Dykes v. Compton

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF TENNESSEE

AT NASHVILLE

DENNIS DYKES ) FOR PUBLICATION

)

Appellant ) FILED: SEPTEMBER 21, 1998

)

) LAKE COUNTY

v. )

) HON. JOE G. RILEY, JR.,

) JUDGE

BILLY COMPTON, Warden )

) NO. 02-S-01-9711-CC-00105

Appellee )

FILED

September 21, 1998

Cecil Crowson, Jr.

For Appellant: For Appellee: Appellate C ourt Clerk

LLOYD R. TATUM JOHN KNOX WALKUP

Henderson, Tennessee Attorney General and Reporter

MICHAEL E. MOORE

Solicitor General

ELIZABETH T. RYAN

Assistant Attorney General

Nashville, Tennessee

C. PHILLIP BIVENS

District Attorney General

Dyersburg, Tennessee

OPINION

REVERSED IN PART; AFFIRMED IN PART BIRCH, J.

Convicted in 1989 upon a plea of guilty to aggravated

rape and now serving a thirty-five year sentence, the appellant,

Dennis Dykes, claims in a petition for writ of habeas corpus that

the failure of the indictment to allege a culpable mental state

renders the indictment invalid and the resulting conviction void.

The trial court dismissed the petition, concluding that challenges

to an indictment are not subject to habeas corpus relief and

further that the judgment in question is not void on its face. The

Court of Criminal Appeals agreed that habeas corpus relief is not

available; nevertheless, it considered the appellant’s claim and

found the indictment valid.

We granted the appellant’s application for permission to

appeal in order to determine whether a challenge to an indictment

may be addressed through a petition for writ of habeas corpus and,

if so, whether the appellant is entitled to the relief sought.

After full and careful consideration, we hold that the validity of

an indictment and the efficacy of the resulting conviction may be

addressed in a petition for habeas corpus when the indictment is so

defective as to deprive the court of jurisdiction. In the present

case, however, we conclude that the indictment sufficiently vested

the trial court with jurisdiction and the resulting judgment of

conviction is valid.

Because this issue is a question of law, our review is de

novo. State v. Hill, 954 S.W.2d 725, 727 (Tenn. 1997). First, we

must determine whether a defect of this nature may be challenged in

a habeas corpus proceeding. The right to habeas corpus relief is

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guaranteed in Article I, § 15 of the Tennessee Constitution. Such

relief, however, is available “only when ‘it appears upon the face

of the judgment or the record of the proceedings upon which the

judgment is rendered’ that a convicting court was without

jurisdiction or authority to sentence a defendant, or that a

defendant’s sentence of imprisonment or other restraint has

expired.” Archer v. State, 851 S.W.2d 157, 164 (Tenn.

1993)(quoting State v. Galloway, 45 Tenn. (5 Cold.) 326, 336-37

(1868)); see also State ex rel. Underwood v. Brown, 244 S.W.2d 168,

171, 193 Tenn. 113, 122 (Tenn. 1951). If the face of the record

shows that the court did not have jurisdiction, then the judgment

is void.

An important distinction must be made between void

judgments and voidable judgments. A void judgment is one in which

the judgment is facially invalid because the court did not have the

statutory authority to render such judgment. Archer, 851 S.W.2d at

161. A voidable judgment is one which is facially valid and

requires proof beyond the face of the record or judgment to

demonstrate its voidableness. In such cases, habeas corpus relief

is inappropriate. Id.

In the case under submission, the appellant contends that

the indictment is so defective that it failed to clothe the court

with jurisdiction to enter a judgment of conviction. A valid

indictment is an essential jurisdictional element, without which

there can be no prosecution. See Hill, 954 S.W.2d at 727; State v.

Stokes, 954 S.W.2d 729, 730 (Tenn. 1997). Because a habeas corpus

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proceeding will allow us to examine the record--including the

indictment--it is an appropriate vehicle to determine whether a

judgment is void.

Having decided to address the merits of the appellant’s

appeal, we must now determine whether the appellant is entitled to

relief under the circumstances of this case. The defect complained

of is the omission from the indictment of any reference to a

culpable mental state. Because of this omission, the appellant

asserts that the indictment failed to provide sufficient

information to enable him to understand the accusation made against

him. However, the failure to charge a culpable mental state is not

a defect so long as the indictment performs its essential

constitutional and statutory purposes. Hill, 954 S.W.2d at 729.

In Hill, an aggravated rape case prosecuted under the

Criminal Sentencing Reform Act of 1989, we stated:

for offenses which neither expressly require

nor plainly dispense with the requirement for

a culpable mental state, an indictment which

fails to allege such mental state will be

sufficient to support prosecution and

conviction for that offense so long as

(1) the language of the indictment is

sufficient to meet the constitutional

requirements of notice to the accused of the

charge against which the accused must defend,

adequate basis for entry of a proper judgment,

and protection from double jeopardy;

(2) the form of the indictment meets the

requirements of Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-13-202;

and

(3) the mental state can be logically inferred

from the conduct alleged.

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Id. at 726-27. The appellant argues that Hill should not apply

because this case was prosecuted under the Sexual Offenses Law of

1979, rather than the 1989 Act.

The indictment against the appellant provides:

[I]n the month of DECEMBER, 1987 in the said

county and state one DENNIS DYKES did

unlawfully and feloniously sexually penetrate

another to-wit: [B.H.]1 while the said [B.H.]

was then and there a child less than thirteen

(13) years of age in violation of Tennessee

Code Annotated Section 39-2-603 and against

the peace and dignity of the State of

Tennessee.

The aggravated rape statute contained in the 1979 Act neither

required nor plainly dispensed with a culpable mental state. Yet,

because Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-11-301 had not yet been enacted, the

1979 Act contained no requirement of a specific culpable mental

state. Aggravated rape was simply defined as the “unlawful sexual

penetration of another” accomplished under certain aggravating

circumstances.2

1

Due to the age of the victim and the nature of the offense, we

identify the victim by initial only.

2

We do not imply that aggravated rape was a strict liability

offense under the 1979 Act. Rather, the offense of aggravated rape

was a “general intent” crime, for which a culpable mental state was

necessary, but easily inferable from the conduct which comprises

the offense. See Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 251-

52, 72 S. Ct. 240, 244, 96 L. Ed. 288, 294 (1952); Walden v. State,

178 Tenn. 71, 77, 156 S.W.2d 385, 387 (1941) (“In the crime of rape

no intent is requisite other than that evidenced by the doing of

the acts constituting the offense.”); Cherry v. State, 539 S.W.2d

51, 54 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1976).

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The Hill analysis is as relevant to crimes committed

under the 1979 Act as it is to those committed under the 1989 Act.

Applying Hill, we find that the language of the above indictment,

as well as the specific reference to the statute allegedly

violated, provided the appellant with ample notice of the offense

charged. The indictment also provided an adequate basis for entry

of judgment and protection from reprosecution for the same offense.

Moreover, the indictment is concise, understandable, and in

accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-13-202 (1990).3 The last

requirement set forth in Hill is that the requisite culpable mental

state must be logically inferred from the conduct alleged in the

indictment. In Hill, we found the mental state easily inferable

from the conduct alleged: the unlawful sexual penetration of a

child under the age of thirteen. We find the same inference in

this case, where the indictment alleges that the appellant “did

unlawfully and feloniously sexually penetrate another,” who was a

child less than thirteen years of age. Therefore, the indictment

satisfies the Hill requirements, and the conviction based upon it

is valid.

In conclusion, we wish to emphasize once again the fact

that the Court has moved away from the strict pleading requirements

of common law. As we noted in Hill, “the purpose for the

3

Tennessee Code Annotated § 40-13-202 (1990) provides that an

indictment must:

state the facts constituting the offense in ordinary and

concise language, without prolixity or repetition, in

such a manner as to enable a person of common

understanding to know what is intended, and with that

degree of certainty which will enable the court, on

conviction, to pronounce the proper judgment; . . . .

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traditionally strict pleading requirement was the existence of

common law offenses whose elements were not easily ascertained by

reference to a statute. Such common law offenses no longer exist.”

Id. at 728. Thus, so long as the constitutional and statutory

requirements outlined in Hill are met, the indictment will be

sufficient to support a conviction.

Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the Court of

Criminal Appeals to the extent that it holds that challenges to an

indictment can never be addressed in a habeas corpus proceeding.

We affirm the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals dismissing

the petition.

The costs of this appeal are taxed to the appellant, for

which execution may issue if necessary.

_________________________________

ADOLPHO A. BIRCH, JR., JUSTICE

CONCUR:

Anderson, C.J.

Drowota, Holder, JJ.

Reid, S.J.

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