Woodland v. Dept. of Rev.

334 September 19, 2023 No. 22

22

371 Or

Woodland

2023 v. Dept. of Rev. September 19, 2023

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE

STATE OF OREGON

Walter H. WOODLAND,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE,

State of Oregon

Defendant-Respondent,

(TC 5446) (SC S069937)

En Banc

On appeal from the Oregon Tax Court.*

Robert T. Manicke, Judge.

Submitted on the briefs June 20, 2023.

Walter Woodland, Yamhill, filed the brief pro se.

Emily N. Snook, Assistant Attorney General, Salem,

filed the brief for respondent. Also on the brief were Ellen

F. Rosenblum, Attorney General, and Benjamin Gutman,

Solicitor General.

JAMES, J.

The judgment of the Tax Court is affirmed.

______________

* 25 OTR 166 (2022).

Cite as 371 Or 334 (2023) 335

JAMES, J.

Taxpayer Walter H. Woodland appealed the Depart-

ment of Revenue’s assessment of $116 in interest for unpaid

estimated taxes in 2019. During the pendency of that appeal,

the department invalidated the assessment and agreed that

taxpayer did not owe that interest. The Regular Division

of the Oregon Tax Court1 accordingly dismissed taxpayer’s

appeal as moot. We affirm.

I. FACTS

The following facts appear to be undisputed. After

taxpayer paid his income taxes for tax year 2019, the depart-

ment concluded that taxpayer had underpaid his estimated

income tax for 2019, so it assessed taxpayer $116 in inter-

est. See ORS 316.587(1) (interest accrues when estimated

income tax has been underpaid).

Taxpayer appealed the $116 assessment to the

Magistrate Division of the Tax Court, contending in part

that the department lacked authority to require estimated

tax payments. The magistrate ruled on the merits and

granted summary judgment in favor of the department.

Taxpayer then appealed to the Regular Division of

the Tax Court. See ORS 305.501(5)(a) (authorizing appeals

from Magistrate Division to Regular Division). Taxpayer

again appeared to challenge the department’s authority to

require any taxpayer to pay estimated taxes.

The department later filed a motion to dismiss,

explaining that it had cancelled the assessment due to an

error in the notice procedures. Accordingly, the department

contended that the appeal was moot. Taxpayer did not dis-

pute that the assessment had been cancelled, but he con-

tended that the court should nevertheless adjudicate his

arguments regarding the department’s authority to require

estimated tax payments.

The Tax Court granted the department’s motion

to dismiss, concluding that the assessment’s invalidation

1

The Tax Court is a single court with two divisions: the Magistrate Division

and the Regular Division. See Village at Main Street Phase II v. Dept. of Rev., 356

Or 164, 167, 339 P3d 428 (2014) (so explaining). For purposes of this opinion, we

will generally use “Tax Court” to refer to the Regular Division.

336 Woodland v. Dept. of Rev.

meant the appeal was moot. The court also declined to exer-

cise its discretion to consider taxpayer’s broader challenges

to the department’s authority, despite mootness, under ORS

14.175, the “capable of repetition, yet evading review” stat-

ute.2 Taxpayer now appeals that decision to this court. ORS

305.445.

II. DISCUSSION

As framed by the litigants, there are two mat-

ters before us in this appeal: whether the Tax Court cor-

rectly concluded that the underlying matter was moot, and

whether the Tax Court, although possessing the discre-

tion to consider matters “capable of repetition but evading

review” under ORS 14.175, abused that discretion in declin-

ing to reach the merits of taxpayer’s arguments. We begin

with the propriety of the Tax Court’s holding that taxpayer’s

appeal was moot.

A matter is moot if (among other things) a decision

of the court can have no practical effect on the rights of the

parties. See, e.g., Dept. of Human Services v. P. D., 368 Or

627, 631, 496 P3d 1029 (2021) (“when it becomes clear that

resolving the merits of a claim will have no practical effect

on the rights of the parties, an appellate court may dismiss

an appeal as moot”); Multnomah County v. Mehrwein, 366

Or 295, 332, 462 P3d 706 (2020) (part of appeal relating

to county ordinance that required disclaimers about fund-

ing be attached to communications in support of a candi-

date had become moot; “the county [has since] amended the

disclosure provisions of its ordinance and a decision about

the validity of the former provisions will have no practical

effect”); Penn v. Board of Parole, 365 Or 607, 612, 451 P3d

589 (2019) (“given that petitioner no longer is subject to the

supervisory condition [of post-prison supervision] that he

challenges, a decision by this court in the matter will not

have a practical effect on his rights—in other words, his

appeal is moot”); Eastern Oregon Mining Association v. DEQ,

360 Or 10, 15-16, 376 P3d 288 (2016) (discussing cases); see

also Garges v. Premo, 362 Or 797, 801, 421 P3d 345 (2018)

2

As we have noted before, ORS 14.175 may not represent “the full scope of a

court’s constitutional authority to decide moot cases.” Penn v. Board of Parole, 365

Or 607, 613 n 2, 451 P3d 589 (2019).

Cite as 371 Or 334 (2023) 337

(“A case becomes moot when a decision on the merits would

resolve merely an abstract question without practical effect.”

(Internal quotation marks and citation omitted.)).

In Eastern Oregon Mining Association, the petition-

ers had challenged the validity of a five-year permit issued

by the Department of Environmental Quality in 2010. See

360 Or at 13. The permit had expired while the matter was

pending in the Court of Appeals, and that court dismissed

the matter as moot. Id. at 14. On review, this court agreed:

“In this case, petitioners’ principal challenge is to the valid-

ity of the 2010 permit. That permit has expired. A judicial

declaration as to the validity of the 2010 permit can have

no possible practical effect on the rights of the parties in

relation to that permit.”

Id. at 16.

The underlying principle of mootness when a lev-

ied tax is cancelled is not novel. In 1890, the United States

Supreme Court dismissed an appeal seeking to annul tax

assessments for street improvements because counsel had

admitted during oral argument that the assessments had

already been annulled by another court. Washington Market

Co. v. District of Columbia, 137 US 62, 11 S Ct 4, 34 L Ed 572

(1890).

The issue before the Tax Court was the same as

in the Magistrate Division: whether taxpayer owed the

department $116 in interest for underpaying his 2019 esti-

mated income tax. The propriety of the department’s assess-

ment was the basis of taxpayer’s appeals to the Magistrate

Division and the Regular Division. Taxpayer’s arguments

were properly before those courts, then, only to the extent

that they bore on whether taxpayer could be required by law

to pay that $116.

The department has since cancelled that particu-

lar assessment. The taxpayer thus has already obtained all

the relief possible in this appeal, because the department

has agreed that he does not owe that $116. See Eastern

Oregon Mining Association, 360 Or at 16 (petition for judi-

cial review was moot once 2010 permit expired; petitioners

had sought “judicial review of a specific agency order—the

338 Woodland v. Dept. of Rev.

2010 permit—not some abstract legal position that DEQ has

taken” (emphasis in original)). Taxpayer’s arguments that

the assessment was invalid for other reasons will not get

him any extra relief; the $116 debt cannot be cancelled more

than once. As the Tax Court correctly concluded, any ruling

on the merits would have no practical effect on taxpayer’s

rights regarding the $116.

Additionally, although taxpayer’s complaint in the

Tax Court had sought “recompense for my time and direct

costs for disputing [the department’s] assessment and col-

lection actions,” the possibility that the Tax Court might

award attorney fees and reasonable expenses in an income

tax case, see ORS 305.490(4), is not enough to make a moot

case justiciable. See Kerr v. Bradbury, 340 Or 241, 245, 131

P3d 737, adh’d to on recons, 341 Or 200, 140 P3d 1131 (2006)

(unappealed award of attorney fees by Court of Appeals did

not make otherwise moot case justiciable).

Accordingly, the Tax Court did not err in concluding

that the matter was moot. That does not fully resolve the

matter, however. ORS 14.175 gives a court authority, in some

circumstances, to address such arguments, “even though

the specific act, policy or practice giving rise to the action

no longer has a practical effect on the party.” We therefore

turn to the second question: whether the Tax Court abused

its discretion in declining to address taxpayer’s additional

arguments under that statute.

ORS 14.175 provides:

“In any action in which a party alleges that an act, pol-

icy or practice of a public body * * * is unconstitutional or is

otherwise contrary to law, the party may continue to pros-

ecute the action and the court may issue a judgment on

the validity of the challenged act, policy or practice even

though the specific act, policy or practice giving rise to the

action no longer has a practical effect on the party if the

court determines that:

“(1) The party had standing to commence the action;

“(2) The act challenged by the party is capable of rep-

etition, or the policy or practice challenged by the party

continues in effect; and

Cite as 371 Or 334 (2023) 339

“(3) The challenged policy or practice, or similar acts,

are likely to evade judicial review in the future.”

The decision to address the merits, despite moot-

ness, under ORS 14.175 is a discretionary decision for a court.

As we explained in Eastern Oregon Mining Association, ORS

14.175 “permits a court to issue a judgment on the validity of

the challenged act or policy.” 360 Or at 19 (emphasis in orig-

inal). But “courts are not required to decide any and every

moot case that falls within the terms of ORS 14.175.” Penn,

365 Or at 613 (emphasis in original). The statute “leaves it

to the court to determine whether it is appropriate to adju-

dicate an otherwise moot case under the circumstances of

each case.” Couey v. Atkins, 357 Or 460, 522, 355 P3d 866

(2015).

Here, the Tax Court explained its exercise of discre-

tion on various grounds of judicial economy. Considerations

of judicial economy are valid reasons for a court to decline to

address a moot matter. See Couey, 357 Or at 501 (reviewing

opinions); id. at 503 (same). Nothing suggests that the Tax

Court abused its discretion when it chose not to consider

taxpayer’s additional arguments.

To the extent that taxpayer is asking us to inde-

pendently address his arguments regarding the depart-

ment’s authority, we also decline to do so. Even if ORS 14.175

might otherwise give this court authority to reach the now

moot-arguments (and we do not decide if it does), we would

decline to exercise our discretion to address them, for essen-

tially the same reason of judicial economy that had been

articulated by the Tax Court.3

The judgment of the Tax Court is affirmed.

3

We do not suggest that taxpayer’s claims have merit. We decide only that

we will not explore the merits in the context of this case.