State of New Jersey v. Robert J. Hartobey

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the

internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-3498-22

STATE OF NEW JERSEY,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

ROBERT J. HARTOBEY,

Defendant-Appellant.

_________________________

Argued October 1, 2024 – Decided October 25, 2024

Before Judges Gooden Brown and Vanek.

On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law

Division, Somerset County, Indictment No. 21-04-

0268.

Rachel E. Leslie, Assistant Deputy Public Defender,

argued the cause for appellant (Jennifer N. Sellitti,

Public Defender, attorney; Rachel E. Leslie, of counsel

and on the briefs).

Alyssa N. Biamonte, Assistant Prosecutor, argued the

cause for respondent (John P. McDonald, Somerset

County Prosecutor, attorney; Alyssa N. Biamonte, of

ounsel and on the brief).

PER CURIAM

Following a jury trial, defendant Robert Hartobey was convicted of animal

cruelty stemming from him kicking and punching his dog, Nessa. The State's

proofs at trial included eyewitness testimony from a good Samaritan, two

responding police officers, an animal control officer, and a veterinarian, all of

whom saw the dog either during the attack or the day after. Defendant, who was

already serving a sentence of parole supervision for life (PSL), N.J.S.A. 2C:43-

6.4, for an unrelated conviction, received a county jail sentence with additional

conditions imposed on his PSL sentence.

On appeal, defendant raises the following points for our consideration:

POINT I

DEFENDANT'S ANIMAL CRUELTY CONVICTION

MUST BE REVERSED BECAUSE THE JURY

INSTRUCTIONS FAILED TO DEFINE THE

CENTRAL ELEMENT OF THE OFFENSE. (NOT

RAISED BELOW).

POINT II

THE COURT ERRED IN DENYING DEFENDANT'S

MOTION FOR A JUDGMENT OF ACQUITTAL

BECAUSE THE STATE FAILED TO PRESENT

EVIDENCE THAT DEFENDANT ACTED

UNNECESSARILY OR CRUELY.

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POINT III

THE NON-CUSTODIAL PORTION OF

DEFENDANT'S SENTENCE IS ILLEGAL AND

MUST BE VACATED BECAUSE THE COURT HAD

NO AUTHORITY TO IMPOSE CONDITIONS ON

DEFENDANT'S PAROLE SUPERVISION FOR LIFE,

AND BECAUSE ALL SENTENCES MUST BE

AUTHORIZED BY LAW.

1. Sentencing Courts Lack Jurisdiction To

Impose Conditions Of Parole.

2. Sentencing Courts May Only Impose

Sentences Authorized By Statute.

Based on our review of the record and the applicable legal principles, we affirm

the conviction but vacate the noncustodial portion of defendant's sentence.

I.

On April 14, 2021, defendant was charged in a Somerset County

indictment with fourth degree cruelty to animals, N.J.S.A. 4:22-17(c)(1). We

glean these facts from the three-day jury trial conducted from May 8 to 10, 2023.

At approximately 10:00 p.m. on May 8, 2020, Heather Dougherty was

"sitting down in [her] living room" with her dog when she heard "a loud thud

against [her] house," followed "about ten seconds later" by "another loud thud."

Dougherty went outside onto her porch and observed a man "kicking" what she

believed was "a book bag" until she "heard . . . whimpering and realized it was

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a dog." Dougherty did not see the man "slam [the] dog against" the foundation

of her house but testified that she "felt it from [her] living room" and that her

dog reacted to it. After yelling at the man "to get the hell off that dog," to which

the man responded that she should "get [her] . . . fat ass back in the house,"

Dougherty went back inside and called 9-1-1. According to Dougherty, as she

reported the incident to the 9-1-1 dispatcher, she observed defendant "kicking"

and "dragging" the dog. She testified the dog "wasn't walking" and "was

whimpering."

Manville Police Officers Michael Zangrillo and David Somonski

responded and observed a man, later identified as defendant, fitting the

description reported in the dispatch. When they arrived on the scene, the officers

saw defendant "striking" the dog "with a closed fist" on "[t]he top of [her] head,"

using "a downward motion." Defendant had "the dog leashed around the neck"

and was "pulling the leash . . . to force the dog to raise [her] head," which Officer

Zangrillo believed was "to make it easier to strike the dog." The officers

witnessed defendant strike the dog twice and then "made contact with

[defendant] as he was attempting his third [strike]."

The officers described defendant as "intoxicated" with "[s]lurred speech,

bloodshot watery eyes, unsteady[,] staggering walk" and emitting "the odor of

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an alcoholic beverage . . . on his breath and . . . person." The dog, later identified

as Nessa, "appeared frightened of . . . defendant" and "scared." She had her "tail

between her legs,"1 her ears tucked "behind [her] head," and she was

"whimpering," "shaking," and "cowering towards the ground." She had an "open

wound" and "fresh blood" on "the very top of [her] head" about "an inch . . .

from her eye." The officers arrested defendant and brought Nessa "[b]ack to the

police station." While at the police station, Nessa was still "[f]rightened,"

"shaking," and "scared." She ran "underneath a trailer" in the station's "sally

port" and "just laid down."

The police contacted the Somerset Regional Animal Shelter to pick up

Nessa, and animal control officer Christopher Moroney responded to the call.

When Moroney arrived at the police station, Nessa was in the "bay area" where

the police cars were located and "hunkered down under [a] car, . . . trying to

make herself as small as could be." According to Moroney, Nessa appeared

"very nervous" and "very frightened." Moroney used dog treats to "coax [Nessa]

out," "lifted her in[to the shelter's] truck," and "transported her to the shelter."

When Moroney picked Nessa up, "she yelped" as if she was in pain.

1

There was conflicting testimony as to whether Nessa had a tail. On cross-

examination, Officer Somonski testified that "[t]he tail looked like it was

between [the dog's] legs."

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The next day, Moroney took Nessa to Whitehouse Veterinary Hospital

where Dr. Brett Newton examined her. Newton "approximated Nessa's age to

be around six months old" and testified that she weighed "[a]bout [fifty]

pounds." Nessa underwent a "full physical examination," including

"radiographs," "a cursory ultrasound," and "blood tests." The radiographs were

"normal" and did not show "bruising to the lungs or broken ribs." Both the

cursory ultrasound and blood work also came back "normal." Newton observed

"some abnormalities in the physical examination," notably "ear mites" as well

as "scabbing and hair loss in a couple [of] different places." Newton believed

that "demodectic mange" was "one of the possible causes for the hair loss on

Nessa's body."

Defendant produced two witnesses, his mother, Catherine McCarthney,

whom Nessa lived with after leaving the shelter, and Dr. Beth Sulner, who was

qualified "as an expert in veterinary medicine" and who treated Nessa over three

months after the incident. McCarthney described Nessa as a "shy" "couch

potato" who "sleeps all the time." She agreed that Nessa was not "violent,"

"vicious," or "aggressive," and was a "very lovable" dog.

Sulner testified that Nessa was brought to her veterinary practice on

August 13, 2020, and treated by her associate, Dr. Jennifer Feeney. According

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to hospital notes reviewed by Sulner, Nessa "came in for a patch of hair loss on

the top of her head." Feeney's examination, which included a skin scrape,

revealed that Nessa had "demodex," "a type of mite that lives under the skin."

As a result, Nessa was diagnosed with "mange."

After the jury returned a guilty verdict, the judge sentenced defendant to

180 days in the county jail and imposed various conditions on his PSL sentence.

The judge memorialized the sentence in a conforming judgment of conviction

entered on June 27, 2023, and this appeal followed.

II.

In Point I, defendant argues he "was denied a fair trial because the critical

element of the animal cruelty charge was never defined for the jury."

Specifically, defendant argues that although the State proceeded "under the

theory that [defendant] 'unnecessarily or cruelly beat' or 'cruelly abuse[d]' the

dog," the jury instructions failed to define "'unnecessarily' and 'cruelly.'"

Defendant further asserts that although the judge "followed the language of the

model charge for animal cruelty," the charge "adds nothing to the statutory terms

of the offense" and fails to "define the acts that constitute" "cruel" or

"unnecessary." Defendant posits that although our courts have not "explored

the meaning of these terms in this context, . . . child cruelty cases provide a

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useful analog." At trial, defendant did not ask the judge to tailor the model jury

charge nor did defendant object to the charge that was delivered.

The governing legal principles that guide our analysis are well settled.

"Appropriate and proper charges to a jury are essential for a fair trial." State v.

Lora, 465 N.J. Super. 477, 501 (App. Div. 2020) (quoting State v. Green, 86

N.J. 281, 287 (1981)). "Jury charges must provide a 'comprehensible

explanation of the questions that the jury must determine, including the law of

the case applicable to the facts that the jury may find.'" State v. Singleton, 211

N.J. 157, 181-82 (2012) (quoting Green, 86 N.J. at 287-88).

If a defendant does not object when a charge is given, as here, "there is a

presumption that the charge was not error and was unlikely to prejudice the

defendant's case." State v. Montalvo, 229 N.J. 300, 320 (2017) (quoting

Singleton, 211 N.J. at 182). When there is no objection, we review for plain

error and "disregard any alleged error 'unless it is of such a nature as to have

been clearly capable of producing an unjust result.'" State v. Funderburg, 225

N.J. 66, 79 (2016) (quoting R. 2:10-2); see State v. Adams, 194 N.J. 186, 206-

07 (2008) ("Generally, a defendant waives the right to contest an instruction on

appeal if he does not object to the instructions as required by Rule 1:7-2.").

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Plain error in a jury charge is "[l]egal impropriety in the charge

prejudicially affecting the substantial rights of the defendant [and] sufficiently

grievous to justify notice by the reviewing court and to convince the court that

of itself the error possessed a clear capacity to bring about an unjust result."

State v. Camacho, 218 N.J. 533, 554 (2014) (first alteration in original) (quoting

Adams, 194 N.J. at 207). "Nevertheless, because clear and correct jury

instructions are fundamental to a fair trial, erroneous instructions in a criminal

case are 'poor candidates for rehabilitation under the plain error theory.'"

Adams, 194 N.J. at 207 (quoting State v. Jordan, 147 N.J. 409, 422-23 (1997)).

To determine whether there was error in a jury charge, "[t]he charge must

be read as a whole." State v. Torres, 183 N.J. 554, 564 (2005) (citing Jordan,

147 N.J. at 422). We "must not look at portions of the charge alleged to be

erroneous in isolation; rather, 'the charge should be examined as a whole to

determine its overall effect,' and 'whether the challenged language was

misleading or ambiguous.'" State v. McKinney, 223 N.J. 475, 494 (2015) (first

quoting Jordan, 147 N.J. at 422; and then quoting State v. Nelson, 173 N.J. 417,

447 (2002)). In addition, the error "must be evaluated in light 'of the overall

strength of the State's case.'" State v. Walker, 203 N.J. 73, 90 (2010) (quoting

State v. Chapland, 187 N.J. 275, 289 (2006)).

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Here, defendant was charged with animal cruelty under N.J.S.A. 4:22-

17(c)(1), which provides "[i]t shall be unlawful to purposely, knowingly, or

recklessly . . . [t]orment, torture, maim, hang, poison, unnecessarily or cruelly

beat, cruelly abuse, or needlessly mutilate a living animal or creature . . . ." In

the final charge, the judge instructed the jury:

[I]n order to find the defendant guilty of this

offense . . . , the State must prove each of the following

elements beyond a reasonable doubt. There are three

elements. Number one, that the defendant acted

purposely, knowingly, or recklessly; number two, that

the defendant committed one or more of the following

acts, tormented, tortured, maimed, hung, poisoned,

unnecessarily or cruelly beat, cruelly abused or

needlessly mutilated; and, number three, that the

defendant committed this conduct against a living

animal or creature.

In explaining the second element to the jury, the judge stated:

[T]he second element that the State must prove beyond

a reasonable doubt is that the defendant committed one

or more of the following acts, tormented the animal,

tortured the animal, maimed the animal, hung the

animal, poisoned the animal, unnecessarily or cruelly

beat the animal, cruelly abused the animal or needlessly

mutilated the animal. Specifically, the State alleges

here that [defendant] unnecessarily or cruelly beat or

cruelly abused Nessa, the six-month-old puppy.

In instructing the jury, the judge read the model jury charge in its entirety

almost verbatim. See Model Jury Charges (Criminal), "Animal Cruelty –

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Torment/Torture (N.J.S.A. 4:22-17(c)(1))" (approved June 7, 2021). Although

model jury charges "are not binding authority," State v. Bryant, 419 N.J. Super.

15, 28 (App. Div. 2011), "a jury charge is presumed to be proper when it tracks

the model jury charge because the process to adopt model jury charges is

'comprehensive and thorough.'" State v. Cotto, 471 N.J. Super. 489, 543 (App.

Div. 2022) (quoting State v. R.B., 183 N.J. 308, 325 (2005)); see Mogull v. C.B.

Com. Real Est. Grp., Inc., 162 N.J. 449, 466 (2000) (noting that "[i]t is difficult

to find that a charge that follows the Model Charge so closely constitutes plain

error"); see also R.B., 183 N.J. at 325 (instructing trial courts to follow the model

jury charges and read them "in their entirety to the jury").

Defendant invites us to look to "child cruelty cases" as "a useful analog"

because, he asserts, the model jury charge for child abuse defines the term

"cruelty." We decline the invitation. The model jury charge for child abuse

does not define the term "cruelty" generally; instead, it provides "that the State

must prove beyond a reasonable doubt . . . that defendant knowingly committed

an act of cruelty against" a child and then provides five possible "act[s] of

cruelty," one or more of which the defendant must have committed to be found

guilty of the charge. See Model Jury Charges (Criminal), "Abuse/Cruelty to

Child (Non-Parent/Guardian/Person Having Control) (N.J.S.A. 9:6-1; N.J.S.A.

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9:6-3)" (approved April 16, 2012). Similarly, the model jury charge for animal

cruelty provides that "the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt . . . that

the defendant committed one or more of the following acts" and then defines

those acts as "tormented the animal; tortured the animal; maimed the animal;

hung the animal; poisoned the animal; unnecessarily or cruelly beat the animal;

cruelly abused the animal; or needlessly mutilated the animal." Model Jury

Charges (Criminal), "Animal Cruelty – Torment/Torture (N.J.S.A. 4:22-

17(c)(1))" (approved June 7, 2021).

We have previously acknowledged that "[a] court's obligation properly to

instruct and to guide a jury includes the duty to clarify statutory language that

prescribes the elements of a crime when clarification is essential to ensure that

the jury will fully understand and actually find those elements in determining

the defendant's guilt." State v. N.I., 349 N.J. Super. 299, 308 (App. Div. 2002)

(quoting State v. Alexander, 136 N.J. 563, 571 (1994)). However, "[t]his is not

to say that every word used in a charge must be further defined even when it has

a readily and commonly understood meaning." Id. at 308 (citing State v. Rovito,

99 N.J. 581, 584-85 (1985)). Indeed, "[c]ertain words can be understood by 'a

person of average intelligence' and 'would not send the average citizen

scrambling for a dictionary.'" Id. at 308-09 (quoting State v. Afanador, 134 N.J.

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162, 171 (1993)). As such, "[w]ords 'used by ordinary citizens in everyday

conversation' need not be defined." Id. at 309 (quoting Afanador, 134 N.J. at

175). Here, we are satisfied that "cruelly" and "unnecessarily" required no

further definition or clarification for the jury.

In Point II, defendant argues that because "the State did not present

sufficient evidence that [defendant] acted unnecessarily or cruelly," the trial

court erroneously denied his motion for a judgment of acquittal and "the [animal

cruelty] offense should not have been submitted for the jury's consideration."

"Motions for a judgment of acquittal are governed by Rule 3:18-1," State

v. Tindell, 417 N.J. Super. 530, 548 (App. Div. 2011), which provides in part,

"[a]t the close of the State's case . . . , the court shall, on defendant's motion or

its own initiative, order the entry of a judgment of acquittal of one or more

offenses charged in the indictment . . . if the evidence is insufficient to warrant

a conviction."

But

a trial court must deny the defendant's motion if

"viewing the State's evidence in its entirety . . . and

giving the State the benefit of all its favorable

testimony as well as all of the favorable inferences

which reasonably could be drawn therefrom, a

reasonable jury could find guilt . . . beyond a reasonable

doubt." State v. Wilder, 193 N.J. 398, 406 (2008)

(quoting State v. Reyes, 50 N.J. 454, 458-59 (1967)).

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[State v. Ellis, 424 N.J. Super. 267, 273 (App. Div.

2012) (omissions in original).]

"On appeal, we utilize the same standard as the trial court in determining

whether a judgment of acquittal was warranted," ibid., but we apply "a de novo

standard of review," State v. Williams, 218 N.J. 576, 593-94 (2014), and "owe

no deference to the findings of . . . the trial court," State v. Lodzinski, 249 N.J.

116, 145 (2021).

At the close of the State's case, defendant moved for a judgment of

acquittal, arguing the evidence was insufficient to warrant a conviction for

animal cruelty. Relying on the testimony of Dougherty and the two responding

police officers, all of whom actually observed defendant repeatedly strike Nessa,

the judge denied the motion. We agree that viewing the State's evidence in its

entirety in the light most favorable to the State, a reasonable jury could have

found defendant guilty of animal cruelty. Three witnesses testified that they

saw defendant physically assault Nessa. Dougherty saw defendant kick Nessa

and the responding officers both saw defendant punch Nessa twice and attempt

a third strike before they interceded. Further, Zangrillo and Somonski observed

an "open wound" and "fresh blood" on "the very top of [Nessa's] head."

Additionally, both officers as well as Moroney described Nessa as scared and

frightened. Moroney also testified that Nessa "yelped" as if she was in pain

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when he picked her up to load her into the truck.

Defendant asserts "the State was required to prove that [he] inflicted

unnecessary pain or suffering, or prolonged torment, upon the animal" and "[t]he

State failed to carry that burden" because "the dog had no signs of bruising, no

signs of trauma, and no fractures" the day after defendant's arrest, and none of

the State's witnesses "testified about events preceding the alleged punching or

kicking." However, contrary to defendant's assertions, the State was only

required to present evidence that defendant unnecessarily or cruelly beat Nessa,

which it did. Indeed, a violation of the statute will be upgraded from fourth

degree to third degree if "the animal or creature suffers serious bodily injury as

a result of the violation." N.J.S.A. 4:22-17(d)(1)(b).

In Point III, defendant argues that because the judge had "no authority" to

impose conditions on his existing PSL sentence, the non-custodial portion of his

sentence was not "authorized by law" and "must be vacated." The challenged

conditions of parole are that defendant shall: (1) have no contact with Nessa;

(2) never own or care for any other animals; and (3) attend anger management

counseling. Defendant does not contest the 180-day county jail sentence or

financial penalties imposed.

The legality of a sentence is reviewed "de novo, 'affording no special

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deference to the court['s] interpretation of the relevant statutes.'" State v.

Steingraber, 465 N.J. Super. 322, 327-28 (App. Div. 2020) (alteration in

original) (quoting State v. Nance, 228 N.J. 378, 393 (2017)). We "may correct

an illegal sentence 'at any time before it is completed.'" Id. at 328 (quoting State

v. Murray, 162 N.J. 240, 247 (2000)); see R. 3:21-10(b)(5) ("A motion may be

filed and an order may be entered at any time . . . correcting a sentence not

authorized by law including the Code of Criminal Justice . . . ."). "If a

defendant's sentence is illegal, a reviewing court must remand for resentencing."

Steingraber, 465 N.J. Super. at 328.

"There are two categories of illegal sentences: those that exceed the

penalties authorized for a particular offense, and those that are not authorized

by law." State v. Hyland, 238 N.J. 135, 145 (2019).

Those two categories of illegal sentences have been

"defined narrowly." [Murray, 162 N.J. at 246]. For

example, . . . [a sentence] is not illegal if the sentencing

judge fails to state the reasons for imposition of a

sentence on the record as is required by case law, but

otherwise imposes an authorized sentence[.] [State v.]

Acevedo, 205 N.J. [40,] 47 [(2011)]. In other words,

even sentences that disregard controlling case law or

rest on an abuse of discretion by the sentencing court

are legal so long as they impose penalties authorized by

statute for a particular offense and include a disposition

that is authorized by law.

[Id. at 145-46.]

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In State v. Beauchamp, pursuant to a plea agreement, the defendant

pleaded guilty to burglary and contempt and was sentenced to an aggregate

prison term of five years. 262 N.J. Super. 532, 534 (App. Div. 1993). At his

plea hearing, the "defendant admitted to a January 1990 burglary at the home of

his estranged wife and a May 1990 violation of a temporary restraint issued

pursuant to the Prevention of Domestic Violence Act [of 1991], [N.J.S.A.

2C:25-17 to -35], under which defendant had been ordered to stay away from

his wife." Ibid. Three sentencing proceedings were conducted, resulting in the

entry of an amended judgment of conviction that prohibited the defendant from

entering the Township of Fairfield or contacting the victim at her place of

employment in Fairfield as a "condition for release from custody." Id. at 534-

35. In support, the judge explained that the defendant "ha[d] continued to

threaten to kill his wife while incarcerated" and "repeated these threats to family

members." Id. at 535.

On appeal, the defendant challenged the trial court's authority to impose

conditions of parole as part of the sentence imposed. Ibid. We reversed, holding

that "the trial court had no authority to impose conditions of parole." Id. at 536.

We reasoned:

We can understand the considerations that

motivated the sentencing judge, in the circumstances he

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faced, to establish the conditions of parole. We share

his concerns for the safety of the victim and her family

in the light of defendant's past conduct. We are,

nevertheless, constrained to conclude that, under clear,

prevailing rules of law, a sentencing judge is without

the power to establish conditions of parole, even those

that are case- or party-related and may be warranted by

the nature of the circumstances or the quality of the

relationships.

[Ibid.]

Because the defendant was not yet on parole, we expressed "concern[]

with the wisdom of judicially established conditions for parole which are crafted

on sentencing day to govern a defendant some time in the future when he

becomes eligible for parole." Ibid. We also relied on separation of powers

principles to support our decision, stating:

Under our constitutional and statutory scheme,

once a trial court has pronounced sentence and entered

a judgment of conviction, it relinquishes jurisdiction

over the matter to the executive branch, except for the

appellate process and to the extent that regular

procedures permit the matter to be reopened in a

judicial forum for limited purposes which can be

achieved only in a court. See, e.g., R. 3:21-10; 3:22.

Just as the executive branch of government may

not intrude unduly on the judiciary's discharge of its

responsibilities in the sentencing process, State v.

Lagares, 127 N.J. 20, [27-28] (1992), so is the judicial

branch limited in its role thereafter as the sentence is

executed. Creation of the substantive standards

governing both branches is the province of the third, the

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legislative, State v. Des Marets, 92 N.J. 62, 80-81

(1983); and the respective prerogatives of the judiciary

and the executive are each immune from undue

intrusion by the other branch. N.J. Const. art. III, [¶] 1.

[Id. at 537.]

We noted that whereas the sentencing judge's "emphatic

recommendations" had "meaning and viability as background for the Parole

Board," the conditions "articulated by the sentencing judge" were "a nullity

insofar as they were designed to govern and control the decisions whether, when,

and under what conditions parole would be granted to defendant" and therefore

had to "be modified to reflect their correct character as recommendations and

not as mandates." Id. at 538. Indeed, "[t]he symmetry of the constitutional

scheme permits the judicial and executive branches to participate in the other's

province by way of recommendation but not by way of directing the outcome. "

Id. at 537.

Applying these principles, we agree with defendant that the judge did not

have the authority to impose conditions on his existing PSL sentence .

Considering the separation of powers concerns expressed in Beauchamp, the fact

that defendant was already on parole does not justify a different outcome. We

are equally unpersuaded by the State's invited error argument based on defense

counsel inviting the judge to impose anger management counseling as a

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condition of defendant's PSL sentence. See State v. Manzie, 335 N.J. Super.

267, 278 (App. Div. 2000) ("[A] defendant may not acquiesce in the imposition

of an illegal sentence."). Accordingly, we affirm the conviction and the

custodial portion of the sentence but vacate the conditions imposed on

defendant's PSL sentence and remand for modification of the judgment of

conviction to conform with this opinion.2

The conviction is affirmed; the sentence is affirmed in part, reversed in

part, and remanded for modification of the judgment of conviction consistent

with this opinion. We do not retain jurisdiction.

2

Although N.J.S.A. 4:22-26.2 allows a sentencing court to ban a person

convicted of an animal cruelty violation from owning, harboring, residing with,

or having custody or control of any other animals, the statute became effective

in July 2023, more than three years after defendant's offense and over one month

after defendant's sentence, and is not implicated in this appeal.

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