Briskey v. Lockhart (INMATE 1)

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

EASTERN DIVISION

CORNELIA BRISKEY,1 )

)

Plaintiffs, )

)

v. ) CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:19-CV-367-WHA

)

SHERIFF SID LOCKHART, )

)

Defendant. )

RECOMMENDATION OF THE MAGISTRATE JUDGE

This 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action is currently pending before the court on claims

challenging conditions and actions that occurred at the Chambers County Detention Center

— the facility in which the plaintiffs were confined at the time they filed the complaint.

On May 29, 2019, the court entered an order of procedure, a copy of which the Clerk mailed

to each of the plaintiffs at their current address of record — the Chambers County

Detention Facility. This order directed each of the plaintiffs to “immediately inform the

court and . . . counsel [for the defendants] of any change in his address. Failure to provide

a correct address to this court within ten (10) days following any change of address will

result in the dismissal of this action. The plaintiffs shall also diligently and properly

prosecute this action or face the possibility it will be dismissed for failure to prosecute.”

Doc. 5 at 4, ¶7. The docket maintained in this case indicates that Cornelia Briskey received

1The plaintiffs originally listed in the complaint were Roscoe Holloway, Adam Amato, Cornelia Briskey,

Dylan Briskey, Shontonio Battle, Terrence Holloway, Michael Crowe and Robert P. Williams. All of the

plaintiffs, with the exception Cornelia Briskey, have previously been dismissed as parties to this case due

to their failure to provide the court with a correct address. Thus, this case is now before the court only on

the claims presented by Cornelia Briskey.

a copy of this order. However, the postal service returned as undeliverable orders entered

on September 19, 2019 (Docs. 20 & 21) and September 24, 2019 (Doc. 23) because Briskey

no longer resided at the last address he provided to the court.

Based on the foregoing, it is clear that Briskey has failed to comply with the

requirements that he provide the court with a current address and properly prosecute this

action. Additionally, this case cannot properly proceed before the court when the

whereabouts of Briskey, the sole plaintiff remaining in this case, are unknown to the court.

The court therefore entered an order requiring that on or before October 18, 2019 Briskey

“show cause why this case should not be dismissed for his failure to comply with the orders

of this court and his failure to adequately prosecute this action.” Doc. 24 at 2. The court

“specifically cautioned [Briskey] that if he fails to respond to this order the Magistrate

Judge will recommend that this case be dismissed due to his failure to keep the court

apprised of his current address and because, in the absence of such, this case cannot proceed

before this court in an appropriate manner.” Doc. 24 at 2. As of the present date, Briskey

has failed to provide the court with his current address pursuant to the directives of the

orders entered in this case. Thus, the court concludes that this case should be dismissed.

The court has reviewed the file to determine whether a less drastic measure than

dismissal of this case is appropriate. See Abreu-Velez v. Board of Regents of Univ. System

of Georgia, 248 F. App’x 116, 117–18 (11th Cir. 2007). After such review, the court finds

that dismissal of this case is the proper course of action. Initially, the court notes that

Briskey is an indigent individual and the imposition of monetary or other punitive sanctions

against him would be ineffectual. Moreover, Briskey has failed to comply with the

directives of the orders entered by this court regarding provision of a current address. It

likewise appears that since Briskey is no longer confined in the Chambers County

Detention Facility he is simply no longer interested in the prosecution of this case.

Additionally, the undersigned finds that any further effort to secure Briskey’s compliance

with the orders entered in this case would be unavailing and a waste of this court’s scarce

resources. Finally, the claims raised by Briskey, the only claims now before the court,

cannot properly proceed before this court when his whereabouts are unknown to the court.

Accordingly, the court concludes that the failure of Briskey to comply with the

orders of this court warrant his dismissal as a party to this case. Moon v. Newsome, 863

F.2d 835, 837 (11th Cir. 1989) (holding that, as a general rule, where a litigant has been

forewarned dismissal for failure to obey a court order is not an abuse of discretion). The

authority of courts to impose sanctions for failure to prosecute or obey an order is

longstanding and acknowledged by Rule 41(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

See Link v. Wabash R.R. Co., 370 U.S. 626, 629–30 (1962). This authority empowers the

courts “to manage their own affairs so as to achieve the orderly and expeditious disposition

of cases.” Id. at 630–31; Mingo v. Sugar Cane Growers Co-Op of Fla., 864 F.2d 101, 102

(11th Cir. 1989) (holding that a “district court possesses the inherent power to police its

docket.”). “The sanctions imposed [upon dilatory litigants] can range from a simple

reprimand to an order dismissing the action with or without prejudice.” Id.

For the above stated reasons, it is the RECOMMENDATION of the Magistrate

Judge that this case be dismissed without prejudice.

On or before November 12, 2019 the parties may file objections to the

Recommendation. A party must specifically identify the factual findings and legal

conclusions in the Recommendation to which the objection is made. Frivolous, conclusive,

or general objections to the Recommendation will not be considered.

Failure to file written objections to the Magistrate Judge’s factual findings and legal

conclusions set forth in the Recommendation in accordance with the provisions of 28

U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) shall bar a party from a de novo determination by the District Court of

those factual findings and legal conclusions and shall “waive the right to challenge on

appeal the District Court’s order based on unobjected-to factual and legal conclusions”

except upon grounds of plain error if necessary in the interests of justice. 11TH Cir. R. 3-

1; see Resolution Trust Co. v. Hallmark Builders, Inc., 996 F.2d 1144, 1149 (11th Cir.

1993)(“When the magistrate provides such notice and a party still fails to object to the

findings of fact [and legal conclusions] and those findings are adopted by the district court

the party may not challenge them on appeal in the absence of plain error or manifest

injustice.”); Henley v. Johnson, 885 F.2d 790, 794 (11th Cir. 1989).

DONE this 28th day of October, 2019.

/s/ Charles S. Coody

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE