Deyo-Bundy v. SAIF

393

Argued and submitted May 20, affirmed July 14, petition for review denied

December 9, 2021 (369 Or 69)

In the Matter of the Compensation of

Brittany Deyo-Bundy, Claimant.

Brittany DEYO-BUNDY,

Petitioner,

v.

SAIF CORPORATION

and Salem Clinic PC,

Respondents.

Workers’ Compensation Board

1705694; A174082

495 P3d 745

Aaron S. Price argued the cause for petitioner. Also on

the briefs was Welch, Bruun & Green.

Daniel E. Walker argued the cause for respondents. On

the brief was Beth Cupani.

Before Lagesen, Presiding Judge, and James, Judge, and

Kamins, Judge.

PER CURIAM

Affirmed.

394 Deyo-Bundy v. SAIF

PER CURIAM

Claimant petitions for judicial review of a final order

of the Workers’ Compensation Board upholding respondent

SAIF Corporation’s denial of her new or omitted condition

claim for opioid use disorder. We affirm.

Claimant suffered a compensable back injury at

work and contends that her opioid use disorder occurred

as a consequence of that injury. Claimant contends that

substantial evidence does not support the board’s finding

that her opioid use disorder predated her workplace injury.

“Substantial evidence exists to support a finding of fact

when the record, viewed as a whole, would permit a reason-

able person to make that finding.” ORS 183.482(8)(c). Here,

Dr. Sudakin’s opinion supports the board’s finding and, hav-

ing considered that opinion in the context of the record as a

whole, we cannot say that it was unreasonable for the board

to rely on it.

Claimant also contends that the board’s determi-

nation is not supported by substantial reason. She notes

that she testified that she did not have an opioid use dis-

order before the work injury, and that the administrative

law judge (ALJ) expressly found her to be a credible wit-

ness based on her demeanor, and argues that the board’s

express acceptance of that credibility determination is not

linked by substantial reason to its ultimate finding, based

on Sudakin’s opinion, that claimant’s opioid use disorder

predated the work injury.

“In determining whether the board’s order is sup-

ported by substantial reason, we consider whether that order

articulates the reasoning that leads from the facts found to

the conclusions drawn.” Walker v. Providence Health System

Oregon, 254 Or App 676, 686, 298 P3d 38, rev den, 353 Or

714 (2013) (internal quotation marks omitted). Here, the

board explained why it relied on Sudakin’s opinion, notwith-

standing the ALJ’s demeanor-based finding that claimant

was credible:

“However, the issue of whether claimant’s June 2016 com-

pensable injury and medical treatment was the major

contributing cause of her opioid use disorder is a complex

Cite as 313 Or App 393 (2021) 395

medical question. Under these particular circumstances,

the compensability of the opioid use disorder condition

must be established by the opinion of a persuasive medical

expert. Consequently, the ALJ’s ‘demeanor-based’ credibil-

ity finding is not determinative.”

That is reason enough. We, like the board, long have rec-

ognized that demeanor-based credibility findings often will

not be a basis for resolving an issue that turns on expert

opinion, because the decision whether to credit an expert

typically will turn on the expert’s reasoning, not demeanor.

McCoy and McCoy, 28 Or App 919, 924, 562 P2d 207, clarified

by 29 Or App 287, 563 P2d 738 (1977) (“However, the man-

ner and demeanor of this type of expert witness is probably

less crucial to ascertaining credibility than is the analysis

of the witness’ reasoning stated in the record.”).

Claimant also argues that the board abused its dis-

cretion by relying on Sudakin’s opinion, in view of claimant’s

credible testimony and the other medical evidence in the

record, which supported claimant’s view of things. Having

considered the record and the basis for Sudakin’s opinion,

we disagree that the board abused its discretion by relying

on it.

Affirmed.