Dcpp v. J.Y.J. and K.O., in the Matter of K.J. and A.J.

RECORD IMPOUNDED

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the

internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-1479-22

NEW JERSEY DIVISION

OF CHILD PROTECTION

AND PERMANENCY,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

J.Y.J.,1

Defendant-Appellant,

and

K.O.,

Defendant.

_________________________

IN THE MATTER OF K.J.

and A.J., minors.

_________________________

Argued September 16, 2024 – Decided October 10, 2024

Before Judges Sumners and Perez Friscia.

1

We use initials and fictitious names for the parents and children to protect

their privacy and the confidentiality of the record. R. 1:38-3(d)(12).

On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey,

Chancery Division, Family Part, Morris County,

Docket No. FN-14-0055-20.

Beatrix W. Shear, Designated Counsel, argued the

cause for appellant (Jennifer Nicole Sellitti, Public

Defender, attorney; Beatrix W. Shear, on the briefs).

Jessica A. Prentice, Deputy Attorney General, argued

the cause for respondent (Matthew J. Platkin, Attorney

General, attorney; Sara M. Gregory, Assistant Attorney

General, of counsel; Jessica A. Prentice, on the brief).

Melissa R. Vance, Assistant Deputy Public Defender,

argued the cause for minors K.J. and A.J. (Jennifer

Nicole Sellitti, Public Defender, Law Guardian,

attorney; Meredith Alexis Pollock, Deputy Public

Defender, of counsel; Melissa R. Vance, of counsel and

on the brief).

PER CURIAM

Defendant J.Y.J. (Jane) appeals from the August 2, 2021 Family Part order

following a fact-finding determination that she abused or neglected her child,

K.J. (Ken), pursuant to N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.21(c)(4). The Law Guardian urges we

reject Jane's arguments and affirm the court's order. Having reviewed the

record, parties' arguments, and applicable legal principles, we conclude the

court's decision was supported by substantial credible evidence and consistent

with applicable law. We affirm.

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2

I.

We summarize the pertinent facts and procedural history adduced from

the three-day fact-finding trial. New Jersey Division of Child Protection and

Permanency (Division) presented the testimony of: two caseworkers, a Center

for Evaluation and Counseling Inc. (CEC) evaluator, Tara Devine, M.S. Ed.,

LAC, and Dr. Robert M. Parinello. Additionally, Jane and her mother testified.

In April 2019, the Division received the first of multiple referrals relating

to Jane's care and supervision of Ken. Law enforcement contacted the Division

to report a domestic violence incident between Jane and Ken's father, K.O.

(Kyle).2 Jane and Kyle share two children, Ken and A.J.,3 born in December

2018 and October 2020, respectively. Jane also has a son, J.J. (Joe), born in

March 2014, from an earlier relationship with I.P. (Ian).

In May 2014, the Division became aware of concerning incidents

involving Jane and Joe. Over six years, the Division received approximately

nine referrals regarding Jane and her children relating to homelessness, Kyle's

substance abuse, mental illness, and domestic violence by Kyle. The Division

2

K.O. is not a party to this appeal.

3

The Division also sought out-of-home placement for A.J. Because A.J. is not

the subject of this appeal, we do not consider the proceedings pertaining to him.

A-1479-22

3

closed each incident after the investigation, and Jane continued to decline most

of the Division's offered services.

In April 2019, Ian moved before the Family Part for Joe's custody, which

was granted. That month, after police responded to a call regarding domestic

violence against Jane by an intoxicated Kyle, the Division referred her for a

forensic assessment at the CEC, which she attended.

Jane also attended a psychiatric evaluation with Dr. Parinello. At trial,

Dr. Parinello was qualified as an expert in the field of psychiatry, and the

Division moved his three authored reports into evidence without objection.

After the initial examination, Dr. Parinello noted "[t]he major question

diagnostically . . . [wa]s whether this woman [wa]s delusional or not." He

recommended a further evaluation to determine whether she had "a psychiatric

condition" and could "benefit from some sort of treatment." He found Jane had

"certain qualities which suggest[ed] an underlying bipolar diagnosis." Dr.

Parinello concluded she did not present an immediate risk to others. Jane did

not attend Dr. Parinello's scheduled follow-up appointment.

On May 28, police again notified the Division of a domestic violence

incident between Jane and Kyle. In August, the Office of Temporary Assistance

(OTA) terminated Jane's housing assistance due to her failure to participate in

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4

the employment services offered. Jane and Ken then moved into her mother's

hotel room with Jane's brother.

The same month, the CEC issued a report, co-authored by Devine in her

capacity as a licensed associate counselor,4 concluding Jane was a high risk for

neglecting Ken "due to severe mental illness" and recommending the Division

consider an alternate placement. Devine, as a CEC forensic risk assessor, had

clinically evaluated Jane. The CEC report, admitted without objection at trial,

noted "[h]omelessness ha[d] always been a concern for [Jane] and her family,"

and at the time of evaluation, she "resided at a motel funded by the . . . OTA."

Jane relayed having been diagnosed with attention-deficit/hyperactivity

disorder, depression, cystic fibrosis, and chronic asthma. She also advised she

was autistic, a high school graduate, and had "four college degrees." Jane

explained that after she lost primary custody of Joe: she lost her appetite; "[t]he

dog tried to commit suicide" by sticking its head in a water dispenser; and Ken

refused to eat and cried all night. She elaborated, Ken "cries all day because

4

N.J.A.C. 13:34- 10.3(b) provides in pertinent part, "The scope of practice of a

licensed associate counselor includes, but is not limited to, counseling,

counseling interventions, appraisal and assessment, consulting, referral and

research activities, as defined in N.J.A.C. 13:34-10.2, under direct supervision

pursuant to the provisions of N.J.A.C. 13:34-13."

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5

[the Division] threatened to take him away from me, right in front of him. . . .

[and] [h]e is not stupid." Ken was approximately five months of age at the time

of the evaluation. Jane informed the CEC that Ken "started saying Mom at two

months" and was "already trying to walk." Jane denied having mental health

issues but admitted she suffered a nervous breakdown years earlier. The CEC

provided emergency recommendations due to Jane's "disheveled, paranoid and

delusional" presentation, concerning comments, and the clinically administered

test findings. The report opined Jane was "in need of long term psychiatric and

psychotherapeutic services." It stated:

[Jane] began this assessment on May 15, 2019, at which

time she presented with rapid speech, thought process

disorganization, paranoia, delusional thoughts, and

deficits with reality testing. A subsequent psychiatric

evaluation of [Jane] at New Bridge diagnosed her with

possible [b]ipolar [d]isorder and/or possible

[d]elusional [d]isorder. [Jane] did not complete her

psychiatric assessment and therefore, was not

prescribed psychotropic medication. [Jane] returned to

[the] CEC to complete her forensic assessment on July

26, 2019, at which time she "plead the Fifth" (i.e.

refused to answer questions, explaining that she viewed

her examiner as a "liar"). Her mental state appeared

unchanged at that time.

In September, Jane attended a follow-up evaluation with Dr. Parinello

during which she refused to answer many questions. Dr. Parinello noted Jane

was hostile and expressed "her belief that she was the victim of a conspiracy"

A-1479-22

6

by the Division and the court. Jane stated Ken, an infant, was angry with her,

often questioning "where is my brother?" She claimed Ken believed she

purposely had Joe removed from the home and expressed anger by pulling her

hair. Dr. Parinello reported Jane ranged from "profusely tearful" to "very

angry," vacillating between "bolt[ing] from the room" and "lung[ing] forward

and rais[ing]" her voice. Dr. Parinello concluded Jane was "acutely psychotic

as demonstrated by an elaborate delusional system whereby she is being

victimized by a host of agencies." Dr. Parinello observed that Jane began to

"incorporat[e] the infant into her persecutory delusional thinking," and he

expressed concerns regarding "where [her] psychosis will take her if left

unattended." He explained "in a psychosis where an infant becomes part of the

delusion system," there "is a risk of an adverse outcome." His mental health

status exam report indicated Jane had psychosis, not otherwise specified (NOS),

and ruling out delusional and bipolar disorders was necessary.

The same day, after Dr. Parinello called the Division expressing his

immediate welfare concerns, the Division's Special Response Unit checked on

Jane and Ken. Jane claimed Ken, who was eight-and-a-half months old at the

time, was speaking in full sentences and asked, "where is my brother?" She

admitted Ken was not up to date on his physical exam and vaccines because he

A-1479-22

7

did not have any medical insurance. Further, she claimed Joe's paternal

grandmother was trying to sell Joe in Peru. Jane continued to deny having any

mental health issues. The caseworkers determined Ken "was safe in the care of

his mother and grandmother," and "[t]here was nothing to indicate [Ken] was in

imminent danger."

The next day, on September 11, Dr. Parinello again expressed concerns

Jane "was actively psychotic and delusional." Division caseworkers again

interviewed Jane and her family, this time meeting at a fast-food restaurant.

During the interview, Jane was "very agitated" and "anxious." She raised her

voice at the Division workers, yelling profusely. Jane admitted, "I'm depressed,

stressed out[,] and you all are making it worse." A caseworker requested Jane

sign a release permitting Dr. Parinello the ability "to speak with [her] medical

doctor" and relayed medication could not "be prescribed without the

[p]sychiatrist having the ability to consult with [her] physician." Jane only

signed a Division "HIPPA form." Further, she refused to return to Dr. Parinello.

The Division continued to contact and evaluate Jane and Ken over the next

few days. Jane continued to refuse psychiatric services and to sign the medical

releases. She also failed to bring Ken to a pediatrician for a necessary check-

A-1479-22

8

up, though the Division had advised they would pay for the doctor's

appointment.

The Division filed an order to show cause and verified complaint seeking

temporary custody of Ken. On October 17, the Division effectuated an

emergency removal of Ken due to Jane's mental health condition and refusal to

participate in services. The Division placed Ken in a relative resource home

with Kyle's brother and his girlfriend. During the removal, Jane threatened to

punch the Division supervisor and lunged at him. On October 21, the court

granted the Division continued custody of Ken, finding Ken's placement with

Jane would be contrary to his welfare under N.J.S.A. 30:4C-11.2.

In December, Jane attended another evaluation with Dr. Parinello;

however, she again refused to cooperate. The evaluation ended after Jane raised

her voice, threatened violence, and lunged at Dr. Parinello. Because of her

behavior, he called the police to have her removed, noting her "increas[ed]

paranoia" and inability to "regain control" of herself.

Jane testified during the factfinding hearing she had not refused Division

and CEC services. Further, she denied suffering from any mental health issues.

Jane claimed that during her second evaluation with Dr. Parinello, he asked her

no mental health questions. She alleged Dr. Parinello called the police because

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9

she was on the phone during her evaluation, not because of any aggressive

behavior. Her mother testified Jane does not have a "mental illness" and does

"a good job as a mother."

On July 27, 2021, the court issued an oral opinion, followed by an order

on August 2, finding the Division demonstrated by a preponderance of the

evidence Jane's "failure to recognize or engage in treatment for her mental health

condition" constituted a "failure to exercise a minimum degree of care, which

placed and continue[d] to place [Ken] in imminent danger of substantial risk."

The court found "the credible, unrebutted, factual evidence regarding statements

directly attributable to [Jane] would lead any lay person to question [her] mental

health." The court added, "there is also substantial and persuasive expert

evidence and opinion." Finding Devine's testimony credible, the court accepted

that Jane was "in need of completing her psychiatric evaluation" as well as

"long-term . . . services." The court noted Jane failed to proffer a mental health

expert to rebut the Division's evidence. The court additionally found Dr.

Parinello's testimony reliable, stating he "testified credibly and consistent with

the findings in his report." While the court agreed with Jane's closing argument

that "expert evaluators must be trained in cultural sensitivity" and it was relevant

A-1479-22

10

to her as a Black woman, the court noted no evidence demonstrated a "lack of

cultural awareness" or "implicit bias."

The court accepted the experts' testimony finding that Ken "was in

imminent danger due to Jane's compromised mental health, including severely

compromised judgment, delusional disorder and being floridly psychotic."

Further, the court concluded:

[Jane] denies having mental health concerns and this is

the problem that remains. This untreated mental health

condition is a danger to [Ken] and the [c]ourt finds that

[Jane]'s failure to recognize or engage in treatment for

her mental health condition as described earlier is a

failure to exercise a minimum degree of care, which

placed and continues to place [Ken] in imminent danger

of substantial risk of harm.

The court highlighted Jane's failure to accept the Division's services offered.

Additionally, the court found the history of domestic violence between Jane and

Kyle "pose[d] an imminent risk to [Ken] as well." The court's August 2 order

provided the Division proved by a preponderance of the evidence Jane abused

or neglected Ken pursuant to N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.21(c).

On September 24, 2021, the court ordered the termination of Jane's

parental rights to Ken and awarded guardianship to the Division for permanent

placement and adoption. Thereafter, the court entered an emergent order

permanently changing Ken's placement to Kyle's parents' home. On October 19,

A-1479-22

11

the court entered a permanency order permitting reunification. On July 27,

2022, the court ordered physical and legal custody of Ken to Jane. Following

reunification, the court terminated the litigation on December 5.

On appeal, Jane argues the court erroneously: found abuse or neglect

without proof her conduct actually or imminently impaired Ken physically,

mentally, or emotionally; permitted Devine to opine as a psychological expert;

relied on Dr. Parinello's unrecognized diagnosis of NOS and "rule out opinions";

and relied on expert opinions authored without consideration of accurate

background information.

II.

It is well established that "[a]ppellate courts defer to a trial court's factual

findings when they are 'supported by adequate, substantial, and credible

evidence.'" N.J. Div. of Child Prot. & Permanency v. B.P., 257 N.J. 361, 373

(2024) (quoting Cesare v. Cesare, 154 N.J. 394, 411-12 (1998)). "[W]e apply a

deferential standard in reviewing the family court's findings of fact because of

its superior position to judge the credibility of witnesses and weigh the

evidence." N.J. Div. of Child Prot. & Permanency v. J.R.-R., 248 N.J. 353, 368

(2021). Family courts "are presumed to have a 'specialized knowledge and

experience in matters involving parental relationships and the best interests of

A-1479-22

12

children.'" N.J. Div. of Child Prot. & Permanency v. S.K., 456 N.J. Super. 245,

261 (App. Div. 2018) (quoting N.J. Div. of Youth & Fam. Servs. v. F.M., 211

N.J. 420, 427 (2012)). A trial court's findings are accorded deference "unless it

is determined that they went so wide of the mark that the judge was clearly

mistaken." N.J. Div. of Youth & Fam. Servs. v. G.L., 191 N.J. 596, 605 (2007).

We owe no deference to a court's legal conclusions which are reviewed de novo.

N.J. Div. of Child Prot. & Permanency v. A.B., 231 N.J. 354, 369 (2017).

"The prevailing concern in abuse and neglect cases is the best interests of

the child." N.J. Div. of Child Prot. & Permanency v. S.G., 448 N.J. Super. 135,

146 (App. Div. 2016); see also N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.8(a) (providing that under Title

Nine, children's safety is "of paramount concern[,] and the best interests of the

child shall be a primary consideration"). "The purpose of a fact-finding hearing

in an abuse or neglect proceeding is not to assign guilt to a defendant, but to

determine whether a child is an abused or neglected child pursuant to N.J.S.A.

9:6-8.44." N.J. Div. of Youth & Fam. Servs. v. V.T., 423 N.J. Super. 320, 328

(App. Div. 2011). "An analysis of a parent's conduct must account for the

surrounding circumstances." N.J. Div. of Child Prot. & Permanency v. E.D.-O.,

223 N.J. 166, 180 (2015).

An abused or neglected child is one:

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13

whose physical, mental, or emotional condition has

been impaired or is in imminent danger of becoming

impaired as the result of the failure of his parent or

guardian . . . to exercise a minimum degree of care (a)

in supplying the child with adequate food, clothing,

shelter, education, medical or surgical care though

financially able to do so or though offered financial or

other reasonable means to do so, or (b) in providing the

child with proper supervision or guardianship, by

unreasonably inflicting or allowing to be inflicted

harm, or substantial risk thereof. . . .

[N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.21(c)(4).]

"[T]he phrase 'minimum degree of care'" under the statute "refers to conduct that

is grossly or wantonly negligent, but not necessarily intentional." G.S. v. Dep't

of Hum. Servs., 157 N.J. 161, 178 (1999); see also N.J. Div. of Youth & Fam.

Servs. v. T.B., 207 N.J. 294, 305 (2011). "Conduct is considered willful or

wanton if done with the knowledge that injury is likely to, or probably will,

result." G.S., 157 N.J. at 178. "Whether a parent or guardian has failed to

exercise a minimum degree of care is to be analyzed in light of the dangers and

risks associated with the situation." Id. at 181-82. "Absent proof of actual

impairment, 'the critical focus is on evidence of imminent danger or substantial

risk of harm.'" B.P., 257 N.J. at 376 (quoting N.J. Div. of Youth & Fam. Servs.

v. A.L., 213 N.J. 1, 22 (2013)).

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Our Supreme Court addressed the definition of imminent danger,

elucidating that:

Per their plain meanings, "imminent" means

"threatening to occur immediately; dangerously

impending . . . [or] about to take place," Black's Law

Dictionary 898 (11th ed. 2019), and "danger" means

"peril; exposure to harm, loss, pain, or other negative

result," id. at 493. Further, Black's Law Dictionary

defines "imminently dangerous" as "reasonably certain

to place life and limb in peril." Id. at 494.

[Id. at 376 (alterations in original).]

Further, when interpreting evidence regarding imminent danger, courts must not

"fill in missing information on their own or take judicial notice of harm." N.J.

Div. of Child Prot. & Permanency v. R.W., 438 N.J. Super. 462, 469 (App. Div.

2014) (quoting A.L., 213 N.J. at 28).

"A parent who fails 'to exercise a minimum degree of care' by

unreasonably allowing harm to be inflicted on a child is accountable under the

statute." J.R.-R., 248 N.J. at 370 (quoting N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.21(c)(4)). The

Division bears the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence a

parent abused or neglected a child. Id. at 369. To sustain that burden of proof,

the Division may seek to admit "competent, material and relevant evidence."

Ibid. (quoting N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.46(b)).

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III.

Jane's contention that the court erroneously found her conduct constituted

abuse or neglect because the Division did not prove actual or imminent

impairment of Ken, is belied by the record. Preliminarily, it bears

acknowledging that a parent's mental health condition does not by itself dictate

a finding of abuse or neglect. See F.M., 211 N.J. at 450 ("Mental illness, alone,

does not disqualify a parent from raising a child."). However, unaddressed

mental illness of a parent may create an environment in which the parent is

incapable of safely caring for her or his children. See N.J. Div. of Youth & Fam.

Servs. v. A.G., 344 N.J. Super. 418, 439-40 (App. Div. 2001). For the Division

to establish a substantial imminent risk of harm to the child, there must be proof

the "parent refuses to treat his [or her] mental illness, the mental illness poses a

real threat to a child, and the other parent . . . is unwilling or incapable of

following court orders to shield [his or] her child from that danger." See F.M.,

211 N.J. at 450-51.

The court found Jane committed abuse or neglect because she placed Ken

in imminent danger by failing to exercise the requisite minimum degree of care.

Ken, an infant in Jane's primary care, was at immediate risk because she failed

to exercise reasonable conduct in addressing her established serious mental

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16

health condition. As the court noted, the Division credibly demonstrated Jane's

"psychotic" disorder "compromised [her] mental health, . . . severely

compromis[ing] [her] judgment." Specifically, Jane's months-long continuous

refusal to accept the Division's offered psychiatric services placed Ken at

immediate risk. Additionally, Jane refused to sign the necessary medical

releases to enable: a psychiatric professional assessment, which included her

prior psychiatric history; mental health services contemplating her current

conditions; and possible medication recommendations.

After noting Jane's "denial" of mental health concerns, the court

specifically found her "failure to recognize or engage in treatment for her mental

health condition . . . is a failure to exercise a minimum degree of care" for Ken.

As the court correctly found, Jane's conduct in failing to address her untreated

mental health condition had already affected Ken and placed his "physical,

mental, [and] emotional conditions" in further immediate danger. Jane's refusal

to accept "offered services to aid her in securing housing, public assistance, or

medical care for Ken" substantiated his imminent impairment.

It is well-established that when "determining whether or not a child has

been abused or neglected, the trial court must base its findings on the totality of

the circumstances." V.T., 423 N.J. Super. at 329. Here, the court determined

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17

the credible evidence established an immediate risk to Ken because of the

continued residential instability, the reports of domestic violence by Kyle, and

Jane's failure to ensure proper pediatric care. We discern no reason to disturb

the court's abuse and neglect finding, as the record amply supports the court's

specific findings of impending risk to Ken based on Jane's conduct.

We also reject Jane's contention that the court erroneously based its abuse

or neglect findings on unsupported and improperly considered expert testimony

by Devine. Appellate courts "rely on the trial court's acceptance of the

credibility of the expert's testimony and the court's fact-findings based thereon,

noting that the trial court is better positioned to evaluate the witness' [s]

credibility, qualifications, and the weight to be accorded [his or her] testimony."

In re Guardianship of D.M.H., 161 N.J. 365, 382 (1999). Therefore, we exercise

limited review of a trial court's decision to admit or exclude expert testimony.

See Townsend v. Pierre, 221 N.J. 36, 52 (2015) ("The admission or exclusion of

expert testimony is committed to the sound discretion of the trial court.");

Hisenaj v. Kuehner, 194 N.J. 6, 12 (2008) (stating trial court's evidentiary

decision to admit expert testimony is reviewed for an abuse of discretion).

The court found the Division's experts, Devine and Dr. Parinello, were

both qualified experts who credibly established Jane's "untreated mental health

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18

condition." Devine attested to being a "licensed associate counselor" with

experience in "perform[ing] forensic evaluations and therapy." In conducting

the forensic assessments, she was experienced in providing "psychological

testing[,] inventories[,] and therapy." She held a bachelor's degree in human

services, which she testified was "based on psychology and social services." She

also held a master's degree in school counseling and had sixty "credits in mental

health counseling." To obtain her license, she passed the National Counselor

Examination. At trial, Jane's counsel consented to Devine's qualification

regarding "information about [Jane's] clinical interview[,] . . . the tests . . .

administered[,] and [Devine's] findings."

Although counsel consented to Devine's qualifications, the court

nonetheless copiously made sufficient findings regarding her qualifications,

stating "the fields in which she is going to testify to are such that the art is in a

sufficiently reliable status and that the witness's obvious experience, she's

conducted over 200 of these type of forensic assessments, 100 leading up to the

one that is at issue" here. The court further found Devine's "curriculum vitae

and testimony outline the extensive training that she has undergone prior to

conducting these team assessments," concluding she was "an expert in the field"

and "allow[ing] her to testify, as her specialized knowledge w[ould] assist the

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19

trier of fact." The record supports the court's qualification of Devine as an expert

in the field of forensic risk assessments providing psychological testing.

Therefore, we discern no error in the court's permitting Devine to testify, within

a "reasonable degree of psychological certainty," to the assessments and

evaluation of Jane that she performed. See N.J. Div. of Child Prot. &

Permanency v. I.B., 441 N.J. Super. 585, 596 (App. Div. 2015) (recognizing

"Family Part judges regularly qualify experts in psychology and psychiatry and

hear the opinion testimony those experts offer in a variety of contexts," and

therefore those judges "are more than capable of evaluating the opinions of

experts.").

We further observe, Dr. Parinello's unrefuted medical opinion alone

established Jane's psychotic mental condition warranted immediate services and

intervention as her untreated mental health conditions placed Ken at imminent

risk. Thus, the court's findings were sufficiently supported regardless of

Devine's testimony.

Jane next argues the court erred in relying on Dr. Parinello's psychiatric

opinion she had a psychosis, NOS because the diagnosis of an NOS mental

illness does not establish a "specific mental disorder." Specifically, she

contends the court should have disregarded Dr. Parinello's opinion because NOS

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20

refers to a group of mental disorders; thus, his diagnosis was incomplete without

ruling out delusional and bipolar disorders. We are unpersuaded. Dr. Parinello's

unrefuted opinion was that Jane was "psychotic." We note the record

demonstrates Jane was uncooperative in completing Dr. Parinello's evaluation

and had to be removed from his office by the police. He explained an observer

could "see[] and appreciat[e] psychotic symptomatology" and that he "certainly

found [Jane] to be very delusional." Further, he found Jane "was suffering from

worsening psychosis over the time span which [he] worked with her" and she

"really needed hospital stabilization . . . given her denial of having any condition

and her refusal of treatment." "Many psychoses are cyclic, others are

unremitting and worsen over time." He clarified an "extended assessment"

could rule out the other disorders, but that Jane suffered from psychosis, NOS.

The court's reliance on Dr. Parinello's psychiatric diagnosis Jane was suffering

from a psychotic state is sufficiently established by the record.

Finally, Jane argues the experts' opinions were invalid because the

Division failed to disclose important background information and the experts

"misinterpreted [Jane's] statements." Each expert provided an adequate

foundation for their opinion. N.J.R.E. 703 requires an expert opinion be

grounded in "facts or data derived from (1) the expert's personal observations,

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21

or (2) evidence admitted at the trial, or (3) data relied upon by the expert which

is not necessarily admissible in evidence but which is the type of data normally

relied upon by experts." Polzo v. County of Essex, 196 N.J. 569, 583 (2008)

(quoting State v. Townsend, 186 N.J. 473, 494 (2006)). We discern no merit to

Jane's argument that the experts were not provided sufficient background

information and misinterpreted her statements. The nature of each experts'

mental health evaluation allowed her the opportunity to disclose relevant

information and participate in the assessments. Therefore, we conclude the

court committed no abuse of discretion considering Dr. Parinello's and Devine's

expert opinions. The court's finding that the Division met its burden of proof

establishing abuse or neglect was sufficiently supported by the record.

To the extent we have not otherwise addressed any of Jane's arguments,

we determine they lack sufficient merit to warrant discussion in a written

opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E).

Affirmed.

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