“[Ajrson as a general proposition creates a dangerous exigency which has the potential to endanger not only the criminal, but also any targeted individual, members of the public, and rescue personnel.”
How later courts described this case
- “[Ajrson as a general proposition creates a dangerous exigency which has the potential to endanger not only the criminal, but also any targeted individual, members of the public, and rescue personnel.”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF TENNESSEE
AT KNOXVILLE
STATE OF TENNESSEE v. ROY D. NELSON
Appeal from the Criminal Court for Washington County
No. 21727 Lynn W. Brown, Judge
No. E1997-00021-SC-R11-CD - Decided May 2, 2000
FOR PUBLICATION
This is an appeal from the Criminal Court for Washington County which convicted the
defendant of aggravated arson. The defendant appealed and argued that the aggravated arson statute
applies only when an individual other than the arsonist sustains serious bodily injuries. Accordingly,
because he was the individual who sustained serious bodily injuries, the defendant contended that
the aggravated arson statute was inapplicable. The Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the judgment
of the trial court, and we granted the defendant’s application for permission to appeal. We hold that
where a defendant sustains serious bodily injuries as the result of an arson he or she committed, that
defendant may be convicted of aggravated arson pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-
14-302(a)(2) (1997). Accordingly, we affirm the judgments of the trial court and the Court of
Criminal Appeals.
Tenn. R. App. P. 11; Judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals is Affirmed.
BARKER, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which ANDERSON, C.J., and DROWOTA , BIRCH,
and HOLDER , JJ. joined.
Donald E. Spurrell, Johnson City, Tennessee, for the appellant, Roy D. Nelson.
Paul G. Summers, Attorney General and Reporter, Michael E. Moore, Solicitor General, and Gordon
W. Smith, Associate Solicitor General, Nashville, Tennessee, for the appellee, State of Tennessee.
OPINION
On the evening of June 3, 1994, the defendant, Roy D. Nelson, entered the basement of
Angela Nelson’s house and poured gasoline on the floor.1 As he walked up the stairs to the
residential portion of the house, the defendant lit a cigarette which ignited the gasoline fumes
causing an explosion that rocked the brick house from its foundation as well as a fire. The defendant
1
At the time of the arson, Angela and Roy Nelson were married but separated. Following
this incident, the Nelsons obtained a divorce.
was admitted to the hospital later that evening where he was treated for first, second, and third
degree burns he sustained in the explosion and fire.
The defendant was indicted and convicted for aggravated arson on the grounds that he
suffered serious bodily injury, thus triggering application of the aggravated arson statute. The
defendant appealed arguing that the aggravated arson statute applies only when some individual
other than the arsonist sustains a serious bodily injury. The Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the
judgment of the trial court, and we granted the defendant’s application for permission to appeal on
this issue.2
DISCUSSION
When statutory language is plain and unambiguous, this Court must not apply a construction
apart from the words of the statute. See Fletcher v. State, 9 S.W.3d 103, 105 (Tenn. 1999). The
aggravated arson statute at issue in this case provides:
A person commits aggravated arson who commits arson as defined in § 39-14-301
or 39-14-303 . . . [w]hen any person, including firefighters and law enforcement
officials, suffers serious bodily injury as a result of the fire or explosion.
Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-14-302(a)(2) (1997). The criminal code further defines “person” to include
“the singular and plural and means and includes any individual.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-11-
106(a)(27) (1997) (emphasis added). Thus, the plain language of the aggravated arson statute
includes not only victims of aggravated arson but also the perpetrator of the act of arson.
The defendant asserts, however, that the language and history of section -302(a)(2) is
ambiguous, and that if the General Assembly intended for the aggravated arson statute to apply
where the arsonist is injured, it would have clearly stated so. For this argument, the defendant relies
on Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-16-602(a) (1997) which makes it a criminal offense to
intentionally prevent or obstruct a law enforcement officer “from effecting a stop, frisk, halt, arrest
or search of any person, including the defendant.” We do not agree, however, from this statutory
language that magic words like “including the defendant” must be explicitly incorporated into all
statutes to impose criminal liability for aggravated offenses. By broadly defining “person” in section
-106(a)(27), the General Assembly has already established the scope of “person” to include
defendants. Consequently, the extra statutory language suggested by the defendant is redundant.
Thus, whether or not “including the defendant” was written explicitly into section -602(a),
defendants would be implicitly included pursuant to the statutory definition of “person.”
We note that if the General Assembly intended to limit the class of persons for which
convictions for aggravated offenses may be had it could have done so. Indeed, throughout the
2
This Court heard oral argument in this case on March 28, 2000 in Winchester, Tennessee,
as part of the S.C.A.L.E.S. (Supreme Court Advancing Legal Education for Students) project.
-2-
criminal code, the General Assembly has limited application of aggravated offense statutes to
situations involving “victims” or individuals other than the defendant.3 Because the General
Assembly has not seen fit to limit section -302(a)(2) to persons other than the defendant as it has
done in so many other sections of the criminal code, we are not inclined to depart from the plain
language of the statute.
The defendant, though, argues that “any person” cannot be so broad as to include the
defendant because any defendant in a structure destroyed by arson automatically commits aggravated
arson simply by his or her presence in the structure. Compare Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-14-302(a)(1)
(1997) (providing that aggravated arson occurs when one or more persons is present in the structure
that is the target of arson). The defendant also contends that the General Assembly could not have
been concerned with injury to the arsonist. We disagree. The Court of Criminal Appeals astutely
observed that “[m]ore so than the other offenses in the criminal code which are aggravated by some
level of bodily injury, arson as a general proposition creates a dangerous exigency which has the
potential to endanger [not only the criminal, but also] any targeted individual, members of the public,
and rescue personnel.” The presence of an arsonist in a building that he or she has targeted or an
arsonist who is injured during the course of an arson inevitably requires the assistance of rescue
personnel, and it is well within the province of the General Assembly to impose a heightened penalty
for the risk to which these public servants are exposed.
CONCLUSION
We hold that where a defendant sustains serious bodily injuries as the result of an arson he
or she committed, that defendant may be convicted of aggravated arson pursuant to Tennessee Code
Annotated section 39-14-302(a)(2) (1997). Accordingly, we affirm the judgments of the trial court
and the Court of Criminal Appeals.
Costs of this appeal are taxed to the appellant, Roy D. Nelson.
3
See, e.g., Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 39-13-102(a)(1)-(2), -13-304(a)(3)-(4), -13-305(a)(4), -13-
402(a)(2), -13-403(a)(2), -13-502(a)(2), -13-504(a)(2), -14-404(a)(2) (1997).
-3-