends to show that her

contact of EEOC was the “but-for cause” of her termination. Jefferson, 891 F.3d at

924 (cleaned up). When Ms. Carene came to Birmingham to terminate Ms. Warner,

Doc. 38-3 ¶ 6, Ms. Carene discussed the state of the Birmingham PWD office with

Mr. Smithey and Mr. North, and they decided to terminate “Ms. Stanford for the

reasons set forth in her separation letter.” Id. ¶ 7. Those reasons did not include the

fact that Ms. Stanford had contacted EEOC. Doc. 38-1 at 127. Ms. Stanford offers

nothing to dispute this evidence with the exception of her testimony that Ms. Kalt

told her that she knew that Ms. Stanford had contacted “an outside entity.” /d. at 47,

Dep. 184:12—21 (cleaned up). Notably, Ms. Stanford did not confirm with Ms. Kalt

“If she knew that [Ms. Stanford] had contacted the EEOC.” /d., Dep. 185:9-18. Ms.

Stanford has failed to show that retaliatory intent influenced—let alone compelled—

the decisionmakers at PWD to terminate her, as required under Eleventh Circuit

precedent. See Yelling, 82 F.4th at 1340 (cleaned up) (“Where but-for causation is

required, a plaintiff with evidence of only a tagalong forbidden consideration cannot

meet her summary judgment burden because she cannot show that the unlawful

retaliation would not have occurred in the absence of the alleged wrongful action or

actions of the employer.”).

The court GRANTS summary judgment in favor of PWD on Ms. Stanford’s

retaliation claim.

IV. CONCLUSION

The court GRANTS the motion for summary judgment filed by PWD. The

court DENIES Ms. Stanford’s request to dismiss the motion for summary judgment

filed by PWD. The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to close the case.

DONE and ORDERED this 5th day of August, 2024.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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