“If a party fails to assert a legal reason why summary judgment should not be granted, that ground is waived.” (quotation omitted)
How later courts described this case
- “If a party fails to assert a legal reason why summary judgment should not be granted, that ground is waived.” (quotation omitted)
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
Case: 23-40564 Document: 59-1 Page: 1 Date Filed: 10/08/2024
United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
____________ FILED
October 8, 2024
No. 23-40564 Lyle W. Cayce
____________ Clerk
Armando Ibanez,
Plaintiff—Appellant,
versus
Texas A&M University Kingsville,
Defendant—Appellee.
______________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Texas
USDC No. 2:21-CV-249
______________________________
Before King, Stewart, and Higginson, Circuit Judges.
King, Circuit Judge:
After being denied tenure and a promotion to associate professor,
Armando P. Ibanez, a Mexican-American male, sued his former employer,
Texas A&M University–Kingsville, alleging employment discrimination on
the basis of race and national origin under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964. The district court granted Texas A&M’s motion for summary
judgment and dismissed Ibanez’s claims. We AFFIRM.
Case: 23-40564 Document: 59-1 Page: 2 Date Filed: 10/08/2024
No. 23-40564
I.
A.
Plaintiff-Appellant Armando P. Ibanez is a Mexican-American male
who was employed by Defendant-Appellee Texas A&M University–
Kingsville (“TAMUK”). TAMUK hired Ibanez in the fall of 2014 to serve
as an Assistant Professor of Communications/Radio-Television-Film—a
tenure-track position. Ibanez’s position was in TAMUK’s Department of
Art, Communications, and Theater, part of the Humanities Division within
the College of Arts and Sciences.
Under TAMUK rules, as a tenure-track professor, Ibanez “had five
years to prepare to apply for tenure and promotion to associate professor.”
At the end of those five years, Ibanez would be “simultaneously evaluated
for both tenure and promotion to associate professor.” 1 To qualify for tenure
and promotion, Ibanez was required to meet certain “minimum
requirements” set by TAMUK. One of those “minimum requirements” was
the creation or completion of “a minimum of two . . . refereed publications
or juried creative activities.” TAMUK permitted “[n]o substitutions, other
than patents” for this requirement.
Additionally, meeting the minimum requirements for scholarly
activity did not guarantee promotion or tenure, and an individual college’s
written guidelines could exceed university minimums. As such, the
Department of Art, Communications, and Theatre “also required a
minimum of two scholarly or creative works in a secondary category of
scholarship.”
_____________________
1
The criteria for tenure and promotion to associate professor were identical.
2
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During Ibanez’s employment with TAMUK, Ibanez produced an
extensive number of productions, performances, and other creative works.
These included, inter alia, five short films, such as South Texas Gentle Men of
Steel—Los Padres (“Men of Steel”), seven poems, six narrative and
documentary films, and two screenplays. In addition, Ibanez acted as Festival
Director for the Blazing Sun Independent Film Shorts Festival and served as
the faculty advisor for the TAMUK Film Society. Critically, however, the
only work that Ibanez labels as “juried” in the summary judgment record is
Men of Steel.
Ibanez submitted his application for tenure and promotion in
December 2019. Applications for tenure and promotion to associate
professor—including Ibanez’s application—were evaluated through the
following multi-level process:
1. First, a committee comprised of the applicant’s tenured department
faculty reviews the applicant’s submitted portfolio and issues a
recommendation.
2. Second, the department chair reviews the portfolio and issues a
recommendation.
3. Third, a committee comprised of tenured faculty from each
department within the applicant’s college reviews the portfolio and
issues a recommendation.
4. Fourth, the dean of the applicant’s college reviews the portfolio and
issues a recommendation.
5. Fifth, the provost reviews the portfolio and issues a recommendation.
6. If the provost issues a negative recommendation, the applicant can
appeal. If the applicant appeals, an advisory committee first performs
an initial review of the applicant’s arguments and decides whether full
consideration of the merits is warranted. The advisory committee
does not determine the merits of the appeal, nor does it issue any
3
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No. 23-40564
recommendation regarding whether the applicant should be tenured
and promoted.
7. If the advisory committee agrees that the applicant’s appeal should
proceed, the appeal is split into two parts: a promotion appeals
committee considers whether the applicant should be promoted, and
a tenure appeals committee separately considers whether the
applicant should be tenured.
8. Finally, after each level of review is complete, and all appeals have
been exhausted, the university president reviews the portfolio and
provides a final decision on whether to recommend the applicant for
tenure and promotion.
Starting at the first level, Ibanez’s departmental committee voted in
favor of recommending him for tenure and promotion. However, at the
second through fifth levels of review, the department chair, the college
committee, the college dean, and the provost voted against recommending
Ibanez for tenure and promotion. The department chair, college dean, and
provost all noted that they based their negative recommendations on the fact
that Ibanez failed to “meet the minimum requirements for scholarly or
creative works” because “he had completed only one juried film during his
five years as an assistant professor at TAMUK.” In addition, the college dean
and provost pointed to Ibanez having proffered only a single work, out of a
necessary two, that fell within the Department of Art, Communications, and
Theatre’s second required category.
Because the provost issued Ibanez a negative recommendation, Ibanez
appealed the decision to an advisory committee. The advisory committee, in
a 3-to-2 vote, concluded that Ibanez “established a prima facie case that the
[provost’s] decision was made in violation of the faculty member’s academic
freedom, for an illegal reason, or without adequate consideration of the
4
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No. 23-40564
faculty member’s record of professional achievement.” 2 Accordingly,
Ibanez’s portfolio was sent for review to both a promotion appeals committee
and a tenure appeals committee.
The two appeals committees split in their decisions: while the
promotion appeals committee voted against Ibanez, the tenure appeals
committee, in a 4-to-3 decision, voted in favor of Ibanez. A majority of the
tenure appeals committee found that Ibanez “met university, college, and
departmental expectations in teaching, scholarly activity, professional
growth, and service,” that Ibanez’s department “lacks formal guidelines for
evaluating scholarly work in the area of film production,” and that Ibanez “is
an asset to the university and has earned tenure and promotion.” 3
After Ibanez’s appeals concluded, the university president conducted
his review of Ibanez’s portfolio, Ibanez’s annual evaluations, and the
decisions from the preceding levels of review. He testified that he declined to
recommend Ibanez for tenure and promotion “[d]ue to Professor Ibanez’[s]
lack of scholarship, and in light of the negative recommendations of the
department chair, college committee, college dean, provost, and promotion
_____________________
2
The record does not contain the exact allegation(s) that Ibanez made against the
provost’s decision. However, in an email sent to the dean prior to the dean’s (and the
provost’s) review, Ibanez explained that the department chair and the college committee
incorrectly voted against his promotion and tenure because his “important
accomplishments” were improperly accounted for. One of the reasons Ibanez proffered for
this outcome was that “there [was] no criteria to evaluate work in filmmaking . . . at the
university.” Ibanez requested that “another party, knowledgeable in evaluating filmmaking
professors” evaluate his work and referred the dean to the criteria adopted by the
University Film and Video Association.
3
Also of note is that TAMUK’s Student Government Association supported
Ibanez’s promotion and tenure and signed a Senate Resolution in “Recognition & Support
[of Ibanez]” on November 18, 2020. The Hispanic Faculty Council similarly expressed
support for Ibanez.
5
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No. 23-40564
appeals committee in his case.” As a result, Ibanez was denied tenure and
promotion.
B.
On October 27, 2021, Ibanez sued TAMUK, alleging that the
university unlawfully denied him tenure and promotion based on his race and
national origin in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. 4 On
June 6, 2023, TAMUK moved for summary judgment, and Ibanez opposed
the motion on June 13, 2023.
In support of his opposition, Ibanez submitted a sworn declaration
and report from an expert witness, Dr. Laura Vazquez. Dr. Vazquez reviewed
Ibanez’s tenure and promotion case, and prepared “an opinion as an expert
in the field of evaluating the work of academic filmmakers.” In her report,
Dr. Vazquez supported Ibanez’s qualification for tenure, explaining that
many of his creative endeavors “received no credit in the tenure review
process,” and that he “was clearly judged by an inappropriate and thus unfair
standard that led to his loss of tenure and promotion.” When evaluated under
alternative “national and international standards of academic filmmakers,”
Ibanez’s achievements were “more than satisfactory.”
Ibanez also submitted a sworn declaration from another (now retired)
TAMUK professor, Santa C. Barraza. Barraza served as a professor in the
Department of Art, Communications, and Theatre, and she taught at
TAMUK for twenty-three years. In her declaration, Barraza stated that she
had “personal knowledge” of three “Euro-American” individuals who were
treated differently than Ibanez during the review of their tenure applications:
_____________________
4
Ibanez also originally brought a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1981. In a decision that
Ibanez does not appeal, the district court dismissed that claim for lack of jurisdiction under
the Eleventh Amendment.
6
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No. 23-40564
Patrick Faherty, Corey Wayne Ranson, and Todd Lucas. Barraza explained
that for Faherty, TAMUK waived certain ordinary requirements for tenure
“in lieu of other scholarly substitutes identified in [an] alternative plan,” and
that for Ranson, TAMUK made an exception “to accommodate his tenure
process when he did not yet hold the required terminal degree of Master of
Fine Arts.” Barraza also noted that Lucas—a graphic design professor—was
promoted and given tenure even though Barraza, while acting as the Chair of
the Art Department, voted against his promotion because of his “limited
scholarship activities and accomplishments.” In sum, Barraza declared that
“TAMUK did not require the same academic standards of all candidates for
tenure and promotion,” and that Ibanez “was not treated equally by the
Departmental Chair and the Dean of College of Arts & Sciences as compared
to Euro-Americans in the department who obtained tenure and promotion.”
On August 29, 2023, the district court granted summary judgment in
favor of TAMUK and dismissed Ibanez’s discrimination claims. Ibanez
timely appealed.
II.
This court reviews grants of summary judgment de novo. Moore v.
LaSalle Mgmt. Co., 41 F.4th 493, 502 (5th Cir. 2022). Summary judgment is
appropriate “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any
material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). “A dispute as to a material fact is ‘genuine’ if the
evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the
nonmoving party.” Boudreaux v. Swift Transp. Co., 402 F.3d 536, 540 (5th
Cir. 2005). In reviewing the record, “the court must draw all reasonable
inferences in favor of the nonmoving party, and it may not make credibility
determinations or weigh the evidence.” Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods.,
Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 150 (2000).
7
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No. 23-40564
However, “a party cannot defeat summary judgment with conclusory
allegations, unsubstantiated assertions, or ‘only a scintilla of evidence.’”
Delta & Pine Land Co. v. Nationwide Agribusiness Ins., 530 F.3d 395, 399 (5th
Cir. 2008) (quoting Little v. Liquid Air Corp., 37 F.3d 1069, 1075 (5th Cir.
1994)). Instead, “the nonmovant must go beyond the pleadings and designate
specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Little, 37 F.3d at
1075. This court may grant summary judgment when “critical evidence is so
weak or tenuous on an essential fact that it could not support a judgment in
favor of the nonmovant.” Armstrong v. City of Dallas, 997 F.2d 62, 67 (5th
Cir. 1993).
Finally, “[i]t is well settled in this Circuit that the scope of appellate
review on a summary judgment order is limited to matters presented to the
district court.” Keelan v. Majesco Software, Inc., 407 F.3d 332, 339 (5th Cir.
2005). “If a party fails to assert a legal reason why summary judgment should
not be granted, that ground is waived and cannot be considered or raised on
appeal.” Id. at 339–40 (quoting Keenan v. Tejeda, 290 F.3d 252, 262 (5th Cir.
2002)). “However, an argument is not waived on appeal if the argument on
the issue before the district court was sufficient to permit the district court to
rule on it.” In re Liljeberg Enters., Inc., 304 F.3d 410, 428 n.29 (5th Cir. 2002).
III.
Under Title VII, it is unlawful for an employer “to discharge any
individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to
his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because
of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.” 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-2(a). A plaintiff may prove a case under Title VII using either direct
evidence or circumstantial evidence. Russell v. McKinney Hosp. Venture, 235
F.3d 219, 222 (5th Cir. 2000). Absent direct evidence of discrimination, this
8
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No. 23-40564
court applies the burden shifting framework set forth in McDonnell Douglas
Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802–03 (1973).
Under this framework, the plaintiff bears the initial burden to establish
a prima facie case of discrimination. Watkins v. Tregre, 997 F.3d 275, 281 (5th
Cir. 2021). If successful, “the burden of production shifts to [the defendant]
to proffer a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for [its] action.” Id. If the
defendant meets that burden, “the presumption of discrimination
disappears,” and the plaintiff must produce substantial evidence indicating
that the defendant’s proffered reason is pretext for discrimination. Vaughn v.
Woodforest Bank, 665 F.3d 632, 636 (5th Cir. 2011); see also Outley v. Luke &
Assocs., Inc., 840 F.3d 212, 216 (5th Cir. 2016).
“Tenure falls within the ambit of employment decisions covered by
Title VII.” Chu v. Miss. State Univ., 592 F. App’x 260, 263 (5th Cir. 2014)
(citing Tanik v. S. Methodist Univ., 116 F.3d 775, 776 (5th Cir. 1997)). “To
establish a prima facie case in the context of a denial of tenure, the plaintiff
must show that: (1) he belongs to a protected group, (2) he was qualified for
tenure, and (3) he was denied tenure in circumstances permitting an
[inference] of discrimination.” Tanik, 116 F.3d at 775–76. Evidence that
supports a prima facie case includes “departures from procedural regularity,
conventional evidence of bias on the part of individuals involved, or that the
plaintiff is found to be qualified for tenure by some significant portion of the
departmental faculty, referrants or other scholars in the particular field.” Id.
(internal quotation omitted).
This court has noted that “[u]niversity tenure decisions represent a
distinct kind of employment action, involving special considerations.” Chu,
592 F. App’x at 265. For example, “tenure contracts require unusual
commitments as to time and collegial relationships, academic tenure
decisions are often non-competitive, tenure decisions are usually highly
9
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No. 23-40564
decentralized, the number of factors considered in tenure decisions is quite
extensive, and tenure decisions are a source of unusually great
disagreement.” Tanik, 116 F.3d at 776 (numbering omitted). As such, courts
have held that tenure decisions “are generally entitled to more deference
than employment decisions in other settings.” Thrash v. Miami Univ., 549 F.
App’x 511, 521 (6th Cir. 2014); see also Kumar v. Bd. of Trs., Univ. of Mass.,
774 F.2d 1, 12 (1st Cir. 1985) (Campbell, C.J., concurring); Adelman-Reyes v.
Saint Xavier Univ., 500 F.3d 662, 667 (7th Cir. 2007); Kobrin v. Univ. of
Minn., 121 F.3d 408, 414 (8th Cir. 1997).
Ibanez has not presented direct evidence of discrimination, so we
apply the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework. The parties agree
that Ibanez is a member of a protected group. Thus, the remaining elements
of a prima facie case in dispute are whether Ibanez was: (1) qualified for
tenure, and (2) denied tenure under circumstances permitting an inference
of discrimination. See Tanik, 116 F.3d at 775–76.
A.
We begin by assessing whether Ibanez has established that he was
qualified for tenure. To determine whether a plaintiff is “qualified for
tenure,” courts examine a university’s “established . . . tenure
requirement[s].” Krystek v. Univ. of S. Miss., 164 F.3d 251, 257 (5th Cir.
1999); see also Chu, 592 F. App’x at 265. Here, a baseline requirement for
tenure at TAMUK was the completion of “a minimum of two . . . juried
creative activities.” Because Ibanez failed to show a genuine dispute of
material fact as to whether he met this prerequisite, his prima facie case fails.
While neither party explicitly defined “juried” in the record, both use
the term to refer to a process for evaluating and selecting creative work for
10
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presentation in some forum. 5 The parties agree that Ibanez completed one
juried work, the film Men of Steel. However, the record before the district
court is devoid of any evidence that Ibanez produced a second juried creative
activity. In fact, in Ibanez’s own exhibit containing a list of his creative
scholarship, the only work labeled as “juried” is Men of Steel.
On appeal, Ibanez cites “numerous examples” of works that he
contends are juried because they were selected for presentation. But nothing
in the record indicates that these works were selected for presentation. Even
assuming that all the works were selected, the record does not describe the
process by which those selections occurred—i.e., whether the selection
process was completely non-competitive and open to all who apply, or
instead involved some form of evaluation. On this record, Ibanez has not
demonstrated a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether he met
TAMUK’s baseline requirements for tenure.
Ibanez also asks this court to consider his qualifications using a
broader definition of “juried” that is based on his own interpretation of a
“Check-List for Promotion/Tenure” published on TAMUK’s website
(which is not part of the appellate record). In relevant part, the form reminds
professors to include “other juried activities/proceedings, such as exhibits,
performances or competitions.” Ibanez argues that the phrase “such as
exhibits, performances or competitions” modifies “juried
activities/proceedings,” meaning that any exhibit, performance, or
competition is a juried activity/proceeding.
_____________________
5
Consistent with this understanding of “juried,” Ibanez explained on appeal that
“[i]f an exhibit or performance is juried, the work is evaluated to see if it meets criteria to
be exhibited in a particular forum.”
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Even assuming the argument was not waived and judicial notice of the
TAMUK website is appropriate, Ibanez’s proposed interpretation is
untenable. A plain reading of the TAMUK checklist shows that the phrase
“such as exhibits, performances or competitions” is intended to provide
examples of “activities/proceedings” not “juried activities/proceedings.”
In other words, the checklist provides that professors should include “juried
exhibits,” “juried performances,” and “juried competitions.” A reading
otherwise would render the word “juried” superfluous. Moreover,
interpreting “juried” to include any “exhibit, performance, or competition”
would contradict Ibanez’s own arguments and evidence, which assume the
term indicates some degree of evaluation that is not present in all
exhibitions. 6
In the alternative, Ibanez contends that he presented sufficient
evidence that he was qualified for tenure because—regardless of whether he
met TAMUK’s baseline requirements—“some significant portion of the
departmental faculty, referrants or other scholars in the particular field”
found him qualified. See Tanik, 116 F.3d at 776 (internal quotation omitted).
Relying on Tanik, which itself adopted the Second Circuit’s reasoning in
Zahorik v. Cornell University, 729 F.2d 85 (2d Cir. 1984), Ibanez argues that
the only “opinions that matter” are those of people with “expertise—i.e.,
department faculty,” and that it was error for the district court “to give
_____________________
6
The University Film Video Association’s Policy Statement on the “Evaluation of
Creative Activities for Tenure and/or Promotion”—submitted in support of Ibanez’s
opposition to summary judgment—indicates that not all exhibits are juried by explaining
that “exhibitions are often juried, and the selectivity of the process should be a
consideration in the review process.” (emphasis added). Ibanez also appears to concede
not all exhibits are juried by arguing that “[i]f an exhibit or performance is juried, the work
is evaluated to see if it meets criteria to be exhibited in a particular forum.” (emphasis
added).
12
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No. 23-40564
deferential weight to the opinions of non-department faculty or others that
are not scholars in the particular field.” Contrary to Ibanez’s arguments,
however, the recommendations of all tenure decisionmakers, not just
departmental faculty, are relevant to an inquiry into whether a professor is
qualified for tenure, and we do not read Zahorik to say otherwise. See Zahorik,
729 F.2d at 90 (reviewing the ultimate tenure recommendations of all
decisionmakers in its analysis); Chu, 592 F. App’x at 262, 265 (reviewing
“every level” of plaintiff’s tenure review process).
Applying this principle, Ibanez’s evidence is insufficient to raise a
genuine dispute of material fact regarding whether he was qualified for tenure
despite failing to meet baseline requirements. Ibanez points to the favorable
recommendations of the departmental committee, the tenure appeals
committee, and his expert witness. However, when compared to all others
voting against Ibanez’s tenure and promotion—including the department
chair, the college committee, the college dean, the provost, and the
promotion appeals committee—it is difficult to conclude that a “significant
portion of the departmental faculty, referrants or other scholars in the
particular field” found him qualified. See Tanik, 116 F.3d at 776 (internal
quotation omitted); Chu, 592 F. App’x at 265. This conclusion is supported
by the fact that Ibanez cannot show he meets the minimum requirements for
tenure, and Ibanez’s expert found him qualified through the use of national
and international standards and the TAMUK Handbook, not through the use
of TAMUK’s published and approved “University Level Minimum
Requirements for Tenure and Promotion.”
In summary, Ibanez has not presented sufficient evidence to create a
genuine dispute of material fact regarding whether he was qualified for
tenure. He cites only one example of a juried creative activity, and his
attempts to classify his other creative endeavors as juried lack evidentiary
support. Further, the favorable opinions of a select number of faculty
13
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members and his expert witness—when compared to the number of faculty
members who voted against Ibanez’s tenure—are insufficient to show that
Ibanez was otherwise qualified. As such, Ibanez failed to make a prima facie
showing of employment discrimination because he was not qualified for
tenure, and the district court did not err in granting summary judgment to
TAMUK.
B.
Even if Ibanez had shown he was qualified for tenure, his prima facie
case would still fail because he has not raised a genuine dispute of material
fact as to whether he was denied tenure under circumstances permitting an
inference of discrimination. On appeal, Ibanez presents numerous reasons
the circumstances surrounding his tenure decision suggest discrimination.
Assuming Ibanez preserved all arguments, we find they fall short of
producing an inference of discrimination. 7
First, Ibanez presents evidence that many individuals and groups
supported his tenure application. But TAMUK’s failure to give deference to
the opinions of departmental faculty, the tenure appeals committee, the
Hispanic Faculty Committee, the student government, and Ibanez’s expert
_____________________
7
While Ibanez correctly notes that he was not required to show a similarly situated
professor to prove discrimination, he also argues that the district court discounted evidence
that TAMUK allowed deviances from its policy for Euro-American professors. To the
extent that Ibanez does intend to argue that there is a similarly situated professor who was
treated differently than him, we note the argument also falls short. To establish a prima
facie case, “a plaintiff must show that he was treated less favorably than others ‘under
nearly identical circumstances.’” Willis v. Cleco Corp., 749 F.3d 314, 320 (5th Cir. 2014)
(quoting Lee v. Kan. City S. Ry. Co., 574 F.3d 253, 259 (5th Cir. 2009)). The district court
adeptly explained that Ibanez failed to show how any other professor, including professors
Faherty, Ranson, and Lucas, was “similarly situated” to Ibanez. Ibanez does not explain
on appeal how the district court erred in its analysis on this issue, nor does he provide any
reasons as to why those professors were similarly situated. Thus, the district court did not
err.
14
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witness does not, itself, give rise to an inference of discrimination where
many other faculty groups—including the department chair, college
committee, college dean, provost, and promotion appeals committee—
recommended against Ibanez’s tenure and promotion. See Zahorik, 729 F.2d
at 95 (“Universities are free to vest authority in designated officials to
override departmental decisions, and the exercise of that authority is not
itself evidence of discrimination . . .”). Moreover, most of the individuals and
groups Ibanez highlights have no role in tenure and promotion decisions, or
came to their conclusions utilizing inapplicable national and international
standards.
Next, Ibanez argues that the department chair, dean, and provost did
not follow tenure and promotion policy. Specifically, Ibanez explains that
during his review, the department chair commented that “most of the work
for [Ibanez’s single juried] film had been completed before Ibanez began
working at TAMUK.” This comment, Ibanez argues, shows a violation of
TAMUK’s policy that scholarly work credited while employed will count
toward tenure. But crucially, as the department chair himself acknowledged,
TAMUK did follow policy and fully credited Ibanez for the juried film.
Ibanez also points to TAMUK’s failure to take certain steps as
evidence of discrimination. For example, he argues that TAMUK failed to
fully document its decision to deny him tenure, failed to produce TAMUK’s
tenure review policy, and failed to act upon the findings of the advisory
committee. 8 But it is difficult to see how TAMUK’s production of direct,
_____________________
8
Ibanez also argues that TAMUK failed to compare Ibanez to other qualified peers.
But as Ibanez himself states, under TAMUK guidelines, decisionmakers “may,” not
“must,” make comparisons to peers. Moreover, the guidelines state that comparisons are
made “in addition to” minimum expectations, not “in lieu of” minimum expectations. In
short, TAMUK decisionmakers were not required to compare Ibanez to his peers—
15
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sworn testimony by the very people who made Ibanez’s tenure decision—as
opposed to other types of documentation—produces an inference of
discrimination. And TAMUK did attach at least some documentary
corroboration to the decision-makers’ affidavits, such as the university
guidelines for tenure and promotion, and lists of college-specific mandatory
minimums for tenure and promotion. Lastly, a review of the record shows
that TAMUK took appropriate steps to investigate the advisory committee’s
findings. Pursuant to TAMUK’s policy, Ibanez’s appeal was submitted to a
tenure appeals committee and a promotion appeals committee for full,
independent review. The university president then considered all available
information—including the reviews of both committees—and came to a
decision. Contrary to Ibanez’s characterization, nothing suggests that
TAMUK disregarded the advisory committee’s report.
Finally, Ibanez argues that TAMUK failed to credit Ibanez’s work
focused on “important historical figures who made significant contributions
to racial justice,” and that he provided evidence of more general, systemic
discrimination at TAMUK. The record does not show that any of Ibanez’s
work was improperly discounted. Rather, the record shows Ibanez was
credited for Men of Steel, the only work he labeled as juried. And, as the
district court correctly noted, allegations of systemic racism within an
institution—without more—are insufficient to carry Ibanez’s burden to
show individualized discriminatory treatment. See Walther v. Lone Star Gas
Co., 977 F.2d 161, 162 (5th Cir. 1992) (“[P]roof of pretext, hence of
discriminatory intent, by statistics alone would be a challenging endeavor.”).
* * *
_____________________
especially after they concluded that Ibanez failed to meet minimum expectations—and
their failure to do so does not produce an inference of discrimination.
16
Case: 23-40564 Document: 59-1 Page: 17 Date Filed: 10/08/2024
No. 23-40564
Ibanez appears to have been a capable artist and well-respected
professor at TAMUK. Crediting Ibanez’s evidence, one may well believe
that TAMUK’s tenure requirements are too arbitrary or that Ibanez
deserved tenure based on his service to the university. But “[e]mployment
discrimination laws are not intended to be a vehicle for judicial second-
guessing of employment decisions.” See Hackett v. U.P.S., 736 F. App’x 444,
451 (5th Cir. 2018) (internal quotation omitted). Courts “are understandably
reluctant to review the merits of a tenure decision” because
“[d]etermination of the required level [of achievement required for tenure]
in a particular case is not a task for which judicial tribunals seem aptly
suited.” Zahorik, 729 F.2d at 93. Thus, the dispositive question is whether
Ibanez has presented sufficient evidence that his race or national origin was
the reason for the failure to promote. See Travis, 122 F.3d at 264. He has not.
In conclusion, Ibanez simply fails to point to any record evidence
indicating that race and national origin factored into TAMUK’s decision to
deny Ibanez tenure and a promotion, and none of Ibanez’s arguments to the
contrary show otherwise. Because Ibanez failed to create a genuine dispute
of fact as to whether he was denied tenure under circumstances giving rise to
an inference of discrimination, he failed to make a prima facie case of
employment discrimination. Therefore, the district court correctly granted
summary judgment to TAMUK.
IV.
Finding no reversible error in the district court’s proceedings, we
AFFIRM.
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