State v. Nix

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF TENNESSEE

AT KNOXVILLE

January 3, 2001 Session

STATE OF TENNESSEE v. SCOTT HOUSTON NIX

Appeal by permission from the Court of Criminal Appeals

Criminal Court for Knox County

No. 67,069 Ray Jenkins, Judge

No. E1999-02715-SC-R11-PC - Filed February 20, 2001

AND

STATE OF TENNESSEE v. RALPH DEAN PURKEY

Appeal by permission from the Court of Criminal Appeals

Criminal Court for Cocke County

No. 25,376 Rex H. Ogle, Judge

No. E1999-01864-SC-R11-CD - Filed February 20, 2001

We granted permission to appeal to consider an issue of first impression: what is the standard of

mental incompetence that a petitioner must satisfy before due process requires tolling of the post-

conviction statute of limitations. We agree with the Court of Criminal Appeals that due process

requires tolling of the statute of limitations only if a petitioner is unable either to manage his or

her own personal affairs or to understand his or her legal rights and liabilities. We also agree

with the intermediate appellate court that, taken as true, the allegations of these petitions are

insufficient to make a prima facie showing of incompetency. Accordingly, we affirm the

judgments of the Court of Criminal Appeals which upheld the trial court judgments that

dismissed these petitions as time-barred by the statute of limitations.

Tenn. R. App. P. 11; Judgments of the Court of Criminal Appeals Affirmed

FRANK F. DROWOTA, III, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which E. RILEY ANDERSON, C.J.,

ADOLPHO A. BIRCH, JR., JANICE M. HOLDER and WILLIAM M. BARKER, JJ., joined.

Mark A. Brown, Knoxville, Tennessee, for the appellants, Scott Houston Nix and Ralph Dean

Purkey.

Paul G. Summers, Attorney General and Reporter; Michael E. Moore, Solicitor General; and Jennifer

L. Smith, Assistant Attorney General, Nashville, Tennessee, for the appellee, State of Tennessee.

OPINION

I. Background

A. Scott Houston Nix

Scott Houston Nix was convicted of attempted first degree murder, especially aggravated

robbery and aggravated robbery on November 19, 1993. The Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed

Nix’s convictions on November 21, 1995, and this Court denied his application for permission to

appeal on May 6, 1996. Accordingly, the post-conviction statute of limitations expired one year after

this Court’s denial of the application.1

More than one year after its expiration, on December 18, 1998, a “next friend” petition for

post-conviction relief was filed on behalf of Nix. Citing this Court’s decision in Watkins v. State,

903 S.W.2d 302 (Tenn. 1995), in which we held that due process requires tolling of the statue during

mental incompetence, the petition alleged that the action was not barred by expiration of the one-year

statute of limitations because Nix had “never been and is not currently competent.” The trial court

disagreed and summarily dismissed the petition as time-barred. Nix appealed the dismissal.

B. Ralph Dean Purkey

On September 26, 1986, Ralph Dean Purkey was convicted of grand larceny, concealing

stolen property, and of being a habitual criminal. Purkey’s motion for new trial was dismissed on

October 31, 1986, and no appeal was taken. Therefore, the post-conviction statute of limitations in

effect at that time expired three years after Purkey’s motion for new trial was dismissed.2 Thereafter,

Purkey filed several petitions for habeas corpus and post-conviction relief, but each of these actions

was dismissed as untimely.

The “next friend” petition giving rise to this appeal was filed on behalf of Purkey on

November 10, 1998, more than eleven years after Purkey’s conviction had become final and almost

nine years after expiration of the applicable statute of limitations. Also relying upon Watkins, the

“next friend” petition asserted that the action should not be dismissed as time-barred because Purkey

had “never been and is not currently competent.” The trial court summarily dismissed the petition

1

Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-30-20 2(a).

2

See Tenn. C ode Ann . § 40-30 -102 (19 82 Rep l.) (effective July 1, 1986) (replaced by the one-year statute of

limitations July 1, 1995).

-2-

as untimely and noted that Purkey previously had filed three petitions for post-conviction relief.

Purkey appealed the trial court’s decision.

C. Court of Criminal Appeals

In separate decisions, the Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the judgments of the trial

courts in these cases. While recognizing that under this Court’s decision in Watkins, due process

requires tolling of the post-conviction statute of limitations during incompetency, the Court of

Criminal Appeals nevertheless concluded that the trial courts appropriately dismissed each of these

petitions because, taken as true, the allegations were not sufficient to make a prima facie showing

that each of these petitioners had been incompetent, i.e., “unable to manage his personal affairs or

estate, or to comprehend his legal rights or liabilities.”

Thereafter, Nix filed a pro se application for permission to appeal to this Court, and a “next

friend” application for permission to appeal was filed in this Court on behalf of Purkey by a fellow

prison inmate. We granted the applications, appointed counsel,3 and consolidated the cases to

consider a single issue: what standard of mental incompetence must a petitioner satisfy before due

process requires tolling of the post-conviction statute of limitations. We conclude that the Court of

Criminal Appeals correctly held that due process requires tolling only if a petitioner makes a prima

facie showing that he is unable either to manage his personal affairs or to understand his legal rights

or liabilities. We agree with the intermediate appellate court that the allegations of these petitions

are insufficient to satisfy this prima facie showing. Accordingly, we affirm the judgments of the

Court of Criminal Appeals.

II. Analysis

Recently, in Seals v. State, 23 S.W.3d 272 (Tenn. 2000), this Court considered the

constitutionality of the one-year statute of limitations enacted as part of the Post-Conviction

Procedure Act of 1995. While rejecting a facial challenge to the constitutionality of the statute, we

concluded that its application may violate due process if it denies a mentally incompetent petitioners

a reasonable opportunity to raise a claim in a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner. As a

result, we concluded that due process requires tolling of the statute of limitations during the period

of mental incompetency. Id. at 279. In so holding, we reaffirmed our earlier decision in Watkins

v. State, 903 S.W.2d 302 (Tenn. 1995), in which we stated:

because a petitioner who was incompetent throughout the limitations period would

be denied the opportunity to challenge his conviction in a meaningful manner, the

failure to toll the limitations period would deny such a petitioner a fair and

reasonable opportunity for the bringing of the [post-conviction] petition, and thus,

would violate due process.

3

On July 20, 20 00, this Co urt appoin ted Ma rk Antione B rown to represent both Nix a nd Purke y in this appeal.

The Court appreciates Mr. Brown’s willingness to accept this appointment and the excellent representation he has

provided the pe titioners.

-3-

Id. at 307. Although the prior three-year statute of limitations was at issue in Watkins, we

emphasized in Seals that the constitutional due process concerns discussed in Watkins apply with

equal force to the current one-year statute of limitations, despite the statutory anti-tolling provisions

that the General Assembly included in the 1995 Post-Conviction Procedure Act. See Seals, 23

S.W.3d at 279.

One issue that was not resolved by either Watkins or Seals, however, is what standard of

mental incompetence must a petitioner satisfy before due process requires tolling of the post-

conviction statute of limitations. Nix and Purkey argue that due process requires tolling whenever

a petitioner shows “a psychological problem that contributes to his inability to comprehend his rights

and responsibilities relative to the 1995 Post-Conviction Relief Act.” In contrast, the State argues

that the Court of Criminal Appeals correctly held that due process requires tolling only if a petitioner

shows that he is unable either to manage his personal affairs or to understand his legal rights and

liabilities. We agree.

While post-conviction proceedings are considered “criminal” in nature for some purposes,4

this Court in Watkins held that, with respect to statute of limitations issues, a post-conviction

proceeding is civil in nature. 903 S.W.2d at 305. The civil standard of competency is well-

established and originated in Porter v. Porter, 22 Tenn. (3 Hum.) 586, 589 (1842), in which this

Court held that a person is of “unsound mind” if the person is “incapable of attending to any

business, or of taking care of herself.” Id. The Porter formulation remains generally consistent with

the common understanding of “unsound mind,” and is consistent with the decisions of other

jurisdictions discussing incompetency for purposes of tolling statutes of limitations. See Doe v.

Coffee County Bd. of Educ., 853 S.W.2d 899 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1992) (citing cases from other

jurisdictions); see also C.S. Patrinelis, Annotation, Proof of Unadjudged Incompetency Which

Prevents Running of Statute of Limitations, 9 A.L.R.2d 964 (1950). Accordingly, we hold that due

process requires tolling of the post-conviction statute of limitations only if a petitioner shows that

he is unable either to manage his personal affairs or to understand his legal rights and liabilities.

In so holding, we reject the petitioners’ implicit contention that due process requires tolling

for incompetency upon the mere assertion of a psychological problem. As the Court of Criminal

Appeals recognized, mental illness is not the equivalent of mental incompetence. See also Coe v.

State, 17 S.W.3d 193, 221 (Tenn. 2000) (“[T]he existence of a mental disorder does not

automatically translate into a finding of incompetency to be executed.”); Seaton v. Seaton, 971

F.Supp. 1188, 1195 (E.D. Tenn. 1997) (“[W]hile the evaluation alludes to plaintiff’s mental health,

it in no way states that she was so incompetent as to be unaware of the injuries she allegedly

sustained through her husband’s actions.”).

We also reject the petitioners’ claim that the civil standard of competency does not satisfy

constitutional due process. As we have often emphasized, “[d]ue process is flexible and calls for

4

State v. Scales, 767 S.W.2d 157 (Tenn. 1989) (holding that post-conviction cases are criminal in nature for

purposes of the timeliness of a notice of appeal).

-4-

such procedural protections as the particular situation demands.” Seals, 23 S.W.3d at 277(citations

and quotations omitted). A petitioner has no fundamental right to collaterally attack a conviction,

and due process requires only that a petitioner be provided an opportunity for the presentation of the

claim at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner. Id. at 278. The competency standard

applied in civil cases in Tennessee satisfies the due process concerns associated with tolling of the

post-conviction statute of limitations. Having concluded that the civil standard of competency

applies when determining whether due process requires tolling of the post-conviction statute of

limitations, we must next determine whether the trial court and intermediate appellate court correctly

found the allegations of these petitions insufficient to make a prima facie showing under that

standard.

As the State points out, Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-30-202(a) declares that the one-year statutory

period is an element of the right to file a post-conviction petition and that it is not an affirmative

defense that must be asserted by the State. Therefore, it is incumbent upon a petitioner to include

allegations of fact in the petition establishing either timely filing or tolling of the statutory period.

See Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-30-204(e) (“The petitioner shall include allegations of fact supporting

each claim for relief set forth in the petition . . . .”). Failure to include sufficient factual allegations

of either compliance with the statute or incompetence requiring tolling will result in dismissal. See

Tenn. Code Ann. 40-30-206(b) (“If it plainly appears from the face of the petition, any annexed

exhibits or prior proceedings in the case that the petition was not filed . . .within the time set forth

in the statute of limitations, . . . the trial judge shall enter an order dismissing the petition.”); Tenn.

Code Ann. § 40-30-206(f) (“If the facts alleged, taken as true, fail to show that the petitioner is

entitled to relief or fail to show that the claims for relief have not been waived or previously

determined, the petition shall be dismissed.”). We emphasize that to make a prima facie showing

of incompetence requiring tolling of the limitations period, a post-conviction petition must include

specific factual allegations that demonstrate the petitioner’s inability to manage his personal affairs

or understand his legal rights and liabilities. Unsupported, conclusory, or general allegations of

mental illness will not be sufficient to require tolling and prevent summary dismissal under Tenn.

Code Ann. § 49-30-206(b) & (f). Cf. Van Tran v. State, 6 S.W.3d 257, 268 (Tenn. 1999) (holding

that unsupported assertions of incompetency to be executed are not sufficient to meet the required

threshold showing); State v. Barnett, 909 S.W.2d 423, 431 (Tenn. 1995) (holding that unsupported

assertions that expert services are needed are insufficient to entitle a defendant to a hearing). The

required prima facie showing may be satisfied by attaching to the petition affidavits, depositions,

medical reports, or other credible evidence that contain specific factual allegations showing the

petitioner’s incompetence. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-30-204(e) (“Affidavits, records or other

evidence available to the petitioner supporting the allegations of the petition may be attached to it.”).

Cf. Van Tran, 6 S.W.3d at 269 (holding that the required threshold showing to establish a genuine

disputed issue regarding a prisoner’s competency to be executed may be met by submitting

affidavits, depositions, medical reports, or other credible evidence). While affidavits and depositions

of mental health professionals may be utilized, they are not essential, and a petitioner may rely upon

affidavits and depositions from family members, prison officials, attorneys, or any other person who

has knowledge of facts that demonstrate either the petitioner’s inability to manage his personal

affairs or the petitioner’s inability to understand his legal rights and liabilities. Even if a petitioner

satisfies the prima facie showing, at the hearing the petitioner bears the burden of proving by clear

-5-

and convincing evidence that the statute of limitations should be tolled for incompetence, and that

as a result of the tolling, the petition is timely. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-30-210(f) (“The petitioner

shall have the burden of proving the allegations of fact by clear and convincing evidence.”). Unless

this burden is satisfied, the petition should be dismissed as time-barred.

III. Conclusion

Evaluating the allegations in these petitions against the applicable standard of competency,

we agree with the Court of Criminal Appeals that the trial court properly dismissed the petitions.

While both Nix and Purkey assert that they have never been and are not currently competent, there

are no specific factual allegations in the petitions that support this assertion. Nix’s petition alleges

that he is incompetent because he suffers mood disorders, depression, schizophrenia, insomnia, and

alcoholism. Purkey’s petition alleges that he is incompetent because he has radical mood swings,

extreme depression, loss of memory, poor judgment, and difficulty with thinking abstractly. None

of these allegations indicates that either Nix or Purkey is incapable of handling his personal affairs

or incapable of understanding his legal rights and liabilities. As previously stated, even when

proven, mental illness does not equate with incompetency. Accordingly, we affirm the judgments

of the Court of Criminal Appeals which upheld the trial court judgments dismissing these petitions

as time-barred.5

It appearing that the petitioners are indigent, costs of these appeals are taxed to the State of

Tennessee for which execution may issue if necessary.

___________________________________

FRANK F. DROWOTA, III, JUSTICE

5

W e acknow ledge tha t the petitione rs in Seals v. State , 23 S.W.3d 272 (Tenn. 2000) were afforded a remand

even though their non-specific allegations would have been insufficient to satisfy the standard adopted herein. Howev er,

the only issue raised in Seals was whether mental incompetence could ever toll the post-conviction statute o f limitations.

The ap propriate standard of men tal incom petence was no t raised, argu ed, or brie fed by th e parties.

-6-