State v. Peele

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF TENNESSEE

AT KNOXVILLE

May 2, 2001 Session

STATE OF TENNESSEE v. CLIFFORD PEELE

Appeal by Permission from the Court of Criminal Appeals

Circuit Court for Carter County

No. 8027 Arden L. Hill, Judge

No. E1999-00907-SC-R11-CD - Filed October 16, 2001

We granted appeal to determine (1) if Tenn. R. App. P. 3(b) permits the appeal of a denial of a

motion to withdraw a guilty plea; and (2) whether a Tenn. R. Crim. P. 32(f) motion to set aside a

guilty plea filed prior to the time the judgment becomes final tolls the time for filing an appeal to

permit the trial court to rule on the motion. We hold (1) that a denial of a motion to set aside a guilty

plea may be appealed pursuant to Tenn. R. App. P. 3(b); and (2) that a trial court retains jurisdiction

to rule on a motion to set aside a guilty plea if the motion is filed prior to the date the judgment

becomes final. Accordingly, the holding of the Court of Criminal Appeals is reversed, and the case

is remanded to the intermediate appellate court for proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Tenn. R. App. P. 11 Appeal by Permission;

Judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals Reversed.

JANICE M. HOLDER , J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which FRANK F. DROWOTA , III, CJ, and

E. RILEY ANDERSON, ADOLPHO A. BIRCH, JR., and WILLIAM M. BARKER , JJ, joined.

Kenneth F. Irvine, Jr., Knoxville, Tennessee, for the appellant, Clifford Peele.

Paul G. Summers, Attorney General and Reporter; Michael E. Moore, Solicitor General; and

Elizabeth B. Marney, Assistant Attorney General, for the appellee, State of Tennessee.

OPINION

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Clifford Peele (Peele) pled guilty on December 6, 1982, to first degree murder, burglary,

grand larceny, and larceny. Approximately seven years later, on February 22, 1990, Peele filed a

motion to withdraw his guilty plea to the first degree murder charge because he had not been

sentenced for the crime.1 On April 30, 1990, the trial court denied his motion to set aside the guilty

plea and sentenced him to life imprisonment. The judgment was filed on May 22, 1990. No appeal

was taken from the judgment.

On June 21, 1990, Peele filed a second motion to withdraw his guilty plea based on alleged

ineffective assistance of counsel. The trial court concluded that Peele had timely filed his motion

under Tenn. R. Crim. P. 32(f). An order entered by the trial court on May 19, 1999, denied Peele’s

second motion to withdraw his guilty plea.2 The Court of Criminal Appeals dismissed the appeal

on June 20, 2000, on the grounds that Tenn. R. App. P. 3(b) does not allow an appeal of right from

a denial of a motion to withdraw a guilty plea. The court also held that the trial court was without

jurisdiction to rule on the motion after the judgment became final on June 21, 1990. Thereafter,

Peele appealed the decision to this Court.

ANALYSIS

I. TENNESSEE RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 3(b)

On June 20, 2000, the Court of Criminal Appeals ruled that the trial court’s denial of a

motion to withdraw a guilty plea was not subject to appeal under Tenn. R. App. P. 3(b). In State v.

Wilson, decided on September 18, 2000, we stated that “[a] direct appeal then lies from a denial of

a Rule 32(f) motion.” 31 S.W.3d 189, 195 n.14 (Tenn. 2000) (citing State v. Newsome, 778 S.W.2d

34 (Tenn. 1989)). Accordingly, Peele properly appealed the denial of the motion to set aside his

guilty plea.

II. THE JURISDICTION OF THE TRIAL COURT

At issue in this case is the continued jurisdiction of the trial court to rule on Peele’s motion

to withdraw his guilty plea. Resolution of this issue requires an analysis of the interplay between

Tenn. R. Crim. P. 32(f) and Tenn. R. App. P. 4(c). With that interplay in mind, we turn first to an

analysis of Tenn. R. Crim. P. 32(f).

Rule 32(f) of the Tennessee Rules of Criminal Procedure allows a defendant who pleads

guilty to file a motion to withdraw that plea. Rule 32(f) provides that

1

Upon entering his guilty plea, Pe ele was sente nced for the burglary, grand larceny, and larceny. The

sentencing for the first degree murder conviction was postponed until Peele testified against his co-defendants. The

extensive time period between Peele’s guilty plea and sente ncing is attrib utable to th e time ne cessary to c onclud e his

multiple co-defendants’ trials and to conduct mental evaluations requested by Peele.

2

A period of approx imately n ine years e lapsed fro m the filing of the seco nd mo tion to withdraw the guilty plea

to the time the order denying the motion was entered. The trial court’s delay in ruling on the motion appears to have

been caused by several m otions filed by Peele fo r substitution of coun sel and for continu ances.

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[a] motion to withdraw a guilty plea may be made upon a showing by the defendant

of any fair and just reason only before sentence is imposed; but to correct manifest

injustice, the court after sentence, but before the judgment becomes final, may set

aside the judgment of conviction and permit the defendant to withdraw the plea.

Tenn. R. Crim. P. 32(f) (2000) (emphasis added).3 A trial court’s judgment as a general rule

becomes final thirty days after its entry unless a timely notice of appeal or specified post-trial motion

is filed. State v. Pendergrass, 937 S.W.2d 834, 837 (Tenn. 1996). After the trial court loses

jurisdiction, generally it retains no power to amend a judgment. Id. (citing State v. Moore, 814

S.W.2d 381, 382 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1991)). Judgments made outside the court’s jurisdiction are

void. Id. (citing Brown v. Brown, 281 S.W.2d 492, 497 (Tenn. 1955)).

The State maintains that the trial court’s judgment became final thirty days after its entry,

despite Peele’s Rule 32(f) motion filed on the thirtieth day. The State, therefore, argues that the trial

court lost jurisdiction to rule on Peele’s Rule 32(f) motion because the court did not rule on the

motion before the judgment became final.

When construing statutes, the mention of one subject in a statute excludes other subjects that

are not mentioned. State v. Brewer, 989 S.W.2d 349, 355 n.4 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1997) (citing State

v. Harkins, 811 S.W.2d 79, 82 (Tenn. 1991)). Statutory segments, however, should be “construed

together in light of the general purpose and plan . . . and object to be obtained.” Id. (quoting Neff

v. Cherokee Ins. Co., 704 S.W.2d 1, 3 (Tenn. 1986)). Furthermore, statutes should be construed “so

that no part will be inoperative, superfluous, void or insignificant . . . and to give effect to every

word, phrase, clause and sentence of the act in order to carry out the legislative intent.” Id. (quoting

Tidwell v. Collins, 522 S.W.2d 674, 676-77 (Tenn. 1975)). Such statutory construction is applicable

in construing rules governing practice and procedure of the court. See, e.g, id. (applying statutory

construction to interpret Tenn. R. Crim. P. 41(c)).

Reading Rule 32(f) to divest the trial court of jurisdiction to rule on a motion filed before the

judgment becomes final would limit the effectiveness of the post-sentence portion of Rule 32(f).

The language of Rule 32(f) clearly states that the trial court may hear a motion to withdraw a guilty

plea after sentence, but before the judgment becomes final. The rule is silent, however, as to whether

such a motion stays the judgment until the trial court rules on the motion. The purpose of Rule 32(f)

is to provide a defendant with a procedure to withdraw a guilty plea. Interpreting Rule 32(f) to limit

the trial court’s ability to decide such a motion would defeat the very purpose for which the rule was

intended.

3

The language of Tenn. R. Crim. P. 32(f) provides that a defend ant may attem pt to withdraw a guilty plea at

two independ ent points in time . The first por tion of Rule 32(f) allo ws a motion to be filed prior to sentencing. The

second part of the rule allows such a motion to be filed after sentencing but before the judgment becomes final. Although

Peele filed both types of Rule 3 2(f) motions in this case, this appeal concerns only the second motion, which was filed

after sentencing.

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If we were to hold that the trial court loses jurisdiction to rule on the timely-filed Rule 32(f)

motion, a moving party would be placed in one of two untenable positions. The moving party would

be forced to choose whether to (1) await the trial court’s ruling on the Rule 32(f) motion and chance

that the trial judge will not rule on the motion before the judgment becomes final; or (2) before the

judgment becomes final, file an appeal under Tenn. R. App. P. 3(b) of the trial court’s anticipated

denial of the Rule 32(f) motion. A defendant who chooses the first option risks the possibility that

the trial court will fail to rule on the motion. Once the judgment became final and the trial court lost

jurisdiction, a defendant would have forfeited his right to appeal a denial of the Rule 32(f) motion.

The second option of an appeal before a trial court ruling presents a similar pitfall. When an appeal

is filed, the trial court loses jurisdiction, and the jurisdiction of the Court of Criminal Appeals

attaches. Pendergrass, 937 S.W.2d at 837 (Tenn. 1996) (citing State v. Peak, 823 S.W.2d 228, 229

(Tenn. Crim. App. 1991)). By prematurely appealing, the defendant would lose the opportunity to

have the trial court rule, perhaps favorably, on his motion. Neither option provides a defendant a

meaningful opportunity for relief under Rule 32(f). Procedural rules should not be applied to

preclude their practical application.

The second part of the analysis concerns Tenn. R. App. P. 4(c). Rule 4(c) directly addresses

the issue of tolling. The rule specifies certain post-trial motions or petitions that toll the time for

filing a notice of appeal:

In a criminal action if a timely motion or petition under the Tennessee Rules of

Criminal Procedure is filed in the trial court by the defendant: (1) under Rule 29(c)

for a judgment of acquittal, (2) under Rule 33(a) for a new trial, (3) under Rule 34

for arrest of judgment, or (4) under Rule 32(f)(1)4 for a suspended sentence, the time

for appeal for all parties shall run from entry of the order denying a new trial or

granting or denying any other such motion or petition.

Tenn. R. App. P. 4(c) (2000). A motion to withdraw a guilty plea is not one of the specified motions

or petitions. However, Rule 4(c) does not specifically exclude from tolling properly filed motions

or petitions not otherwise enumerated in the rule.

The Advisory Commission Comments to Rule 4(c) state that “unless these motions are

abolished, it would be undesirable to proceed with the appeal while the trial court has before it a

motion the granting of which would vacate or alter the judgment appealed from, and which might

affect . . . the decision to seek appellate review.” Although a motion to withdraw a guilty plea is not

one of the enumerated motions or petitions listed in Rule 4(c), the granting of such a motion would

vacate the judgment. Had the trial court determined that Peele was entitled to withdraw his guilty

plea, the judgment sentencing him would have been vacated. Peele would have been entitled to a

jury trial on the first degree murder charge, and he would have had no need to appeal the conviction

4

Subsection Rule 32(f)(1) is a typographical error. The rule concern ing suspe nded se ntences is found in Tenn.

R. Crim . P. 32(a). R ule 32 d oes not co ntain a sub section 32 (f)(1).

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and sentence. Allowing Peele to await a ruling on the motion to withdraw his guilty plea before

instituting an appeal from his conviction, therefore, would further the stated purpose of Rule 4(c).

Conversely, reading Rule 4(c) and Rule 32(f) to allow the trial court’s judgment to become

final before a ruling is made on a timely-filed Rule 32(f) motion effectively grants the trial court a

“pocket veto.” The trial court would have complete discretion to rule on the motion or to allow the

time to run until the judgment became final. By waiting in good faith for a ruling that is never made,

the defendant would lose the opportunity to appeal. Therefore, common sense dictates that the

timely filing of a Rule 32(f) motion should stay the judgment of the trial court until the motion is

decided.

Accordingly, we hold that Tenn. R. App. P. 4(c) and Tenn. R. Crim. P. 32(f) vest the trial

court with jurisdiction to decide a timely-filed Rule 32(f) motion. In this case the judgment of the

trial court was entered on May 22, 1990, and the judgment would have become final on June 21,

1990, thirty days after its entry. Peele’s second motion to withdraw the guilty plea for first degree

murder was filed on June 21, 1990. The filing of the motion therefore stayed the judgment until the

trial court ruled on the motion to set aside the guilty plea.

CONCLUSION

A Tenn. R. App. P. 3(b) direct appeal lies from a trial court’s denial of a motion to withdraw

a guilty plea raised under Tenn. R. Crim. P. 32(f). Upon the trial court’s denial of the motion to

withdraw his guilty plea, the defendant was entitled to appellate review of the decision. We

therefore overrule the Court of Criminal Appeals’ holding that a direct appeal does not arise from

such a denial.

The trial court correctly exercised its jurisdiction under Tenn. R. Crim. P. 32(f) to rule on the

motion to set aside the guilty plea. Although a judgment generally becomes final thirty days after

its entry, the motion filed on June 21, 1990, stayed the judgment of the trial court, which would have

otherwise been final on that day. We therefore overrule the Court of Criminal Appeals’ holding that

the trial court lacked jurisdiction to rule on the motion. The case is remanded to the Court of

Criminal Appeals for proceedings consistent with this opinion. Costs are assessed to the State for

which execution may issue if necessary.

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JANICE M. HOLDER, JUSTICE

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