Toney v. Collier (INMATE 2)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

NORTHERN DIVISION

KENNETH TONEY, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) CASE NO. 2:22-CV-565-WHA-CSC

)

NANCY COLLIER, et al., )

)

Defendants. )

RECOMMENDATION OF THE MAGISTRATE JUDGE

I. Introduction

Plaintiff Kenneth Toney, an inmate at the Autauga Metro Jail in Prattville, Alabama,

filed this pro se complaint for damages on September 22, 2022, using this Court’s standard

form for actions brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.1 Doc. 1. Plaintiff names as defendants

District Court Judge Joy Booth, Charlotte Griffith, Clerk/Magistrate of the Prattville

Municipal Court, and Nancy Collier, an investigator employed by the Prattville Police

Department. Id. After review and consideration of Plaintiff’s filing, the undersigned

Magistrate Judge RECOMMENDS that this case be DISMISSED for the reasons set forth

below.

1 While Plaintiff also requests his immediate release from detention, a challenge to the fact or

duration of his confinement is more appropriately filed in an application for habeas corpus relief.

See Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475 1973.

II. Standard of Review

Because the Court granted Plaintiff leave to proceed in forma pauperis (Doc. 3), his

Complaint is subject to screening under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B), which requires a court

to dismiss a complaint or any portion thereof when it is frivolous or malicious, fails to state

a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief against a defendant

who is immune. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b).

In applying § 1915, “the court is authorized to test the proceeding for frivolousness

or maliciousness even before service of process or before the filing of the answer.” Ali v.

Higgs, 892 F.2d 438, 440 (5th Cir. 1990).

An early determination of the merits of an IFP proceeding provides a

significant benefit to courts (because it will allow them to use their scarce

resources effectively and efficiently), to state officials (because it will free

them from the burdens of frivolous and harassing litigation), and to prisoners

(because courts will have the time, energy and inclination to give meritorious

claims the attention they need and deserve). “We must take advantage of

every tool in our judicial workshop.” Spears [v. McCotter], 766 F.2d [179,

182 (5th Cir. 1985)].

Green v. McKaskle, 788 F.2d 1116, 1120 (5th Cir. 1986). See also 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a)

(“The court shall review, before docketing, if feasible or, in any event as soon as practicable

after docketing, … .”).

III. Discussion

A. Judge Joy Booth

Joy Booth is a judge on the Autauga County District Court. Plaintiff bases his §

1983 claims against Judge Booth on the principal allegation that she signed warrants for

his arrest which failed to designate the place where the charged offenses occurred. Doc. 1

at 4. Claiming that Judge Booth failed to reply to his motion to dismiss to correct this

injustice and also presided over his preliminary hearing, Plaintiff alleges she is not

impartial to his cases. Id. Id. Because Plaintiff’s allegations against Judge Booth concern

actions taken in her role as judicial officer over his district court criminal proceedings, they

are subject to dismissal on the basis of judicial immunity. See Wahl v. McIver, 773 F.2d

1169, 1172 (11th Cir. 1985) (applying judicial immunity in § 1983 proceeding).

Judicial immunity is immunity from suit, not just from the ultimate assessment of

damages, and it applies regardless of whether a judge’s action was in error, was done

maliciously, or was taken in excess of authority. Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 356–

57 (1978) (internal quotations and citation omitted); Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 11 (1991)

(per curiam) (holding that judicial immunity is not overcome by allegations of bad faith or

malice). Judicial immunity may be overcome only if a judge acts outside the judicial

capacity or takes action in the complete absence of all jurisdiction. Stump, 435 U.S. at

356–57. The “relevant inquiry is the nature and function of the act, not the act itself.”

Mireles, 502 U.S. at 13 (internal quotations and citation omitted).

None of Plaintiff’s allegations against Judge Booth suggest any actions taken

outside of her ordinary judicial capacity. To the contrary, Plaintiff’s allegations reflect that

all actions were taken as part of normal state court proceedings over which jurisdiction

existed. See Hyland v. Kolhage, 267 F. App’x 836, 840–41 (11th Cir. 2008) (holding that,

because judge’s actions were taken in his judicial capacity and he did not act in the absence

of all jurisdiction by altering minutes of a sentencing hearing after the hearing, he was

entitled to absolute judicial immunity); Stump, 435 U.S. at 356 (finding that judge was

entitled to immunity where he was not acting in the clear absence of all jurisdiction, even

if plaintiff alleges the action was erroneous, malicious, or without authority).

Judicial immunity extends its protection to requests for declaratory and injunctive

relief as well. Tarver v. Reynolds, 808 F. App’x 752, 754 (11th Cir. 2020). “To receive

declaratory or injunctive relief against a judicial officer under Section 1983, the judicial

officer must have violated a declaratory decree or declaratory relief must otherwise be

unavailable. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983. In addition, there must also be an ‘absence of an

adequate remedy at law.” Id. (quotation marks and citations omitted). Therefore, to the

extent Plaintiff requests declaratory or injunctive relief against Judge Booth, such relief is

improper because there is no allegation that Judge Booth violated a declaratory decree, and

Plaintiff’s ability to appeal challenged rulings and decisions to an appropriate higher court

provides him an adequate remedy at law. See id.

Because the doctrine of judicial immunity serves as an absolute bar, all of Plaintiff’s

claims against Judge Booth are due to be dismissed under § 1915(e)(2)(B). Clark, 915

F.2d at 640 n.2 (citing Fuller v. Georgia State Bd. of Pardons & Paroles, 851 F.2d 1307,

1310 (11th Cir. 1988) (holding that parole board members entitled to absolute quasi-

judicial immunity from suit for damages)); see also Pugh v. Balish, 564 F. App’x 1010,

1012 (11th Cir. 2014) (affirming frivolity dismissal of plaintiff’s claims and noting,

“[w]here a judge is immune from suit, an action against the judge may be subject to

dismissal on frivolity grounds, as the action is completely without a legal basis.”).

B. Municipal Court Clerk Charlotte Griffith

Plaintiff alleges that Griffith violated his constitutional rights on February 15, 2022,

by signing warrants for his arrest which failed to specify where the charged offenses

occurred. Doc. 1 at 4. It is clear that Griffith’s official action in signing warrants is part of

her duties as a municipal court clerk. “Judges have absolute immunity from civil actions

for the performance of judicial acts as long as they are not done in the clear absence of

jurisdiction.” See Jenkins v. Clerk of Ct., 150 F. App’x. 988, 990 (11th Cir. 2005) (citing

Roland v. Phillips, 19 F.3d 552, 555 (11th Cir. 1994)). In other words, a municipal court

judge is entitled to absolute immunity from damages for actions taken in his official

capacity, “even when his actions are allegedly erroneous, malicious, or in excess of his

jurisdiction.” Wuyisa v. City of Miami Beach, 614 F. App’x. 389, 392 (11th Cir. 2015)

(citing Bolin v. Story, 225 F.3d 1234, 1239 (11th Cir. 2000)). While “[c]ourt clerks enjoy

a narrower ambit of immunity than judges, Hyland, 267 F. App’x at 842 (quotation marks

and citation omitted), “[n]onjudicial officials have absolute immunity for their duties that

are integrally related to the judicial process.” Jenkins, 150 F. App’x at 990. And while court

clerks are not entitled to absolute immunity from claims for equitable relief, they do “have

absolute immunity from actions for damages arising from acts they are specifically

required to do under court order or at a judge’s direction.” Tarter v. Hury, 646 F.2d 1010,

1013 (5th Cir. 1981); see also Roland, 19 F.3d at 556 n.4) (explaining that when a court

official “acts pursuant to a direct judicial order, absolute quasi-judicial immunity is

obvious”); Foster v. Walsh, 864 F.2d 416 (6th Cir. 1988) (clerk of municipal court who

issued erroneous bench warrant was absolutely immune from liability).

Absolute immunity also bars claims for injunctive relief brought against “a judicial

officer for an act or omission taken in such officer’s judicial capacity” except in limited

circumstances; “unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was

unavailable.” 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Judicial officers also are not absolutely immune from suits

for declaratory relief if the plaintiff establishes a violation, a serious risk of continuing

irreparable injury if the relief is not granted, and the absence of an adequate remedy at law.

Bolin, 225 F.3d at 1242.

The actions about which Plaintiff complains stems from Griffith carrying out duties

associated with her position as Clerk for the Municipal Court of Prattville, Alabama. This

conduct falls within the scope of the Clerk/Magistrate duties which are an integral part of

the judicial process for which she has absolute immunity. Scott v. Dixon, 720 F.2d 1542

(11th Cir. 1983). To the extent Plaintiff seeks declaratory relief against Griffith, he must

establish a violation, a serious risk of continuing irreparable injury if the relief is not

granted, and the absence of an adequate remedy at law. Bolin, 225 F.3d at 1242. Plaintiff

has not indicated that Griffith violated any declaratory decree nor—to the extent

declaratory relief is available—has he made the requisite showing under Bolin of

entitlement to such relief by showing an absence of an adequate remedy at law.

Consequently, Plaintiff’s claims against Griffith are due to be dismissed under 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii & iii).

C. Investigator Collier

Plaintiff alleges Collier, the complainant who signed the challenged warrants, failed

to identify the location where the charged offenses occurred and lied under oath at his

preliminary hearing when she testified that the incidents occurred in Autauga County,

Alabama, despite not having stated as much in the depositions filed for the purpose of

securing warrants. Doc. 1 at 3–4. Plaintiff asserts a claim for “malicious intent to falsely

imprison/unlawfully detain Plaintiff” based on the conduct described. Id. at 3.

Public records from the Alabama Trial Court System2 reflect Collier signed

depositions in the District Court for Autauga County on February 15, 2022, to obtain

warrants against Plaintiff for First Degree Stalking/Second Degree Domestic Violence

(DC-22-348) and Terrorist Threats (DC-22-349).3 See Keith v. DeKalb Cnty. Georgia, 749

F.3d 1034, 1041 n.18 (11th Cir. 2014) (noting that “[w]e take judicial notice of [the state’s]

Online Judicial System.”) (citing Fed. R. Evid. 201). The same records show that the

depositions for these offenses contain redacted information. Id. Specifically, the documents

redacted Plaintiff’s personal identifying information and the place of occurrence for the

charged offenses. Id. The Court takes judicial notice of these public records. See Chinn v.

PNC Bank, N.A., 451 F. App’x 859, 860 n.1 (11th Cir. 2012) (noting that “[a] district court

may take judicial notice of facts capable of accurate and ready determination by using

sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned, including public records.”)

(citing Fed. R. Evid. 20(b)); Garfield v. NDC Health Corp., 466 F.3d 1255, 1260 n.2 (11th

Cir. 2006)).

2 Hosted at www.alacourt.com (last visited November 30, 2022).

3 Copies of the depositions, obtained from the public records maintained on the Alabama Trial

Court System, are attached to this Recommendation.

“A Fourth Amendment violation involving [a warrant-based seizure] occurs when

legal process itself goes wrong—when, for example, a judge’s probable-cause

determination is predicated solely on a police officer’s false statements.” See Williams v.

Aguirre, 965 F.3d 1147, 1158 (11th Cir. 2020) (citation and internal quotations omitted).

“To prevail on his Fourth Amendment claim, [Plaintiff] must establish that the legal

process justifying his seizure—the arrest warrant[s] that listed [the charges for First Degree

Stalking/Second Degree Domestic Violence and Terrorist Threats]—w[ere]

constitutionally infirm and that his seizure would not otherwise be justified without legal

process.” Id. at 1165. Plaintiff “can prove that his arrest warrant was constitutionally infirm

if he establishes either that the officer who applied for the warrant should have known that

his application failed to establish probable cause [] or that an official . . . intentionally or

recklessly made misstatements or omissions necessary to support the warrant[.]” Id.

(citations omitted).

Here, Plaintiff has not adequately alleged that the legal process justifying his seizure

was constitutionally infirm. Plaintiff’s assertion that Collier failed to identify in the written

depositions where the charged offenses occurred and subsequently testified falsely at his

preliminary hearing that the offenses occurred in Autauga County stems from a

misunderstanding or misreading of the written depositions used to secure the challenged

warrants and which contain redacted location information. Consequently, and without

more, “the judicial officer who approved the [warrants] had sufficient information to find

probable cause. See Aguirre, 965 F.3d at 1163; see also Paez v. Mulvey, 915 F.3d 1276,

1288 (11th Cir. 2019) (finding no Fourth Amendment violation where, “[a]fter reviewing

all of the relevant information—what was included and what was omitted [in the

affidavit]—there [] was probable cause to believe [the plaintiff] . . . had [committed the

offenses]”). Because Plaintiff has not adequately alleged that Collier violated his Fourth

Amendment rights, his claims against her are due to be dismissed for failure to state a

claim.

IV. Conclusion

For the reasons stated above, the undersigned Magistrate Judge RECOMMENDS

as follows:

1. Plaintiff’s 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims against Judge Joy Booth and Charlotte

Griffith be DISMISSED with prejudice under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i-iii).

2. Plaintiff’s claims against Investigator Collier be DISMISSED without prejudice

under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).

3. This case be DISMISSED prior to service of process under 28 U.S.C. §

1915(e)(2)(B)(i-iii).

It is ORDERED that by December 15, 2022, the parties may file written objections

to this Recommendation. An objecting party must identify the specific portion of the

factual findings or legal conclusions to which the objection is made and must describe in

detail the basis for the objection. Frivolous, conclusive, or general objections will not be

considered.

Failure to file a written objection to this Recommendation shall bar a party from a

de novo determination by the District Court of any factual findings or legal conclusions

contained herein and shall waive the right of the party to challenge on appeal any

subsequent order that is based on factual findings and legal conclusions accepted or

adopted by the District Court, except upon grounds of plain error or manifest injustice.

11TH Cir. R. 3-1; see Resolution Tr. Co. v. Hallmark Builders, Inc., 996 F.2d 1144, 1149

(11th Cir. 1993); Henley v. Johnson, 885 F.2d 790, 794 (11th Cir. 1989).

Done, this 1st day of December 2022.

/s/ Charles S. Coody

CHARLES S. COODY

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

State of Alabama ‘arrantSiummons □□□□□□□

Uated fac stem DEPOSITION

Form CR-5? (front) Poew.ay98 Case Number

220214022

iN Cistrict, SOUT OF Alga ALABAMA

(Circur, Oistiet, or Murreipal) {Name of Murvelpality or County}

[7] STATE OF ALABAMA

[]MUNIGIPALITYOF v. Kenneth John Toney

Defendant

INSTRUCTIONS: COMPLETE THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION ON THE ACCUSED

RSS OTESET TRY arnt John Tone

INSTRUCTIONS: COMPLETE THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION ON THE OFFENSE

Gtieres:_Stalking 131 Degree’ Domestic Violence 2nd

Date and Time of Offense: OAMAO022 OI pe □□□ See

ro rn

Peron Abacked or ; x □□

How Attacked: Volo, sochal media i" i ‘ we a

a _—_

‘ nee ee □□

Was docused under the influance of local ora controlled substance? ["]ves [¥]Ne Ce

Any law enforcement agency contacted? Le] Yes Cl No er

IP yes. whieh one? Prattville Police Department

Olid Accuaed Possess or like a Waenon? lV lyes L]mo Types: gun ——————

threatened i

Did you go te the hospital? [] Yen [y?] Na

Camage Done or injunes Received: ga ities tt ss

Value of Property:

Details of Offense: _Oocumentation of the avanta of the stalkin anon O2/102022 thatwe have documented in our system

_- Showing that Kenneth Jahn Toney has made threats to come to her place of employment Rhonda Toney, estranged wife,

recieved texts thal Kenneth John Toney was comi kill his estranged wife, Ha posted on Facebook thal he

owas going to kill Rhonda Toney. Kenneth Toney called pariment advising that he was going to kill Rhonda

Taney. The threat is viable and believed based on pest activity raported thal Kenneth John Toney has the means to carry

oul the beat he has made toward Rhonda Toney,

iene ifanional pages arenecessary,

1]

wmcewmay wwe SSCRORTTION

Any Law Enforcement sey Contached? [ives □□□

lFyes, which aoe? Prattvite Poliga Department

| make thes sfaternend fac ihe purpose of securing a WARAANT/SUMMONS aga the named of accused. I understand that | hetituling a criminal

proceeding and cannot dismiss tis case, | further undersiand thal if ary foragaing facta are unirue, | may, in any altar guniahi ment

provided by law, be lated «ih court costs in le proceeding.

Sworn toad Subseribed before me thie N Collier n42

□ day af Complainant

_Ltbn Loe □ _ _—_

CA Goole! Security Number

201 Gin Shop Hill Rd Prattville AL 36067

larkiMapes inane Acdnass

ee

WITNESSES. _

Name Addrass Telephone Number

MAGISTRATE NOTES ___ __|

Warrant Summons issued? (] Yea (0) Mo Warrant Nuribear;

12

State of Alabama Sammons umber

Unified fedicial System DEPOSITION

Form CR-57 (front) Rew5/96 Case Number

220214024

IN THE _ District COURT OF Autauga , ALABAMA

(Cirecull, Dietnet, or Municinal) (Name of Municipality or County)

[VISTATE OF ALABAMA

[| MUNICIPALITY OF v. Kenneth John Toney

Defendant

INSTRUCTIONS: COMPLETE THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION ON THE ACCUSED

SETS Keeton Toe

Dg

cg, |

pe

INSTRUCTIONS: COMPLETE THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION ON THE OFFENSE

Qitanea: Terrorist threats 0 eg eet get

Carte ond Tins of Ottense: 0242022 0630 _ a wa ee □ ss

Puce ire: I

Person Aficked or Property Camaged i □□ —

How Attacked: pie seg

Was acouged under the influance of aioahel ora conbatied substance? Yes []No He

Any law evorceament agency contacted’? [¥'] ves (L] Ne APR 13.202?

“Ifyes. which one? Prattville Pollca Daperiment wae os

Old Accused Postess or ise a Weapon? GFlyea [] Ne Types: —DEBRABILG

te ROUT CLERK

Did you go to the hospital? ] ves □□□ No

Gamage Gone or injurigs Received: = __ ne

Value of Property: ei oes

Details of Offense: Kenneth Toney fad been calling the Kindercare because his estranged wife refused to communicate with

hin. He genta meseage to the day care through a message board stating that he was planning on killing Rhecda Toney

arid if she was found there he would have no choice but to risk lives of children to get to her. Police officers had to sitat the _

a i: ensure that Kenneth Toney would not arrive and carry out the threats made. Kenneth Toney called the

_Praitvilla Police Department stating to Sgt. Amos that he was coming to kill Rhonda al the daycare. The day care hadto

hire @ private security company te protect Ihe occupants of the business that include children.

L Pheck FPadditonal pages are EERIE

13

mmaoma tow] ROSTTION

Any Law Enforcement Agancy Gantactes? []ves [No

iFyes, which one? Prattville Police Dapariment 4 2

[make this statement for tha purpose of sacuring a WARRANT/SUMMONS against the named of accused. | underatand Lam insttubeg @ oriminal

proceeding and carnal digmiga this case, | furlter urderstand that if any of the foregalng fects are untrug, | ma 4M ae ta any other punishment

provided by law, be taxed wit cour qoats in the proceeding. 7 fj

Swom to and Subseribad bahane me thie

‘so Nancy Gotier 042 AKAM

dy fF Complainant

Lebuinal ;

} Socal Securily Number

fc : □ dabiasi 204 Gin Shop Hill Re Prativille AL 36067

wibgtate Addrage

pai inten □□ emian pss sian

Naima. Address Telephone Number

a _—___—CSMMAGISTRATE NOTES

Warrant or Summons issued? 0 Yes O No Warrant Number: _ .

14