The opinion
STATE OF LOUISIANA
COURT OF APPEAL
FIRST CIRCUIT
NO. 2023 CU 1342
KRISTIN DELEO
VERSUS
LINDSEY MARIE NICOLINI
AUG 2 1 2024
Judgment Rendered:
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Appealed from the
21st Judicial District Court
Parish of Tangipahoa, State of Louisiana
No. 2022-1866
The Honorable Jeffrey Cashe, Judge Presiding
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Craig J. Robichaux Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellant,
Lindsey S. Olsen Kristin Deleo
Mandeville, Louisiana
Nicole R. Dillon Attorneys for Defendant/Appellee,
Glen R. Galbraith Lindsey Marie Nicolini
Morgan J. Brown
Hammond, Louisiana
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BEFORE: GUIDRY, C.J., McCLENDON, WELCH,
WOLFE, AND STROMBERG, JJ.
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WOLFE, J.
Kristin Deleo appeals the trial court’s declaratory judgment that denied her
petition for nullity and declared that her marriage to Lindsey Marie Nicolini was
valid.' We reverse the trial court’s judgment and render judgment declaring the
marriage an absolute nullity.
FACTS
Ms. Deleo and Ms. Nicolini were involved in a romantic relationship and, on
the evening of July 21, 2019, participated in a “spiritual” marriage ceremony in front
of family and friends at their home. Ms. Deleo was eight months pregnant with a
child conceived by in vitro fertilization and the couple had been told that they needed
to be married for Ms. Nicolini’s name to appear on the baby’s birth certificate. The
ceremony was performed by Ms. Nicolini’s friend, Vanessa Coombe, who advised
the couple that she was ordained, but not yet registered as an ordained minister in
Louisiana, which she explained to them meant that she could not sign the couple’s
matriage certificate.
Ms. Deleo and Ms. Nicolini signed a marriage certificate that indicated the
wedding ceremony took place on July 21, 2019, at 6:00 p.m.? Ms. Coombe signed
as a witness rather than the officiant. Instead, Ms. Coombe’s friend, Walter Rustin
Loyd, who was authorized to perform marriages in Louisiana, but was not present at
the July 21 ceremony, signed as the officiant. The parties now dispute when, where,
and under what circumstances that document was signed, and whether any ceremony
was actually performed by Mr. Loyd.
Ms. Deleo filed a petition seeking a declaration that the parties’ “marriage”
was an absolute nullity, contending that Mr. Loyd did not officiate any ceremony
i In the record, Ms. Deleo’s last name is also spelled “Delao,” and Ms. Nicolini’s first name
is also spelled “Lindsay.”
2 The document is entitled “Certificate of Marriage” and was alternately referenced
throughout this proceeding as a marriage certificate and marriage license.
2
between the parties. In contrast, Ms. Nicolini maintains that the parties went to Mr.
Loyd’s home on July 22, 2019, the day after the spiritual ceremony, where a second
“official ceremony” was held. Ms. Nicolini characterized the July 21 date on the
marriage certificate as a clerical error that did not affect the validity of the marriage.
After an evidentiary hearing, the trial court denied Ms. Deleo’s requested relief and,
on April 25, 2023, signed a judgment that declared the marriage valid.
Ms. Deleo now appeals.’
DISCUSSION
Marriage is a legal relationship created by a civil contract that is subject to
special rules prescribed by law. See La. Civ. Code art. 86. Under Louisiana law,
the three requirements for a valid contract of marriage are: 1) the absence of any
legal impediment; 2) a marriage ceremony; and 3) the free consent of the parties to
take each other as husband and wife as expressed at the ceremony. La. Civ. Code
art. 87. A marriage ceremony requires the participation of both parties and a third
person who is qualified, or reasonably believed by the parties to be qualified, to
perform the marriage ceremony. All three persons must be physically present at the
ceremony when it is performed. La. Civ. Code art. 91. While recognized as a
common-law marriage in other jurisdictions, a marriage contracted without a
ceremony in Louisiana is absolutely null. See La. Civ. Code art. 94; Ghassemi v.
Ghassemi, 2007-1927 (La. App. Ist Cir. 10/15/08), 998 So.2d 731, 743, writs
denied, 2008-2674 and 2008-2675 (La. 1/16/09), 998 So.2d 104. When a marriage
is absolutely null, a judicial declaration of nullity is not required; however, an action
to recognize the nullity may be brought by any interested person. La. Civ. Code art.
94.
3 A judgment granting or refusing an annulment of marriage is an appealable judgment. See
La. Code Civ. P. art. 3492. Out of an abundance of caution, the appellate record has also been
supplemented with an order of the trial court that certified the judgment as final. See La. Code
Civ. P. art. 1915(B).
Ms. Deleo testified that she and Ms. Nicolini signed the marriage certificate
immediately after the wedding performed by Ms. Coombe on July 21, and that their
friend, Allie Revere, and Ms. Coombe signed as witnesses at the same time. Ms.
Deleo’s mother testified that she was present and saw the couple and witnesses sign
the certificate immediately after the July 21 ceremony. According to Ms. Deleo, the
name of the officiant was left blank.
During her deposition testimony, Ms. Deleo explained it was her
understanding that, although Ms. Coombe was not yet “fully register[ed]” to perform
marriages, Ms. Coombe “could work under somebody and that ... somebody would
sign.” At the hearing, Ms. Deleo testified that Ms. Coombe reached out to Mr. Loyd
to “see if he would be willing to sign for [them].” Ms. Coombe confirmed that she
sent Mr. Loyd a message through Facebook on the morning of July 21, in which she
stated “They need to be married, like, later today. Are you free? I can do the
ceremony, but I need you to sign the marriage certificate.” Mr. Loyd responded,
“Oh yeah. For sure. Pll sign it.” After Ms. Coombe thanked him, Mr. Loyd
responded “It’s as easy as a signature. Not a problem.”
Mr. Loyd signed the marriage certificate as the officiant; however, Ms. Deleo
averred that he did so outside of her presence. During her deposition testimony, Ms.
Deleo denied being told that she needed to appear in front of Mr. Loyd to execute
the marriage certificate or participating in any ceremony officiated by Mr. Loyd. At
the hearing, as she did during her deposition testimony, Ms. Deleo denied going to
Mr. Loyd’s house or even meeting Mr. Loyd outside of this court proceeding. At
the hearing, Ms. Deleo testified that the first time she heard anything about having
gone to Mr. Loyd’s house was approximately a month before the depositions
conducted in relation to this proceeding, when Ms. Nicolini asked her questions
suggesting that she should remember going there.
In their depositions, Ms. Nicolini, Ms. Coombe, Ms. Revere (who was then in
a romantic relationship with Ms. Nicolini), and Mr. Loyd testified that Ms. Deleo
and Ms. Nicolini participated in a second short “legal” ceremony that took place at
Mr. Loyd’s house, during which the couple affirmed their intent to marry. Ms.
Nicolini, Ms. Coombe, and Ms. Revere all agreed that the ceremony took place on
July 22, between 6:00 and 6:30 p.m. Mr. Loyd could not recall if the ceremony that
he officiated took place on July 21 or July 22, or the time that it took place. Mr.
Loyd admittedly did not verify the identities of the couple who participated in the
ceremony; however, Ms. Nicolini, Ms. Coombe, and Ms. Revere all testified that
Ms. Deleo and Ms. Nicolini were the participants.
Ms. Deleo testified during her deposition and at trial that she worked as an
emergency room nurse at Ochsner Baptist Medical Center in New Orleans, and on
July 22, 2019, was scheduled to work a twelve-hour shift beginning at 6:45 a.m. She
presented evidence from her employer that her shift was scheduled to end at 7:15
p.m., and that she clocked out at 7:26 p.m. Ms. Deleo explained that her employer
used software that required employees to clock out by scanning their badge or their
fingerprint, or by having their supervisor clock out for them after the employee
completed a “missed punch” form. A text message exchange with a co-worker
confirmed that Ms. Deleo worked until after 7:00 p.m. Ms. Deleo testified that she
typically called Ms. Nicolini during her drive home to Hammond, which took
approximately one hour to one hour and ten minutes. Ms. Deleo stated that she
called Ms. Nicolini at 7:17 p.m., and they spoke for eleven minutes. She then sent
a text message update at 7:45 p.m., which stated “Off the spillway.” At trial, Ms.
Deleo acknowledged that the timing of text message and phone calls showed that
she most likely had to do a missed punch form; however, none was presented as
evidence.
In addition to the evidence that showed Ms. Deleo was at work and could not
have been at Mr. Loyd’s house at the time of the alleged second ceremony, copies
of text messages were introduced into evidence that showed that Ms. Nicolini and
Ms. Revere were grocery shopping at 6:00 p.m. on July 22.
When questioned at the hearing about the specific timeline of alleged events
on July 22, Ms. Nicolini acknowledged the “discrepancy” in her deposition
testimony and attempted to explain it, stating that she recalled seeing the time of
6:00 p.m. on the marriage certificate and “thought that we went earlier [to Mr.
Loyd’s] than what we did.” She testified that she got off of work around 5:00 p.m.,
went to the grocery store, then waited for Ms. Deleo to get home. She stated she
believed that Ms. Deleo left work between 7:00 and 7:15 p.m., and called at 7:17
p-m., which meant Ms. Deleo was in the car beginning the drive home. She stated
that Ms. Deleo was “off the spillway right around 7:45,” which was the halfway
point of the drive, and that Ms. Deleo arrived home at around 8:15 p.m. Ms. Nicolini
affirmed that she, Ms. Deleo, and Ms. Revere drove together to Mr. Loyd’s house,
which was also in Hammond and less than a ten-minute drive from the home she and
Ms. Deleo shared.
Ms. Nicolini recalled that it was still light outside when they arrived at Mr.
Loyd’s house, though her internet research showed that the sun set at 8:02 p.m. that
evening. Ms. Nicolini also stated that her interpretation of her own Facebook
analytics indicated that she did not use her phone between 8:00 and 8:42 p.m. that
night.
Ms. Revere testified at the hearing that she traveled with Ms. Nicolini and Ms.
Deleo from their house to Mr. Loyd’s house on July 22. She recalled testifying in
her deposition that the event occurred between 5:30 and 6:30 and gave no response
when questioned about the text message she sent at 6:32 p.m. about the grocery trip.
She stated that she could not recall the specific time they left for the ceremony at
Mr. Loyd’s house, only that it was still light outside when they arrived at his house.
She also acknowledged that none of the text messages confirmed that she went to
Mr. Loyd’s house at all.
At the hearing, Ms. Coombe testified that she went to Mr. Loyd’s house from
work, which was located in Mandeville, close to Abita Springs. She stated that she
probably “got off from work” at about 5:00 p.m. She thought that it was light outside
when she arrived at Mr. Loyd’s and that she stayed there only fifteen to twenty
minutes.
At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court observed that there were “two
different stories” and that “[s]omebody [was] just not being honest.” The trial court
then stated that its credibility determination was that “there was a ceremony,” noting
that Mr. Loyd and “all of these other people” said they were “at this house.” Thus,
the trial court found that there was a valid marriage between Ms. Deleo and Ms.
Nicolini.
We recognize that the manifest error standard demands great deference to the
trial court’s factual findings that are based on determinations regarding the
credibility of witnesses because the trial court had the opportunity to observe the
variations in demeanor and tone of voice that bear so heavily on understanding the
witnesses’ testimony. See Rosell v. ESCO, 549 So.2d 840, 844 (La. 1989).
However, even when a factual finding is purportedly based upon a credibility
determination, an appellate court may find manifest error when the witnesses’
testimony is contradicted by the evidence or is so internally inconsistent or
implausible on its face, that it cannot reasonably be credited. See Id. After careful
review, we find that such is the case here.
Although Ms. Nicolini’s version of events had the greater number of general
supporters, it was internally inconsistent and contradicted by other evidence. Her
first version of events—that a second ceremony took place on Monday between 6:00
and 6:30 p.m.—was disproved not only by objective evidence that Ms. Deleo was at
work during that time, but also by Ms. Nicolini’s own text messages that showed
she was grocery shopping with Ms. Revere. When that evidence became apparent,
Ms. Nicolini claimed that the ceremony at Mr. Loyd’s house took place after Ms.
Deleo returned home from work.
Ms. Nicolini’s testimony at the hearing presented the following timeline of
events. The sun set at 8:02 p.m. Based on Ms. Deleo’s text message that she was
“off the spillway” at 7:45 p.m., Ms. Deleo arrived home at 8:15 p.m. Ms. Nicolini,
Ms. Deleo, and Ms. Revere then made the approximately seven-minute drive to Mr.
Loyd’s house, arriving while it was still light outside. A short ceremony where the
couple affirmed their intent to marry took place before 8:42, when Ms. Nicolini
accessed her Facebook account. While at Mr. Loyd’s house, everyone signed the
marriage certificate. A text message confirmed that Ms. Nicolini and Ms. Deleo
were at their home by 9:00.
Ms. Revere, Ms. Coombe, and Mr. Loyd generally agreed that a second
ceremony took place; however, their testimony did not support the timeline Ms.
Nicolini’s testimony established at the hearing. Ms. Coombe recalled going to Mr.
Loyd’s house after leaving work at approximately 5:00 p.m. Ms. Revere could not
recall any specifics of the second ceremony after confirming that she sent a text
message about groceries at the time she previously attested that the ceremony at Mr.
Loyd’s occurred. Mr. Loyd could not recall any details regarding the time and date
of the ceremony he said he performed.
Additionally, despite the numerous text messages between Ms. Nicolini, Ms.
Deleo, and Ms. Revere from July 22 that were introduced into evidence, none
referenced them going to Mr. Loyd’s house—a place none of them had previously
been—for the second ceremony. Nor did Ms. Nicolini produce any evidence of
communications with Ms. Coombe and Mr. Loyd confirming the time, place, or
details of a July 22 ceremony at Mr. Loyd’s house. The only documentary evidence
of a ceremony performed by Mr. Loyd was the marriage certificate itself, which
everyone agreed contained erroneous information. No pictures or other
documentation was offered.
The entirety of the evidence discredits Ms. Nicolini’s testimony that she and
Ms. Deleo participated in a second ceremony performed by Mr. Loyd on July 22,
after Ms. Deleo, who was in the advanced stages of her pregnancy, returned home
from work. Since both Ms. Deleo and Ms. Nicolini agree that the July 21 ceremony
performed by Ms. Coombe was without legal effect, we find that the trial court erred
in declaring that the marriage between Ms. Deleo and Ms. Nicolini was valid. This
is not a case of a simple clerical error on a marriage certificate; rather, one of the
three requirements of a valid marriage under Louisiana law is lacking. See La. Civ.
Code art. 87.
We note that on appeal, Ms. Nicolini argues that Ms. Deleo judicially
confessed that the two were married in pleadings she filed in this case. A judicial
confession is a party’s explicit admission of an adverse factual element. Cichirillo
v. Avondale Industries, Inc., 2004-2894 (La. 11/29/05), 917 So.2d 424, 429.
Under Louisiana law, a marriage contracted without a marriage ceremony is
absolutely null. La. Civ. Code art. 94. While other states recognize marriages
confected without a ceremony as valid common law marriages, Louisiana does not.
See Ghassemi, 998 So.2d at 743. Thus, any prior assertion by Ms. Deleo that the
marriage was valid is immaterial.
Ms. Nicolini further argues that Ms. Deleo believed she was married when
she filed the marriage certificate with the clerk of court and when she listed Ms.
Nicolini’s name on the baby’s birth certificate, noting that knowingly filing a
document containing a false statement in any public office is a felony. See La. R.S.
14:133. Ms. Nicolini contends that since she too had the honest and reasonable
belief that they were married, the civil effects of a valid marriage should flow to
her.’ However, these arguments are beyond the scope of this appeal, which is limited
solely to the question of whether the marriage was absolutely null.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the trial court’s April 25, 2023 judgment that
declared valid the marriage between Kristin Deleo and Lindsey Marie Nicolini is
reversed. Judgment is rendered recognizing the absolute nullity of the marriage. All
costs of this appeal are assessed to Lindsey Marie Nicolini.
REVERSED AND RENDERED.
‘In this regard, Ms. Nicolini argues that the provision of La. Civ. Code art. 96, which states that
a purported marriage between same-sex couples produces no civil effects, is invalid after the
United States Supreme Court’s decision in Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644, 647, 135 S.Ct.
2584, 2591, 192 L.Ed.2d 609 (2015),
10
KRISTIN DELEO STATE OF LOUISIANA
COURT OF APPEAL
VERSUS
FIRST CIRCUIT
LINDSEY MARIE NICOLINI NO. 2023 CU 1342
STROMBERG, J., dissents.
¥ I respectfully dissent from the majority opinion. Our courts are reluctant to
invalidate a marriage, and they will not do so unless the law and the facts clearly
indicate that it should be annulled. Tennison v. Nevels, 2006-2124 (La. App. | Cir.
6/8/07), 965 So.2d 425, 427; Parker v. Saileau, 213 So.2d 190, 194 (La. App. 3 Cir.
1968). This litigation began when Ms. Deleo filed a petition for divorce pursuant to
La. C.C. art. 102 on the basis that a valid marriage existed, contrary to her later
position that the marriage should be annulled. In finding the marriage valid, the trial
court specifically found the testimony of the witnesses, officiant, and Ms. Nicolini
credible. Notably, Ms. Deleo filed the marriage certificate with the Clerk of Court
the day after the formal ceremony.
I find no manifest error in the trial court’s factual conclusions that a valid
marriage ceremony occurred. As the majority recognizes, an appellate court may
not set aside a trial court’s findings of fact unless a reasonable factual basis does not
exist for the findings and, further, a review of the entire record shows that the factual
findings are clearly wrong. See Rosell v. ESCO, 549 So.2d 840, 844 (La. 1989).
Additionally, where the fact-finder’s determination is based on its decision to credit
the testimony of one or more witnesses, that finding can virtually never be manifestly
erroneous. Purvis v. Grant Parish School Board, 2013-1424 (La. 2/14/ 14), 144
So.3d 922, 926. Accordingly, I would affirm the judgment of the trial court denying
Ms. Deleo’s request to nullify the marriage and deeming the marriage between Ms.
Deleo and Ms. Nicolini valid.
STATE OF LOUISIANA
COURT OF APPEAL
FIRST CIRCUIT
2023 CU 1342
KRISTIN DELEO
VERSUS
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LINDSEY MARIE NICOLINI
: \ McClendon, J., agrees and assigns additional reasons.
Pursuant to LSA-C.C. art. 87, a marriage ceremony is one of the requirements for
a valid marriage. With regard to the marriage ceremony, LSA-C.C. art. 91 provides, in
pertinent part, that “[t]he parties must participate in a marriage ceremony performed by
a third person who is qualified, or reasonably believed by the parties to be qualified, to
perform the ceremony.” Thus, a valid marriage may exist, even where the officiant is not
qualified, if the parties reasonably believe the officiant to be qualified. Nevertheless,
because the appellant does not raise this issue as an assignment of error or argue same,
I do not address it at this time.