Opinion

SAIF v. Chavez-Cordova

  • 314 Or. App. 5
  • 496 P.3d 39
Court
Court of Appeals of Oregon
Filed
Aug 18, 2021
Status
Published
On the bench
Armstrong
Cited by
2 cases
Authority
More cited than 53.7%

stating that the claimant’s injury occurred during personal-comfort activ- ities and therefore satisfied “in the course of” prong

How later courts described this case

  • stating that the claimant’s injury occurred during personal-comfort activ- ities and therefore satisfied “in the course of” prong
  • addressing “aris- ing out of” prong where it had been determined that claim- ant’s injury occurred during personal-comfort activities and therefore satisfied “in the course of” prong
  • a requirement that claimant stay on the work site during breaks and an absence of water created need for claimant to bring his own beverage

Written by the judges who cited it.

The opinion

5

Argued and submitted January 19, affirmed August 18, 2021

In the Matter of the Compensation of

John Chavez-Cordova, Claimant.

SAIF CORPORATION

and Shelter Management, Inc.,

Petitioners,

v.

John CHAVEZ-CORDOVA,

Respondent.

Workers’ Compensation Board

1801525; A173321

496 P3d 39

Claimant’s eye was injured when, as he was opening an energy drink bottle,

its contents exploded and the cap shot into his eye. Employer seeks judicial review

of an order of the Workers’ Compensation Board, contending that the board erred

in determining that claimant’s eye injury arose out of his employment because

it was caused by a neutral risk to which claimant’s work conditions had exposed

him. Held: Because the risk of injury from the bottle cap was neither employment-

related nor personal, the Workers’ Compensation Board correctly concluded that

the risk of injury was a neutral one. And because employer required claimant to

take his paid breaks at the job site and did not provide drinks, bringing his own

beverage was a feature of claimant’s employment. The board found that employer

acquiesced in and contemplated claimant’s consumption of beverages while on

his paid break, and that finding is supported by substantial evidence. The board

therefore did not err in determining that claimant’s employment placed him in a

position to be injured and that the injury therefore arose out of the employment.

Affirmed.

Beth Cupani argued the cause and filed the briefs for

petitioners.

Aaron Clingerman argued the cause and filed the brief

for respondent.

Before Armstrong, Presiding Judge, and Tookey, Judge,

and Aoyagi, Judge.

ARMSTRONG, P. J.

Affirmed.

6 SAIF v. Chavez-Cordova

ARMSTRONG, P. J.

Employer seeks judicial review of an order of the

Workers’ Compensation Board, contending that the board

erred in determining that claimant’s eye injury arose out of

his employment. We conclude that the board did not err and

affirm.

Claimant worked for employer as a painter of new

construction. Claimant was required to stay on the work

site during mandatory paid work breaks. In the absence of

a place to sit during his break, claimant sat in the cab of

employer’s truck. Claimant’s eye was injured when, as he

was opening an energy drink bottle, its contents exploded

and the cap shot into his eye.

An injury is compensable if it arises out of and in

the course of employment. ORS 656.005(7)(a). It is undis-

puted that claimant’s injury occurred during the course of

his employment. See Halfman v. SAIF, 49 Or App 23, 29-30,

618 P2d 1294 (1980) (typical “personal comfort” activities

include restroom breaks, getting something to drink, and

other typical kind of break activities contemplated by the

employer and therefore do not remove the employee from

the employment situation under the personal comfort doc-

trine). The only dispute concerns whether the injury arose

out of claimant’s employment. An injury “arises out of” the

employment if it arises from the nature of the claimant’s

work or from a risk to which the work environment exposes

the worker. Fred Meyer, Inc. v. Hayes, 325 Or 592, 598, 943

P2d 197 (1997).

Risks are generally categorized as employment-

related risks, personal risks, or neutral risks. Phil A.

Livesley Co. v. Russ, 296 Or 25, 29-30, 672 P2d 337 (1983).

Employment-related risks are those that are inherent to

the job. SAIF Corp. v. Marin, 139 Or App 518, 524, 913 P2d

336, rev den, 323 Or 535 (1996) (citing Larson, 1 Workmen’s

Compensation Law, § 7.20, 3-13 (1995)). Personal risks are

risks that have no employment connection and that arise

from conditions or circumstances that are personal to the

worker. Sheldon v. U. S. Bank, 364 Or 831, 834, 441 P3d

210 (2019) (“Personal risks include a claimant’s personal

medical conditions, such as conditions that can lead to an

Cite as 314 Or App 5 (2021) 7

idiopathic fall.”); Marin, 139 Or App at 523-24. Neutral risks

have no particular employment or personal character and

are compensable if work conditions caused the claimant to

be in a position to be injured. Id. at 523; see also Sheldon,

364 Or at 834 (adhering to analysis).

It is undisputed that the cause of claimant’s injury

was not an employment-related risk. The board also rejected

employer’s contention that claimant was injured due to a per-

sonal risk, finding, “Claimant was not injured by an allergic

reaction or anything distinctly personal to him (i.e., he did

not prepare the drink or cause it to explode).” The board rea-

soned that the risk of the bottle cap hitting claimant in the

eye was a “neutral risk” that was neither connected to the

employment nor personal to claimant.

The board found, further, that claimant’s injury

resulted from a risk to which the work environment had

exposed him:

“Claimant was injured while engaging in a typical break

activity (drinking a beverage) acquiesced in and contem-

plated by the employer. Specifically, the employer required

claimant to stay on the worksite during breaks, but did

not provide him anything to drink. * * * Confined to the

worksite for eight hours a day, with no designated break

room or anything to drink, it was reasonable to expect

claimant to bring a drink to work. Further, the employer

specifically allowed claimant to drink any non-alcoholic

beverage at work. * * * It follows then, that claimant was

injured during an activity impliedly authorized by the

employer, on a paid break, complying with the employer’s

requirement to stay on the worksite, in an employer-owned

truck, from a drink that he brought to work because of the

conditions of his work environment.”

The board rejected employer’s contention that the

injury did not arise out of the employment because the work

did not expose claimant to the specific risk of an exploding

energy drink. Citing Clark v. U. S. Plywood, 288 Or 255, 266,

605 P2d 265 (1980), the board reasoned that the employ-

ment connection of the cause of injury need not be strong if

the worker is within the course of employment at the time

of injury and is engaged in an activity that is normal and

accepted. The board found:

8 SAIF v. Chavez-Cordova

“Claimant was injured in a work truck, on the employer’s

worksite, while drinking a beverage (as contemplated by

and acquiesced in by the employer), during a paid break. We

consider the circumstances surrounding claimant’s injury

to be a normal, accepted activity sufficient to establish

a work connection between his injury and work environ-

ment.”

Thus, the board concluded that claimant’s injury resulted

from a risk to which the work environment had exposed him

and therefore arose out of his employment.

Employer challenges the board’s determination that

the injury arose out of claimant’s employment. Although

employer does not dispute the board’s finding that claim-

ant’s injury was not caused by a circumstance personal to

him, such as an idiopathic condition, employer asserts that

the risk of injury was still personal to claimant, because the

exploding beverage was a “personal instrumentality”—a

danger that claimant brought to the workplace. See Larson,

1 Workers’ Compensation Desk Edition § 9.03[1] (2019) (dis-

cussing cases describing risks of “imported dangers”).

Beverage bottles are ubiquitous in the workplace, and we

would be skeptical of treating them as inherently hazard-

ous objects or personal instrumentalities of risk.1 Although

the board found that the beverage bottle cap caused claim-

ant’s injury when the bottle’s contents exploded, there was

no finding as to why the contents exploded. The board found

that there was nothing that claimant did that caused the

contents of the bottle to explode or the cap to hit his eye—he

did not prepare the beverage or cause it to explode—and that

finding is supported by substantial evidence. We agree with

the board’s conclusion that the risk of the bottle’s contents

1

Larson has summarized the cases addressing the issue of imported

dangers:

“This treatment of the imported-risk doctrine, then, may be summed

up by observing that while it has been applied in a wide range of cases

including explosives, weapons, automobiles, food (at least by dictum), and

matches, there is also considerable support for the view that the doctrine

should be limited to articles that are genuinely and inherently hazardous,

and not extended to articles that are familiar adjuncts of living, such as food,

soft drinks, matches, automobiles, and clothing, merely because the article

proves to be dangerous due to a defect, or as in the Puffin case, due to a haz-

ardous quality that was evidently not apparent to the wearer.”

Larson § 9.03[5].

Cite as 314 Or App 5 (2021) 9

exploding and the cap injuring claimant’s eye was not a risk

personal to claimant.

Because the risk of injury was neither employment-

related nor personal, the risk of injury was a neutral one.

Marin, 139 Or App at 522. As the court said in Panpat v.

Owens-Brockway Glass Container, Inc., 334 Or 342, 350, 49

P3d 773 (2002), “[u]nexplained accidents are a classic exam-

ple of neutral risks.” Although the board found that the

explosion of the beverage caused the bottle cap to shoot into

claimant’s eye, the board made no finding as to the cause of

the explosion. Thus, the cause of claimant’s injury is similar

to those described in Panpat as “unexplained.” Id. (citing

Redman Industries, Inc. v. Lang, 326 Or 32, 37 n 1, 943 P2d

208 (1997)). The board correctly held that claimant’s injury

was caused by a neutral risk.

An injury resulting from a neutral risk is compen-

sable where the conditions of employment put a claimant in

a position to be injured. As Larson explains, even injuries

caused by “imported” risks can be compensable if there is

some causal nexus to the employment. Larson § 9.03[3]; see

Goodyear Aircraft Corp. v. Industrial Comm’n, 62 Ariz 398,

158 P2d 511 (1945) (where employer required the employee

to remain on the job while he consumed his lunch, eye injury

caused when soft drink bottle that claimant brought to work

exploded arose out of and in the course of employment). Even

assuming, as employer contends, that claimant’s energy

drink was an imported risk, claimant’s consumption of the

drink had an employment connection. Because employer

required claimant to take his paid breaks at the job site

and did not provide drinks, bringing his own beverage was

a feature of claimant’s employment. The board found that

employer acquiesced in and contemplated that claimant

would drink beverages while on his paid break, and that

finding is supported by substantial evidence. Claimant’s

injury occurred while he was engaged in that authorized

act. We conclude that the board did not err in determin-

ing that claimant’s employment placed him in a position

to be injured and that the injury therefore arose out of the

employment.

Affirmed.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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