Dortch v. Parker (INMATE 1)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

NORTHERN DIVISION

HAROLD L. DORTCH, )

#298361, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) CASE NO. 2:20-CV-321-WKW-CSC

)

SIMONE A. PARKER, )

)

Defendant. )

RECOMMENDATION OF THE MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Plaintiff Harold L. Dortch, a former inmate proceeding pro se, filed this 42 U.S.C.

§ 1983 action in May 2020 seeking only injunctive relief. Doc. 1. Plaintiff has since been

released from prison. See Case No. 2:20-CV-334-MHT-CSC (M.D. Ala. 2020), Doc. 83.1

Accordingly, for the reasons set forth below, the undersigned RECOMMENDS that this

case be DISMISSED without prejudice for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.2

I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Plaintiff brings this action against Simone A. Parker, who was employed as a

Classification Specialist at Bullock Correctional Facility at the time of the events alleged

in the Complaint. Doc. 1 at 2. In his Complaint, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Parker

refused to send him back to work release in retaliation for previous lawsuits he filed in

1 See also http://doc.state.al.us/inmatesearch (last visited on April 26, 2023).

2 “[A] dismissal for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction is ‘entered without prejudice.’” Yeh Ho v. Sabocik,

775 F. App’x 551, 555 (11th Cir. 2019) (quoting Stalley ex rel. U.S. v. Orlando Reg’l Healthcare Sys.,

Inc., 524 F.3d 1229, 1232 (11th Cir. 2008)).

this Court. Id. As relief, he seeks “to imediately [sic] receive [his] comm. custody back”;

to “be transfered [sic] imediately [sic] back to Mobile Work Release”; for the Court to

“call Mrs. Sandra Conway at the Central Review Board” who “can handle everything”;

and for Defendant Parker, as well as an individual not named as a defendant, to be fired.

Id. at 4. In a subsequent amendment to the Complaint, Plaintiff reiterates that he wants

his “Comm. 1 Work Release . . . given back to [him]” and to be “transfered [sic] back to

Mobile Work Release imediately [sic].” Doc. 9 at 5.

On July 20, 2020, Defendant Parker filed a Special Report with supporting

evidentiary materials addressing Plaintiff’s claims. Doc. 12. Plaintiff then filed a second

amendment to the Complaint, in which he states additional allegations and again seeks

transfer from Bullock. See Docs. 21, 22. Later, Plaintiff filed a third amendment to the

Complaint, in which he continues to seek “transfer to a lower level security camp.” See

Docs. 25, 26. Later still, Plaintiff filed a fourth amendment to the Complaint, in which he

states, “I’m asking the Court for an imediate [sic] transfere [sic].” Doc. 35 at 2.

Defendant Parker filed Supplemental Special Reports addressing the claims presented in

Plaintiff’s amendments. See Docs. 33, 40. Finally, Plaintiff filed a response to

Defendant’s Special Report and supplements. Doc. 45.

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II. DISCUSSION

In his Complaint and subsequent amendments, Plaintiff solely seeks injunctive

relief.3 See Docs. 1, 9, 21, 25, 35. Specifically, he repeatedly seeks a lower custody

classification and transfer from Bullock to a work release program. However, in October

of 2021, Plaintiff notified the Court that he had been transferred from Bullock to Elmore

Correctional Facility. Doc. 46. And, in April of 2023, Plaintiff notified the Court that he

has been released from custody and is no longer incarcerated. See Case No. 2:20-CV-

334-MHT-CSC (M.D. Ala. 2020), Doc. 83. The Alabama Department of Corrections

inmate database further indicates that Plaintiff is no longer incarcerated. See

http://doc.state.al.us/inmatesearch (last visited on April 26, 2023).

“[A] prisoner’s transfer or release from a correctional facility generally will moot

his claims for injunctive relief in a § 1983 action.” Owens v. Centurion Med., 778 F.

App’x 754, 758 (11th Cir. 2019) (citing Spears v. Thigpen, 846 F.2d 1327, 1328 (11th

Cir. 1988) (noting that, in this circumstance, there is no longer a “case or controversy

once the inmate has been transferred”) and Wahl v. McIver, 773 F.2d 1169, 1173 (11th

Cir. 1985) (“Past exposure to illegal conduct does not constitute a present case or

3 In Plaintiff’s response to the Special Report and supplements, he purports—for the first time—to seek

monetary damages in addition to injunctive relief. See Doc. 45 at 8. However, that request is not properly

before the Court, as neither the Complaint nor any of the amendments thereto contained such a request,

and Plaintiff did not move to amend his Complaint to include monetary damages. Moreover, even if he

had, the motion would have been untimely because Plaintiff’s response was filed more than 21 days after

Defendant’s final Supplemental Special Report (Doc. 40). See Doc. 5 at 5 (“All amendments to the

complaint and/or motions to amend must be filed within twenty-one (21) days of the defendant filing

his/her special report . . . . Proposed amendments or motions to amend filed after this date will be

considered untimely.”).

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controversy involving injunctive relief if unaccompanied by any continuing, present

adverse effects.”)). “Nor will there be any case or controversy when the chance of a

prisoner’s return to the offending facility is too speculative.” Owens, 778 F. App’x at 759

(citing Cotterall v. Paul, 755 F.2d 777, 780 (11th Cir. 1985) (holding that a prisoner’s

claim for injunctive relief was moot since he was no longer being held in the jail with the

conditions he had challenged and the risk of being sent back to that jail, and suffering

from the threatened injury, was too speculative)).

Because Plaintiff is no longer incarcerated, there is no reasonable expectation that

Defendant Parker may continue to deprive him of a particular custody classification or

work release, and any effects of that alleged deprivation have been completely and

irrevocably eradicated. See Owens, 778 F. App’x at 759 (citing Los Angeles Cnty. v.

Davis, 440 U.S. 625, 631 (1979)). Further, any possibility that Plaintiff will be

reincarcerated and return to Bullock is speculative at best. Thus, Plaintiff’s release from

custody since the filing of this action renders moot his requests for injunctive relief with

regard to his custody classification. See Owens, 778 F. App’x at 759; Spears, 846 F.2d at

1328. Accordingly, this case is due to be DISMISSED for lack of subject-matter

jurisdiction.4

4 The jurisdiction of the federal courts is limited to actual cases and controversies. Finstad v. Fla., Dep’t

of Bus. and Pro. Regul., 295 F. App’x 352, 353 (11th Cir. 2008) (citing Crown Media, LLC v. Gwinnett

Cnty., Ga., 380 F.3d 1317, 1324 (11th Cir. 2004). “[A] district court must sua sponte inquire into subject

matter jurisdiction, and may dismiss a case, whenever it may be lacking.” McGee v. YWCA Miami-Dade

Cnty., No. 11-22410-CIV, 2011 WL 3235983, at *1 (S.D. Fla. July 28, 2011) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P.

12(h)(3); Univ. of S. Ala. v. Am. Tobacco Co., 168 F.3d 405, 410 (11th Cir. 1999)). “[O]nce a federal

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III. CONCLUSION

Accordingly, for the reasons set forth above, the undersigned RECOMMENDS

that this case be DISMISSED without prejudice for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.

It is further ORDERED that, on or before May 15, 2023, the parties may file

objections to this Recommendation. The parties must specifically identify the factual

findings and legal conclusions in the Recommendation to which objection is made.

Frivolous, conclusive, or general objections will not be considered. The parties are

advised that this Recommendation is not a final order and, therefore, is not appealable.

Failure to file written objections to the Magistrate Judge’s findings and

recommendations in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) will bar a party from a de

novo determination by the District Court of legal and factual issues covered in the

Recommendation and waive the right of the party to challenge on appeal the District

Court’s order based on unobjected-to factual and legal conclusions accepted or adopted

by the District Court except on grounds of plain error or manifest injustice. Nettles v.

Wainwright, 677 F.2d 404 (5th Cir. 1982); 11th Cir. R. 3-1. See Stein v. Reynolds Sec.,

Inc., 667 F.2d 33 (11th Cir. 1982); see also Bonner v. City of Prichard, Ala., 661 F.2d

1206 (11th Cir. 1981) (en banc).

court determines that it is without subject matter jurisdiction, the court is powerless to continue.” Univ. of

S. Ala., 168 F.3d at 410.

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DONE this 1st day of May, 2023.

/s/ Charles S. Coody

CHARLES S. COODY

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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