Cutler-Hammer v. Crabtree

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF TENNESSEE

AT KNOXVILLE

January 3, 2001 Session

CUTLER-HAMMER, A DIVISION OF EATON CORP. v.

TIMOTHY L. CRABTREE

Appeal from the Supreme Court Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel

Circuit Court for Bradley County

No. V-95-721 R. Steven Bebb, Judge

No. E1998-00845-SC-WCM-CV - Filed September 7, 2001

We granted review in this cause to determine whether the trial court erred in finding Timothy L.

Crabtree permanently and totally disabled as a result of mental and physical injuries sustained while

working for Cutler-Hammer. Crabtree injured his back while working on a production line; then,

during treatment for the back injury, he developed severe depression. The trial court found that

Crabtree was permanently and totally disabled as a result of the combined effect of his mental and

physical injuries. The Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel rejected this finding,

concluding instead that Crabtree’s mental disorder was not compensable because it was not

connected to his back injury, which was compensable. On review, we conclude that Crabtree’s

mental disorder resulted from his physical injury. We hold, therefore, that Crabtree’s mental

disorder is compensable, and we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-225(e)(5)(B); Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law of the

Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel Accepted in Part and Rejected in Part;

Judgment of the Circuit Court Affirmed

ADOLPHO A. BIRCH, JR., J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which E. RILEY ANDERSON, C.J.,

FRANK F. DROWOTA , III, and JANICE M. HOLDER , J., joined. WILLIAM M. BARKER , J., not

participating.

Robert S. Thompson, Cleveland, Tennessee, for the appellant, Timothy L. Crabtree.

George Lane Foster, Chattanooga, Tennessee, for the appellee, Cutler-Hammer, a division of Eaton

Corp.

OPINION

I. Facts and Procedural History

Timothy L. Crabtree, the appellant, a 43-year-old high school graduate, began working for

Cutler-Hammer, a division of Eaton Corp. (Cutler-Hammer) in March 1977. During the 18 years

in which he worked for Cutler-Hammer, his work assignments all included manual labor. His

seniority enabled him to be assigned to one of the least strenuous production lines available in the

plant. In February 1995, however, his supervisor moved him to a more physically demanding job

because his co-workers complained repeatedly that he had been slacking on the production line. On

February 28, 1995, shortly after being moved to the more strenuous production line, Crabtree was

pulling a case of parts from a shelf when he felt severe pain in his back. He immediately reported

the injury to a co-employee and to Cutler-Hammer’s personnel department.1

On the day of Crabtree’s injury, Cutler-Hammer arranged an appointment with Paul Smith,

M.D., a general practitioner. Smith treated Crabtree and returned him to work the next day, and the

supervisor placed him back on the same job he was performing when he was injured. Later that

morning, however, after a conversation with Smith, Cutler-Hammer provided Crabtree with light

duty work. Crabtree continued under Smith’s care for several months. His therapy included

cortisone injections, pain medication, and physical therapy. While Crabtree was under Smith’s care,

Cutler-Hammer scheduled him to work overtime on Saturdays. When Smith sent a letter to Cutler-

Hammer stating that Crabtree should not be required to work on Saturdays, the company informed

Crabtree that he would be required to work overtime in the evenings. Crabtree then obtained a

second note instructing Cutler-Hammer that he should be limited to 40-hour work weeks.

Thereafter, Cutler-Hammer sent Crabtree to its welding department, where he was placed on a job

which required him to bend, twist, and turn his back in order to perform his assigned work. Crabtree

apparently was not relieved from this position until Smith sent a third note to Cutler-Hammer to

emphasize that he had placed Crabtree on light duty and had restricted him from performing duties

which involved bending, twisting, and turning his back.

Eventually, Smith referred Crabtree to Kevin Bailey, M.D., an orthopedic surgeon. Bailey

examined Crabtree, took X-rays, and performed an MRI scan of Crabtree’s spine, but found only

minor degenerative changes which he concluded were not the cause of Crabtree’s pain. Bailey

diagnosed Crabtree as having a lumbar strain with right sacroiliitis, treated him with physical

therapy, and kept him on light duty for several months, but he opined that Crabtree had suffered no

permanent impairment from his back injury.

Crabtree also consulted his family physician, internal medicine specialist Kent Chastain,

M.D. Chastain diagnosed Crabtree as suffering from various maladies including gastroesophageal

reflux disease and lumbar strain, but his examination of Crabtree’s lumbar spine revealed no

objective abnormalities. He noted in his records, however, that Crabtree was “especially stressed

and was extremely emotional and was crying because of the pressure on him at work.” Because he

1

In its supplemental brief, Cutler-Hammer insinuates that Crabtree was untruthful in claiming that he injured

his back. A t trial, howev er, Cutler-H amm er stipulated that Crabtr ee suffere d an injur y on Fe bruary 2 8, 1995 .

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suspected that Crabtree might be suffering from depression, he recommended that Crabtree see a

clinical psychologist.

On July 24, 1995, Bailey released Crabtree to return to work without restrictions. After

Crabtree returned to regular duty, Cutler-Hammer placed him on an even more physically

demanding job, which consisted of heavy lifting, twisting, turning, and repetitive moving of boxes

which weighed over 70 pounds. Crabtree’s pain continued, but his requests for additional medical

treatment were denied. When he informed his supervisor that he could “hardly stand” the pain he

was experiencing, his supervisor responded, “our company doctor is through with you. If you think

you can get your own doctor to get you out, get out.”

During this period of time, Crabtree’s mental condition deteriorated significantly, and he

began experiencing emotional breakdowns and persistent vomiting before and after work. At trial,

Crabtree’s wife testified that during the summer and fall of 1995, Crabtree began crying frequently

in front of her and his daughters. She stated that Crabtree had always been very strong and that he

had never been emotionally unstable before he injured his back, but after his injury he would

routinely have emotional breakdowns whenever anyone discussed his supervisors at work. She

further testified that he had nightmares and difficulty sleeping because of anxiety, back pain, and the

fear of losing his job and health insurance. When Cutler-Hammer informed Crabtree that he would

be fired unless he met certain production standards, he decided that he could no longer perform his

job because of his back pain and emotional difficulties and quit.

In February 1996, Crabtree’s emotional difficulties led him to consult Joseph Ball, M.D.,

P.C., a board-certified psychiatrist. Ball noted that Crabtree exhibited symptoms including crying

spells, frequent depressive mood episodes, problems with frustration and anger, nightmares, and

general anxiety, and he diagnosed Crabtree as suffering from major depression with some post-

traumatic features. Ball prescribed anti-depressant medication to treat Crabtree’s depression and a

muscle relaxant to treat his persistent back pain. On the basis of Crabtree’s depression, he assigned

Crabtree an impairment rating of 25 percent to the body as a whole. Ball testified in a deposition

that Crabtree’s perceived mistreatment at Cutler-Hammer, his feelings of inadequacy, his anxiety

over his inability to care for his family, and his lack of income all contributed to his depression. He

ultimately decided, however, that the depression was directly related to his work injury and that he

would not have developed a mental disorder had he not sustained that injury. Although Ball

indicated that Crabtree’s condition might improve somewhat in the future, he opined that Crabtree’s

impairment probably would not improve beyond the 25 percent impairment rating he had assigned.

On the advice of his attorney, Crabtree consulted orthopedic surgeon Walter H. King, Jr.,

M.D., for an independent medical evaluation. King noted that Crabtree exhibited a decreased range

of motion in his lower back and that an MRI showed mild degenerative changes. King diagnosed

Crabtree as suffering from degenerative disk disease, which he concluded had been aggravated by

Crabtree’s back injury. Based on his examination, King assigned Crabtree an impairment rating of

11 percent to the body as a whole, attributing 6 percent of the impairment to the degenerative disc

disease and 5 percent to ongoing lower back pain. King acknowledged that it would be impossible

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to discern how much of the 6 percent impairment assigned to the degenerative disc disease could be

ascribed to aggravation from the work injury.

Cutler-Hammer filed suit against Crabtree pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-225(a)(1)

(1999), requesting that the court absolve the company of liability for Crabtree’s injuries.2 After a

hearing, the trial court found that Crabtree was permanently and totally disabled as a result of the

combined effects of his physical and mental injuries. In a Memorandum Opinion, the trial judge

stated,

2

In its Memorandum Opinion, the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel noted:

This suit is somewhat unusual in that the employer filed suit against the

employee in what is commonly referred to as a “jump suit.” The work ers’

compensation law . . . allows suits to be filed either by the injured worker, or by

the employer. . . . When such suit is filed by the employer, the burd en of pro of . .

. rests upon the worker, to prove by a preponderance of the evidence . . . every

factual allegation upon which he relies for recovery. To the extent that the

complaint filed by the employer seeks the decision of the Court fairly establishing

the percentage of vocational disability and other contested matters, the employee’s

answer may fa irly set forth the issues presented before the Court. Frequently,

however, and as a general rule, the better practice for the worker is that of filing of

a counter-action, setting forth the grounds upon which he seeks to recover.

Although at trial the practice under our rules of procedure is to provide the

oppor tunity for the plain tiff to presen t his proof f irst, followed by that of the

defendant . . . , this is true because the burden of proof generally falls upon the

plaintiff. In a “jump suit” the burden of proof being upon the defendant, we

believe the better procedure to be that of allowing the worker, or the defend ant, to

proceed to present his evidence first, followed by the evidence presented by the

plaintiff. Similarly, opening statements and closing state ments o f counse l should

be presented such that the worker has the opportunity to make his opening

statement first, and closing statements should also be presented such that the

worker has the opp ortunity to present h is closing pr esentation first, and then has the

oppor tunity to answer the final argument of the employer, again for the reason that

the worker has the burden of proo f.

The rule may appear to remove from the employer some of the advantages

of filing a “jum p suit,” but a ppears to be proper when the procedural burdens of the

parties are consid ered. The employer still has the advantage of selecting the forum

for the litigatio n when filing a “jum p suit.”

At trial in this cause, the employer proceeded first at each stage of the

hearing. While we do not assign reversible error because of this procedure, we do

feel that the better practice is to . . . allow the worker, who has the burden of proof,

to presen t his case first.

We adopt the statements of the Panel regarding this issue.

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The most persuasive testimony is that of Mr. Crabtree himself. This

Court finds that Mr. Crabtree reached maximum medical

improvement on January 21, 1997 when rated by Dr. Ball. The Court

finds further that the treatment of Mr. Crabtree at Cutler-Hammer

when he was unable to work . . . was certainly inconsistent with 18

years of excellent work history with no injuries and no exhibitors of

psychiatric disorders. The Court finds that there was a concerted

effort by Cutler-Hammer to get rid of Mr. Crabtree whether they

believed him to be a malingerer or just wanted to be free of an injured

employee.

In making his findings of fact, the trial judge did not distinguish what portions of Crabtree’s total

disability could be attributed to his physical or his mental injury.

Cutler-Hammer appealed, and the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel considered

this matter. Regarding Crabtree’s physical injury, the Panel found that he was entitled to

compensation for a 5 percent anatomical impairment due to chronic pain, though it rejected the

additional 6 percent anatomical impairment found by King because the record did not reflect any

evidence of an anatomical change in Crabtree’s pre-existing degenerative condition. After

considering evidence regarding Crabtree’s age, education, skills, training, and employment

opportunities, the Panel concluded that Crabtree possessed minimal ability to secure employment

and was entitled to an award of 30 percent permanent partial disability to the body as a whole.3

Regarding Crabtree’s mental injury, however, the Panel disagreed with the trial court. The

Panel found that the mental injury had been brought about primarily by the criticism Crabtree

received from his supervisors and co-workers and by Crabtree’s fear that he would lose his job.

Noting that Crabtree’s co-workers and supervisors had criticized his work performance even before

he suffered his back injury, the Panel concluded that his mental injury was independent from his

physical injury. Holding that “[f]ear that one might lose his job and benefits of his employment .

. . is not within itself sufficient to require payment of compensation benefits,” the Panel concluded

that Crabtree’s mental injury was not compensable. We granted review in this cause pursuant to

Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-225(e)(5)(B) in order to determine whether the trial court erred in finding

that Crabtree’s mental injury was compensable. Because we conclude that the preponderance of the

evidence supports the trial court’s finding of a causal connection between Crabtree’s back injury and

his severe depression, we reject the Panel’s findings of fact and conclusions of law regarding the

mental injury and affirm the judgment of the trial court.

II. Standard of Review

3

On rev iew, this Court agrees with the Panel’s conclusion that Crabtree suffered a permanent impairment as

a result of his phy sical injury a nd that he should b e award ed com pensation for the vo cational disa bility caused by that

impairm ent. Consequently, we accept the Panel’s findings of fact and conclusions of law concerning the physical injury.

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In workers’ compensation cases, the standard of review is de novo upon the record,

accompanied by a presumption of the correctness of the trial court’s factual findings, unless the

preponderance of the evidence is otherwise. Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-225(e)(2); Spencer v. Towson

Moving and Storage, Inc., 922 S.W.2d 508, 509 (Tenn. 1996). The application of this standard

requires the Court to weigh in more depth the factual findings and conclusions of the trial court in

a workers’ compensation case. Cleek v. Wal-Mart Stores, 19 S.W.3d 770, 773 (Tenn. 2000). When

the trial judge has seen and heard a witness’s testimony, considerable deference must be accorded

on review to the trial court’s findings of credibility and the weight to be accorded to that testimony.

Townsend v. State, 826 S.W.2d 434, 437 (Tenn. 1992); Humphrey v. David Witherspoon, Inc., 734

S.W.2d 315, 315 (Tenn. 1987).

III. Analysis

In order to recover benefits under the Tennessee’s Workers’ Compensation Act, an employee

must prove that he or she has suffered an “injury by accident arising out of and in the course of

employment.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-102(12) (1999). An injury is considered to be “by

accident” when it is “produced by an ‘unusual combination of fortuitous circumstances.’”

Continental Ins. Co. v. Dowdy, 560 S.W.2d 619, 621 (Tenn. 1978) (quoting Brown Shoe Co. v.

Reed, 350 S.W.2d 65, 69 (1961)). An injury is deemed to arise out of the employment “when there

is apparent to the rational mind . . . a causal connection between the conditions under which the work

is . . . performed and the resulting injury, and occurs in the course of one’s employment if it occurs

when an employee is performing a duty he was employed to do.” Fink v. Caudle, 856 S.W.2d 952,

958 (Tenn. 1993)(citations omitted). In Tindall v. Waring Park Ass’n, this Court defined the “causal

connection” required before an injury will be held compensable:

[B]y “causal connection” is meant not proximate cause as used in the

law of negligence, but cause in the sense that the accident had its

origin in the hazards to which the employment exposed the employee

while doing his work. Although absolute certainty is not required for

proof of causation, medical proof that the injury was caused in the

course of the employee’s work must not be speculative or so

uncertain regarding the cause of the injury that attributing it to the

plaintiff’s employment would be an arbitrary determination or a mere

possibility. If, upon undisputed proof, it is conjectural whether

disability resulted from a cause operating within petitioner’s

employment, or a cause operating without employment, there can be

no award. If, however, equivocal medical evidence combined with

other evidence supports a finding of causation, such an inference may

nevertheless be drawn by the trial court under the case law.

725 S.W.2d 935, 937 (Tenn. 1987)(citations and internal quotation marks omitted).

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Because of the difficulty in pinpointing the exact cause of many mental injuries, Tennessee

courts have long struggled to define precisely when a mental injury will be deemed an injury by

accident arising out of the employment. In so doing, they have endeavored to strike a balance

between compensating employees for their injuries and ensuring that employers are not obligated

to bear the costs of spurious claims or claims whose true origins lie outside the workplace. Cf. Jose

v. Equifax, 556 S.W.2d 82, 84 (Tenn. 1977) (stating that the Tennessee Workers’ Compensation Act

“does not embrace every stress or strain of daily living or every undesirable experience encountered

in carrying out the duties of a contract of employment” and noting that “[workers’] compensation

coverage is not as broad as general, comprehensive health and accident insurance”); Lawrence

Joseph, The Causation Issue in Workers’ Compensation Mental Disability Cases, 36 Vand. L. Rev.

263, 291 n.113 (1983) (discussing the use of a “discernible objective event” as a “badge of

reliability” which may be used to objectively determine the causal connection between employment

and a mental injury). In crafting this balance, Tennessee courts have resolved that mental injuries

should be compensable when shown to be work-related, but, under the statutory “injury by accident”

requirement, there must be a specific incident that triggers the injury. See 26 Tenn. Jur. Workers’

Compensation § 24 (1999). Thus, Tennessee has allowed compensation for a mental injury when

that injury has been caused by either (1) a compensable physical injury, or (2) a sudden or unusual

mental stimulus, such as a fright, shock, or even excessive, unexpected anxiety. See Jose, 556

S.W.2d at 84; but see Allied Chem. Corp. v. Wells, 578 S.W.2d 369, 373 (Tenn. 1979) (holding that

worry, anxiety, and stress “within the bounds of the ups and downs of emotional normal human

experience” are insufficient to support an award).

In this case, the only medical proof offered concerning the origins of Crabtree’s mental injury

was Ball’s deposition testimony. Ball conceded that Crabtree’s worries over his financial ability to

support his family and his perceived mistreatment at work contributed to his depression, but he

testified repeatedly and unequivocally that those worries resulted from Crabtree’s physical injury

and that he would not have developed the depression he suffered had he not been injured at work.

None of the evidence offered by Cutler-Hammer controverts Ball’s testimony. Moreover, Crabtree,

whose testimony the trial court found persuasive, attributed his depression to his physical injury, as

did his wife. Based on this testimony, we conclude that the preponderance of the evidence supports

the trial court’s conclusion that Crabtree’s mental injury had its origin in the work-related back

injury he suffered on February 28, 1995. Therefore, we affirm the trial court’s conclusion that

Crabtree’s mental injury is compensable. Given Crabtree’s age, work history, education, and limited

job opportunities, we conclude that the evidence does not preponderate against the trial court’s

determination that Crabtree has been rendered permanently and totally disabled by the combined

effects of his physical and mental injuries.

IV. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, we hold that Crabtree’s mental injury was caused by a physical

injury arising out of and in the course of his employment, and therefore we find the mental injury

to be compensable. Accordingly, we reject the findings of fact and conclusions of law of the Special

Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel regarding Crabtree’s mental injury, and we affirm the

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decision of the trial court. Costs on this appeal will be taxed to Cutler-Hammer, for which execution

may issue if necessary.

___________________________________

ADOLPHO A. BIRCH, JR., JUSTICE

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