Fred Watson v. Eddie Boyd, III

United States Court of Appeals

For the Eighth Circuit

___________________________

No. 22-3233

___________________________

Fred Watson

lllllllllllllllllllllPlaintiff - Appellant

v.

Eddie Boyd, III; City of Ferguson, Missouri

lllllllllllllllllllllDefendants - Appellees

____________

Appeal from United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Missouri - St. Louis

____________

Submitted: January 10, 2024

Filed: October 21, 2024

____________

Before SMITH, Chief Judge,1 GRUENDER, and SHEPHERD, Circuit Judges.

____________

SMITH, Chief Judge.

Following a police interaction between Fred Watson and Officer Eddie Boyd,

III, at a Ferguson, Missouri park, Watson filed suit against the City of Ferguson,

1

Judge Smith completed his term as chief judge of the circuit on March 10,

2024. See 28 U.S.C. § 45(a)(3)(A).

Missouri (City), and Officer Boyd for violation of his civil rights. See 42 U.S.C.

§ 1983. Against Officer Boyd, Watson alleged unlawful search and seizure, in

violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments (Count I); unlawful retaliation,

in violation of the First Amendment (Count II); and malicious prosecution, in

violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments (Count III). Watson also alleged

a municipal liability claim against the City (Count IV). The district court granted

summary judgment to the defendants. Watson appeals. We affirm on all but the

district court’s grant of summary judgment on Watson’s First Amendment use-of-

force retaliation claim because a disputed question of fact remains as to that claim.

I. Background2

A. Underlying Facts

On August 1, 2012, Watson returned to his parked car after playing basketball

at a City park. Watson rested in the running vehicle, with the air conditioner on and

the driver’s side window partially down.

Officer Boyd, at that time, was patrolling the park. He maintains that “a spate

of recent car break-ins” had occurred. R. Doc. 100, at 1. According to Officer Boyd,

at approximately 8:17 p.m., he saw a parked vehicle with excessively tinted windows

and no front license plate idling with its headlights on near an area where children

were playing. “Both Missouri law and the Ferguson City Code of Ordinances (‘City

Code’) restrict vision-reducing material applied to the windows and windshield of a

car.” Watson v. City of Ferguson, No. 4:17-cv-2187 JCH, 2022 WL 16569365, at *5

(E.D. Mo. Sept. 26, 2022) (citing Mo. Rev. Stat. § 307.173; City Code § 44-404).

Missouri law also “requires, with certain exceptions not relevant here, that license

2

We recite the facts in the light most favorable to Watson as the non-movant.

See Smith-Dandridge v. Geanolous, 97 F.4th 569, 575 (8th Cir. 2024).

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plates be fastened to the front and rear of motor vehicles.” Id. (citing Mo. Rev. Stat.

§ 301.130.5). Officer Boyd parked his car near the vehicle and approached on foot.3

As he walked toward the vehicle, Officer Boyd unsnapped his gun holster.

Watson “lower[ed] the window more as [Officer Boyd] approached the car so [they

could] have an exchange” and so Officer Boyd could “see” Watson. R. Doc. 187-2,

at 12.4 Officer Boyd asked Watson, “[D]o you know why I pulled you over, do you

know why I stopped you”? Id. Watson responded, “Sir, you didn’t pull me over, you

didn’t stop me, I’ve been sitting here 10, 15 minutes in the park.” Id. Officer Boyd

then directed Watson to state his Social Security number. Watson refused. Officer

Boyd responded with a series of “hypotheticals” to justify his request, including that

Watson “could be a pedophile.” Id. at 13.

“At some point[,] [Watson] asked [Officer Boyd for] his name and his badge

number, [but] he refused . . . .” Id. at 15. Officer Boyd became “visibly upset” and

told Watson, “[N]o, you don’t need that, it will be on your ticket.” Id. at 29. Watson

replied, “[W]hat ticket[?] I have not broken any law.” Id. Officer Boyd responded, “I

think your tint is too dark[,] and I could give you a ticket for that.” Id. Watson replied,

“[S]ir, that’s fine.” Id. During this exchange, Watson’s hands were on the steering

wheel. After Officer Boyd informed Watson about the ticket, Watson removed his

right hand from the steering wheel to reach for his phone located “next to the steering

wheel . . . where the . . . navigation system [was].” Id. at 29. Officer Boyd then yelled,

“[P]ut your f***ing phone down and put your hands on the steering wheel.” Id. He

3

Officer Boyd asserts that he pulled his police cruiser adjacent to Watson’s car;

Watson maintains that Officer Boyd parked directly in front of his car, thereby

blocking it.

4

Officer Boyd contends that the vehicle’s windows were so dark that he was

unsure whether the car was occupied until he approached and saw movement inside.

Officer Boyd further maintains that he was able to see only that Watson was not

wearing his seatbelt.

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told Watson, “[B]ecause of police safety[,] don’t start reaching around grabbing

stuff.” Id. at 16. Watson complied and “put it down.” Id. Watson returned his hands

to the steering wheel. Officer Boyd called for backup. Officer Boyd then “pulled his

gun” and said, “I can shoot you right here” “[a]nd nobody will give a s**t.” Id. at 18.

Officer Boyd ordered Watson to “throw the keys out of the car.” Id. at 18. He

also asked for Watson’s driver’s license and registration. In his deposition, Watson

agreed that he “refused [Officer Boyd’s] request to throw the keys out” of the car. Id.

at 17. Watson replied that he could not throw the keys out of the window or retrieve

the driver’s license because his key fob5 and driver’s license were in a pair of pants

folded up on the back seat. Watson told Officer Boyd that his registration was in the

glove compartment. Officer Boyd ordered Watson to exit the vehicle, and “Watson

admits that he did not exit the vehicle before backup came, for fear of his life.” R.

Doc. 194, at 8.

At some point, Officer Boyd asked Watson his name. See id. at 14 (“[Officer

Boyd] asked me [Watson] about my name . . . This was after the pedophile

[comment], this is after [he stated,] [‘]I can write you a ticket for tint . . . .[’]”); see

also id. (“[Q.] All right. But now you recall him asking your name, is that right?

Before he asked you to throw the keys out of the window, is that accurate? [A.] I

[Watson] don’t recall the sequence of those two things.”). Watson replied, “Fred

Watson.” Id. at 14. Watson’s legal name is “Freddie Watson”; however, he goes by

“Fred Watson.” Id. at 15. Officer Boyd also asked for Watson’s address. Watson gave

a Florida address but was actually living in Illinois at the time of the stop. According

to Officer Boyd, he tried to locate the name “Fred Watson” in REJIS, a computer

system that law enforcement agencies use to identify individuals, including locating

their driver’s license information. He could not locate “Fred Watson” in the database.

5

Watson’s car started remotely with the key fob.

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Once backup arrived, Watson exited the vehicle with his hands raised. After

exiting, Watson closed the door with his foot because he did not want the police to

search his vehicle. Officer “Boyd handcuffed Watson, squeezing the cuffs . . . , and

placed [him] in the back of [Officer] Boyd’s police car.” R. Doc. 137, at 6 (Sealed).

He then searched Watson’s vehicle and the items therein, including a book bag, pants,

the glove compartment, and the center console. According to the police report,

Officer Boyd conducted the search incident to arrest. Officer Boyd located

documentation indicating that Watson’s legal name was “Freddie Watson,” not “Fred

Watson.”6 Officer Boyd located “Freddie Watson” in REJIS. The REJIS search

indicated that Watson had “an expired operator’s license through Missouri that had

not been surrendered to another state.” R. Doc. 187-1, at 31. Specifically, the search

revealed that “Freddie D[.]” “Watson” had a “resident address” in “St[.] Louis, MO,”

where he had a “valid expired” Missouri driver’s license that was never

“surrendered.” Id. at 37 (all caps omitted). The REJIS report listed a “current address”

for Watson in “Fairview Hts[.], IL.” Id. (all caps omitted). Another REJIS search

completed shortly thereafter indicated that Watson’s vehicle was registered and

insured in Florida. See id. at 38. “It is undisputed that Watson’s vehicle had a Florida

license plate, and [it] did not have an inspection sticker.” Watson, 2022 WL

16569365, at *2.

Officer Boyd issued Watson seven tickets: “no operator’s license in possession;

no proof of insurance; vision reducing material applied to windshield[7]; expired state

operator’s license; no seat belt; failure to register an out[-]of[- ]state motor vehicle

6

Watson testified that he took pictures of the belongings that were in his car

after the search. He said that he “point[ed] out [his] driver’s license [on] the floor”

and his “registration.” R. Doc. 196-3, at 52. Watson further confirmed that his

“current driver’s license” was “issued out of . . . Florida.” Id. at 79–80.

7

“Although Officer Boyd had a device that measured tint on windows, he did

not use the device to measure whether Watson’s windows or windshield were tinted.”

Id. at *3 n.13.

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within 30 days of residence; and no vehicle inspection.” Id. at *3. Additionally,

Watson was charged with two more offenses written on complaints instead of tickets:

making a false statement and failure to obey the orders of a police officer. Watson

learned of these additional charges when his attorney received the complaints from

the prosecutor.

Watson contested the charges. He subsequently received notice that the tickets

were either stayed or paid off, despite Watson never pleading guilty to any of the

charges or paying the fines. The City ultimately dismissed all the charges.

B. Procedural History

Watson filed suit in federal court. He brought the following claims against

Officer Boyd under § 1983: (1) violation of his Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment

rights to be free from unlawful searches, seizures, and force (Count I); (2) violation

of his First Amendment right to be free from retaliation for requesting Officer Boyd’s

name and badge number (Count II); and (3) violation of his Fourth and Fourteenth

Amendment right to be free from malicious prosecution (Count III). He also brought

Monell8 claims under § 1983 (Count IV) against the City for the following: (1)

maintaining a custom of unconstitutional conduct by police officers; (2) failing to

adequately screen Officer Boyd during the hiring process; (3) inadequately training

Officer Boyd; and (4) failing to supervise or discipline Officer Boyd.

Officer Boyd and the City (collectively, “defendants”) jointly moved for

summary judgment. The district court concluded that Officer Boyd was not entitled

to qualified immunity on Watson’s claims of unlawful seizure, search, force, and

retaliation because the parties disputed the facts in their entirety and a reasonable jury

could find in favor of Watson. The district court granted summary judgment based on

qualified immunity to Officer Boyd on Watson’s malicious-prosecution claim. The

8

Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978).

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court reasoned that the Eighth Circuit had not yet recognized such a claim under

§ 1983. Finally, the district court generally denied the City’s motion for summary

judgment on Watson’s Monell claims based on its finding that Officer Boyd was not

entitled to qualified immunity for the underlying conduct. Although the court granted

summary judgment to the City on Watson’s inadequate-training claim, it concluded

that a reasonable jury could find that the City had maintained a custom of

unconstitutional conduct, failed to screen Officer Boyd, and failed to supervise or

discipline Officer Boyd. As a result, it denied the City’s request for summary

judgment on those claims.

Officer Boyd and the City filed an interlocutory appeal of the district court’s

denial of qualified immunity and summary judgment. On appeal, we “pass[ed] no

judgment on whether Officer Boyd is entitled to qualified immunity because the

district court failed to undertake the necessary analysis.” Watson v. Boyd, 2 F.4th

1106, 1114 (8th Cir. 2021). As a result, “we vacate[d] the district court’s order and

remand[ed] the case for a more detailed consideration and explanation of the validity,

or not, of Officer Boyd’s claim to qualified immunity in a manner consistent with

[our] opinion.” Id. We dismissed the City’s appeal for lack of jurisdiction. Id.

On remand, the defendants filed a new motion for summary judgment based on

qualified immunity and Watson’s failure to establish constitutional violations. The

district court granted the motion on all counts.

1. Unlawful Search and Seizure (Count I)

In Count I, Watson asserted that Officer Boyd is liable for an unlawful search

and seizure. He asserted that Officer Boyd violated his Fourth Amendment rights by

(1) stopping and arresting him without probable cause; (2) seizing him unreasonably

by pointing a gun at his head at close range; (3) seizing him unreasonably by

initiating charges against him; and (4) conducting an illegal search by ransacking

Watson’s car after having unlawfully arrested him.

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a. Stop Without Probable Cause

The district court assumed that a fact question remained as to whether

Watson’s front windshield was excessively tinted. But it found that fact question

immaterial because no dispute existed that Watson’s car lacked a front license plate.

See Mo. Rev. Stat. § 307.173; City Code § 44-404. As a result, it granted summary

judgment to the defendants on this issue.

b. Arrest Without Probable Cause

Officer Boyd asserted that he “had probable cause, or at least arguable probable

cause, to believe that Watson had committed numerous offenses, any one or all of

which justified his arrest.” Watson, 2022 WL 16569365, at *6. The district court

agreed and granted summary judgment on this issue. It analyzed the offenses as

follows.

i. Failure to Provide Driver’s License and Proof of Insurance

Officer Boyd argued that “he had probable cause or arguable probable cause

to cite and arrest Watson both for failure to provide a driver’s license and for failure

to provide proof of insurance.” Id. The court found it “undisputed that Officer Boyd

asked Watson to provide his driver’s license and proof of insurance, and that Watson

failed to provide either.” Id. Based on Watson’s failure to provide this information,

the court concluded that “Officer Boyd had at least arguable probable cause to arrest

Watson and issue the two citations.” Id.

ii. Windshield

Officer Boyd claimed he had probable cause or arguable probable cause to

arrest Watson based on his heavily tinted windows. The court found it “undisputed

that Watson’s vehicle windows contained tint.” Id. at *7. Missouri law prohibits

excessive tint on windows. The court reasoned that “even if Officer Boyd ultimately

was wrong, . . . he still possessed at least arguable probable cause to issue the

citation.” Id.

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iii. Expired Driver’s License

Officer Boyd asserted that “he had probable cause or arguable probable cause

to cite and arrest Watson for operating a vehicle under an expired state driver’s

license, because the REJIS system indicated that Watson’s Missouri driver’s license

was expired and had not been surrendered to another state.” Id. The court concluded

that Officer Boyd had at least arguable probable cause to arrest Watson for an expired

driver’s license based on (1) his “determin[ation] that Watson’s Missouri license had

never been surrendered”—“as required to obtain a license in another state”—and had

expired, and (2) Officer Boyd’s inability “to locate a driver’s license for Watson in

any other state.” Id.

iv. Seat Belt

Officer Boyd maintained that he had probable cause or arguable probable cause

to arrest Watson for “not wearing his seatbelt” while he was “sitting in his running

vehicle, in a public park.” Id. at *8. The court concluded that Officer Boyd had at

least arguable probable cause to cite and arrest Wilson based on these undisputed

facts.

v. Vehicle Registration/Inspection Sticker

Officer Boyd argued that “he had probable cause, or at least arguable probable

cause, to believe that Watson’s vehicle was required to be registered in the state of

Missouri based on the information located in REJIS” “that Watson was a Missouri

resident [with an expired Missouri driver’s license] who had failed to register his

vehicle under Missouri law.” Id. at *9. Furthermore, he asserted “he had probable

cause to believe Watson was in violation of [Missouri] law for failure to have an

inspection approval sticker.” Id. The court concluded that “Officer Boyd had ample

evidence that any alleged Florida registration was invalid, as Watson’s car should

have been registered in Missouri.” Id.

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vi. Failure to Obey

Officer Boyd claimed that he had probable cause to arrest Watson for his

refusal to comply with Officer Boyd’s command “to throw his keys out of the window

and exit his vehicle.” Id. The court concluded “that Officer Boyd had at least arguable

probable cause to believe Watson was disobeying his order” based on the undisputed

fact that “Watson refused to comply with his demands.” Id.

vii. False Statement

Officer Boyd argued that he had probable cause or arguable probable cause to

arrest Watson for making two material false statements: “identif[ying] himself as

‘Fred Watson’ rather than ‘Freddie Watson’” and “provid[ing] a false Florida address,

when Watson knew he did not reside in Florida.” Id. at *10. The court concluded that

Officer Boyd had at least arguable probable cause to issue the citation to Watson for

providing a false statement based on the undisputed facts. According to the court,

although a fact issue may exist “as to whether Watson’s answers were willfully or

knowingly deceitful, that question does not affect whether Officer Boyd had at least

arguable probable cause to believe Watson uttered at least one false declaration”

based on the undisputed facts. Id.

c. Excessive Force

Watson alleged that when “he moved his hand from the top of the steering

wheel to the console above the radio, in an effort to reach his phone and call the

police[,] . . . . Officer Boyd directed Watson not to use the phone and to keep his

hands on the steering wheel, allegedly for officer safety purposes.” Id. Watson further

alleged that Officer Boyd pulled his gun on Watson “after Watson put his phone back

down.” Id. at *11. Watson claimed that when Officer Boyd pulled his gun and pointed

it at Watson for ten seconds, Officer Boyd told Watson that “he could shoot Watson

right then and nobody would give a damn.” Id. at *10.

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The court concluded that Officer Boyd had “an objectively reasonable concern

for officer safety or suspicion of danger” when he pulled his gun because he “was

facing a non-compliant occupant of a vehicle who made a movement within the

vehicle.” Id. at *11. Alternatively, the court determined “that even if Officer Boyd did

violate Watson’s constitutional rights,” “it was not clearly established that Officer

Boyd’s alleged act of pulling his gun for ten seconds on a non-compliant suspect

constituted an unreasonable seizure under the Fourth Amendment.” Id. at *11–12.

d. Search

Officer Boyd claimed his warrantless search of Watson’s vehicle was lawful

as a search incident to arrest or under the automobile exception. The court concluded

that Officer Boyd’s “warrantless search of Watson’s vehicle was lawful as a search

incident to arrest” because “Officer Boyd had probable cause or arguable probable

cause to arrest Watson for, inter alia, . . . no operator’s license in possession, no proof

of insurance, and providing false declarations.” Id. at *12. Alternatively, the court

concluded that any violation of a constitutional right was not clearly established.

2. Unlawful Retaliation (Count II)

In Count II, Watson asserted “two distinct claims” for First Amendment

retaliation. Appellant’s Br. at 22. First, he asserted that Officer “Boyd

unconstitutionally used force by pointing his gun at him and threatening to shoot him

in retaliation for . . . Watson questioning him.” Id. (citing R. Doc. 35, at 18; R. Doc.

196-1, at 36). Second, he asserted that Officer “Boyd cited [him] for violating several

municipal ordinances without probable cause in retaliation for [his] questioning [of

Officer Boyd] and [his] attempt[] to report the encounter.” Id.

The district court did not address the retaliatory use-of-force claim; instead, it

addressed only the retaliatory-arrest claim. Officer Boyd argued that “Watson’s claim

for First Amendment retaliation fails because Officer Boyd had probable cause to

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arrest and charge Watson.” Watson, 2022 WL 16569365, at *13. The district court

agreed and granted summary judgment to Officer Boyd.

3. Monell Claims (Count IV)

Based on its prior conclusions that Watson failed to state claims under § 1983

for unlawful search and seizure and unlawful retaliation, the court concluded that

there could be no Monell liability on the part of the City.

II. Discussion

On appeal, Watson argues that the district court erroneously granted summary

judgment to the defendants on his First Amendment retaliation claim in Count II, his

Fourth Amendment unreasonable search claim in Count I, and his Monell claim in

Count IV.

“Viewing the facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, we

review the district court’s grants of summary judgment de novo.” Smith-Dandridge,

97 F.4th at 575 (internal quotation marks omitted). “Whether a given set of facts

entitles the official to summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds is a question

of law. But if there is a genuine dispute concerning predicate facts material to the

qualified immunity issue, there can be no summary judgment.” Francisco v. Corizon

Health, Inc., 108 F.4th 1072, 1077 (8th Cir. 2024) (internal quotation marks omitted).

“To decide whether an official is entitled to qualified immunity, we conduct a

two-step inquiry: (1) whether the facts, viewed in the light most favorable to the

plaintiff, demonstrate a constitutional or statutory deprivation; and (2) whether the

right was clearly established at the time.” Nieters v. Holtan, 83 F.4th 1099, 1105 (8th

Cir. 2023) (internal quotation marks omitted), cert. denied, 144 S. Ct. 1349 (2024).

We may “consider [these steps] in either order.” Presson v. Reed, 65 F.4th 357, 365

(8th Cir. 2023) (internal quotation marks omitted). A right is clearly established if

“the contours of the right [are] sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would

understand that what he is doing violates that right. While prior cases need not have

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expressly determined that the action in question is unlawful, in the light of

pre-existing law the unlawfulness must be apparent.” Id. (internal quotation marks

omitted).

A. First Amendment Retaliation

Watson alleges that Officer Boyd unlawfully retaliated against him in violation

of his First Amendment rights after Watson requested Officer Boyd’s name and badge

number. On appeal, he argues that the district court erroneously granted summary

judgment in favor of the defendants on this claim by (1) erroneously concluding that

probable cause existed to justify his arrest on his retaliatory-arrest claim and (2)

failing to address his retaliatory use-of-force claim.

“Criticism of public officials lies at the very core of speech protected by the

First Amendment.” Peterson v. Kopp, 754 F.3d 594, 602 (8th Cir. 2014) (cleaned up),

abrogated on other grounds by Laney v. City of St. Louis, 56 F.4th 1153, 1157 n.2

(8th Cir. 2023). “Official reprisal for protected speech offends the Constitution

because it threatens to inhibit exercise of the protected right, and the law is settled

that as a general matter the First Amendment prohibits government officials from

subjecting an individual to retaliatory actions . . . for speaking out.” Hartman v.

Moore, 547 U.S. 250, 256 (2006) (cleaned up).

To succeed on a First Amendment retaliation claim [Watson] must

demonstrate: (1) he engaged in protected First Amendment activity; (2)

Officer [Boyd] took an adverse action that would chill a person of

ordinary firmness from continuing in that protected activity; and (3)

there was a but-for causal connection between [Watson’s] injury and

Officer [Boyd’s] retaliatory animus.

Nieters, 83 F.4th at 1110. As to the third element, “a plaintiff must establish a ‘causal

connection’ between the government defendant’s ‘retaliatory animus’ and the

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plaintiff’s ‘subsequent injury.’” Nieves v. Bartlett, 587 U.S. 391, 398 (2019) (quoting

Hartman, 547 U.S. at 259). “[T]he motive must cause the injury. Specifically, it must

be a ‘but-for’ cause, meaning that the adverse action against the plaintiff would not

have been taken absent the retaliatory motive.” Id. at 398–99 (quoting Hartman, 547

U.S. at 260).9

1. Retaliatory Arrest

We will first address Watson’s retaliatory-arrest claim. Watson argues that the

district court erroneously granted summary judgment on this claim because Officer

Boyd lacked arguable probable cause for five of the nine citations that he issued to

Watson: (1) driving without a driver’s license in his possession; (2) failing to register

his vehicle; (3) failing to have an inspection sticker; (4) failing to obey; and (5)

making a false statement.10

“For a number of retaliation claims, establishing the causal connection between

a defendant’s animus and a plaintiff’s injury is straightforward.” Nieves, 587 U.S. at

399. But “in other types of retaliation cases,” “the consideration of causation is not

so straightforward.” Id. “[R]etaliatory arrest claims involve causal complexities . . . . ”

Id. at 401. “[A]s a general rule, a plaintiff bringing a retaliatory-arrest claim ‘must

plead and prove the absence of probable cause for the arrest.’” Gonzalez v. Trevino,

144 S. Ct. 1663, 1665 (2024) (per curiam) (quoting Nieves, 587 U.S. at 402).

9

“To the extent Peterson suggests that a substantial factor is enough, even in

the absence of but-for causation, it is inconsistent with Nieves and no longer good

law.” Laney, 56 F.4th at 1157 n.2 (emphasis added) (cleaned up).

10

Watson does not challenge the district court’s conclusion that Officer Boyd

had probable cause to issue him citations for violating the financial-responsibility

ordinance, applying vision-reducing materials to his windshield, not wearing a

seatbelt, and having an expired driver’s license.

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“Probable cause exists when the totality of the circumstances at the time of the

arrest are sufficient to lead a reasonable person to believe that the defendant has

committed or is committing an offense.” Brown v. City of St. Louis, 40 F.4th 895, 900

(8th Cir. 2022) (internal quotation marks omitted). Courts “determine whether an

officer had probable cause for an arrest” by “examin[ing] the events leading up to the

arrest, and then decid[ing] whether these historical facts, viewed from the standpoint

of an objectively reasonable police officer, amount to probable cause.” Id. (internal

quotation marks omitted). Whether probable cause exists to effectuate an arrest

“depends upon the reasonable conclusion to be drawn from the facts known to the

arresting officer at the time of the arrest.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).

Probable cause “is an objective standard requiring that we afford officers substantial

latitude in interpreting and drawing inferences from factual circumstances.” Id.

(cleaned up). The question is whether the “facts and circumstances [were] sufficient

to warrant a prudent man in believing that the suspect had committed or was

committing an offense.” Id. (cleaned up). “[We] have assigned consideration of actual

probable cause to our constitutional violation prong analysis . . . .” Id. at 901.

Distinct from the legal concept of “probable cause” is “arguable probable

cause.” Id. (recognizing that the terms “are not interchangeable”). “[A]rguable

probable cause exists” “where the officers act on a mistaken belief that probable

cause exists, if that mistake is objectively reasonable.” Id. at 900–01 (internal

quotation marks omitted). We consider whether arguable probable cause exists as

“part of the resolution of qualified immunity’s second prong, the clearly established

prong.” Id. at 901; see also id. (“[W]e have . . . reserv[ed] any consideration of

arguable probable cause for our clearly established prong analysis.”). “[N]o arguable

probable cause” exists when “the state of the law at the time of the arrests was clearly

established such that a reasonable person would have known there was no probable

cause to arrest the plaintiffs.” Id. (cleaned up).

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“In sum, even if an officer arrests an individual without actual probable

cause—in violation of the Constitution—he has not violated that individual’s clearly

established rights for qualified immunity purposes if he nevertheless had arguable

probable cause to make the arrest.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Here,

Watson argues that Officer Boyd lacked even arguable probable cause to issue the

challenged citations. We disagree and affirm the district court’s grant of summary

judgment on the retaliatory-arrest claim.

a. Driver’s License

Watson first asserts that Officer Boyd lacked arguable probable cause to issue

the “suspended license citation” because Officer “Boyd had ample information that

proved . . . Watson had a valid and current Florida driver’s license.” Appellant’s Br.

at 30. Specifically, Watson points to Officer Boyd’s (1) REJIS search showing that

Watson had a valid Florida driver’s license, and (2) discovery of Watson’s Florida

driver’s license during his search of Watson’s car. Id.

As a threshold matter, Watson was not charged with having a suspended

license but instead with driving without a driver’s license in his possession. See R.

Doc. 196-11, at 2. City Code § 44-81(a) provides that “[i]t shall be unlawful for any

person to drive any motor vehicle . . . in the city unless such person shall have a

driver’s license . . . as required by state law, and shall have such license in possession

at all times while so driving on the streets of the city.” R. Doc. 187-4, at 5. Further,

City Code § 44-81(c) provides that “[f]ailure to produce a driver’s . . . license upon

lawful demand shall give a police officer probable cause to arrest the driver.” Id.

“[W]e have held that asking for [a] driver’s license and registration papers is

a reasonable part of the investigation following a justifiable traffic stop.” United

States v. Smart, 393 F.3d 767, 771 (8th Cir. 2005) (citing United States v. Clayborn,

339 F.3d 700, 702 (8th Cir. 2003) (“We have consistently held that a reasonable

investigation following a justifiable traffic stop may include asking for the driver’s

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license and registration.” (cleaned up)); United States v. Jones, 275 F.3d 673, 680

(8th Cir. 2001) (“Once a car is lawfully stopped, the police may request the driver’s

license and registration.”)).

As the district court recognized, “It is undisputed that Officer Boyd asked

Watson to provide his driver’s license and proof of insurance, and that Watson failed

to provide either.” Watson, 2022 WL 16569365, at *6; see also R. Doc. 187-2, at 18

(stating that when Officer Boyd asked for Watson’s “[driver’s] license and

registration,” Watson kept his hands on the steering wheel and “told him it’s in the

back, [the] license is in [the] pants in the back [of the car]”). It was only during the

search of Watson’s vehicle that Officer Boyd located documentation with Watson’s

legal name on it. With this name, Officer Boyd was able to locate Watson in REJIS.

Results showed that Watson had an valid expired Missouri driver’s license.

Watson argues that, during the search, Officer Boyd found Watson’s Florida

driver’s license. He contends that because Officer Boyd knew that Watson had a

Florida driver’s license, Officer Boyd lacked probable cause to cite him for not

having a valid driver’s license. But, based on the undisputed facts, Officer Boyd at

least had arguable probable cause to believe that Watson’s Florida driver’s license

was not valid. A REJIS search completed at 9:04 p.m. revealed that “Freddie D[.]”

“Watson” had a “resident address” in “St[.] Louis, MO,” where he had a “valid

expired” Missouri driver’s license that was never “surrendered.” R. Doc. 187-1, at 37

(all caps omitted). The REJIS report listed a “current address” for Watson in

“Fairview Hts[.], IL.” Id. (all caps omitted). Another REJIS search completed at 9:46

p.m. indicated that Watson’s vehicle was registered and insured in Florida. See id. at

38. But it also listed Watson’s Illinois address. See id. Officer Boyd, who stopped

Watson in Missouri, testified that because Watson “had an expired [Missouri driver’s]

license,” he “believed that [Watson] was a Missouri resident.” R. Doc. 187-1, at 21.

The REJIS searches supported this belief. As the defendants correctly note, “Had

Officer Boyd been correct [that Watson was a Missouri resident], Watson would not

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have had a valid [Florida] driver’s license because he was not a resident of Florida.”

Appellee’s Br. at 22 (citing Mo. Rev. Stat. § 302.080(2) (providing that “[a]

nonresident who is at least sixteen years of age and who has in his immediate

possession a valid [driver’s] license issued to him in his home state or country” is

“exempt” from Missouri’s license law (emphasis added)).11

As a result, we conclude that at least arguable probable cause existed for

driving without a driver’s license.

b. Vehicle Registration/Inspection Sticker

Watson next argues that Officer “Boyd . . . lacked arguable probable cause to

charge [him] with not having a Missouri inspection or registration, as he . . . had

ample information that proved [his] car was lawfully registered in Florida, and had

no information that suggested the car had to be registered and inspected in Missouri.”

Appellant’s Br. at 31. Specifically, he asserts that REJIS shows that his “car was

lawfully registered and insured and Florida,” he “had a valid Florida license plate,”

he “provided his Florida address to [Officer] Boyd upon request,” and Officer “Boyd

found [Watson’s] valid Florida registration when . . . searching his car.” Id.

Under Missouri law, “[a]pplication for registration of a motor vehicle not

previously registered in Missouri . . . and previously registered in another state shall

be made within thirty days after the owner of such motor vehicle has become a

resident of this state.” Mo. Rev. Stat. § 301.100.3. Additionally, City Code § 44-387

provides that “[i]t shall be unlawful for any person to operate or park a motor vehicle

11

In fact, the record shows that Watson was neither a resident of Missouri

nor Florida at the time of the encounter; he resided in Illinois. See R. Doc. 187-2, at

28. Watson had not resided in Florida since 2005. See id. at 6. Under Illinois law, new

residents have 90 days to obtain an Illinois driver's license, at which time their

out-of-state license is no longer valid. 625 Ill. Comp. Stat. § 5/6-102(7). Thus,

Watson’s Florida driver’s license would not have been valid at the time of the event.

-18-

on any roadway in this city unless there is an unexpired, valid state license plate

. . . registered to that vehicle and displayed on such vehicle in accordance with state

law.” R. Doc. 187-4, at 5.

Missouri law also requires that the owner of every vehicle required to be

registered in Missouri “shall submit such vehicles to a biennial inspection of their

mechanism and equipment . . . and obtain a certificate of inspection and approval and

a sticker.” Mo. Rev. Stat. § 307.350.1; City Code § 44-406(b) likewise requires “[a]ll

motor vehicles . . . [to] display current inspection stickers as required by state law.”

R. Doc. 187-4, at 9.

It is undisputed that, at the time he was stopped, Watson was driving a car in

Missouri that had a Florida license plate. Watson told Officer Boyd that his name was

“Fred Watson” instead of “Freddie Watson” and provided a Florida address. Officer

Boyd was unable to locate “Fred Watson” in REJIS. After searching the vehicle and

learning Watson’s legal name, Officer Boyd again searched REJIS and learned that

Watson had an expired Missouri driver’s license that he had never surrendered. See

R. Doc. 187-1, at 31. Watson’s “resident address” was listed as “St[.] Louis, MO.” Id.

at 37 (all caps omitted). This search also showed a “current address” for Watson in

“Fairview Hts[.], IL.” Id. (all caps omitted). Finally, a subsequent REJIS search

indicated that Watson’s vehicle was registered and insured in Florida. See id. at 38.

“It is undisputed that Watson’s vehicle . . . did not have an inspection sticker.”

Watson, 2022 WL 16569365, at *2.

Given this conflicting information—Watson’s resident address of St. Louis,

Missouri, with an expired, non-surrendered Missouri driver’s license; his current

address of Fairview Heights, Illinois; and his vehicle registration in Florida—Officer

Boyd had at least arguable probable cause to believe that Watson was a Missouri

resident who failed to properly register his vehicle, in violation of Mo. Rev. Stat.

§ 301.100.1 and City Code § 44-387. For the same reasons, Officer Boyd had at least

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arguable probable cause to cite Watson for failing to have an inspection sticker, in

violation of Mo. Rev. Stat. 307.350.1 and City Code § 44-406.

c. Failure to Obey

It is undisputed that Officer Boyd instructed Watson to “throw the keys out of

the car,” R. Doc. 187-2, at 18, and “exit the vehicle,” R. Doc. 194, at 8, but Watson

failed to do so. Section 29-16 of the City Code makes it unlawful for any person “to

willfully and knowingly obstruct, resist, oppose or fail to obey a lawful command of

any police officer or city official charged with enforcement of this Code.” R. Doc.

187-4, at 3 (emphasis added).

On appeal, Watson argues that a fact question remains as to whether he

“willfully and knowingly” disobeyed Officer Boyd. He asserts that the reason he

failed to comply with Officer Body’s commands is because Officer “Boyd had just

ordered him to keep his hands on the steering wheel under the threat of being shot,

and therefore his orders were conflicting and . . . Watson was complying with the

earlier order out of fear for his life.” Appellant’s Br. at 38–39.

As the district court explained, Watson’s subjective state of mind is irrelevant

to the arguable probable cause analysis. See Ehlers v. City of Rapid City, 846 F.3d

1002, 1011 (8th Cir. 2017) (“[The officer] provided two warnings before executing

the takedown procedure. Even accepting [the plaintiff’s] account that he did not hear

[the officer’s] instructions, an arrestee’s subjective motive does not bear on how

reasonable officers would have interpreted his behavior.”). Watson admittedly did not

obey Officer Boyd’s commands. Thus, Officer Boyd had at least arguable probable

cause to issue the citation for failure to obey.12

12

Watson alternatively argues that even if arguable probable cause exists for

his arrest for failure to obey, “the ‘narrow’ exception to the probable cause

requirement [applies]: ‘where officers have probable cause to make arrests, but

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d. False Statement

Watson argues that Officer Boyd lacked arguable probable cause to charge him

with making a false statement. Specifically, he argues that (1) the district court failed

to recognize that he was charged with “false reports” instead of “false statements,”

(2) no reasonable officer would have believed that Watson was making a false

statement by identifying himself as “Fred Watson” instead of “Freddie Watson,” and

(3) he did not knowingly make a false statement.

We first address Watson’s contention that a fact dispute remains over whether

he was charged with making a false statement or a false report. The record shows that

on the date of Watson’s arrest—August 1, 2012—Officer Boyd submitted an

“Offense/Incident Report.” R. Doc. 194-3, at 1. It lists the “Type of Incident” as

“Failure to obey, obstructing, resisting, etc. [a] city official.” Id. (all caps omitted).

The report states, in relevant part:

[Watson] refused to exit the vehicle and after the 5th time of instructing

him to exit the vehicle he was advised he was under arrest for “Fail[ure]

to Obey an Officer” and that if he didn’t exit the vehicle he would be

typically exercise their discretion not to do so.’” Appellant’s Br. at 40 (quoting

Nieves, 587 U.S. at 406). Under the Nieves exception, “[t]he existence of probable

cause does not defeat a plaintiff’s claim if he produces ‘objective evidence that he

was arrested when otherwise similarly situated individuals not engaged in the same

sort of protected speech had not been.’” Gonzalez v. Trevino, 144 S. Ct. 1663,

1665–66 (2024) (per curiam) (quoting Nieves, 587 U.S. at 407). Here, Watson has

produced no such objective evidence. Cf. id. at 1667 (holding former city council

member’s survey of past decade’s misdemeanor and felony data for the county in

which city was located, which purportedly showed that Texas’s anti-tampering statute

had never been used in the county to criminally charge someone for trying to steal a

nonbinding or expressive document, was a permissible type of objective evidence for

the council member to produce to show that the existence of probable cause to arrest

did not defeat her First Amendment retaliation claim).

-21-

tased. He raised his window up and moments later reluctantly exited the

vehicle where he was taken into custody and all resisting ceased. After

placing him into handcuffs he kicked his driver’s door closed in an

attempt to lock it as if he were trying to conceal something. The door did

not lock and a search incident to arrest revealed his real name was:

Freddie Watson . . . .

Watson was additional[ly] charged with making a [“]False

Statement[.”] It should be noted a REJIS computer check of Freddy

[sic] Watson revealed no record of an operator’s license through Florida,

Illinois, or Missouri.

A REJIS check of Freddie Watson revealed an [“]Expired Operators

License[”] through Missouri that had not been surrendered to another

state.

Id. at 2–3 (emphases added) (spacing altered).

Like the report, the complaint for the false statement charge is dated “8/1/12”

in the upper right-hand corner. R. Doc. 196-13, at 2. In the complaint, Officer Boyd

wrote: “False Statement—Watson gave a false name after advising he did not have

his identification on him. He later said his military ID was in the vehicle he tried to

secure before being taken into custody.” Id. And the bond form dated “8-2-12” that

Watson admitted receiving when he was released lists all nine of the citations,

including the false statement charge. R. Doc. 205-2, at 21.13

13

Contrary to the record, Watson argues that Officer “Boyd did not charge

[him] with false statements until . . . a day after [his] arrest,” Appellant’s Br. at 43

(first emphasis added). In actuality, Watson did not learn of the charges of making

a false statement and failure to comply until later. See R. Doc. 196-3, at 58 (“Well,

I wasn’t given [the] tickets [for making a false statement and failure to comply] up

front and when I went to complain I found out about them later when I got a lawyer

and that’s again when I first found out about those two tickets.” (emphasis added)).

-22-

A “Municipal Division Filing Memorandum” dated July 5, 2013, likewise

states that Watson was charged with “False Declaration” in violation of City Code

§ 29-16. R. Doc. 205-8, at 11 (all caps omitted). Stephanie Karr, the City’s

prosecuting attorney, testified that “false statement” and “false declaration” are

interchangeable. R. Doc. 205-8, at 4 (“It’s sometimes referred to as false declaration

or something.”)

The Ferguson Municipal Court’s criminal case docket, printed on May 31,

2016, is the only record that shows Watson was charged with “False Reports,” in

violation of City Code § 29.21. R. Doc. 197-14, at 2 (all caps omitted). Watson faults

the district court for not analyzing whether Officer Boyd would have had probable

cause to issue a citation to him under this provision.

We discern no error. First, the record shows that Officer Boyd listed the charge

as “false statement” in both his report and the complaint. Watson has produced no

evidence that Officer Boyd had control over the listing of the charges on the criminal

case docket. Second, the relevant documents are the charging documents. In her

deposition, Karr confirmed that Watson was “charged” with “false declaration.”

See R. Doc. 205-8, at 4. As a result, there is no genuine dispute of material fact as to

whether Officer Boyd arrested Watson for, inter alia, making a “false statement.”

Next, we consider whether a reasonable officer would have believed that

Watson was making a false statement by identifying himself as “Fred Watson” instead

of “Freddie Watson.” Consistent with Officer Boyd’s report and complaint listing the

offense as “false statement,” the Municipal Division Filing Memorandum lists the

offense as “False Declaration” in violation of City Code § 29-16. R. Doc. 205-8, at

11. As previously discussed, City Code § 29-16 makes it unlawful for any person “to

willfully and knowingly obstruct, resist, oppose or fail to obey a lawful command of

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any police officer or city official charged with enforcement of this Code.” R. Doc.

187-4, at 3.

There is no dispute that Officer Boyd asked for Watson’s name and address and

that, in response, Watson told Officer Boyd that his name was “Fred Watson”—as

opposed to “Freddie Watson”—and gave him a Florida address. Watson did not

provide Officer Boyd with an alternative name. Watson was unable to locate “Fred

Watson” in REJIS. Only after conducting the vehicle search and finding Watson’s

documentation did Officer Boyd learn that Watson’s legal name was “Freddie

Watson,” not “Fred Watson.” Thereafter, Officer Boyd conducted another REJIS

search with this name and was able to retrieve Watson’s information. That search

showed that “Freddie Watson” did not have a Florida address but instead had a

“resident address” in “St[.] Louis, MO,” and a “current address” in “Fairview Hts[.],

IL.” R. Doc. 187-1, at 37 (all caps omitted). Based on this conflicting information,

Officer Boyd had arguable probable cause to believe that Watson did not obey his

command to provide him with his name and address but instead attempted to mislead

Officer Boyd by providing his non-legal name and address that was not his resident

address or current address.

Finally, we can easily dispense of Watson’s argument that a fact dispute

remains over whether he knowingly made a false statement when he provided Officer

Watson with his commonly used name of “Fred Watson” instead of his legal name of

“Freddie Watson.” As explained supra, Watson’s subjective state of mind is

irrelevant in analyzing arguable probable cause. See Ehlers, 846 F.3d at 1011.

2. Retaliatory Use of Force

Watson argues that the district court ignored his use-of-force retaliation claim

and that he provided sufficient evidence to withstand summary judgment on this

claim. The defendants respond that “[a]lthough the [d]istrict [c]ourt did not explicitly

-24-

address Watson’s claim for retaliatory use of force, the [d]istrict [c]ourt correctly

found in favor of Officer Boyd on Count II, and that decision should be affirmed.”

Appellees’ Br. at ii.

Because the district court did not consider Watson’s retaliatory use-of-force

claim, we consider whether Watson produced sufficient evidence to withstand

summary judgment on the claim.

To establish a violation of the First Amendment based on the

retaliatory use of force, a plaintiff must show that (1) []he engaged in

protected activity, (2) the officer used force that would chill a person of

ordinary firmness from continuing the protected activity, and (3) the use

of force was motivated by the exercise of the protected activity.

Welch v. Dempsey, 51 F.4th 809, 811 (8th Cir. 2022).

“[C]riticizing a police officer and asking for his badge number is protected

speech under the First Amendment” and therefore satisfies the first element of a

retaliatory use-of-force claim. Peterson, 754 F.3d at 602. Here, Watson “asked

[Officer Boyd for] his name and his badge number, [but] he refused.” R. Doc. 187-2,

at 15. The first element of a retaliatory use-of-force claim is satisfied.

The second element of a retaliatory use-of-force claim is “[t]he ordinary-

firmness test.” Garcia v. City of Trenton, 348 F.3d 726, 728 (8th Cir. 2003). “The test

is an objective one, not subjective.” Id. at 729. It “is well established in the case law,

and is designed to weed out trivial matters from those deserving the time of the courts

as real and substantial violations of the First Amendment.” Id. at 728 (citing Bart v.

Telford, 677 F.2d 622 (7th Cir. 1982)). “In applying this ‘test,’” we remain “mindful”

that “[t]he effect on freedom of speech may be small, but since there is no

justification for harassing people for exercising their constitutional rights it need not

-25-

be great in order to be actionable.” Id. at 729 (quoting Bart, 677 F.2d at 625).

Construing the facts in the light most favorable to Watson, he has raised a genuine

issue of material fact as to whether Officer Boyd’s actions chilled Watson’s speech.

Under Watson’s account of the events, Officer Boyd’s action of pulling a gun on

Watson and telling him that he could “shoot you right here” “[a]nd nobody will give

a s**t” easily satisfies the ordinary firmness test. See, e.g., Peterson, 754 F.3d at 602

(“[The defendants] . . . do not deny that pepper spraying someone in the face would

chill a person of ordinary firmness.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Garcia, 348

F.3d at 729 (holding that receiving several parking tickets totaling just $35.00 would

chill a person of ordinary firmness); Keenan v. Tejeda, 290 F.3d 252, 258 (5th Cir.

2002) (holding plaintiff stated a retaliation claim that would chill a person of ordinary

firmness with allegations that officers stopped his car and detained him for an

unreasonable time, “allegedly with their guns drawn during part of the traffic stop,

and ultimately issued only a minor traffic citation that was later dismissed”).

To satisfy the final element of a retaliatory use-of-force claim, Watson must

produce evidence that Officer Boyd’s use of force was motivated by Watson’s

exercise of his constitutional rights. See Welch, 51 F.4th at 811. Viewing the facts in

the light most favorable to Watson, he has raised a genuine issue of material fact as

to retaliatory motive. Watson testified that he asked Officer Boyd for his name and

badge number, but Officer Boyd refused to provide the information. He described

Officer Boyd as “visibly upset” in response to Watson’s question. R. Doc. 187-2, at

29. After Watson removed his hands from his steering wheel to reach for his cell

phone and Officer Boyd instructed him to put the phone down and place his hands

back on the steering wheel, Watson complied. Crucially, according to Watson’s

testimony, it was after he had already complied with Officer Boyd’s command that

Officer Boyd “pulled his gun” and said, “I could shoot you right here” “[a]nd nobody

will give a s**t.” Id. at 18. Based on these facts, a reasonable factfinder could

conclude that retaliation was a but-for cause of Officer Boyd pulling his weapon on

-26-

Watson. See Peterson, 754 F.3d at 603 (“Moments before [the officer] used the

pepper spray, [the plaintiff] had asked for [the officer’s] badge number. Temporal

proximity is relevant but not dispositive. Here, [the plaintiff] went beyond the timing

of events, explaining that [the officer] engaged in a conversation with him about his

badge number. [The officer] refused to give [the plaintiff] his badge number . . . .”

(cleaned up)).

The defendants point out that “Watson [has] not challenge[d] the [d]istrict

[c]ourt’s ruling that Officer Boyd was entitled to qualified immunity on Watson’s

Fourth Amendment use of force claim, wherein the court found that the pulling of a

gun for ten seconds on a non-compliant suspect did not constitute an unreasonable

use of force.” Appellees’ Br. at 34. As a result, the defendants argue that Watson has

failed to prove that the law was clearly established at the time of event “because this

[c]ourt has never recognized a First Amendment right to be free from retaliatory use

of force when that use of force is objectively reasonable under the circumstances.”

Id. at 37. They assert that a reasonable officer in Officer Boyd’s position “could easily

have concluded that just as having probable cause shields the officer from [a] First

Amendment claim for retaliatory arrest or retaliatory charges, an objectively

reasonable use of force shields the officer from a First Amendment retaliatory use of

force claim.” Id. at 38.

We have previously considered cases in which the plaintiff brought both a

Fourth Amendment excessive force claim and a First Amendment retaliatory use-of-

force claim. See Dreith v. City of St. Louis, 55 F.4th 1145, 1148 (8th Cir. 2022)

(“[The plaintiff] filed suit in federal district court, claiming that [the officer] had

violated her Fourth Amendment right to be free from excessive force and that he had

pepper-sprayed her in retaliation for the exercise of her First Amendment rights.”);

Peterson, 754 F.3d at 596 (“[The plaintiff] asserts that [the officer] arrested him

without probable cause, used excessive force, and did so in retaliation for engaging

-27-

in protected speech.”). In Dreith and Peterson, the district court granted summary

judgment to the officers on the Fourth Amendment excessive force claim. See Dreith,

55 F.4th at 1148 (affirming district court’s grant of summary judgment on excessive

force claim); Peterson, 754 F.3d at 60 (involving officer’s interlocutory appeal of

denial of qualified immunity on First Amendment retaliatory use-of-force claim

wherein district court had also granted summary judgment to officer on Fourth

Amendment excessive force claim). In both cases, we also held that the First

Amendment retaliatory use-of-force claim survived summary judgment even when

the Fourth Amendment excessive force claim did not.14

In this particular claim, Watson is “alleging retaliatory use of force in violation

of the First Amendment.” Welch, 51 F.4th at 812 (emphasis added). This type of

claim is distinguishable from cases involving “a claim of retaliatory arrest under the

First Amendment and an allegation of unreasonable seizure under the Fourth

Amendment,” which “concern seizures.” Id. (first citing Justice v. City of St. Louis,

7 F.4th 761, 768–69 (8th Cir. 2021), then citing Peterson, 754 F.3d at 598). We

acknowledge that “a First Amendment retaliatory arrest claim should not turn solely

14

See Dreith, 55 F.4th at 1149 (“[The officer] contends that at the time he

pepper-sprayed [the plaintiff], it was ‘not clearly established that a use of force that

does not violate the Fourth Amendment violates the First Amendment.’ . . . [T]he

argument does not undermine the district court’s conclusion that [the plaintiff’s] right

to be free from a retaliatory use of force was clearly established at the time of the

incident.” (citation omitted)); Peterson, 754 F.3d at 602–03 (“We agree that [the

officer] is entitled to qualified immunity on [the plaintiff’s] retaliatory arrest claim

because, as detailed above, [the officer] had at least arguable probable cause for the

arrest. However, [the plaintiff] also claims that [the officer] pepper sprayed him in

retaliation for criticizing [the officer] and asking for his badge number. . . . Taking

the evidence in the light most favorable to [the plaintiff], as we must for this summary

judgment analysis, [the plaintiff] has presented affirmative evidence that [the officer]

pepper sprayed him in retaliation for criticizing him and asking for his badge

number.”).

-28-

on the personal motive of the arresting officer” because “subjective intent” is not

relevant “[i]n the Fourth Amendment context.” Id. at 812–13 (alteration in original)

(quoting Nieves, 587 U.S. at 403). “But if there is an argument for extending the

Nieves no-probable-cause requirement beyond a claim of retaliatory Fourth

Amendment seizure, . . . then [the defendants] ha[ve] not presented it.” Id. at 813.15

In summary, the district court erred in failing to address Watson’s retaliatory

use-of-force claim. Watson has presented sufficient evidence on this claim to

withstand summary judgment.

B. Unreasonable Search and Seizure

Watson argues that “the district court erroneously held that [Officer] Boyd’s

warrantless search of [his] car was lawful when the evidence showed that . . . Watson

was arrested for traffic offenses, and Supreme Court precedent establishes that arrests

for traffic offenses cannot justify warrantless vehicle searches.” Appellant’s Br. at 20.

Warrantless searches “are per se unreasonable under the Fourth

Amendment—subject only to a few specifically established and well-delineated

exceptions.” Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 338 (2009) (internal quotation marks

omitted). “[A] search incident to a lawful arrest” is one of those “exceptions to the

warrant requirement” and “derives from interests in officer safety and evidence

preservation that are typically implicated in arrest situations.” Id. “Police may search

a vehicle incident to a recent occupant’s arrest only if [(1)] the arrestee is within

15

The defendants note that we have declined to decide whether “arguable

probable cause is an absolute defense to a First Amendment retaliation claim.”

Molina v. City of St. Louis, 59 F.4th 334, 354 (8th Cir. 2023). As Watson points out,

“[t]hat is a distinct question from the one raised here.” Appellant’s Reply Br. at 6 n.4.

We need only decide whether Watson’s retaliatory use-of-force claim survives

summary judgment.

-29-

reaching distance of the passenger compartment at the time of the search or [(2)] it

is reasonable to believe the vehicle contains evidence from the offense of arrest.” Id.

at 351 (emphasis added).

It is undisputed that Watson was handcuffed in the back of the patrol car at the

time of the search; therefore, we need only address whether Officer Boyd reasonably

believed that the vehicle contained evidence from the offense of arrest. “Under the

second Gant exception, officers may conduct a warrantless search of a vehicle

incident to arrest—even after the arrestee is restrained in the back of a patrol

vehicle—when officers have a reasonable basis to believe the vehicle contains

evidence related to the crime of arrest.” United States v. Stegall, 850 F.3d 981, 984

(8th Cir. 2017); see also Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 385 (2014) (“Gant added

. . . an independent exception for a warrantless search of a vehicle’s passenger

compartment when it is reasonable to believe evidence relevant to the crime of arrest

might be found in the vehicle.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). “A permissible

search incident to arrest may extend to the passenger compartment, including

containers in the passenger compartment.” United States v. Campbell-Martin, 17

F.4th 807, 815 (8th Cir. 2021).

“In many cases, as when a recent occupant is arrested for a traffic violation,

there will be no reasonable basis to believe the vehicle contains relevant evidence.”

Gant, 556 U.S. at 343. In Gant, the Supreme “Court refused to apply the

[search-incident-to-arrest] exception to the offense of driving with a suspended

license.” Campbell-Martin, 17 F.4th at 816 (citing Gant, 556 U.S. at 344).

The Gant [C]ourt held that searching a car to find evidence of driving

with a suspended license did not fall within the exception “[b]ecause

police could not reasonably have believed either that Gant could have

accessed his car at the time of the search or that evidence of the offense

for which he was arrested might have been found therein.”

-30-

Id. (quoting Gant, 556 U.S. at 344); see also United States v. Hambrick, 630 F.3d

742, 747 (8th Cir. 2011) (“[L]ike the defendant in Gant, Hambrick was arrested for

driving with a suspended license, and therefore the second prong of Gant would not

allow the officers to search the vehicle for evidence of the offense of arrest.”).

We distinguished Gant in Campbell-Martin. There, an officer requested the

identification of a vehicle’s occupants. Campbell-Martin, 17 F.4th at 812. The driver

and front seat passenger provided their names but denied having any identification.

Id. at 812. The officer ran the name of the front seat passenger and learned that it was

a false name, so the officer arrested him “for providing false identification

information.” Id. Another officer arrived to assist and asked the back seat passenger

to look for the driver’s identification in a purse located in the back seat. Id. From that

identification, the officer learned that the driver had given a false name and arrested

her “for providing false identification information.” Id. The police performed a search

incident to arrest “and found a backpack on the floor of the front-seat passenger area”

containing drugs, cash, and paperwork addressed to the defendants. Id. After

conditionally pleading guilty, the defendants appealed the denial of their suppression

motion challenging the search. Id. at 812–13. On appeal, they challenged, among

other things, the legality of the police’s warrantless search of the backpack. Id. at 815.

They “d[id] not challenge the basis for or the legality of their arrest.” Id. at 816 n.2.

The case was distinguishable from Gant based on “the offense of arrest—the

offense of providing false identification information.” Id. at 816. We held that “it was

reasonable to believe that the vehicle and the backpack contained evidence of the

offense of providing false identification information.” Id. While the officers already

knew that the defendants provided false identification prior to the search, we noted

that the officers lacked the front seat passenger’s “actual identification, which would

help prove that [he] provided false identification.” Id.; see also id. (“‘[I]t [was]

-31-

reasonable to believe the vehicle contain[ed] evidence of the offense of arrest’

because police could have found evidence in the car and in the backpack relevant to

the occupants providing false identification information, even though the officer

already knew their real names.” (second and third alterations in original) (quoting

Gant, 556 U.S. at 351)). We determined that “[i]t was reasonable to think that his

identification would be in the car because he had not given the officers any

identification even after he was arrested.” Id. The backpack was positioned at the

front seat passenger’s feet; thus, it “was a logical place to look for identification such

as a driver’s license, mail, receipts, credit cards, or checks.” Id. We found “[n]othing

in Gant prohibit[ing] the police from searching for additional evidence of an offense.”

Id. (citing Gant, 556 U.S. at 343–44). “Considering the totality of the circumstances,

we conclude[d] that the officers were permitted to search the car and the backpack as

a search incident to arrest.” Id. at 817.

Watson attempts to distinguish Campbell-Martin from his case on two bases.

First, he asserts that “it is clear what crime justified the search in Campbell-Martin.”

Appellant’s Br. at 47. By contrast, a genuine issue of material fact exists in this case

as to which offense of arrest justified Officer Boyd’s search of his vehicle. See United

States v. Webster, 625 F.3d 439, 445 (8th Cir. 2010) (“[T]he record evinces a dispute

regarding the nature of Webster’s arrest, which impacts whether the officers had

reason to believe the vehicle contained evidence of the offense of arrest.” (internal

quotation marks omitted)).

The district court “held that Officer Boyd had probable cause or arguable

probable cause to arrest Watson for, inter alia, the following offenses: no operator’s

license in possession, no proof of insurance, and providing false declarations (for

identifying himself as ‘Fred Watson’ rather than ‘Freddie Watson’ and providing a

false Florida address).” Watson, 2022 WL 16569365, at *12. Watson argues that “no

reasonable officer would believe [his] vehicle contained evidence related to the first

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two offenses, and therefore those could not be the bases for the search.” Appellant’s

Br. at 43. He further argues that “if the third offense was the basis for the search, then

that necessarily fails too because [Officer] Boyd did not charge [him] with false

statements until after [he] had attempted to lodge a complaint against [Officer] Boyd

a day after [his] arrest.” Id.

We will examine the record to determine whether the district court correctly

concluded that Officer Boyd conducted the search incident to arrest based on, inter

alia, Watson making a false statement. As explained supra, Officer Boyd’s report—

dated on the arrest date—provides that Watson was also charged with making a false

statement. See R. Doc. 194-3 at 2–3. The complaint for the false statement

charge—also dated on the arrest date—charges Watson with making a false

statement; specifically, Watson giving Officer Boyd a “false name” after stating he

did not have his identification. Based on the record, there is no genuine dispute of

material fact as to the offenses for which Watson was arrested. All the

contemporaneous documents from the day of the incident list nine charges, including

the false-statement charge.16

16

Watson also argues that Officer Boyd was not searching the vehicle for the

purpose of finding evidence to support the false-statement charge. But Officer Boyd's

subjective state is irrelevant in evaluating whether the search-incident-to-arrest

exception applies. Cf. Bond v. United States, 529 U.S. 334, 338, n.2 (2000) (“The

parties properly agree that the subjective intent of the law enforcement officer is

irrelevant in determining whether that officer’s actions violate the Fourth

Amendment. . . . [T]he issue is not his state of mind, but the objective effect of his

actions.”); Arkansas v. Sullivan, 532 U.S. 769, 771–72 (2001) (per curiam) (holding

that a custodial arrest for a traffic violation and search incident to arrest do not violate

the Fourth Amendment just because an officer had a subjective pretextual motivation

for making the stop).

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Second, Watson argues that Campbell-Martin is distinguishable because “it is

clear why in Campbell-Martin the crime of false identification would justify a search

incident to arrest”—“the officer had probable cause to believe that the suspects were

lying about not having identification as they were trying to be purposefully evasive.”

Appellant’s Br. at 47. By contrast, Watson maintains that he provided his “real name”

to Officer Boyd and that Officer “Boyd found Mr. Watson in the REJIS database

based on that name, with the only deviation being that Mr. Watson was listed as

Freddie and not Fred.” Id. (citations omitted).

There is no dispute that Watson told Officer Boyd that his name was “Fred

Watson”—as opposed to “Freddie Watson”—prior to the search. Watson could not

locate “Fred Watson” in REJIS. Officer Boyd then conducted the search, located

Watson’s documentation, and learned that his legal name was “Freddie Watson,” not

“Fred Watson.” Thereafter, Officer Boyd conducted another REJIS search with this

name and was able to retrieve Watson’s information. Even if Officer Boyd had

already determined from the first REJIS search that Watson provided him with a false

name because it did not appear in REJIS, he still lacked Watson’s “actual

identification, which would help prove that [Watson gave a false name].” Campbell-

Martin, 17 F.4th at 816.

Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s dismissal of Watson’s unreasonable

search claim.

C. Monell Claim

The district court granted summary judgment to the City on Watson’s Monell

claim based on its conclusion that Officer Boyd did not violate any of Watson’s

constitutional rights. But we have determined that a genuine issue of material fact

exists as to whether Officer Boyd used force against Watson for exercising his First

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Amendment right to request Officer Boyd’s name and badge number. See supra Part

II.A.2.

The defendants nonetheless assert that “even if Officer Boyd’s actions did

violate Watson’s constitutional rights, Officer Boyd is still entitled to qualified

immunity because those claimed rights were not ‘clearly established.’” Appellee’s Br.

at 46. “As a result,” the City argues, it “is entitled to summary judgment on its Monell

claims because where a right is not clearly established, Watson cannot show the

City’s fault rose to the level of deliberate indifference.” Id. at 46–47.

We disagree. It was clearly established at the time of the event that “the First

Amendment prohibits government officials from subjecting an individual to

retaliatory actions . . . for speaking out.” Hartman v. Moore, 547 U.S. 250, 256

(2006) (cleaned up). As a result, we reverse the grant of summary judgment on

Watson’s Monell claim.

III. Conclusion

Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s grant of summary judgment on all

claims except Watson’s First Amendment retaliatory use-of-force claim and remand

for further proceedings on that claim.

GRUENDER, Circuit Judge, concurring in part and dissenting in part.

I respectfully dissent from Part II.A.2, which denies qualified immunity to

Officer Eddie Boyd on Fred Watson’s use-of-force retaliation claim, as well as Part

II.C, which denies summary judgment to the City of Ferguson (“City”) on Watson’s

Monell claim. I would affirm the district court’s judgment in its entirety.

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Officer Boyd is entitled to qualified immunity, unless Watson shows that a

genuine dispute of material fact exists on whether (1) he engaged in protected

activity, (2) Officer Boyd took adverse action against him that would chill a person

of ordinary firmness from continuing in the activity, and (3) that there was a but-for

causal connection between his injury and Officer Boyd’s alleged retaliatory animus.

See Nieters v. Holtan, 83 F.4th 1099, 1110 (8th Cir. 2023). If there exists an

“obvious alternative explanation” for Officer Boyd’s use of force, causation is

missing. Auer v. City of Minot, 896 F.3d 854, 861 (8th Cir. 2018); Laney v. City of

St. Louis, 56 F.4th 1153, 1158 (8th Cir. 2023). I agree with the court’s analysis on

(1) and (2). However, as to (3), the court believes that Officer Boyd is not entitled

to qualified immunity because a reasonable factfinder could conclude that there exists

a but-for causal connection between Watson’s request for Officer Boyd’s name and

badge number and Officer Boyd’s pointing of his firearm at Watson. Ante, at 26-27.

In my view, there is no genuine dispute of material fact on the issue of causation.

Causation is missing because there exists an “obvious alternative explanation”

for Officer Boyd’s use of force. Auer, 896 F.3d at 861. Watson testified that his

hands were placed on his car’s steering wheel when he asked for Officer Boyd’s name

and badge number. After Officer Boyd refused to provide Watson with this

information, Watson removed his hands from the steering wheel and grabbed his

phone, which was on the “console above the radio.” According to Watson, Officer

Boyd began “yelling and screaming [for Watson to] put the phone down” “because

of police safety.” Officer Boyd then called for backup and pointed his firearm at

Watson. Thus, the “obvious alternative explanation” for Officer Boyd’s use of force

was the intervening act where Watson reached for his phone.

The court glosses over the existence of this intervening act, concluding that a

genuine dispute of material fact exists because Watson had already returned his hands

to the steering wheel by the time Officer Boyd pointed his firearm at him. Ante, at 26.

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However, this single act by Watson does not negate the rapid sequence of events that

occurred prior to it. Watson admitted that Officer Boyd did not point his firearm at

him immediately after he asked for Officer Boyd’s name and badge number. It was

only subsequent to that—after Officer Boyd observed Watson’s aggressive hand

motion for his phone—that Officer Boyd called for backup and pointed his firearm

at Watson. The court does not properly consider this entire sequence of events and

therefore takes a narrow view of the entire encounter. In doing so, the court holds

Officer Boyd to a higher standard than is required to obtain qualified immunity. See

District of Columbia v. Wesby, 583 U.S. 48, 63 (2018) (stating that qualified

immunity protects “all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate

the law”).

The court also suggests that the temporal proximity between Watson’s request

for Officer Boyd’s name and badge number and Officer Boyd’s subsequent display

of force creates a genuine dispute of material fact on causation. Ante, at 26-27. As

an initial matter, temporal proximity, without more, does not allow for an inference

of a retaliatory motive. See Wilson v. Northcutt, 441 F.3d 586, 592 (8th Cir. 2006)

(“Temporal proximity is relevant but not dispositive.”). But, even more importantly,

the court focuses on the temporal proximity between Watson’s request and Officer

Boyd’s subsequent display of force while simultaneously ignoring that Watson’s act

of reaching for his phone occurred even closer in time to that display of force. The

entire sequence of events dispositively shows that Officer Boyd pointed his firearm

at Watson due to Watson having reached for his phone. A reasonable factfinder

could not conclude otherwise.

Officer Boyd was required to make a “split-second judgment[]” in a “tense,

uncertain, and rapidly evolving” circumstance. Shelton v. Stevens, 964 F.3d 747, 752

(8th Cir. 2020). Because Officer Boyd’s use of force was justified by the existence

of the intervening act (Watson reaching for his phone), Officer Boyd is entitled to

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qualified immunity on Watson’s use-of-force retaliation claim. Accordingly, there

is also no basis to hold the City liable on Monell. See Edwards v. City of Florissant,

58 F.4th 372, 376 (8th Cir. 2023) (“Absent a constitutional violation by a city

employee, there can be no § 1983 or Monell liability for the City.”). For these

reasons, I respectfully dissent as to Parts II.A.2 and II.C of the court’s opinion.

______________________________

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