Com. v. Strouse, L.

J-S35029-24

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

: PENNSYLVANIA

Appellant :

:

:

v. :

:

:

LINDA SUE STROUSE : No. 171 MDA 2024

Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered January 29, 2024

In the Court of Common Pleas of Lycoming County Criminal Division at

No(s): CP-41-CR-0001890-2018

BEFORE: PANELLA, P.J.E., MURRAY, J., and KING, J.

MEMORANDUM BY MURRAY, J.: FILED OCTOBER 28, 2024

The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania appeals from the order granting

Linda Sue Strouse’s (Defendant) petition filed pursuant to the Post Conviction

Relief Act (PCRA), 42 Pa.C.S.A. § §§ 9541-9546, and granting Defendant the

opportunity to withdraw her nolo contendere plea. After careful review, we

affirm.

The PCRA court summarized the underlying factual and procedural

history:

On January 4th, 2019, [Defendant] was charged with 124

counts of theft and forgery related to monies that she stole and

spent from the victim, Rose Strouse[ (Rose)], deceased[, who was

over 60 years of age at the time the offenses were committed].

Rose [] was form[er]ly [Defendant]’s Mother-in-Law. This matter

was originally scheduled for a guilty plea on January 14th, 2019,

but was continued numerous times until it eventually was put on

the trial list on March 4th, 2020. On June 4th, 2021[,] the

Commonwealth filed a motion to amend the information, and on

June 7th, 2021[,] the information was amended to reduce the

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charges to 25 counts. On the same date[, Defendant entered an

open plea of nolo contendere] to all 25 counts[,1] and was

sentenced by [the trial court] on September 2nd, 2021[, to an

aggregate 50 to 100 months in prison].[ Christian Lovecchio,

Esquire (plea counsel), represented Defendant at her plea and

sentencing hearings.]

Thereafter, [Defendant] filed a [PCRA petition] on

September 13th, 2021. Argument was held on December 23rd,

2021, and [the PCRA court] denied [Defendant’s petition] by

Opinion and Order dated January 12th, 2022. [Defendant] did not

file [an] appeal. [Defendant filed a second PCRA petition] on

March 22nd, 2022. After the filing of her petition[,] Donald

Martino, Esquire[ (PCRA counsel]), was appointed as counsel. In

this [second PCRA] petition[,] Defendant was seeking relief by

way of her [direct] appeal rights being reinstated[,] and

[requested] that her sentence be amended by order finding that

she [was eligible for the Recidivism Risk Reduction Incentive

(RRRI)2 program]. Upon no objection by the Commonwealth[,]

Defendant’s petition was granted[,] her sentence was amended

and her direct appeal rights were reinstated.

[Defendant] filed a timely appeal alleging that the trial

[c]ourt abused its discretion when imposing her sentence. The

Superior Court of Pennsylvania affirmed th[e trial c]ourt’s

sentence on March 3rd, 2023. Defendant’s sentence then became

final on or about April 3rd, 2023. On May 22nd, 2023[, Appellant

filed] the present[,] timely[, PCRA petition, pro se].

____________________________________________

1 Pertinently, Appellant entered nolo contendere pleas to two counts of theft

by deception, 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3922(a)(1), which, under the circumstances of

the instant case, carried mandatory terms of imprisonment. See 42 Pa.C.S.A.

§ 9717(a) (where, as here, the victim of theft by deception is over 60 years

of age, and the perpetrator of the crime is under 60 years of age, the trial

court shall sentence the defendant to a period of incarceration “not less than

12 months, but the imposition of the minimum sentence shall be discretionary

with the court where the court finds justifiable cause and that finding is written

in the opinion.”).

2 Under the RRRI Act, 61 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 4501-4512, eligible offenders may

qualify for lower minimum sentences through their “participation in evidence-

based programs that reduce the risks of future crime….” 61 Pa.C.S.A. § 4502.

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By way of [PCRA counsel], the Defendant filed an amended

petition on June 27th, 2023. In the petition[,] the Defendant

allege[d] that the circumstances surrounding her plea, as a whole,

establish that [] her plea was involuntary, unknowing, and

unintelligent because of the ineffectiveness of her plea counsel.

PCRA Court Opinion, 1/29/24, at 1-2 (footnotes added).

Specifically, in the instant PCRA petition, Defendant averred that 1) plea

counsel did not apprise Defendant of the applicable sentencing guidelines, 2)

plea counsel advised Defendant she was likely to receive a sentence of

probation, 3) the trial court “did not address the rights a defendant has

regarding the entry of a [nolo contendere] plea[,]” and 4) the cumulative

effects of plea counsel’s and the trial court’s errors “amount[ed] to a manifest

injustice and require[d] withdraw[al] of [Defendant’s] nolo contendere

plea[.]” Amended PCRA Petition, 6/27/23, ¶¶ 52, 54, 76, 110. The matter

proceeded to evidentiary hearings on October 20 and November 6, 2023. Plea

counsel, plea counsel’s colleague (Matthew Diemer, Esquire (Attorney

Diemer)), and Defendant testified.

The PCRA court summarized the testimony presented at the evidentiary

hearings:

[Defendant] testified that at no point [did plea counsel] read the

plea form to her. N.T., 10/20/23, at 42. Further, [Defendant]

testified that [plea counsel] never discussed a [nolo contendere]

plea with her, just that she had two options, “go to trial or …

[enter] an open plea[.”] Id. at 42, 45. Overall, [Defendant’s]

testimony in regard to her plea was that she did not understand

the proceedings as nothing was explained to her.

On the contrary, … [plea counsel] testified that, on the day

of [Defendant’s] plea[,] he went through the charges and the

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elements of said charges with [Defendant]. Id. at 7. [Plea

counsel] also testified that he had gone through each question on

the plea colloquy form with [Defendant] and then recorded her

answers. Id. at 13. Further, [plea counsel] stated that he

explained to [Defendant] what a nolo contendere plea was. Id.

at 19. Attorney [] Diemer … stated that he was present at the

time [Defendant] and [plea counsel] went through and filled out

[Defendant’s] plea colloquy. Specifically, [A]ttorney Diemer

testified that [Defendant’s] testimony that she was handed a

blank colloquy form and was asked to sign it, was untrue. N.T.,

11/6/23, at 6. Additionally, he testified that if [] Defendant had

a question while [plea counsel] was filling out the colloquy form[,

plea counsel] answered any of her questions. Id. at 13.

[] Defendant further claim[ed] that she was never told

prison was a possibility, that she was promised a long

probationary sentence, and did not know the sentencing

guidelines. [Defendant] testified [plea counsel] guaranteed that

she would get long[-]term probation. N.T., 10/20/23, at 43-44.

She also stated, “the only thing that was told to me [was] that if

I go to trial, I could face up to 12 years[,”] in response to whether

or not [plea counsel] had talked to [Defendant] at any point about

the advisory guideline sentence range. Id. at 45. [Defendant]

explain[ed] throughout her testimony that she was under the

belief [that] if she went to trial[,] she could face up to twelve (12)

years [in prison], but[,] if she took a plea[,] she would get

probation.[ Finally, Defendant testified that plea counsel never

advised her that two of the offenses to which she entered nolo

contendere pleas carried mandatory terms of incarceration. See

id. at 49.]

[Plea counsel] testified that, although the standard

sentencing ranges were not fil[l]ed in on the plea colloquy form,

he did … explain what the ranges would be to [Defendant]. Id. at

9-10. Also, [plea counsel] stated that he made [Defendant] aware

that there were no guarantees and the sentence was ultimately

up to the [court]. Id. at 10. Further, it was Attorney Diemer’s

testimony that[ plea counsel] told [Defendant] that he would

argue for probation. N.T., 11/6/23, at 9.

PCRA Court Opinion, 1/29/24, at 4-5 (record citations modified).

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The PCRA court issued an opinion and order on January 29, 2024,

granting Defendant’s PCRA petition, and scheduling a hearing “at which time

[Defendant] may withdraw her plea.” PCRA Court Opinion, 1/29/24, at 7. The

PCRA court largely did not find Defendant’s testimony credible. See id. at 5.

However, the PCRA court opined that the

[t]estimony regarding [Defendant’s] knowledge of the mandatory

minimum in this case is less than clear. Although [plea counsel]

testified that he went over the mandatory minimums with []

Defendant, they were never filled in on her [written] plea colloquy.

N.T., 10/20/23, at 14-15. Additionally, there is no notice in the

[Clerk of Court’s] file that the Commonwealth intended to pursue

the [mandatory] minimum sentences. Also, it is [the court’s]

recollection that at the time of sentencing[,] it was unclear

whether [plea] counsel was previously aware of the mandatory

minimums before the date of sentencing.3

….

Throughout the testimony of [plea counsel], he stated that

he made [] Defendant aware that he could only argue for a

probationary sentence[,] and that he could not guarantee

anything. If [plea counsel] was aware at the time [of] Defendant’s

plea of the mandatory minimums associated with her charges[,]

he failed to let her know they would apply in this case.

Additionally, when [plea] counsel was made aware of the

mandatory sentences at the time of sentencing[,] he made no

attempt to withdraw her plea.

Th[e PCRA c]ourt cannot conclude that [Defendant] was

made aware of the mandatory sentence required by law at the

time of her plea. As a result, the [PCRA c]ourt finds that

____________________________________________

3 The court’s recollection is supported by the record.

See N.T., 9/2/21, at 13

(plea counsel requesting a sentence of probation); see also id. at 36 (plea

counsel incorrectly stating the mandatory minimum sentences governed by

42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9717(a) only apply “if the victim was alive” at the time of

sentencing).

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[Defendant’s] plea counsel was ineffective in regard to her plea

on the two counts of [t]heft by [d]eception.

PCRA Court Opinion, 1/29/24, at 6-7 (record citations modified; footnote

added).

The Commonwealth timely appealed.4 On February 2, 2024, the PCRA

court ordered the Commonwealth to file a concise statement of errors

complained of on appeal. Both the PCRA court and the Commonwealth have

complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.

The Commonwealth presents the following issue: “Whether the [PCRA]

court erred by allowing [Defendant] to withdraw her entire [nolo contendere]

____________________________________________

4 On February 14, 2024, Defendant filed an application to quash the

Commonwealth’s appeal, arguing the PCRA court’s January 29, 2024, order

granting Defendant’s PCRA petition is not a final, appealable order, in that it

did not vacate Defendant’s pleas, but, instead, scheduled a hearing where she

“may motion to withdraw her plea[s].” See Application to Quash, 2/14/24, ¶

13 (quoting PCRA Court Opinion, 1/29/24, at 7); see also id. ¶ 23 (arguing

“the Pennsylvania Supreme Court distinguished an order entered addressing

a [PCRA] petition that resolves some claims and schedules a hearing on

others.” (citing Commonwealth v. Scarborough, 64 A.3d 602, 609 (Pa.

2013)). We denied Defendant’s application without prejudice to the merits

panel’s review. In her brief, Defendant reiterates the argument set forth in

her application to quash. See Defendant’s Brief at 5-7.

Upon review, we decline to quash the Commonwealth’s appeal. While the

PCRA court included the additional step of requiring a separate hearing for

Defendant to formally withdraw her pleas, the PCRA court clearly granted the

only relief Defendant sought, which was withdrawal of her nolo contendere

pleas. See Pa.R.A.P. 341(f)(1) (“An order granting, denying, dismissing, or

otherwise disposing of all other claims within a [PCRA petition], shall

constitute a final order for purposes of appeal.”). Accordingly, the instant

matter is ripe for review.

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plea when she is only entitled to withdraw her [nolo contendere] pleas as to

two charges[?]”

Our scope and standard of review from an order granting PCRA relief

are well settled:

Our scope of review “is limited to the PCRA court’s findings and

evidence of record,” viewed … in the light most favorable to … the

party who prevailed before the PCRA court. Commonwealth v.

Small, 238 A.3d 1267, 1280 (Pa. 2020) (citing Commonwealth

v. Hanible, 30 A.3d 426, 438 (Pa. 2011)). “Our standard of

review calls for us to determine whether the ruling of the PCRA

court is supported by the record and free of legal error.”

Commonwealth v. Wharton, 263 A.3d 561, 567 (Pa. 2021)

(quoting Commonwealth v. Washington, 927 A.2d 586, 593

(Pa. 2007)).

Commonwealth v. Robinson, 278 A.3d 336, 340 (Pa. Super. 2022)

(citations modified; brackets omitted). “The PCRA court’s credibility

determinations, when supported by the record, are binding on this Court.”

Commonwealth v. Mojica, 242 A.3d 949, 956 (Pa. Super. 2020) (quoting

Commonwealth v. Medina, 92 A.3d 1210, 1214-15 (Pa. Super. 2014)).

Instantly, the PCRA court granted relief based on plea counsel’s

ineffectiveness. Although the Commonwealth does not challenge the PCRA

court’s ineffectiveness finding,5 it is helpful to our analysis to briefly outline

the law with respect to ineffective assistance of counsel claims.

____________________________________________

5 The Commonwealth raised six additional issues in its 1925(b) statement

alleging the PCRA court erred in various respects when it found plea counsel

provided ineffective assistance of counsel. However, in its brief, the

Commonwealth abandoned its challenges to the PCRA court’s ineffectiveness

(Footnote Continued Next Page)

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To be entitled to relief based on a claim of ineffective assistance of

counsel, a PCRA petitioner must establish that: 1) the underlying claim is of

arguable merit; 2) there was no reasonable basis for counsel’s action or

inaction; and 3) but for counsel’s error, there is a “reasonable probability the

result of the proceeding would have been different.” Commonwealth v.

Treiber, 121 A.3d 435, 444 (Pa. 2015). “The ‘reasonable probability’ test is

not a stringent one.” Commonwealth v. Hickman, 799 A.2d 136, 141 (Pa.

Super. 2002) (citation omitted).

“The right to the constitutionally effective assistance of counsel extends

to counsel’s role in guiding his client with regard to the consequences of

entering into a guilty plea.” Commonwealth v. Barndt, 74 A.3d 185, 192

(Pa. Super. 2013) (citation omitted). “In the context of a plea, an

ineffectiveness [claim] may provide relief only if the alleged ineffectiveness

caused an involuntary or unknowing plea.” Commonwealth v. Midgley, 289

A.3d 1111, 1119 (Pa. Super. 2023) (citation omitted).

Where a court finds “a reasonable probability that [a defendant] would

not have pled guilty but for plea counsel’s constitutionally deficient advice, …

[her] plea [is] involuntary and unknowing.” Hickman, 799 A.2d at 142 (citing

Hill v. Lockart, 474 U.S. 52 (1985)); see also Commonwealth v.

____________________________________________

determination. See Commonwealth Brief at 14 (“After reflection and

additional research, the Commonwealth is no longer challenging the [PCRA]

court’s decision granting PCRA relief ….”). Accordingly, we only address the

Commonwealth’s remaining issue.

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Velazquez, 216 A.3d 1146, 1150 (Pa. Super. 2019) (“The reasonable

probability test refers to a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in

the outcome.” (citation omitted)); Barndt, 74 A.3d at 199-200 (“[P]rejudice

may be established by demonstrating a reasonable probability that [an

a]ppellant would have opted to go to trial rather than plead guilty had [s]he

been given legally sound advice.” (citation omitted)).

Where the PCRA court determines a petitioner is owed relief, “it shall

order appropriate relief and issue supplementary orders as to rearraignment,

retrial, custody, bail, discharge, correction of sentence or other matters that

are necessary and proper.” 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9546(a). However, “[g]enerally,

when a petitioner is granted PCRA relief for ineffective assistance of counsel,

a new trial is granted.” Commonwealth v. Young, 35 A.3d 54, 64 (Pa.

Super. 2011).

Preliminarily, we consider whether the Commonwealth preserved its

sole issue for our review. Defendant argues that the Commonwealth waived

its claim “due to its failure to include the issue presented in its [Pa.R.A.P.]

1925(b) concise statement of matters complained of on appeal.” Defendant’s

Brief at 8 (some capitalization modified).

Under our appellate rules, an appellant may not raise issues on appeal

that were not raised before the trial court. See Pa.R.A.P. 302(a) (providing

that issues not raised in the lower court are waived and cannot be raised for

the first time on appeal). It is axiomatic that “any issue not raised in a Rule

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1925(b) statement will be deemed waived for appellate review.”

Commonwealth v. Bonnett, 239 A.3d 1096, 1106 (Pa. Super. 2020) (citing

Commonwealth v. Lord, 719 A.2d 306, 309 (Pa. 1998)). We have further

observed that “[a] concise statement which is too vague to allow the court to

identify the issues raised on appeal is the functional equivalent to no concise

statement at all.” Commonwealth v. Vurimindi, 200 A.3d 1031, 1038 (Pa.

Super. 2018) (citation omitted; some capitalization modified).

Instantly, the Commonwealth identified the following issue in its

Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement:

The [PCRA] court erred as a matter of law in allowing Defendant

to withdraw her guilty plea as to all counts when the court only

found plea counsel ineffective with respect to his legal advice for

two counts. The proper remedy would be for Defendant to be

resentenced under the sentencing guidelines for those two counts

only.

1925(b) Statement, 2/13/24, ¶ 3.

Defendant argues

[t]he [PCRA] court’s 1925(a) opinion specifically addresses [the

Commonwealth’s issue as stated in its] 1925(b) statement.

However, because the Commonwealth has altered the proposed

remedy related to the error, the [PCRA] court has not addressed

the Commonwealth’s proposed remedy of permitting [Defendant]

to withdraw her plea on only two (2) counts of the multiple counts

she entered a plea to. The [PCRA] court’s 1925(a) opinion

addresses the Commonwealth’s request to resentence

[Defendant] on those two counts without consideration of the

mandatory sentencing provisions utilized. Therefore, the [PCRA]

court’s position on the Commonwealth’s altered appeal issue is

unknown. This discrepancy poses a substantial impediment to

meaningful and effective appellate review as this Court is left to

speculate on the [PCRA] court’s position on a withdrawal of

[Defendant’s] plea on the two (2) counts surrounded by error.

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Defendant’s Brief at 9-10 (some capitalization modified).

We are unpersuaded by Defendant’s argument. The question the

Commonwealth presents in its brief, regarding whether Defendant was

entitled to withdraw all of her pleas, is consistent with the issue presented in

its Rule 1925(b) statement. While the Commonwealth’s position has shifted

concerning the relief it believes Defendant is owed, see Commonwealth Brief

at 20 (opining Defendant is entitled to proceed to trial on her defective theft

by deception convictions, and must be resentenced on her remaining

convictions), the predicate question of whether the PCRA court erred in

allowing Defendant to withdraw all of her pleas remains the same. Therefore,

we conclude the Commonwealth properly preserved this issue.

As we have concluded the Commonwealth preserved its issue for review,

we turn to the merits of its claim. The Commonwealth observes that the PCRA

court did not credit a significant portion of Defendant’s testimony. See

Commonwealth Brief at 15 (citing PCRA Court Opinion, 1/29/24, at 5). The

Commonwealth acknowledges, however, that the PCRA court did find credible

Defendant’s testimony that “she was never told that there were mandatory

sentencing provisions that might apply to her case, and[,] if she had known,

she would not have entered a plea[,] but would have gone to trial.” Id. at

15. Nevertheless, the Commonwealth maintains the PCRA court’s order

permitting Defendant to withdraw all of her pleas

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was not the correct remedy. The correct remedy would have been

to vacate the sentence, but only allow [Defendant] to withdraw

her plea with respect to two charges. Because [Defendant] failed

to meet her burden of proof regarding [plea] counsel’s

performance and advice related to twenty-three (23) of the

twenty-five (25) charges that she pled [nolo contendere] to, she

is not entitled to withdraw her [nolo contendere] pleas with

respect to those twenty-three (23) charges. She can withdraw

her [nolo contendere] plea and proceed to trial only on the two

theft by deception charges, because that is the only relief that she

is entitled to in light of the factual findings and legal conclusions

by the [PCRA] court following the PCRA hearing.

Id. at 16 (emphasis in original).

In support of its position, the Commonwealth relies on Commonwealth

v. DiMatteo, 177 A.3d 182 (Pa. 2018), and Commonwealth v. Conaway,

105 A.3d 755 (Pa. Super. 2014). See Commonwealth Brief at 16, 19.

In DiMatteo, the defendant entered guilty pleas to numerous drug-

related offenses, several of which carried mandatory minimum sentences that

the trial court imposed. See DiMatteo, 177 A.3d at 183. The defendant

timely filed a post-sentence motion seeking reconsideration of his sentence,

which the trial court denied. See id. at 184. Five days later, the United States

Supreme Court decided Alleyne v. United States, 570 U.S. 99 (2013)

(holding that “[a]ny fact that, by law, increases the penalty for a crime is an

‘element’ that must be submitted to the jury and found beyond a reasonable

doubt.”). See id.

The defendant did not file a direct appeal; instead, he filed a PCRA

petition alleging counsel’s ineffectiveness for failing “to investigate a change

in the law which prohibits the imposition of the mandatory minimum sentences

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under which he was sentenced[,] and for [failing] to file a direct appeal.” Id.

The trial court denied the defendant’s PCRA petition. On appeal, this Court

vacated the defendant’s sentence based on Alleyne and remanded the matter

for resentencing. See id. The Commonwealth appealed. Id. at 185.

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court agreed with this Court that Alleyne

rendered the defendant’s sentence illegal. See id. at 191. The DiMatteo

Court further agreed that the defendant was only entitled to resentencing, as

opposed to vacation of his plea, distinguishing the defendant’s case from

Commonwealth v. Melendez-Negron, 123 A.3d 1087 (Pa. Super. 2015):

[T]he appropriate remedy in this case is vacating the judgment of

sentence and remanding without consideration of the mandatory

minimum sentence. We reach this conclusion based on the

particular circumstances and timing of the entry of [the

defendant’s] plea. Although both this case and Melendez–

Negron arise in the context of seeking collateral relief under the

PCRA, the remedies are specific to the unique procedural

posture of the case. First, we note that the Superior Court in

Melendez–Negron analyzed the claim under the ineffectiveness

paradigm. A finding that plea counsel was constitutionally

ineffective which resulted in prejudice entitled Melendez–Negron

to relief under the PCRA in the form of vacating the plea. See 42

Pa.C.S. § 9543(a)(2)(ii). In the instant circumstance, the

Superior Court found the illegality of the sentence manifest and

ordered relief from the illegal sentence, a remedy authorized by

the PCRA. 42 Pa.C.S. § 9542. Moreover, Melendez–Negron’s

negotiated guilty plea was accepted on November 15, 2013, which

was five months after the decision in Alleyne was announced and

one month following the intermediate court’s opinion in which it

determined that Section 9712.1 was unconstitutional as applied.

See Melendez–Negron, 123 A.3d at 1090–91. Consequently,

at the time of the plea, counsel was ineffective for failing to advise

Melendez–Negron to “reject a plea that incorporated a sentence

based upon § 9712.1.[”] …. Id. at 1091.

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DiMatteo, 177 A.3d at 195–96 (emphasis added). The Court further

observed that “the holding[] of [Melendez-Negron] appl[ies] only to

negotiated guilty pleas, not to open guilty pleas.” Id. at 196.

In Conaway, the defendant proceeded to trial on burglary and related

offenses. Conaway, 105 A.3d at 756. The Conaway Court found that the

trial court erred by specifically instructing the jury that the Commonwealth

had proven one of the elements of the burglary charge. See id. at 763. The

Court then briefly addressed the remedy to which the defendant was entitled,

vacating the burglary conviction and remanding for a new trial on that sole

count. See id. at 765. The Court explained, “because we are vacating a

conviction in a multiple count case, and vacating [the defendant’s] burglary

conviction may upset the overall sentencing scheme vis-à-vis [the

defendant’s] other convictions, we vacate the entire judgment of sentence.”

Id.

In the instant case, Defendant was neither subjected to an illegal

sentence, nor was she found guilty by a jury. Instead, Defendant alleged that

plea counsel failed to apprise her of a direct consequence of her guilty plea:

the imposition of mandatory minimum sentences. Further, the trial court

credited Defendant’s testimony that she “would have went to trial” had plea

counsel informed her of the mandatory minimum sentences she was facing.

N.T., 10/20/23, at 55. We are bound by the credibility determinations of the

PCRA court where, as here, they are supported by the record. See Mojica,

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242 A.3d at 956; see also PCRA Court Opinion, 1/29/24, at 7 (finding that

“[i]f [plea counsel] was aware … of the mandatory minimums associated with

[Defendant’s] charges[,] he failed to let her know they would apply in this

case.”).

The cases relied upon by the Commonwealth are inapposite and

unavailing. Moreover, the Commonwealth has not supplied this Court with

any authority demonstrating that the PCRA court was not permitted to

consider the individual circumstances of Defendant’s case in tailoring an

appropriate order granting relief. To the contrary, the PCRA itself empowers

courts to “order appropriate relief” where a petitioner presents a meritorious

claim. 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9546(a); see also DiMatteo, 177 A.3d at 195 (stating

PCRA “remedies are specific to the unique procedural posture of the case[,]”

and based on the “particular circumstances” of a defendant’s plea). As the

Commonwealth concedes the PCRA court credited Defendant’s testimony that

she would have proceeded to trial but for plea counsel’s ineffectiveness, see

Commonwealth Brief at 15, we discern no legal error in the PCRA court’s

remedy of granting Defendant’s request to withdraw her entire plea so that

she may proceed to trial.

Order affirmed.

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Judgment Entered.

Benjamin D. Kohler, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 10/28/2024

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