United Academics of OSU v. OSU

348

Argued and submitted September 29, affirmed October 27, 2021

UNITED ACADEMICS OF

OREGON STATE UNIVERSITY,

Respondent,

v.

OREGON STATE UNIVERSITY,

Petitioner.

Employment Relations Board

UP02118; A174198

502 P3d 254

Petitioner seeks judicial review of a final order of the Employment Relations

Board (ERB), which determined that petitioner attempted to influence fac-

ulty members’ decisions regarding union representation in violation of ORS

243.670(2)(a) and ORS 243.672(1)(i). Petitioner argues that its conduct does not

fall within the category of conduct precluded by ORS 243.670(2)(a), and that the

ERB does not support its findings with substantial reason. In the alternative,

petitioner and its amici argue that petitioner’s conduct is shielded from liabil-

ity by an exception provided in ORS 243.670(3). Held: The ERB’s interpretation

of ORS 243.670(2)(a) was not erroneous and its inferences, based on stipulated

historical facts, were reasoned and reasonable. Petitioner’s conduct did not fall

within the narrow exception provided by ORS 243.670(3).

Affirmed.

Jeffrey P. Chicoine argued the cause for petitioner. Also

on the opening brief was Miller Nash Graham & Dunn LLP.

Also on the reply brief were Ivan Resendiz Gutierrez and

Miller Nash Graham & Dunn LLP.

Jason M. Weyand argued the cause for respondent. Also

on the brief was Tedesco Law Group.

Kyle T. Abraham, Trevor R. Caldwell, Natalie M. Pattison,

and Barran Liebman LLP filed the brief amicus curiae for

Oregon Public Employer Labor Relations Association.

Liani J. Reeves, John M. Stellwagen, and Bullard Law

filed the brief amicus curiae for The Oregon Public

Universities.

Noah T. Barish, McKanna Bishop Joffe, LLP, Risa

Lieberwitz, Washington, D. C., Aaron Nisenson, Washington,

Cite as 315 Or App 348 (2021) 349

D. C., and Nancy Long, Washington, D. C., filed the brief

amicus curiae for American Association of University Pro-

fessors and Oregon Higher Education Faculty Associations.

Noah T. Barish, Caleb D. Mammen, McKanna Bishop

Joffe, LLP, Lane Toensmeier, Danielle Holmes, and Tedesco

Law Group filed the brief amicus curiae for Labor Coalition.

Before Lagesen, Presiding Judge, and James, Judge, and

Kamins, Judge.

LAGESEN, P. J.

Affirmed.

350 United Academics of OSU v. OSU

LAGESEN, P. J.

Oregon State University (OSU) petitions for judi-

cial review of a final order of the Employment Relations

Board (ERB). In that order, the ERB determined that OSU

attempted to influence faculty members’ decisions regard-

ing whether to support union representation by United

Academics of Oregon State University (union) in violation

of ORS 243.670(2)(a) and ORS 243.672(1)(i). That determi-

nation was based on its findings that OSU solicited ques-

tions and created, maintained, and distributed information

through a “Frequently Asked Questions” (FAQ) webpage

during the organization campaign in an effort to deter union

organizing. Seeing no error, we affirm.

The historical facts are not disputed. The public

phase of a union organizing drive orchestrated by the union

began in 2017, culminating in a petition to certify a new

bargaining unit of OSU faculty employees in June 2018. In

response to the organizing drive, OSU administrators cre-

ated a webpage to distribute information to faculty mem-

bers. The webpage contained a list of questions described as

“frequently asked questions,” or FAQs.

OSU used the university email system to notify

faculty of the new webpage, providing a link to the page

with those initial FAQs through a series of emails. The first

email was sent by Senior Vice Provost for Faculty Affairs,

Capalbo. In addition to a link to the FAQ webpage, the first

email provided a link for employees to submit their own

questions to OSU relating to the organizing drive. Provost

and Executive Vice President, Feser, began sending emails

with similar content eight months later.

The FAQ webpage was accessible through the OSU

intranet, could be viewed by any OSU employee with a

university-issued login, and also could be reached by click-

ing on a link in the emails sent by university administrators,

Capalbo and Feser. Once at the FAQ webpage, employees

could review the list of questions, then click on a question

to reveal the answer provided by OSU. The webpage also

included a link for employees to submit their own ques-

tions. Any OSU employee was able to submit questions for

Cite as 315 Or App 348 (2021) 351

consideration and posting as an FAQ, including supervisory

or managerial employees.

The initial set of 27 FAQs—both the questions and

answers—were drafted by OSU. Those initial FAQs did not

respond to specific questions received by OSU from faculty

members, and remained unchanged until March 22, 2018,

the day Feser sent his first email. At that time, additional

questions and answers were added. Feser’s email informed

employees that “Oregon law allows public employers to

respond to questions they receive from employees during

a union organizing drive” and that the FAQ webpage was

created “to provide responses to such questions.” (Emphasis

added.)

Although the character of the FAQs varied, sev-

eral, both from the original 27 drafted by OSU and those

that came after, raise topics commonly used in the context

of anti-union materials, including strikes and union dues.

Some of the original FAQs drafted by OSU highlighted

potential consequences of unionization, including the possi-

bility of fair share fees and faculty benefits being subject to

bargaining, to explain “what the success of a unionization

effort might mean at OSU.” In some instances, OSU edited

submitted questions before publishing them.

Capalbo’s email did not inform faculty that OSU

had generated the initial 27 questions and answers. None of

Feser’s emails informed faculty that many of the remainder

of the questions published on the FAQ webpage had been

edited or changed from the questions actually submitted by

employees. Some of the textual changes were minor gram-

matical or stylistic changes. Some questions were edited to

omit the opinions expressed by the employee. Several ques-

tions received answers that exceeded the scope of the posted

question, including giving advice on how to revoke submit-

ted authorization cards after submitting them to the union.

On June 16, 2018, the union’s legal counsel contacted

the Director of Labor Relations Services for the University

Shared Services Enterprise (USSE) with concerns about

OSU’s FAQs. The resulting exchange produced substantial

information about how each question was received and if

352 United Academics of OSU v. OSU

and how the university edited each question. Specifically, as

noted, the original 27 questions and answers were drafted

by OSU. Later additions were derived primarily from anon-

ymous submissions through the online form on the FAQ

webpage with some coming directly from named faculty.

Four submissions were designated by OSU as received

by “other” means. Three of the FAQs labeled by OSU as

“other” were prompted not by submitted questions, but by

a Corvallis Gazette-Times news article written by Bennett

Hall, Getting Organized: OSU Faculty Members Take Steps

to Form a Union, May 20, 2018, which primarily raised the

topic of how union organizing impacted OSU’s shared gover-

nance structure.

The final FAQ submitted as “other” was inspired by

a request from a faculty member, who opposed the union, to

use the school’s distribution lists to send information to fac-

ulty. After his request was denied by Feser’s special assis-

tant, the following FAQ was added to the webpage:

“How do I contact my fellow colleagues without using

the faculty Listserv?

“You can make a Public Records Request seeking the

public email addresses for all faculty. Email [OSU Office of

General Counsel] your public records request. Once received,

you can use that list to create your own email distribu-

tion list. Please keep in mind your obligations under the

Acceptable Use of University Computing Resources Policy[.]”

After obtaining that information about the FAQs

from the USSE employee, the union initiated this unfair-

labor-practice proceeding before the ERB, alleging that OSU

violated ORS 243.672(1)(i) when it solicited questions from

employees about union organizing and created, maintained,

and distributed information through its FAQ webpage while

OSU faculty were in the process of deciding whether to

unionize. ORS 243.672(1)(i) makes it an unfair labor prac-

tice to violate ORS 243.670(2). ORS 243.670(2)(a) provides,

in relevant part, that a public employer may not “[u]se public

funds to support actions to assist, promote or deter union

organizing[.]” ORS 243.670 and ORS 243.672(1)(i) were

added to the Public Employee Collective Bargaining Act

in 2013, when the legislature enacted the Public Employer

Cite as 315 Or App 348 (2021) 353

Accountability Act through House Bill (HB) 3342 (2013). See

Or Laws 2013, ch 663, § 4.

The parties filed joint exhibits and joint stipulated

facts, and both stipulated to $1 of public funds being used

by OSU for the challenged conduct. Those stipulations

establish that the ERB’s findings of historical fact, which

are based on the joint exhibits and joint stipulated facts,

are undisputed. Nor is the allegation that OSU used public

funds for the conduct at issue disputed.

Based on the entirety of the record, the ERB found

that OSU used its FAQ webpage to subtly influence the

campus debate on whether its employees should support or

oppose union organizing and that, in some instances, OSU

actively participated in that debate. The ERB held these

findings to be sufficient to conclude that OSU tried to influ-

ence the decision of its employees regarding whether those

employees should support or oppose the union, thereby vio-

lating ORS 243.670(2)(a) and, thus, ORS 243.672(1)(i). The

ERB rejected OSU’s contention that its conduct was shielded

by ORS 243.670(3), which permits an employer to respond to

inquiries from employees.

OSU petitioned us for judicial review. As we under-

stand its arguments on review, OSU contends that, in con-

cluding that its conduct violated ORS 243.670, the ERB

misconstrued provisions of the statute. ORS 183.482(8)(a).

OSU also contends that the ERB’s inferences and ultimate

legal conclusions are not reasonable ones, such that the

board’s order is not supported by substantial evidence and

substantial reason. ORS 183.482(8)(c); Jenkins v. Board of

Parole, 356 Or 186, 195-96, 335 P3d 828 (2014) (explain-

ing the substantial-reason requirement that is implicit in

substantial-evidence standard). The union responds that

the ERB’s order is correct in all respects.

At issue in this case is the correctness of the ERB’s

determination that OSU violated ORS 243.670(2). It pro-

vides, in relevant part:

“A public employer may not:

“(a) Use public funds to support actions to assist, pro-

mote or deter union organizing[.]”

354 United Academics of OSU v. OSU

ORS 243.670(1)(a) provides the following relevant

definition:

“ ‘Assist, promote or deter union organizing’ means any

attempt by a public employer to influence the decision of

any or all of its employees or the employees of its subcon-

tractors regarding:

“(A) Whether to support or oppose a labor organization

that represents or seeks to represent those employees; or

“(B) Whether to become a member of any labor organi-

zation.”

The board ultimately interpreted that text to pro-

hibit “any act or instance of a public employer making an

effort to affect or alter (including by indirect or intangible

means) the decision of any or all of its employees regarding

whether to support or oppose a labor organization that seeks

to represent those employees.”

We start by noting that, to the extent OSU argues

that the board’s determination rests on an erroneous inter-

pretation of ORS 243.670(2), OSU does not seem to disagree

with the board’s articulated interpretation, as far as it goes.

Instead, OSU appears only to be contesting whether that

interpretation encompasses OSU’s specific conduct. While

OSU does not concede that it was intending to influence

union organization, it relies heavily on legislative history

to argue that the statute prohibits only conduct that can be

understood to be “taking a public stand and actively oppos-

ing union organizing[.]” Rather than engaging with the

plain text of the statute, OSU relies on select statements

made before Senate and House committees by the original

sponsor of the bill, Representative Dembrow, to argue that

HB 3342, as codified in ORS 243.670, was only intended to

bar “big budget anti-union campaigns and compel public

employer neutrality.”

OSU’s proposed interpretation of the statute is not

persuasive because it conflicts with the plain words used

by the legislature. ORS 243.670(1)(a) defines the prohibited

conduct as “any attempt by a public employer to influence the

decision of any or all of its employees * * *.” (Emphasis added.)

No analysis of the legislative history can undercut the fact

Cite as 315 Or App 348 (2021) 355

that the legislature wrote the statute broadly to encompass

“any” attempt to influence the decisions of employees with

regard to union organizing, and did not include the limita-

tions that OSU’s argument asks us to recognize. See, e.g.,

Sherman v. Dept. of Human Services, 368 Or 403, 418, 492

P3d 31 (2021) (declining to read limitation into a statute

that the text did not include on the basis of legislative his-

tory); State v. Gaines, 346 Or 160, 172, 206 P3d 1042 (2009)

(“[A] party seeking to overcome seemingly plain and unam-

biguous text with legislative history has a difficult task

before it.”).

We turn to OSU’s assertion that the ERB’s deter-

mination that OSU violated ORS 243.670 is not supported

by substantial evidence and substantial reason. Evaluating

a challenge to a board’s ruling for substantial evidence

requires us to determine whether the record, taken as a

whole, would permit a reasonable person to make the dis-

puted finding. Garcia v. Boise Cascade Corp., 309 Or 292,

295, 787 P2d 884 (1990). When a finding hinges on an infer-

ence, we ask whether the record allows the conclusion that

“there is a basis in reason” for the inferred fact:

“The substantial evidence rule is not entirely dispositive

in reviewing findings which embody inferences. An infer-

ence has two parts: a primary fact plus a deduction. The

evidence directly establishes only the truth of the primary

fact or facts from which an inference may be derived there-

from. Rational bases may exist for more than one inference

to be drawn from the same primary fact, and the factfinder

(i.e., the agency) has the task to decide which one to draw.

The court does not substitute its judgment as to which

inference should be drawn, but it must review for the exis-

tence of a rationale. The rationale is reviewed for sound-

ness, not for conformity to judicial preference. Judicial

review of an inference is thus in two stages: (1) whether the

basic fact or facts are supported by substantial evidence,

and (2) whether there is a basis in reason connecting the

inference to the facts from which it is derived.”

City of Roseburg v. Roseburg City Firefighters, 292 Or 266,

271, 639 P2d 90 (1981).

Similarly, whether an agency’s ultimate conclusions

from its findings of fact are supported by substantial reason

356 United Academics of OSU v. OSU

turns on whether the agency’s order supplies a “rational

connection between the facts and the legal conclusions it

draws from them” such that the conclusions are sufficiently

reviewable by an appellate court. Jenkins, 356 Or at 195-96.

Confronted with a substantial-reason challenge, our review

is simply to determine whether the order supplies the neces-

sary reasoning.

Starting with the issue of substantial evidence, we

do not understand OSU to argue that the ERB’s findings

of historical fact are not supported by substantial evidence.

Those facts were pulled either directly from the joint stipu-

lated facts or from the jointly submitted exhibits, and OSU

has not pointed to any particular historical finding that it

views as incorrect.

Rather, OSU’s main contention appears to be that

it cannot be reasonably inferred from the historical facts

found by the ERB that OSU’s conduct surrounding the FAQ

webpage amounted to an effort to affect or influence its

employees’ decision about organizing.

First, OSU asserts that the ERB “cherry-picked”

from the record to support its conclusion, implying that a

review of the whole record would not allow for the determi-

nation that the ERB reached. While the ERB’s order does

not quote the entirety of the record, it belies OSU’s implica-

tion that the ERB did not consider the record in its entirety

and only chose facts that supported its ultimate conclusion.

In fact, the order expressly acknowledges examples of OSU

conduct that do not directly support the finding of a viola-

tion, but explains that the examples did not persuade the

ERB to disregard the facts that point toward the inference

that OSU was attempting to influence its employees’ deci-

sion. Regardless, a substantial reason argument alleging

insufficient reference to the record or consideration of the

evidence (or “cherry-picking”) misconstrues the standard

as laid out in Jenkins, which does not require a complete

recounting of all evidence. See, e.g., Mendacino v. Board of

Parole, 287 Or App 822, 838, 404 P3d 1048 (2017), rev den,

362 Or 508 (2018) (citing Jenkins, 356 Or at 200, to explain

that an order may adequately explain its conclusion even

without overtly addressing countervailing evidence).

Cite as 315 Or App 348 (2021) 357

Second, OSU argues that the record does not allow

for the conclusion that its actions exceeded the requirements

of neutrality imposed by ORS 243.670 or that OSU had the

intention of influencing its employees with regard to union

organization. In other words, while OSU does not dispute

the ERB’s findings about its historical conduct, it disputes

what inferences can (and should) be drawn from it and con-

tends that the ERB has not sufficiently justified the infer-

ences it drew with reasoning.

That argument is refuted by the order itself, which

contains a detailed and reasonable explanation of its infer-

ences, making numerous references to the joint stipulated

facts and exhibits. While it may be possible to draw differ-

ent inferences from the evidence, that does not mean that

the inferences drawn by the ERB were unreasonable, and

we are not empowered under our standard of review to dis-

place reasonable—and reasoned—inferences drawn by the

agency. See Roseburg, 292 Or at 271 (“[T]he court will not

substitute its judgment for that of the agency in drawing an

inference, but the court must be satisfied that agency judg-

ment has actually been exercised.”). For example, it may

be reasonable to interpret the discrepancy between OSU

telling faculty the FAQs were a result of questions asked

by employees on the one hand, and many of the FAQs actu-

ally being generated by the administration directly on the

other as benign; however, it is not unreasonable to infer

that this repeated discrepancy in OSU’s conduct points

to an intention to manipulate the conversation between

administration and faculty, particularly when considered

in the context of OSU’s other conduct. Also, while evi-

dence of how OSU edited questions and framed its answers

may permit the inference that management of the FAQs

was simply inconsistent, it is also reasonable to infer, as

the ERB did, that, based on the edits made and answers

given, OSU was aiming to subtly cast union organizing in a

negative light. Finally, while it may be reasonable to inter-

pret OSU’s occasional provision of information in excess of

the scope of the question asked as neutral, it also is not

unreasonable to consider the nature of the advice given,

and infer an attempt to assist employees in opposing union

organizing.

358 United Academics of OSU v. OSU

We turn to OSU’s final argument. Although OSU

did not fully develop this argument in its opening brief, we

address it because amici have raised the point and because it

is easily resolved on this record. The argument is that ORS

243.670(3) shields OSU from liability under ORS 243.670(2),

even if OSU was attempting to influence its employees’ deci-

sions about organizing. That provision states, “If an employee

requests the opinion of the employee’s employer or supervi-

sor about union organizing, nothing in this section prohibits

the employer or supervisor from responding to the request

of the employee.” (Emphasis added.) Although OSU argues

that the provision shows that the legislature intended to

grant public employers broad authority to address employee

questions, the provision by its terms is narrow. It states sim-

ply that, if an employee asks for an opinion on organizing,

an employer or supervisor can respond. It does not say that

an employer can engage in the conduct that OSU was found

to have engaged in here: actively soliciting such requests

from employees, writing questions of its own and then dis-

tributing answers, modifying and then publishing questions

it receives, crafting answers that go beyond the scope of a

question, and maintaining those questions and answers on

a webpage accessible to all employees with a login—all while

using public funds to do so. In other words, as a factual mat-

ter, OSU’s conduct went far beyond supplying an opinion

in response to requests by individual employees. The ERB

correctly concluded that ORS 243.670(3) did not immunize

OSU from liability under ORS 243.670(2).

We briefly address the points made in the multi-

ple amicus curiae briefs submitted to us. Amici expand on

competing policy arguments provided by the parties as to

why the ERB’s decision should or should not be upheld.

Both sides contemplate the impact the ERB’s interpretation

and application of ORS 243.670 will have on traditions of

academic freedom and statutorily mandated shared gover-

nance. They, in essence, suggest that we should interpret

and apply ORS 243.670 in a way that takes into account

the unique setting of higher education. But ORS 243.670 is

a statute that governs all public employers, and nothing in

its text suggests that the legislature intended the particu-

lar nature of a public employer to bear on the meaning or

Cite as 315 Or App 348 (2021) 359

application of the statute. If the legislature had intended

to take into account special considerations related to uni-

versity governance, it would have drafted specific provisions

addressing the application in the context of a college or uni-

versity, as it has done elsewhere in the Public Employees

Collective Bargaining Act. See, e.g., Oregon Tech AAUP v.

Oregon Institute of Technology, 314 Or App 595, 604, 500

P3d 55 (2021) (holding that university department heads

are not excluded from the right to unionize because they

do not fall under “supervisory employee” as defined in ORS

243.650(23)(b)). To the extent that ORS 243.670, as drafted,

gives rise to unique challenges within the setting of institu-

tions of higher education, those challenges are ones for the

legislature to address through legislation.

Affirmed.