Aishly Foy v. Sheriff of Jefferson County, Alabama

USCA11 Case: 23-11302 Document: 26-2 Date Filed: 10/24/2024 Page: 1 of 7

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Eleventh Circuit

____________________

No. 23-11302

____________________

AISHLY FOY,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

SHERIFF OF JEFFERSON COUNTY, ALABAMA,

ADAM ENNIS,

KATELYN PAYNE,

DAVID AGEE,

TERRY SCOTT,

Defendants-Appellants,

NURSE FLETCHER, et al.,

Defendants.

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2 Order of the Court 23-11302

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Alabama

D.C. Docket No. 2:19-cv-01887-JHE

____________________

Before JORDAN and JILL PRYOR, Circuit Judges.

BY THE COURT:

David Agee, Adam Ennis, Katelyn Payne, Mark Pettway,

and Terry Scott (collectively, the “Pettway Defendants”) appeal

from the district court’s March 20, 2023 order partially granting and

partially denying their motion for summary judgment, specifically

challenging the court’s partial denial of their request for qualified

immunity. That order was entered by a magistrate judge after

Plaintiff Aishly Foy and multiple defendants filed forms indicating

their consent to a magistrate judge conducting the proceedings un-

der 28 U.S.C. § 636(c).

On appeal, we issued jurisdictional questions asking the par-

ties to address whether (1) the denial of qualified immunity was

immediately appealable; (2) Agee and Scott had appellate standing;

and (3) all parties consented under § 636(c). The Pettway Defend-

ants responded, in part, that all proper defendants had consented,

arguing that several individuals identified as defendants in the

amended complaint (the “Maddox Defendants”) were not parties

and that their consent was not required. We concluded that those

individuals were parties and that there was a factual question as to

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23-11302 Order of the Court 3

whether they had consented, so we remanded the case to the dis-

trict court for a factual determination as to whether all defendants

consented.

On remand, the district court held a hearing and concluded

that the Maddox Defendants had implicitly consented. Upon re-

view of the record, including the proceedings on remand, and the

Pettway Defendants’ appellate filings, we conclude that (1) all par-

ties consented under § 636(c); and (2) the partial denial of qualified

immunity is immediately appealable; but (3) Agee and Scott lack

appellate standing, and the Pettway Defendants lack standing to

raise arguments on behalf of non-appealing defendants.

I.

First, we conclude that all parties consented under § 636(c).

We remanded for the district court to determine whether Deputies

Maddox, Martin, McCants, T Russell, and Simpson (collectively,

“Maddox Defendants”) consented. Although counsel for the

Pettway Defendants represented the Maddox Defendants and filed

a signed written consent form, counsel listed only the Pettway De-

fendants’ names on the form and asserted on appeal that the Mad-

dox Defendants had not consented. However, we agree with the

district court’s conclusion on remand that the Maddox Defendants

implicitly consented.

We generally lack jurisdiction to hear appeals directly from

magistrate judge orders. United States v. Schultz, 565 F.3d 1353,

1359 (11th Cir. 2009). However, under § 636(c), a magistrate judge

can conduct all proceedings in a civil matter and ultimately enter

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4 Order of the Court 23-11302

final judgment “[u]pon the consent of the parties,” in which case

the parties can appeal the magistrate judge order or judgment di-

rectly to us. 28 U.S.C. § 636(c).

Consent under § 636(c) may be express written or oral con-

sent or inferred from a party’s conduct. Roell v. Withrow, 538 U.S.

580, 590 (2003). For example, in Roell, the Supreme Court con-

cluded that two defendants who never filed explicit written con-

sent nevertheless implicitly consented by participating in the pro-

ceedings without objection up through a jury trial and final judg-

ment after they were notified that they could refuse magistrate

judge jurisdiction. Id. at 582-87, 590; see also Chambless v. Louisi-

ana-Pacific Corp., 481 F.3d 1345, 1350-51 (11th Cir. 2007) (conclud-

ing that party implicitly consented under § 636(c) where party un-

derstood the consent procedure and participated in pretrial pro-

ceedings before a magistrate judge for eight months before object-

ing for the first time).

Here, we conclude that the Maddox Defendants implicitly

consented to the magistrate judge conducting the case. Although

the Pettway Defendants have argued that the Maddox Defendants

were not parties and expressed some uncertainty as to whether

their counsel represented the Maddox Defendants, we conclude

that the Pettway Defendants’ counsel represented the Maddox De-

fendants because counsel (1) filed notices of appearance and other

documents on behalf of the Maddox Defendants until filing their

notice of appeal; (2) moved to dismiss the claims against the Mad-

dox Defendants; (3) filed a report concerning a planning meeting

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23-11302 Order of the Court 5

identifying themselves as counsel for the Maddox Defendants; and

(4) filed a notice of withdrawal expressly identifying one lawyer as

counsel for the Maddox Defendants. Thus, the Maddox Defend-

ants participated in this action through defense counsel for years

without objecting to magistrate judge jurisdiction even after they

were notified of the need for consent and their right to refuse. See

Roell, 538 U.S. at 584, 586, 590; Chambless, 481 F.3d at 1350-51. Fur-

thermore, defense counsel agreed with the district court’s conclu-

sion on remand that there was consent.

II.

Second, we conclude that the district court’s denial of quali-

fied immunity is immediately appealable. Although we generally

only have jurisdiction to review district courts’ final decisions, an

order denying a defendant qualified immunity is immediately ap-

pealable under the collateral order doctrine if the denial rests on a

legal question. See 28 U.S.C. § 1291; CSX Transp., Inc. v. City of Gar-

den City, 235 F.3d 1325, 1327 (11th Cir. 2000); Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472

U.S. 511, 525-30 (1985). Here, the Pettway Defendants argue on

appeal that the district court erred by denying them qualified im-

munity after Foy failed to respond to their motion for summary

judgment and by concluding that a qualified immunity defense was

not available as to two of Foy’s claims. Both arguments are purely

legal, so we may review them. See Mitchell, 472 U.S. at 525-30.

III.

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6 Order of the Court 23-11302

Finally, we conclude that Agee and Scott lack appellate

standing as prevailing parties and that the Pettway Defendants lack

standing to raise arguments on behalf of the non-appealing Maddox

Defendants.

Litigants must establish standing to appeal, and only a liti-

gant aggrieved by an order may appeal. Wolff v. Cash 4 Titles, 351

F.3d 1348, 1353-54 (11th Cir. 2003); Hawes v. Gleicher, 745 F.3d 1337,

1342 (11th Cir. 2014). A prevailing party generally lacks standing

to appeal because the appealed order did not injure him. Agripost,

Inc. v. Miami-Dade Cnty. ex rel. Manager, 195 F.3d 1225, 1230 (11th

Cir. 1999). Furthermore, a party generally may not appeal to pro-

tect the rights of others. Hawes, 745 F.3d at 1342.

Here, the district court dismissed all claims against Agee and

Scott, so they were not aggrieved by the appealed order. Wolff, 351

F.3d at 1353-54; Agripost, Inc., 195 F.3d at 1230. The Pettway De-

fendants argue that Agee and Scott have standing because the court

allowed part of Foy’s Count 1, an excessive force claim, to proceed

and it is arguable that Count 1 was raised against Agee and Scott.

We disagree because (1) Count 1 of the counselled complaint was

titled as raised against other defendants; (2) Foy did not allege that

Agee or Scott participated in the alleged beating that formed the

basis for Count 1; (3) the Pettway Defendants did not argue in their

motion for summary judgment that Count 1 was raised against

Scott and Agee; and (4) the court described Count 1 as raised

against other defendants and noted that neither Scott nor Agee

were present for the alleged beating. While the body of Count 1

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23-11302 Order of the Court 7

asserted that the claim was raised against all defendants in their in-

dividual capacities, we cannot read that language as raising Count

1 against Agee and Scott given the above facts.

Furthermore, although the Maddox Defendants never ap-

pealed, the Pettway Defendants argue that the district court erred

by denying the Maddox Defendants qualified immunity and allow-

ing Counts 2 and 5 to proceed as to the Maddox Defendants. How-

ever, the Pettway Defendants lack standing to raise arguments on

behalf of other parties. See Wolff, 351 F.3d at 1353-54; Hawes, 745

F.3d at 1342.

Accordingly, this appeal is DISMISSED IN PART for lack of

jurisdiction as to Agee and Scott and any arguments the Pettway

Defendants raise on behalf of the Maddox Defendants. The appeal

may otherwise proceed.