State v. Chalmers

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF TENNESSEE

AT JACKSON

April 11, 2000 Session

STATE OF TENNESSEE v. TYRONE CHALMERS

Appeal from the Court of Criminal Appeals, Western Section

Criminal Court for Shelby County

No. 95-04473, 74 Carolyn W. Blackett, Judge

No. W1997-00174-SC-DDT-DD - Filed October 5, 2000

The defendant was convicted of felony murder and especially aggravated robbery. The jury

sentenced him to death after finding that the evidence of an aggravating circumstance – that the

defendant was previously convicted of one or more felonies, other than the present charge, whose

statutory elements involve the use of violence to the person – outweighed evidence of mitigating

circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt. The trial judge imposed a sentence of twenty years for

the especially aggravated robbery conviction, to run concurrently with the death sentence but

consecutively to sentences previously imposed in another case. On direct appeal, the Court of

Criminal Appeals affirmed the convictions and sentences. We conclude that the State’s introduction

of evidence and subsequent argument concerning the specific facts and circumstances of the

defendant’s prior violent felony convictions do not mandate reversal under State v. Bigbee, 885

S.W.2d 797 (Tenn. 1994), that the sentence of death is not excessive or disproportionate to the

penalty imposed in similar cases, and that race is considered when performing comparative

proportionality review to ensure that an aberrant death sentence was not imposed due to the

defendant’s race. Accordingly, we affirm the Court of Criminal Appeals in all respects.

Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-206(a)(1) Automatic Appeal;

Judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals Affirmed

JANICE M. HOLDER , J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which E. RILEY ANDERSON, C.J., and

WILLIAM M. BARKER, J., joined. ADOLPHO A. BIRCH, JR., filed a concurring and dissenting opinion.

FRANK F. DROWOTA , III, J., not participating.

Linda Kaye Garner, Memphis, Tennessee, for the appellant, Tyrone Chalmers.

Paul G. Summers, Attorney General and Reporter, Michael E. Moore, Solicitor General, and Erik

William Daab, Assistant Attorney General, for the appellee, State of Tennessee.

OPINION

In this capital case, the defendant, Tyrone Chalmers, was convicted of one count of felony

murder and one count of especially aggravated robbery. The jury sentenced him to death after

finding that the evidence of an aggravating circumstance – that the defendant was previously

convicted of one or more felonies, other than the present charge, whose statutory elements involve

the use of violence to the person, see Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-204(i)(2) (Supp. 1994), – outweighed

evidence of mitigating circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt. The trial judge imposed a sentence

of twenty years for the especially aggravated robbery conviction, to run concurrently with the death

sentence but consecutively to sentences previously imposed in another case.

On direct appeal, the Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the convictions and the sentences

imposed. The defendant appealed to this Court raising numerous issues. We entered an order

designating the following issues for oral argument:1 (1) whether plain error occurred, requiring

reversal of the sentence in light of State v. Bigbee, 885 S.W.2d 797 (Tenn. 1994), and Tenn. Code

Ann. § 39-13-204(c) (Supp. 1998), when the prosecution introduced evidence concerning the facts

and circumstances underlying the defendant’s prior violent felony convictions and when the

prosecution referred to the circumstances of these prior violent felony convictions during argument;

(2) whether the sentence of death in this case is excessive or disproportionate to the penalty imposed

in similar cases, considering both the crime and the defendant, and all other issues mandated by

Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-206(c)(1) (Supp. 1994); and (3) whether and how the factor of race should

be considered when performing comparative proportionality review.

We conclude that the State’s introduction of evidence and subsequent argument concerning

the specific facts and circumstances of the defendant’s prior violent felony convictions do not

mandate reversal under Bigbee. We further conclude that the evidence supports the jury’s findings

as to aggravating and mitigating circumstances and that the sentence of death was not imposed

arbitrarily and is not excessive or disproportionate to the penalty imposed in similar cases. Lastly,

we clarify that race is considered when performing comparative proportionality review to ensure that

an aberrant death sentence was not imposed due to the defendant’s race. Accordingly, the judgment

of the Court of Criminal Appeals is affirmed.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

At approximately 5:00 a.m. on August 20, 1994, the body of the African-American victim,

28-year-old Randy Allen, was discovered lying face down on the sidewalk next to Netherwood

Street in Memphis. His pants and underwear had been pulled down around his ankles, and he had

been shot five times. Two of the wounds, one to the head and another to the back, were fatal.

1

“Prior to the setting of oral argument, the Court shall review the record and briefs and consider all errors

assigned. The Court may enter an order designating those issues it wishes ad dressed a t oral argum ent. . . .” Tenn. R.

Sup. Ct. 1 2.2.

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Ten days after the shooting, the 21-year-old African-American defendant admitted to

Memphis police that he had killed the victim during a robbery. The defendant stated:

I met up with “Dre” and “Black” on Orleans and So. Parkway near

the park. “Black” was driving something like a [sic] Oldsmobile,

“Dre” was in the front passenger seat and I got in the back seat. We

were just riding around looking for somebody to rob. I had some

kind of automatic rifle, it had a clip in it, black and brown color.

“Dre” had a .380 automatic or something, look [sic] black to me. I

think “Black” had a shotgun. “Black” was driving down

Netherwood, and me and “Dre” jumped out on two boys.2 We tried

to rob them. We made them strip, then I had hit the one that was

killed with the rifle and it went off, and I couldn’t let the rifle go.

Then me and “Dre” jumped in the car and left, with “Black” driving.

Then “Black” dropped me and “Dre” off near a house, close to

Southside School.

The defendant, who robbed Murphy and the victim of $3.00, estimated that he had fired six times.

The defendant concluded his statement by remarking, “I’m sorry it ever happened. If I could go

through it again, I wouldn’t.”

Based on this proof, the jury convicted the defendant of felony murder and especially

aggravated robbery.3

During the sentencing phase, the State introduced evidence of the defendant’s previous

convictions for attempted especially aggravated robbery and attempted first degree murder for a

criminal episode occurring on the same date as the present offenses. The Deputy Clerk for the

Shelby County Criminal Court Clerk’s Office testified that, according to the court records, Tyrone

Chalmers was convicted of attempted especially aggravated robbery and attempted first degree

murder on July 8, 1996, for offenses committed against Joseph Hunter on August 20, 1994. During

cross-examination, defense counsel contested the clerk’s identification of the defendant, asking,

“[Y]ou have no way of knowing whether or not those documents that you have are in fact, belong

to [sic] Tyrone Chalmers, do you? You have no personal knowledge yourself, do you?” Hunter, the

victim of those prior crimes, then testified that he was driving home at approximately 2:55 a.m. on

August 20, 1994, when the defendant stepped in front of his car, pointed a rifle at him, and told him

2

These “two boys” were the victim and his cousin, Marlon Murphy. The defendant was also indicted for the

aggravated robbery of Murphy, but the charge was dismissed due to Murphy’s unavailability as a witness for the

prosecution.

3

W e agree with the Court of Criminal Appeals that the ev idence is sufficient to supp ort the convictions.

Jackson v. Virgin ia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S. Ct. 2781, 61 L. Ed. 2d 560 (1979); State v. Cabbage, 571 S.W.2d 832, 835

(Tenn. 1978); Liakas v . State, 199 Tenn. 298, 305, 286 S.W.2d 856, 85 9, cert. denied, 352 U.S. 845, 77 S. Ct. 39, 1 L.

Ed. 2d 49 (1956).

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to “give it up.” According to Hunter, the defendant fired approximately fifteen rounds at him as he

drove away, striking Hunter in the leg and arm.

The defendant presented the testimony of his mother and sister. His mother testified that the

defendant was one of seven children, had graduated from high school, and had never given her any

trouble. At the time of these offenses, the defendant was employed and was caring for his mother

who suffered from diabetes. The defendant’s sister described the defendant as “a very caring

person” and her best friend. She conceded that he had been in juvenile court once but claimed that

the victim of that offense had “actually committed a crime” against the defendant.

The last witness was the defendant, who testified that only hours before he committed these

offenses he had been drinking alcohol and had smoked crack cocaine for the first time. He claimed

that he could not remember what happened but did recall that the gun he used belonged to one of the

accomplices. He admitted having been in juvenile court but asserted that the only criminal charges

he had ever faced were those arising from the events of the early morning hours of August 20, 1994.

The defendant told the victim’s family that he was sorry and expressed his desire to take the victim’s

place if he could. On cross-examination, the defendant admitted that he tried to rob Hunter before

he ever met up with Dre and Black.

Based on this proof, the jury sentenced the defendant to death.

PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT

As noted above, after introducing evidence at the sentencing hearing that the defendant was

previously convicted of the attempted especially aggravated robbery and attempted first degree

murder of Joseph Hunter, the State presented Hunter’s testimony about the specific facts of those

crimes. Later, during argument, the State referred to the circumstances concerning the offenses

involving Hunter. The defendant did not object at trial and did not complain on appeal.

Generally, this Court will not consider issues not raised by the parties; however, plain error

is a proper consideration for an appellate court whether properly assigned or not. State v. Taylor,

992 S.W.2d 941, 943-44 (Tenn. 1999). Plain error may be recognized pursuant to Tenn. R. Crim.

P. 52(b) when a “substantial right” of the accused is affected and consideration of the error is

“necessary to do substantial justice.” In Bigbee, this Court held that it is inappropriate to admit

evidence regarding specific facts of the crime resulting in the prior conviction when the prior

conviction on its face shows that it involved violence or the threat of violence to the person. Bigbee,

885 S.W.2d at 811. This error combined with the prosecutor’s improper argument, which among

other things emphasized the circumstances of the prior conviction, required reversal of the death

sentence in Bigbee. Id. at 812. In light of Bigbee, we asked the parties to address whether plain

error requiring reversal occurred in this case.

The defendant asserts that evidence of the underlying facts of the defendant’s prior

convictions necessarily affected the jury’s deliberations and effectively eliminated the option of life

imprisonment as a sentence. See id. at 811 (citing State v. Smith, 755 S.W.2d 757, 767 (Tenn.

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1988)). The State counters that the evidence was admissible because it was necessary to respond to

claims by the defense. See id. at 812 (citing Cozzolino v. State, 584 S.W.2d 765, 767-68 (Tenn.

1979)). The State further contends that, because the evidence was admissible, the argument based

upon it was proper.

When a prosecutor has engaged in improper conduct, the test for determining whether there

is reversible error is “whether the impropriety ‘affected the verdict to the prejudice of the

defendant.’” Id. at 809 (quoting Harrington v. State, 215 Tenn. 338, 340, 385 S.W.2d 758, 759

(1965)). In making this determination, the Court considers: (1) the conduct complained of viewed

in the light of the facts and circumstances of the case; (2) the curative measures undertaken by the

court and the prosecution; (3) the intent of the prosecutor in making the improper arguments; (4) the

cumulative effect of the improper conduct and any other errors in the record; and (5) the relative

strength and weakness of the case. Id. (citing State v. Buck, 670 S.W.2d 600, 609 (Tenn. 1984)).

We have reviewed the record in this case and conclude that the prosecutor’s conduct does

not mandate reversal under Bigbee. Hunter’s testimony was relevant to respond to defense claims

contesting identification of the defendant as the perpetrator of the prior offenses about which the

clerk testified. See Cozzolino, 584 S.W.2d at 768. It was inappropriate, however, to introduce

evidence of the facts and circumstances of those prior crimes that was not relevant to the

identification issue. The prosecutor could have elicited testimony from Hunter limited to Hunter’s

ability to identify the defendant. Cf. State v. Dyle, 899 S.W.2d 607, 612 (Tenn. 1995) (holding that

jury must be instructed that value of identification testimony may depend upon the witness’s

capacity and opportunity to observe the offender).

As for the argument, this case is distinguishable from Bigbee. The argument in Bigbee was

highly improper for several reasons, including: emphasizing the character of the victim of the prior

murder, informing the jury of the life sentence for that offense, implying that the defendant should

be sentenced to death as punishment for the prior murder, and appealing to the jury to react out of

vengeance. Bigbee, 885 S.W.2d at 811-12. The Court held that, although each of these errors might

have been harmless standing alone, considered cumulatively, the improper prosecutorial argument

and the admission of irrelevant evidence affected the jury’s sentencing determination to the

defendant’s prejudice. Id. at 812.

During opening argument at the sentencing phase in this case, the prosecutor did not mention

the facts or even the specific convictions involving the Hunter offenses. The prosecutor indicated

only that the State would be relying on the aggravating circumstance that the defendant was

previously convicted of one or more felonies, other than the present charge, which involved violence

to the person. During closing argument, the prosecutor did refer to the circumstances of the Hunter

offenses when he stated in pertinent part:

This man before you has been convicted of a crime that involved

violence prior to this particular trial. We not only put on the clerk to

show that, we brought the victim to show you the nature of that

offense. This is not a violence where somebody gets hit or slapped,

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pushed or knocked down. This violence involves an individual, Mr.

Hunter, coming home, a man appears on the street, wants to take his

car or whatever or his life. And, proceeds to shoot at him fifteen

times and hit him two times. He gets away, barely. Less than two

hours after that, this particular offense occurs. I submit to you that

we have proven beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant has

been convicted of an offense of violence prior to this particular

offense.

While it was proper to argue that Hunter’s testimony had proven the aggravating

circumstance beyond a reasonable doubt, the prosecutor engaged in improper argument by implying

that the jury should consider the nature of the violence against the victim in the Hunter offenses. Cf.

id. at 812 (holding that argument regarding victim of prior offense was improper). However, unlike

Bigbee, the improper remarks in this case were not extensive. See also State v. Cauthern, 967

S.W.2d 726, 737 (Tenn. 1998). No curative measures were taken because the defendant failed to

object. See id. The intent of the prosecutor in introducing Hunter’s testimony was not improper in

that the prosecutor was responding to defense claims that the evidence of the prior convictions was

insufficient with regard to identification of the defendant as the perpetrator. The impropriety was

limited to the introduction of the details of the Hunter offenses. Moreover, unlike Bigbee, the

argument here was improper only in the respect that it implied that the jury should consider the

nature of the violence against Hunter. The proof of the aggravating circumstance, even excluding

the inadmissible evidence, was considerable, and the mitigating evidence was slight. The

inadmissible evidence and the improper argument, considered cumulatively, did not affect the jury’s

sentencing determination to the defendant’s prejudice. See Bigbee, 885 S.W.2d at 812. Any

constitutional error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. See id. at 809; see also State v.

Howell, 868 S.W.2d 238, 260 (Tenn. 1993). Because we find no reversible error, we need not

address the State’s assertion that reversal is not warranted in light of Tenn. Code Ann.

§ 39-13-204(c) (Supp. 1998).4

4

After sentencin g in this case , Tenn. C ode An n. § 39-1 3-204 (c) was am ended to add the following language:

In all cases where the state relies upon the aggravating factor that the defendant

was previously convicted of one (1) or more felonies, other than the present charge,

whose statutory eleme nts involv e the use o f violence to the perso n, either pa rty

shall be permitted to introduce evidence concerning the facts and circumstances of

the prior conviction. Such evidence shall not be construed to pose a danger of

creating unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, or misleading the jury and shall not

be subject to exclusion on the ground that the probative value of such evidence is

outweighed by prejudice to either party. Such evidence shall be used by the jury

in determining the weight to be accorded the agg ravating factor.

Tenn. C ode An n. § 39-1 3-204 (c) (Supp . 1998).

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COMPARATIVE PROPORTIONALITY REVIEW

The defendant contends that his sentence is disproportionate to the penalty imposed in similar

cases. Pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-206(c)(1)(D) (Supp. 1994), the Court conducts a

comparative proportionality review to ensure that no aberrant death sentence is affirmed. State v.

Blanton, 975 S.W.2d 269, 281 (Tenn. 1998). In performing our comparative proportionality

function, we have consistently employed the precedent-seeking approach, which compares the case

at issue with other cases in which defendants were convicted of the same or similar crimes. State

v. Bland, 958 S.W.2d 651, 664 (Tenn. 1997). Factors relevant to the process of identification and

comparison of similar cases include: (1) the means of death; (2) the manner of death (e.g., violent,

torturous, etc.); (3) the motivation for the killing; (4) the place of death; (5) the similarity of the

victims’ circumstances including age, physical and mental conditions, and the victims’ treatment

during the killing; (6) the absence or presence of premeditation; (7) the absence or presence of

provocation; (8) the absence or presence of justification; and (9) the injury to and effects on non-

decedent victims. Id. at 667. Factors relevant to comparison of the characteristics of defendants

include: (1) the defendant’s prior criminal record or prior criminal activity; (2) the defendant’s age,

race, and gender; (3) the defendant’s mental, emotional or physical condition; (4) the defendant’s

involvement or role in the murder; (5) the defendant’s cooperation with authorities; (6) the

defendant’s remorse; (7) the defendant’s knowledge of helplessness of victim(s); and (8) the

defendant’s capacity for rehabilitation. Id.

The present case is similar to numerous cases in which the sentence of death was affirmed

by this Court. We have reviewed and upheld the death sentence on direct appeal in the following

cases involving the shooting of a randomly chosen victim during a robbery: State v. Smith, 993

S.W.2d 6 (Tenn. 1999); State v. Burns, 979 S.W.2d 276 (Tenn. 1998); State v. Howell, 868 S.W.2d

238 (Tenn. 1993); State v. Boyd, 797 S.W.2d 589 (Tenn. 1990); State v. Johnson, 762 S.W.2d 110

(Tenn. 1988); State v. Bobo, 727 S.W.2d 945 (Tenn. 1987); State v. Sparks, 727 S.W.2d 480 (Tenn.

1987); State v. Harries, 657 S.W.2d 414 (Tenn. 1983); State v. Coleman, 619 S.W.2d 112 (Tenn.

1981). In addition to Smith, supra, other cases in which we have upheld the death sentence based

on the sole aggravating circumstance of a prior violent felony conviction include State v. Adkins,

725 S.W.2d 660 (Tenn. 1987), and State v. Goad, 707 S.W.2d 846 (Tenn. 1986).

We have considered the defendant’s argument that he should have received a life sentence

because he committed an act totally alien to his character while under the influence of drugs. To the

contrary, the defendant’s own witnesses established that he had been in juvenile court on another

matter before the incidents of August 20, 1994. The record supports the jury’s finding that the

aggravating circumstance of prior violent felony convictions outweighed any mitigating

circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt. Based upon the strength of this aggravating circumstance

and the similarity of this case to other cases in which the death penalty was imposed, we conclude

that the death sentence in this case is not disproportionate.

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RACE AS A FACTOR IN PROPORTIONALITY ANALYSIS

The defendant does not allege and there is no indication that the jury’s sentencing

determination in this case was based upon race. Nevertheless, the State suggests a need for

clarification regarding the use of race in proportionality analysis. In Bland, the Court listed race,

along with age and gender, as one of the factors to be considered when comparing characteristics of

defendants. 958 S.W.2d at 667. In applying the Bland factors to the defendant in State v. Pike, 978

S.W.2d 904 (Tenn. 1998), the Court noted that “[w]hile Pike is only the second woman to receive

the death sentence in Tennessee, there is absolutely no indication that the jury’s imposition of the

death sentence was motivated by or based upon Pike’s gender.” Id. at 919. Likewise, race is

considered when performing comparative proportionality review to ensure that an aberrant death

sentence was not imposed due to the defendant’s race.

CONCLUSION

In accordance with the mandate of Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-206(c)(1) (Supp. 1994) and the

principles adopted in prior decisions of this Court, we have considered the entire record in this case

and conclude that the sentence of death was not imposed in an arbitrary fashion, that the evidence

supports the jury’s finding of the statutory aggravating circumstance, that the evidence supports the

jury’s finding that the aggravating circumstance outweighed mitigating circumstances beyond a

reasonable doubt, and that the sentence of death is not excessive or disproportionate to the penalty

imposed in similar cases, considering both the nature of the crime and the defendant. We have

carefully reviewed all of the issues raised by the defendant and the issue we raised regarding the

State’s introduction of evidence and subsequent argument concerning the specific facts and

circumstances of the defendant’s prior violent felony convictions, and we have determined that these

issues are without merit or do not require reversal. With respect to issues not specifically addressed

in this opinion, we affirm the decision of the Court of Criminal Appeals, authored by Judge Gary

R. Wade and joined in by Judges Thomas T. Woodall and John Everett Williams. Relevant portions

of that opinion are attached as an appendix to this opinion. The defendant’s sentence of death is

affirmed and shall be carried out on the 9th day of February, 2001, unless otherwise ordered by this

Court or proper authority.

It appearing from the record that the appellant is indigent, costs of this appeal are assessed

to the State of Tennessee.

___________________________________

JANICE M. HOLDER, JUSTICE

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