The opinion
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[PUBLISH]
In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Eleventh Circuit
____________________
No. 23-13368
Non-Argument Calendar
____________________
STATE OF GEORGIA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
JEFFREY BOSSERT CLARK,
Defendant-Appellant.
____________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Georgia
D.C. Docket No. 1:23-cv-03721-SCJ
____________________
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2 Opinion of the Court 23-13368
Before WILLIAM PRYOR, Chief Judge, and ROSENBAUM and GRANT,
Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Jeffrey Clark appeals the order remanding his state criminal
prosecution for conspiring to interfere in the 2020 presidential elec-
tion and denying his request to remove the special purpose grand
jury proceeding that preceded his criminal indictment. Clark ar-
gues that he is entitled to remove his state prosecution based on
federal-officer jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1), and the special
purpose grand jury proceeding based on federal-question jurisdic-
tion, id. §§ 1331, 1441(a). We affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
Jeffrey Clark served as the Assistant Attorney General for the
Environmental and Natural Resources Division of the Department
of Justice and as the Acting Assistant Attorney General for the De-
partment’s Civil Division when former President Donald Trump
lost his bid for reelection in November 2020. In May 2022, a special
purpose grand jury was impaneled in Fulton County, Georgia, to
conduct a criminal investigation into “possible attempts to disrupt
the lawful administration of the 2020 elections in” Georgia and to
prepare a report and recommendation “concerning criminal pros-
ecution as it shall see fit.” See O.C.G.A. § 15-12-100. In January 2023,
after issuing its final report, the special purpose grand jury was dis-
solved. See id. § 15-12-101(b). The final report was published.
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23-13368 Opinion of the Court 3
On August 14, 2023, a distinct Fulton County grand jury
charged Clark, Trump, and 17 other defendants with crimes relat-
ing to election interference in the 2020 presidential election. The
indictment charged Clark with violating two state laws: the Geor-
gia Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, id.
§ 16-14-4(c), and criminal attempt to commit false statements and
writings, id. §§ 16-4-1, 16-10-20. The indictment alleged that Clark
committed these crimes by knowingly and willfully making a false
writing stating that the Department had identified “significant con-
cerns that may have impacted the outcome of the election in mul-
tiple States, including the State of Georgia” and by asking two De-
partment officials to join him in signing and issuing the false writ-
ing to Georgia officials.
Clark filed a notice of removal in the district court, see 28
U.S.C. § 1455, based on federal-officer jurisdiction, see id.
§ 1442(a)(1). He argued that he “was a high-ranking U.S. Justice De-
partment official,” the allegations related “directly to his work at
the Justice Department as well as with the former President,” and
he had colorable federal defenses. Clark also sought to remove the
special purpose grand jury proceeding that preceded his criminal
indictment based on federal-question jurisdiction, see id. §§ 1331,
1441, and as a “civil in nature” action that was “ancillary” to his
criminal prosecution, see id. § 1442(d)(1).
The district court ordered an evidentiary hearing. At the
hearing, the parties disputed whether the federal-officer removal
statute applies to former federal officers. The district court received
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4 Opinion of the Court 23-13368
evidence that included testimony from live witnesses and declara-
tions from Clark and former Attorney General Edwin Meese, III,
supporting Clark’s request for removal.
The district court declined to assume jurisdiction over
Clark’s criminal prosecution and denied his request to remove the
special purpose grand jury proceeding. Without the benefit of our
decision in Georgia v. Meadows, 88 F.4th 1331 (11th Cir. 2023), the
district court ruled that Clark was not entitled to removal because
he failed to establish a causal connection between his alleged crim-
inal conduct and his former office. It declined to address whether
he had a colorable federal defense. And it denied Clark’s request to
remove the special purpose grand jury proceeding because, even if
the proceeding were removable, Clark failed to establish a basis for
removal. It also declined to allow removal because the proceeding
had concluded.
II. STANDARDS OF REVIEW
We review issues of removal jurisdiction de novo. See Mead-
ows, 88 F.4th at 1338. We review whether an issue is moot de novo.
See Cook v. Bennett, 792 F.3d 1294, 1298 (11th Cir. 2015).
III. DISCUSSION
We divide our discussion in two parts. First, we explain that
section 1442(a)(1) does not provide Clark, as a former officer, a
right of removal to federal court. Second, we explain that the issue
whether the special purpose grand jury proceeding was removable
is moot.
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23-13368 Opinion of the Court 5
A. Clark Was Not Entitled to Federal-Officer Removal, 28 U.S.C.
§ 1442(a)(1).
The federal-officer removal statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1),
“provides a right of removal to federal court if a defendant proves
that he is a federal officer, his conduct underlying the suit was per-
formed under color of federal office, and he has a ‘colorable’ federal
defense.” Meadows, 88 F.4th at 1338. The statute applies only to
current officers. See id. at 1335–38 (holding that Clark’s codefend-
ant Mark Meadows, a former federal officer, was not entitled to
removal under the federal-officer removal statute). As a former of-
ficer, Clark cannot remove his criminal prosecution under section
1442(a)(1).
As we explained in Meadows, the text and history of the re-
moval statute make clear that the statute applies only to current
“officer[s] . . . of the United States,” 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1). Clark
does not argue that he is a current federal officer. So under Mead-
ows, which we are bound to follow, he is ineligible to seek removal
under section 1442(a)(1). See Meadows, 88 F.4th at 1338; United
States v. Dubois, 94 F.4th 1284, 1293 (11th Cir. 2024) (A “prior
panel’s holding is binding on all subsequent panels unless and until
it is overruled or undermined to the point of abrogation by the Su-
preme Court or by this court sitting en banc.”); see also United States
v. Lee, 886 F.3d 1161, 1163 n.3 (11th Cir. 2018). We need not decide
whether his alleged conduct was performed under color of his of-
fice or whether the district court abused its discretion in weighing
the evidence. See United States v. Bane, 948 F.3d 1290, 1294 (11th Cir.
2020) (We “may affirm for any reason supported by the record.”).
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6 Opinion of the Court 23-13368
B. The District Court Did Not Err in Rejecting Clark’s Request to Re-
move the Concluded Special Purpose Grand Jury Proceeding.
Clark argues that the special purpose grand jury proceeding
was removable based on federal-question jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C.
§§ 1331, 1441(a), because the proceeding was “completely
preempted” by federal law and is not moot. But we disagree. Fed-
eral courts lack authority to decide moot questions or abstract
propositions or to declare principles or rules of law that cannot af-
fect the case before it. Zinni v. ER Sols., Inc., 692 F.3d 1162, 1166
(11th Cir. 2012). An issue is moot “when it no longer presents a live
controversy with respect to which the court can give meaningful
relief.” Christian Coal. of Fla., Inc. v. United States, 662 F.3d 1182,
1189 (11th Cir. 2011).
Regardless of whether the proceeding could have been re-
moved during the investigation, the removability of the proceed-
ing is moot because it no longer presents a “live controversy.” Id.
Clark identifies no concrete interest in having the “case” heard now
by a federal court, nor could he. The special purpose grand jury
issued its final report and was dissolved over seven months before
another grand jury indicted Clark and before he sought removal.
And the special grand jury was not responsible for indicting Clark
in the first place. See Kenerly v. State, 715 S.E.2d 688, 691 (Ga. Ct.
App. 2011) (explaining that a special purpose grand jury does not
have “the power to indict following its investigation” and that
Georgia law anticipates “that the special grand jury be dissolved
upon the completion of the investigation or upon the issuance of a
report”); O.C.G.A. § 15-12-100 et seq.
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23-13368 Opinion of the Court 7
IV. CONCLUSION
We AFFIRM the order remanding Clark’s criminal action to
state court and denying his request to remove the special purpose
grand jury proceeding.
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23-13368 ROSENBAUM, J., Concurring 1
ROSENBAUM, Circuit Judge, Concurring:
I agree with the Majority Opinion that Jeffrey Clark cannot
remove his Georgia criminal prosecution to federal court under 28
U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1) (the “federal-officer removal statute”) because
he is a former federal officer, and we have held that § 1442(a)(1)
does not apply to former federal officers. But even if § 1442(a)(1)
covered former federal officers, Clark still could not remove his
Georgia prosecution to federal court under that statute.
The federal-officer removal statute is not a get-out-of-state-
court-free card for federal officers. It allows a federal officer to re-
move his criminal prosecution from state court to federal court
only if the action is “for or relating to any act under color of [their]
office.” 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1). But none of Clark’s charged con-
duct falls within the job description of his former positions as a fed-
eral officer. So Clark can’t satisfy the removal statute.
To be sure, Clark indisputably served as a federal officer. Be-
tween November 2018 until January 2021, Clark served as the As-
sistant Attorney General for the Environment and Natural Re-
sources Division (“ENRD”) of the United States Department of Jus-
tice (“DOJ”). Beginning in September 2020, he also served as Act-
ing Assistant Attorney General for DOJ’s Civil Division.
But Georgia alleges that Clark, along with former White
House Chief of Staff Mark Meadows and several others, conspired
to interfere with the results of the 2020 Presidential election, in vi-
olation of Georgia’s Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organiza-
tions (“RICO”) Act. It also asserts that Clark criminally attempted
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2 ROSENBAUM, J., Concurring 23-13368
to commit the offense of making false statements and writings by
preparing and attempting to send Georgia a letter from the United
States Department of Justice (“DOJ”) that falsely purported to iden-
tify “significant concerns that may have impacted the outcome of
the election in . . . Georgia.” The letter also falsely claimed that
DOJ “recommend[ed] that the Georgia General Assembly should
convene in special session” to “evaluate irregularities in the 2020
election” and “take whatever action is necessary” if the “election
failed to make a proper and valid choice.”
The problem for Clark is that these alleged criminal acts bear
no connection to either of his positions at the United States Depart-
ment of Justice. Indeed, the district court found that neither DOJ’s
Assistant Attorney General for ENRD nor its Acting Assistant At-
torney General for the Civil Division handles election-related af-
firmative investigations or litigation. That’s the role of the Assis-
tant Attorney General of DOJ’s Civil Rights Division and to a cer-
tain extent, the Attorney General of DOJ’s Criminal Division—dif-
ferent presidentially nominated and Senate-confirmed appointees.
And the record here doesn’t allow for the conclusion that the dis-
trict court clearly erred in its factual findings. Under the federal-
officer removal statute and Georgia v. Meadows, 88 F.4th 1331 (11th
Cir. 2023), that is fatal to Clark’s removal effort.
As we recently explained in Meadows, to remove state
charges to federal court under the federal-officer removal statute,
a federal officer bears the burden of showing “a ‘causal connection
between the charged conduct and asserted official authority.’” Id.
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23-13368 ROSENBAUM, J., Concurring 3
at 1343 (quoting Jefferson County v. Acker, 527 U.S. 423, 431 (1999)).
We concluded in Meadows that Meadows failed to satisfy that bur-
den. Meadows, of course, binds us here. And it is especially relevant
because it discusses not only the framework for evaluating federal
officers’ attempted removals of state charges, but also the nature of
the conspiracy that Georgia alleges both Meadows and Clark par-
ticipated in.
I divide my discussion of why Clark’s removal effort fails un-
der the federal-officer removal statute and Meadows into four parts.
Section I reviews the relevant aspects of Meadows. Section II iden-
tifies the acts that Georgia charged Clark with. Section III explains
that Clark’s official responsibilities, just like Meadows’s, “did not
include superintending state election procedures.” Id. And Section
IV shows that Clark’s charged conduct was “not related to his of-
fice[s]” at DOJ. So even if the federal-officer removal statute ap-
plied to former officers, Clark could not remove his Georgia pros-
ecution to federal court under that law.
I. Meadows governs the analysis of whether Clark has
satisfied his burden to show that he committed the al-
leged acts under “color of [federal] office,” 28 U.S.C.
§ 1442(a)(1).
We thoroughly discussed the facts in Meadows in that opin-
ion. See Meadows, 88 F.4th at 1335–38. I summarize them here only
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4 ROSENBAUM, J., Concurring 23-13368
as relevant to our evaluation of Clark’s attempted removal of his
Georgia charges.
A Fulton County grand jury charged Meadows, Clark, and
sixteen others with, among other things, conspiracy to “change the
outcome of the [2020] election in favor of Trump.” Id. at 1335.
Meadows sought to remove the case to federal court under the fed-
eral-officer removal statute. Id. at 1336. The district court denied
summary remand and ordered an evidentiary hearing. Id. (citing
28 U.S.C. § 1455(b)(5)). After considering the evidence, the district
court denied removal and remanded to Georgia state court. Id. at
1337. On appeal, we affirmed the district court’s remand. Id. at
1350.
As relevant here, we explained that to remove a state action
to federal court under the federal-officer removal statute, a federal
officer bears the burden of “establish[ing] a ‘causal connection be-
tween the charged conduct and asserted official authority.’” Id. at
1343 (quoting Acker, 527 U.S. at 431). In assessing whether the fed-
eral officer has done so, we said, we “identify the ‘act’ or charged
conduct underlying [the state’s] prosecution, the scope of [the of-
ficer’s] federal office, and the existence of a causal nexus between
[officer’s] conduct and his office.” Id. at 1343–44.
We then considered these steps as they applied to the con-
spiracy count against Meadows. At the first step—identifying the
“act”—we explained that when we evaluate a conspiracy count,
“we must look to the ‘heart’ of Meadows’s conduct to determine
whether his section 1442(a)(1) ‘act’ . . . supports removal.” Id. at
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23-13368 ROSENBAUM, J., Concurring 5
1345. Using that methodology, we identified Meadows’s alleged
conspiracy act to be “conspiring to ‘unlawfully change the out-
come of the election in favor of Trump.’” Id.
Turning to the scope of Meadows’s formal office, we said
that “[t]he ‘color of office’ element requires acts to be done ‘in en-
forcement of federal law.’” Id. (citing Mesa v. California, 489 U.S.
121, 131–32 (1989)). We explained that, in addressing this element,
a federal officer “must identify a source of positive law for his as-
sertions of official authority for us to determine whether his alleged
acts were attributable to exercises of that authority.” Id. “[O]ur
judicial duty [then] demands an independent assessment of the lim-
its of [the federal officer’s] office.” Id. at 1346.
We noted that Meadows identified no statutory source of
law that empowered the White House Chief of Staff to regulate or
supervise state voting procedures in federal elections. Id. at 1346–
47. And when Meadows pointed to DOJ’s Civil Rights Division
and its Election Crimes Branch within its Criminal Division as
sources of positive legal authority, we said he “fail[ed] to explain
how the duties of his office or his charged conduct implicated ei-
ther division of the Department.” Id. at 1347. We similarly found
unavailing his reliance on the Constitution’s Take Care Clause,
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3, as “empower[ing] the President with broad
authority to ‘ensure that federal voting laws are enforced.’” Id. As
we explained, “the President has no ‘direct control’ over the indi-
viduals—members of Congress and state officials—who conduct
federal elections.” Id. “And tellingly,” we observed, Meadows
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6 ROSENBAUM, J., Concurring 23-13368
cited “no legal authority for the proposition that the President’s
power extends to ‘assess[ing] the conduct of state officials.’” Id. In-
deed, we said, we were “aware of no authority suggesting that the
Take Care Clause empowers federal executive interference with
state election procedures based solely on the federal executive’s
own initiative, and not in relation to another branch’s constitution-
ally authorized act.” Id.
As to the causal-nexus requirement, we emphasized that a
federal officer “must be ‘specific and positive’ in showing that his
charged conduct ‘was confined to his acts as an officer.’” Id. at 1348
(quoting Colorado v. Symes, 286 U.S. 510, 520 (1932)). Not only that,
we explained, but “in ‘a criminal case, a more detailed showing
might be necessary because of the more compelling state interest
in conducting criminal trials in the state courts.’” Id. (quoting
Willingham v. Morgan, 395 U.S. 402, 409 n.4 (1969)). We affirmed
the district court’s conclusion that Meadows “failed to ‘provide suf-
ficient evidence’ that his association with the alleged conspiracy
was ‘related to any legitimate purpose of the executive branch.’”
Id. In reaching this conclusion, we remarked that “the district court
was entitled to evaluate the demeanor and presentation of wit-
nesses, assess the credibility of testimony including Meadows’s,
and weigh competing evidence.” Id. Ultimately, we held that
Meadows had failed to establish a “‘causal connection’ between
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23-13368 ROSENBAUM, J., Concurring 7
[his] ‘official authority’ and his alleged participation in the conspir-
acy.” Id. at 1349.
With Meadows firmly in mind, I explain why Clark’s at-
tempted removal meets the same fate as Meadows’s.
II. Clark’s alleged acts include conspiring to overturn the
2020 presidential election, drafting a false letter to
Georgia officials, and trying to cause that false letter
to be sent to Georgia officials.
I start with the first step of Meadows: “identify[ing] the ‘act’
or charged conduct underlying [the state’s] prosecution,” id. at
1343. The acts underlying Clark’s charges are simple to identify.
Under the RICO charge, which Clark shares with Meadows
for the same conspiracy, we found that the underlying act “was
[Meadows’s] alleged association with the conspiracy to overturn
the presidential election.” Id. at 1344. We explained that in as-
sessing whether conspiratorial “association” relates to an officer’s
position, we consider the “heavy majority of overt acts” the officer
allegedly committed in furtherance of the conspiracy. Id.
Here, Georgia asserted that Clark committed four overt acts
in furtherance of the conspiracy. Act 98 alleged that, on or about
December 28, 2020, Clark attempted to commit the felony offense
of making false statements and writings, in violation of GA. CODE
ANN. § 16-10-20. More specifically, Act 98 alleged Clark wrote a
letter on behalf of DOJ “knowing [it] contain[ed] the false state-
ment that [DOJ] had ‘identified significant concerns that may have
impacted the outcome of the [2020 presidential] election in . . .
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8 ROSENBAUM, J., Concurring 23-13368
Georgia.” Act 98 continued, asserting that Clark sent Acting U.S.
Attorney General Jeffrey Rosen and Acting U.S. Deputy Attorney
General Richard Donoghue an email seeking authorization to send
the “false writing” to Georgia Governor Brian Kemp, Speaker of
the Georgia House of Representatives David Ralston, and Presi-
dent Pro Tempore of the Georgia Senate Butch Miller.
Relatedly, Act 99 alleged that, also on or about December
28, 2020, Clark solicited Rosen and Donoghue to sign the same
“false” letter Act 98 described and send it to Kemp, Ralston, and
Miller.
Act 110 asserted that, on or about January 2, 2021, Clark re-
ceived a call from codefendant Scott Graham Hall1 and, in a 63-mi-
nute-long conversation, discussed the November 3, 2020, election.
And returning to the “false” letter that Act 98 described, Act
111 alleged that, on January 2, 2021, Clark again sought for Rosen
1 Among other overt acts, the Indictment charged Hall with, on or about Jan-
uary 7, 2021, “committ[ing] the felony offense of INTERFERENCE WITH
PRIMARIES AND ELECTIONS, in violation of [GA. CODE. ANN.] § 21-2-566,
. . . by willfully and unlawfully tampering with electronic ballot markers and
tabulating machines in Coffee County, Georgia.” Relatedly, it alleged Hall
committed the Georgia felony offenses of unlawful possession of ballots, com-
puter theft, computer trespass, computer invasion of privacy, and conspiracy
to defraud the state.
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23-13368 ROSENBAUM, J., Concurring 9
and Donoghue to sign that document and to send it to Kemp, Ral-
ston, and Miller.
Finally, Count 22 of the indictment separately charged Clark
with the felony offense of criminal attempt to commit false state-
ments and writings, in violation of GA. CODE ANN. §§ 16-4-1 & 16-
10-20, for the same acts alleged in Acts 98, 99, and 111 of the con-
spiracy count.
III. Clark’s official responsibilities, just like Meadows’s,
“did not include superintending state election proce-
dures.”
In Meadows, we established that “[a]cts taken under color of
office are those [that are] ‘vested with, or appear to be vested with,
the authority entrusted to that office.’” Id. at 1345 (quoting Color
of Office, BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019)). They must be
“in enforcement of federal law[,]” id. (quoting Mesa, 489 U.S. at
131–32), and the officer “must identify a source of positive law for
his assertions of official authority for us to determine whether his
alleged acts were attributable to exercises of that authority.” Id.
At no point in the litigation has Clark argued that his role as
head of ENRD is relevant to this removal request. That was a wise
choice; ENRD focuses on environmental statutes like, for example,
the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1251, the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C.
§ 7401, and the Toxic Substances Control Act of 1976, 15 U.S.C. §
2601. U.S. Dep’t of Just., Just. Manual § 5-6.130 (2018). And
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10 ROSENBAUM, J., Concurring 23-13368
regulating or supervising state voting procedures in federal elec-
tions has nothing to do with toxic substances regulated by federal
law.
On appeal, Clark seems to have also mostly abandoned his
arguments that his post atop DOJ’s Civil Division related to moni-
toring elections. Another wise decision. As former Trump Admin-
istration Assistant Attorney General for the Civil Division, Jody
Hunt, testified, the Civil Division mostly “defend[s] suits that are
filed against the United States or officers of the executive branch.”
Hunt further explained that “[a]nything with respect to election ir-
regularities or voter discrimination would either fall to the Civil
Rights Division or to the Criminal Division.” 2
So Clark instead argues that, as an Assistant Attorney Gen-
eral, his position was “fungible,” and the President or DOJ
2 Clark argues the district court acted inappropriately by giving weight to for-
mer Assistant Attorney General Hunt’s testimony because Hunt “left DOJ
months before the 2020 election.” At the same time, Clark takes the contra-
dictory position that the district court should have given more weight to an
affidavit from former Attorney General Edwin Meese III based on Meese’s
personal experience at DOJ “that occurred decades before Mr. Clark’s service
in the Trump administration.” Hunt was Clark’s direct predecessor in the
Trump administration. His testimony was subject to live cross-examination.
And we have no basis to conclude that the district court clearly erred when it
found Hunt’s testimony highly credible and gave less weight to Meese’s affi-
davit because of its decades-long temporal distance from the events Georgia
alleged. See Yorktown Sys. Grp. Inc. v. Threat Tec LLC, 108 F.4th 1287, 1293 (11th
Cir. 2024) (noting our review of a district court’s factual findings is “only for
clear error,” and “[a] district court’s credibility determination gets special def-
erence, and we accept it unless it is contrary to the laws of nature, or is so
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23-13368 ROSENBAUM, J., Concurring 11
leadership could assign him more duties outside his Divisions.
Clark urges that confining his duties to those as head of ENRD or
the Civil Division would be tying him “to a stovepipe.” And as
Clark tells it, the President or DOJ leadership could assign him du-
ties with election-related issues.
Clark is right that the statute governing the appointment of
Assistant Attorneys General provides only that they “assist the At-
torney General in the performance of his duties.” 28 U.S.C. § 506.
So it’s plausible that this broad statutory language could permit the
President or the Acting Attorney General to assign Clark responsi-
bilities related to election law. And under Acker, we are obligated
to “credit[] a plausible reading of a specific legal authority[]” offered
by the removing officer. Meadows, 88 F.4th at 1346 (emphasis omit-
ted).
But even after we accept Clark’s reading of this statute, he
still must identify “a source of positive law for his assertions of of-
ficial authority.” Id. at 1345. To do that, at the very least, Clark
must show that (1) DOJ has legal authority to do what Clark did
and (2) his superiors in fact assigned him authority to take the ac-
tions he’s alleged to have engaged in. He has not done so. And as
we explained in Meadows, “Acker does not instruct us to blindly
inconsistent or improbable on its face that no reasonable factfinder could ac-
cept it” (citation omitted)).
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12 ROSENBAUM, J., Concurring 23-13368
accept an expansive proclamation of executive power relying on
no source of positive law.” 88 F.4th at 1346.
A. The President and DOJ did not delegate Clark authority to
intervene in Georgia’s election.
Clark offers three potential sources of delegated authority
relevant to his removal effort: the White House Chief of Staff, DOJ
leadership, and the President. None work.
First, Clark highlights that Meadows, as White House Chief
of Staff, “specifically directed the Acting Attorney General to have
Clark investigate Fulton County, Georgia signature matching
problems.”
This is not a plausible claim of authority. We held in Mead-
ows that “neither the Constitution, nor statutory law, nor prece-
dent prescribe any role for the White House chief of staff” in “su-
perintend[ing] the states’ administration of elections.” Id. Mead-
ows was not authorized by law to direct that Clark investigate
Georgia’s elections. So Clark can’t claim Meadows’s alleged orders
as authority.
Second, Clark asserts that the Acting Attorney General au-
thorized him to (1) receive a national security briefing, (2) review a
classified report on potential foreign election interference, and (3)
consult with the U.S. Attorney for the Northern District of Georgia
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23-13368 ROSENBAUM, J., Concurring 13
on law-enforcement matters. But this is not a plausible claim of
delegated authority to write the charged letter, either.
For starters, Clark drafted the letter at issue here before the
Acting Attorney General made these authorizations. Not only
that, but Acting Attorney General Rosen, only after Clark’s persis-
tence with the letter, authorized the briefing and suggested Clark
speak to the U.S. Attorney to show there was no evidence of voter
fraud.
Even Rosen testified that he found Clark’s drafted letter
“strange” because Clark “didn’t have responsibility over election
issues.” In Rosen’s view “there were so many problems with
[Clark’s drafted letter],” including that “it’s not the Justice Depart-
ment’s responsibility” to superintend state election procedures.
Acting Deputy Attorney General Donoghue also responded
to Clark’s letter. He told Clark it was not DOJ’s role to offer “rec-
ommendations to a State Legislature about how they should meet
their Constitutional obligation to appoint Electors.” In fact, Do-
noghue went so far as to tell Clark his letter was “wildly inappro-
priate and irresponsible” and “nothing less than the Department
meddling in the outcome of a presidential election.”
Against this testimony, the district court found that “the spe-
cific contents of the December 28 letter were not within the scope
of [DOJ’s] authority more broadly.” Clark has not made a plausible
showing that DOJ leadership directed him to superintend state
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14 ROSENBAUM, J., Concurring 23-13368
elections. Indeed, I can’t say that the district court clearly erred in
concluding DOJ leadership did not authorize Clark’s acts.
And third, Clark claims that he had been “assigned duties at
the White House and the President directly consulted with him
about the 2020 election.” With this statement, he seems to suggest
that the President directly delegated him authority to superintend
Georgia’s elections. But the district court found that Clark offered
no persuasive evidence that the President delegated him such au-
thority. To the contrary, the district court found that the President
was not involved “in this letter specifically until the January 3 meet-
ing when the President decided not to send it to the Georgia offi-
cials.” 3 Again, nothing in the record allows for the conclusion that
the district court’s factual finding was clearly erroneous.
Perhaps for this reason, Clark argues that the law doesn’t re-
quire him to show that the President delegated him the authority
3 According to Rosen and Donoghue, the January 3, 2021, meeting, held at
Rosen’s request, included President Trump, White House Counsel Pat Cipol-
lone, Deputy White House Counsel Pat Philbin, Assistant Attorney General
for the Office of Legal Counsel Steve Engel, White House lawyer Eric Hersch-
mann, Rosen, Donoghue, and Clark. At the meeting, the President considered
whether to appoint Clark Acting Attorney General and send the letter to Geor-
gia officials. Only Clark advocated for his position. Donoghue testified that
when President Trump was advised there would be mass resignations at DOJ
if he appointed Clark and sent the letter, he chose not to. According to Do-
noghue, at the conclusion of the discussion, President Trump told Clark, “I
appreciate you being willing to do this. I appreciate you being willing to step
up and take all the abuse . . . . We’re going to have mass resignations. It’s
going to be a disaster . . . . So we’re not going to do this.” Donoghue further
claims that Trump asked him if he was going to fire Clark, which Donoghue
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23-13368 ROSENBAUM, J., Concurring 15
to draft the letter. He asserts that proving the delegation would
require revealing privileged communications.
But Clark, as the removing officer, bears the burden to es-
tablish the scope of his office as relevant to his removal claim. See
Meadows, 88 F.4th at 1345. That showing is especially important
when his two offices typically have nothing to do with state elec-
tions. And the bottom line is he didn’t make that showing.
B. DOJ had no authority to intervene in Georgia’s elec-
tions.
What’s more, even assuming Clark could show his superiors
gave him authority to intervene in Georgia’s elections, he still has
not presented “a source of positive law for his assertions of official
authority.” Id. As Rosen and Donoghue correctly testified, DOJ as
a whole could not lawfully interfere in Georgia’s 2020 presidential
election.
As we recognized in Meadows, the Constitution gives no ex-
press role to the President in overseeing election procedures; it
“empowers only the states and Congress to ‘regulate the conduct
of [federal] elections.’” Id. at 1346 (alteration in original) (quoting
Roudebush v. Hartke, 405 U.S. 15, 24 (1972)); see U.S. CONST. art. I, §
4, art. II, § 1. We must reiterate that “[t]he states are responsible
for enacting ‘a complete code for . . . elections,’ including ‘regula-
tions relati[ng] to . . . prevention of fraud and corrupt practices
said he had no authority to do. In response, Trump allegedly stated he was
not going to fire Clark.
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16 ROSENBAUM, J., Concurring 23-13368
[and] counting of votes.’” Id. (alterations in original) (quoting
Moore v. Harper, 60 U.S. 1, 29 (2023)).
The Framers of our Constitution recognized that if the Pres-
ident had constitutional authority over the procedures used for his
own election, he might abuse his office to ensure reelection. To
mitigate that risk, federal officers are constitutionally barred from
serving as presidential Electors. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 2.
As Hamilton articulated in Federalist No. 68, federal officers
“might be suspected of too great devotion to the President in of-
fice.”
So for good reason, the President’s broad Take Care Clause
authority does not extend to directing state election procedure. As
we explained in Meadows, “we are aware of no authority suggesting
that the Take Care Clause empowers federal executive interference
with state election procedures based solely on the federal execu-
tive’s own initiative.” 88 F.4th at 1347.
DOJ recognizes these limitations. The Justice Manual,
which contains DOJ policy, states as much:
The Department has long recognized that the States – not
the federal government – are responsible for administering
elections, determining the validity of votes, and tabulating
the results, with challenges handled by the appropriate elec-
tion administrators, officials, legislatures, and courts. The
Department has a limited role in these processes and should
generally avoid interfering or appearing to interfere with
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23-13368 ROSENBAUM, J., Concurring 17
election administration, tabulation, validation, or certifica-
tion.
U.S. Dep’t of Just., Just. Manual § 9-85.300 (2022).
For the President to get directly involved with state election
authorities, Congress needs to at least have told him to do so.4 But
Clark offers no law Congress enacted that gave the President or
DOJ power to intervene in Georgia’s elections. And we are not
aware of any such statute.
Notably, Clark does not cite the statutes enforced by DOJ’s
Civil Rights Division, which contains the Voting Section. Those
federal laws include
provisions of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 52 U.S.C.
§§ 10301 to 10702; Voting Accessibility for the Elderly and
Handicapped Act of 1984, 52 U.S.C. §§ 20101 to 20107; Uni-
formed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act of 1986,
52 U.S.C. §§ 20301 to 20311; National Voter Registration Act
of 1993, 52 U.S.C. §§ 20501 to 20511; Help America Vote Act
of 2002, 52 U.S.C. §§ 21081 to 21085, 21111; and the Civil
4 Congress’s constitutional authority to enact statutes interfering with a state’s
chosen process of appointing Electors can be powerful, but it is also limited.
See Georgia v. Shafer, 23-13360 (11th Cir. 2024) (Rosenbaum, J., concurring).
The President could not regulate elections based on an unconstitutional law.
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18 ROSENBAUM, J., Concurring 23-13368
Rights Acts of 1957 and 1960, 52 U.S.C. §§ 10101, 20701 to
20706.
U.S. Dep’t of Just., Just. Manual § 8-2.270 (2022). The Voting Sec-
tion investigates and files complaints against state authorities for
violations of these statutes. Id. But the statutes focus on civil-rights
violations. None are concerned with purported voter fraud.
For its part, DOJ’s Criminal Division prosecutes certain elec-
tion crimes. But its responsibilities are “limited to investigating and
prosecuting violations of federal election laws and deterring crimi-
nal conduct.” Id. § 9-85.300 (2022). The Criminal Division enjoys
no authority to interfere with state election procedures on its own
initiative, and not in relation to another branch’s constitutionally
authorized act.
At most, DOJ leadership could have delegated Clark author-
ity to take on the responsibilities of the Voting Section or Criminal
Division. But Clark points to nothing that shows the executive
branch could authorize him to interfere with a state’s election re-
sults on claimed grounds of voter fraud.
IV. Clark’s charged conduct was not related to his offices.
For Clark to get access to federal court, he must establish
some “causal connection” between his acts and the scope of his of-
fice. Meadows, 88 F.4th at 1343. We have recognized that “the bar
for proof is ‘quite low.’” Id. at 1348 (quoting Caver v. Cent Ala. Elec.
Coop., 845 F.3d 1135, 1144 (11th Cir. 2017)). Still, the removing
party “must be ‘specific and positive’ in showing that his charged
conduct ‘was confined to his acts as an officer.’” Id. (quoting Symes,
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23-13368 ROSENBAUM, J., Concurring 19
286 U.S. at 520). And when the removing party is a criminal de-
fendant, we’ve said, “a more detailed showing might be necessary
because of the more compelling state interest in conducting crimi-
nal trials in the state courts.” Id. (quoting Willingham, 395 U.S. at
409 n.4).
So Clark had “to support the factual averments linking his
conduct and his office ‘by competent proof.’” Id. (quoting United
Food & Com. Workers Union v. Ctr. Mark Props. Meriden Square, Inc.,
30 F.3d 298, 301 (2d Cir. 1994)). And in assessing that proof, “the
district court was entitled to evaluate the demeanor and presenta-
tion of witnesses, assess the credibility of testimony . . . , and weigh
competing evidence.” Id.
All told, Clark did not present much evidence to show that
his actions—drafting a letter to influence state election proce-
dures—related to his offices. His principal two pieces of evidence
included an affidavit by former Attorney General Edwin Meese III
and a personal affidavit.
Meese offered the opinion that Assistant Attorneys General
can be shuffled and delegated more responsibility beyond their Di-
visions. The district court accepted this legal conclusion. But as
I’ve noted, the district court still concluded that Clark did not show
he had in fact been delegated election-related issues.
Clark’s personal affidavit also provides little support linking
his letter to his office. The district court excluded it from evidence,
noting that even if it were to consider the Clark affidavit, it would
give the affidavit only “slight” weight because of the affidavit’s
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20 ROSENBAUM, J., Concurring 23-13368
“clear self-interest” and the fact “that it was not subject to cross-
examination.” 5
On the other side of the ledger, Clark faced substantial evi-
dence suggesting his letter did not relate to his duties. The Acting
Attorney General found it “strange” Clark was working on election
issues. And Acting Deputy Attorney General Donoghue told Clark
it was not the DOJ’s role to offer “recommendations to a State Leg-
islature about how they should meet their Constitutional obliga-
tion to appoint Electors.” Clark’s subordinate, tasked with drafting
the letter, was also “shocked” by an election-related assignment.
In sum, Clark’s letter sought to instruct a state on its own
election procedures. But Clark did not establish that his offices au-
thorized this activity. That dooms his removal effort.
Worse still, as I’ve explained, Clark’s alleged actions ex-
ceeded the authority of the Justice Department as a whole. So he
5 The district court also addressed one of the main arguments the affidavit
supported. Clark was named counsel in a suit to defend Vice President Mike
Pence and other officials in their conduct surrounding the 2020 election. He
argued that litigation shows his portfolio contained election issues. But the
district court found more credible former Assistant Attorney General Hunt’s
explanation of that litigation. Hunt testified that when officials are sued in
their official capacities, the Civil Division has the responsibility to defend the
suit, no matter the subject matter. In other words, the litigation was defen-
sive, while Clark’s charged conduct, drafting a letter directed at Georgia offi-
cials, offensively sought to interfere with valid state election procedures. And
that wasn’t something within the Department’s authority. Again, nothing in
the record supports the conclusion that the district court’s factual finding was
clearly erroneous.
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23-13368 ROSENBAUM, J., Concurring 21
has failed to show “a ‘causal connection between the charged con-
duct and asserted official authority’” necessary to qualify for fed-
eral-officer removal under section 1442(a)(1).
V. Conclusion
Congress allows federal officers to remove their cases from
state to federal court to protect the performance of their lawful du-
ties. But Georgia did not charge Clark for acts he undertook within
his responsibilities as an Acting Assistant Attorney General. So
even if the federal-officer removal statute applied to former federal
officers, he would still not be entitled to removal of the Georgia
action under the federal-officer removal statute.
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23-13368 GRANT, J., Concurring 1
GRANT, Circuit Judge, Concurring:
For the reasons outlined in my separate opinion in Georgia v.
Shafer, No. 23-13360 (11th Cir. 2024), I respectfully concur.