Ramsey v. Town of Oliver Springs

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF TENNESSEE

AT KNOXVILLE

FILED

FOR PUBLICATION

July 19, 1999

Filed: July 19, 1999

JAMES N. RAMSEY, District ) Cecil Crowson, Jr.

Attorney General, Seventh ) Appellate Court Clerk

Judicial District, )

)

Appellee, ) ROANE CHANCERY

)

)

)

Vs. ) HON. FRANK V. WILLIAMS, III,

) CHANCELLOR

)

)

)

TOWN OF OLIVER SPRINGS, A ) NO. 03-S-01-9807-CH-00073

Municipal Corporation under the )

Law of Tennessee, et al., )

)

Appellants. )

For Appellants: For Appellee:

James M. Webster John Knox Walkup

Oak Ridge, Tennessee Attorney General & Reporter

Michael E. Moore

Solicitor General

Gordon W. Smith

Associate Solicitor General

Nashville, Tennessee

OPINION

COURT OF APPEALS AFFIRMED ANDERSON, C.J.

We granted this appeal to determine whether the City Court for the Town of

Oliver Springs, which sits in Roane County, Tennessee, may properly adjudicate a

criminal case in which the offense was committed in Anderson County.

The District Attorney General for Anderson County brought this declaratory

judgment action against the Town of Oliver Springs seeking a judgment that the town’s

policy and practice of prosecuting Anderson County cases in Roane County is illegal.

Portions of the Town of Oliver Springs are located in three different counties, Anderson,

Roane, and Morgan, but Oliver Springs’ city court is physically located in Roane

County.

The Chancellor held that the city court was authorized to adjudicate such cases

pursuant to 1994 Tenn. Priv. Acts, ch. 137, § 1, provided that a defendant waives the

constitutional right to be tried in the county where the offense is committed. The Court

of Appeals reversed, holding that a defendant does not have an unqualified right to

waive venue and that the Town of Oliver Springs’ application of the Private Act impeded

the District Attorney General’s duty to prosecute crimes committed in Anderson County.

We agree with the Court of Appeals that the Town of Oliver Springs’ policy and

practice pursuant to the Private Act is unconstitutional as applied in this case because it

impedes the District Attorney General’s constitutional and statutory obligation to

prosecute offenses committed in Anderson County. Tenn. Const. art. VI, § 5. We

therefore do not reach the issue of a defendant’s right to waive venue under Tenn.

Const. art. I, § 9. The Court of Appeals’ judgment is therefore affirmed, but upon the

single ground stated herein.

BACKGROUND

After the declaratory judgment action was filed, a hearing was held before the

Chancellor in which the parties stipulated to the following:

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That the Town of Oliver Springs includes portions of

Anderson, Roane and Morgan Counties.

That the physical location of the City Court for Oliver Springs

is in Roane County.

That the duly elected Judge of the City Court for Oliver

Springs is Defendant Joseph Van Hook. That the duly

elected District Attorney General for Anderson County,

which is the Seventh Judicial District, is Plaintiff James N.

Ramsey.

That Defendant Grant Lowe is Police Chief for the Town of

Oliver Springs and Chief Lowe brings persons charged in

the Anderson County portion of Oliver Springs before Judge

Joe Van Hook sitting as a Court in Roane County.

That Joseph Van Hook as Judge of the City Court for Oliver

Springs has presided as a Judge with General Sessions

Court for [sic] criminal jurisdiction sitting in Roane County

over criminal charges which arose in the Anderson County

portion of Oliver Springs over the objection of the Plaintiff

District Attorney for Anderson County.

That waivers of venue have not been obtained from all of the

Defendants charged with committing crimes in Anderson

County who appeared before Court. That the Court now

requires a “waiver of venue” before accepting guilty pleas.

That the Defendants, absent a ruling from a Court of

competent jurisdiction, intend pursuant to 1994 Tenn.

Private Acts, Ch. 127 [sic] to continue exercising the criminal

jurisdiction for a Sessions Court in the City Court of Oliver

Springs located in Roane County over charges of crimes

committed in Anderson County.

In the hearing, James Ramsey, the District Attorney General for the Seventh

Judicial District, objected to the prosecution of offenses committed in Anderson County

in the City Court sitting in Roane County. He argued that offenses committed in

Anderson County must be prosecuted in Anderson County, and that the policy and

practice followed by the Town of Oliver Springs impeded his ability to discharge the

responsibilities of his office. The District Attorney General also argued that a defendant

does not have an unqualified right to waive venue.

The Town of Oliver Springs responded by relying upon 1994 Tenn. Priv. Acts ch.

137, § 1, which states in part:

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(d) The City Judge shall be vested with concurrent jurisdiction with

courts of general sessions for violations of criminal laws, and shall try all

offenses against the peace and dignity of the town of Oliver Springs.

(e) The City Judge shall also have jurisdiction in and over all cases

arising under the state laws and ordinances of the town of Oliver Springs

and all cases relative to the violation of such laws and ordinances and

offenses against the state or the town of Oliver Springs.

Id. Oliver Springs defended its practice under the Private Act and argued that a

defendant may properly waive the right to venue under Tenn. Const. art. I, § 9. The

Chancellor agreed and upheld the practice of trying Anderson County cases in the city

court in Roane County under the Private Act.

On appeal, the Court of Appeals observed that the Private Act was constitutional

on its face. The Court of Appeals concluded, however, that a defendant does not have

an absolute right to waive venue1 and that prosecuting Anderson County cases in the

city court located in Roane County impinged upon the District Attorney General’s

obligation to discharge the function of his office by prosecuting offenses committed in

his district.

We granted the Town of Oliver Springs’ application for permission to appeal.

ANALYSIS

A District Attorney General is an elected constitutional officer whose function is

to prosecute criminal cases in his or her circuit or district. E.g., State v. Superior Oil,

Inc., 875 S.W.2d 658, 660 (Tenn. 1994). The Tennessee Constitution states in part:

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The cour t obs erve d tha t only tw o pro vision s add ress the w aiver of ve nue , Ten n. R. C rim .

P. 21 and Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-214 (1997). Rule 21(a) allows a change of venue “upon motion of the

defend ant, or upo n the cou rt’s own m otion with the conse nt of the de fendan t, if it appears to the cour t that,

due to undue excitement against the defendant in the county where the offense was committed or any

other cause, a fair trial probably could not be had.” Id. Section 40-35-214 authorizes a change in venue

upon the written consent of the defendant for the purpose of allowing him or her to plead guilty in one

proceeding to charges pending in more than one county. The statute provides, however, that the

defendant’s waiver is “subject to the approval of the district attorney general and the court having criminal

jurisdiction for each county.” Id.

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An Attorney for the State for any circuit or district, for which a Judge

having criminal jurisdiction shall be provided by law, shall be elected by

the qualified voters of such circuit or district . . . . In all cases where the

Attorney for any district fails or refuses to attend and prosecute according

to law, the Court shall have the power to appoint an Attorney pro tempore.

Tenn. Const. art. VI, § 5.

The legislature has codified many of the District Attorney General’s duties and

responsibilities. Foremost among them is that “[e]ach district attorney general . . .

[s]hall prosecute in the courts of the district all violations of the state criminal statutes

and perform all prosecutorial functions attendant thereto, including prosecuting cases in

a municipal court where the municipality provides sufficient personnel to the district

attorney general for that purpose.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 8-7-103(1) (Supp. 1998). The

District Attorney General’s discretion to seek a warrant, presentment, information, or

indictment within its district is extremely broad and subject only to certain constitutional

restraints. Superior Oil, 875 S.W.2d at 660; Dearborne v. State, 575 S.W.2d 259, 262

(Tenn. 1978); Quillen v. Crockett, 928 S.W.2d 47, 50-51 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1995).

The District Attorney General and only the District Attorney General can make

the decision whether to proceed with a prosecution for an offense committed within his

or her district. As we observed in Superior Oil:

[T]here are no statutory criteria governing the exercise of the prosecutorial

discretion traditionally vested in the officer in determining whether, when,

and against whom to institute criminal proceedings. Indeed, it has been

often recognized that “prosecutorial discretion in the charging process is

very broad.” So long as the prosecutor has probable cause to believe that

the accused committed an offense, the decision whether to prosecute,

and what charge to bring before a grand jury generally rests entirely within

the discretion of the prosecution . . . .

Id. at 660 (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted). Similarly, in Dearborne, the office of

District Attorney General was described as follows:

[The District Attorney General] is answerable to no superior and has

virtually unbridled discretion in determining whether to prosecute and for

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what offense. No court may interfere with [the] discretion to prosecute,

and in the formulation of this decision, he or she is answerable to no one.

In a very real sense this is the most powerful office in Tennessee today.

Its responsibilities are awesome; the potential for abuse is frightening.

Id. at 262 (quoting Pace v. State, 566 S.W.2d 861, 867 (Tenn. 1978) (Henry, C.J.,

concurring)). Were it otherwise, prosecutorial discretion would rest not with the District

Attorney General, but with police officers who may arrest with or without a warrant

depending on the circumstances. This is, in fact, precisely the harm created by the

policy and practice employed by the Town of Oliver Springs.

In Superior Oil, we commented on the broad prosecutorial discretion inherent in

the constitutional office of District Attorney General in addressing the constitutionality of

the Water Quality Control Act of 1977. The Act required that a District Attorney General

or a grand jury obtain the permission of the Water Quality Control Board or the

Commissioner of the Department of Health and Environment before issuing a warrant,

presentment or indictment charging a violation of the Act. We concluded:

The effect of . . . requiring that the district attorney general obtain written

authorization from either the Board or the Commissioner before issuing a

warrant or seeking an indictment for a criminal violation of the Water

Quality Control Act of 1977, is to partially divest the district attorney

general of the broad prosecutorial discretion and awesome responsibility

inherent in the constitutional office. Although the General Assembly may

enact laws prescribing or affecting the “procedures for the preparation of

indictments or presentments,” it cannot enact laws which impede the

inherent discretion and responsibilities of the office of district attorney

general without violating Article VI, § 5 of the Tennessee Constitution.

Superior Oil, Inc., 875 S.W.2d at 661 (second emphasis added) (footnote omitted).

Accordingly, we held that this portion of the Act was unconstitutional.

We agree with the Court of Appeals that the Private Act, as applied by the Town

of Oliver Springs, violated Tenn. Const. art. VI, § 5. The Private Act, while facially valid,

served as the basis upon which the Town of Oliver Springs prosecuted offenses

committed in Anderson County in a city court located in Roane County. When the Act

was applied in this manner, i.e., allowing the Oliver Springs Police Chief to take

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defendants who have allegedly committed crimes in Anderson County before the city

court in Roane County, Oliver Springs’ policy and practice impeded the constitutional

and statutory obligation of the District Attorney General for Anderson County to

discharge the duties of his office. We agree with the intermediate court that such an

impediment violates Tenn. Const. art. VI, § 5. We therefore do not reach the waiver

issue and affirm the Court of Appeals’ judgment on the grounds stated.

CONCLUSION

We conclude that the Town of Oliver Springs’ application of 1994 Private Act, ch.

137, § 1, which permits offenses committed in Anderson County to be heard in the city

court located in Roane County, violates Tenn. Const. art. VI, § 5. We affirm the

judgment of the Court of Appeals on that ground. Costs of the appeal shall be paid by

the appellants, for which execution shall issue if necessary.

___________________________________

RILEY ANDERSON, CHIEF JUSTICE

Concur:

Drowota, Birch, Holder and Barker, JJ.

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