Joseph Lee Young v. State of Indiana

IN THE

Court of Appeals of Indiana

Joseph Lee Young, FILED

Appellant-Defendant Oct 04 2024, 9:03 am

CLERK

Indiana Supreme Court

v. Court of Appeals

and Tax Court

State of Indiana,

Appellee-Plaintiff

October 4, 2024

Court of Appeals Case No.

23A-CR-2544

Appeal from the Johnson Superior Court

The Honorable Douglas B. Cummins, Judge

Trial Court Cause No.

41D03-2303-F2-16

Opinion by Judge May

Judges Brown and Foley concur.

May, Judge.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-2544 | October 4, 2024 Page 1 of 27

[1] Joseph Lee Young appeals following his convictions of Level 2 felony dealing

methamphetamine in an amount of ten grams or more 1 and Level 6 felony

unlawful possession of a syringe 2 and his adjudication as a habitual offender. 3

Young presents four issues for our review, which we revise, restate, and reorder

as:

1. Whether the warrantless search of Young’s vehicle, which included

looking inside a loose door panel, violated Young’s rights under:

1.1. the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution; or

1.2. Article 1, section 11 of the Indiana Constitution;

2. Whether the trial court abused its discretion when it ruled that the

State established an adequate chain of custody to support admission of

the items law enforcement collected during the search of Young’s

vehicle;

3. Whether the State presented sufficient evidence to sustain Young’s

convictions; and

1

Ind. Code § 35-48-4-1.1(e) (2017).

2

Ind. Code § 16-42-19-18 (2015).

3

Ind. Code § 35-50-2-8 (2017).

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4. Whether Young’s aggregate thirty-five-year sentence is inappropriate

in light of the nature of his offenses and his character.

We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History 4

[2] On March 8, 2023, Franklin Police Department (“FPD”) officers conducted

long-range surveillance of Young because there was an outstanding warrant for

Young’s arrest. The officers observed Young sitting in the front seat of a

Chevrolet Trailblazer while it was parked on the street outside of Young’s

residence, and after Young sat in the car for about an hour, Detective Kody

Martin of the FPD parked his patrol vehicle behind the Trailblazer, ordered

Young out of the vehicle, and handcuffed Young. Detective Martin conducted

a pat down search of Young and found approximately half a gram of a

substance later determined to be methamphetamine and a substance Detective

Martin believed was marijuana.

[3] Multiple other law enforcement officers arrived at the scene including

Lieutenant Christopher Tennell of the FPD and Detective Andrew Eggebrecht,

a K-9 officer with the Johnson County Sheriff’s Office. Detective Eggebrecht

4

We heard oral argument in this case on Constitution Day, September 17, 2024, at the University of

Evansville. We commend counsel for their advocacy and thank University of Evansville President

Christopher Pietruszkiewicz as well as the university’s faculty, staff, and students for their warm reception

and hospitality.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-2544 | October 4, 2024 Page 3 of 27

used his police dog to perform a free air sniff around the Trailblazer. The police

dog gave a positive indication near the rear passenger-side door of the vehicle,

so Detective Eggebrecht and Detective Martin searched the vehicle, while

Lieutenant Tennell stood with Young. Detective Eggebrecht searched the area

near the rear passenger-side door and found a “marijuana-branded tray that had

residue on it.” (Tr. Vol. 2 at 234.) There were tools and wires scattered

throughout the vehicle and the center console had been disassembled. As the

officers were searching near the driver’s door, Lieutenant Tennell noticed that

Young’s behavior changed. Young had been ignoring the search, but Young

became more attentive at that point. Detective Eggebrecht found “a magnetic

box” near the vehicle’s instrument cluster “stuck on the side of it where there

was an air vent that was missing.” (Id. at 234-35.) The officers found red

baggies, marijuana cigarettes, and a pipe inside the magnetic box.

[4] The officers continued searching the vehicle and Detective Martin noticed the

plastic interior door panel of the driver’s door moved away from the door and

was “super loose.” (Ex. 1 at 24:04-:06.) Detective Eggebrecht noticed “there

was a plastic clip that was holding the bottom of that door panel in rather than

the normal number of clips that hold it all the way around the perimeter.” (Tr.

Vol. 2 at 236.) Detective Martin pulled the loose plastic panel away from the

door and a bag containing approximately nineteen grams of methamphetamine,

small baggies with methamphetamine inside them, a scale, a latex band,

syringes, and numerous unused plastic baggies fell out. The officers then used

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their fingers to unscrew the door panel, but they did not find any additional

evidence secreted behind the door panel.

[5] Detective Martin sorted the evidence at the scene and placed it into plastic bags.

He then transported the evidence to FPD headquarters. Detective Martin gave

the evidence to FPD Detective Jess Harris. Detective Harris tagged each bag of

evidence with the case number and an item number, initialed and dated each

bag, and placed the bags into an evidence locker used for temporary storage.

The evidence technician was the only person who could retrieve the bags from

the evidence locker.

[6] On March 14, 2023, the State charged Young with Level 2 felony dealing in

methamphetamine and Level 6 felony unlawful possession of a syringe.

Evidence Technician Mark Riley removed the bagged evidence from the

evidence locker on March 16, 2023, processed the evidence, and then stored the

evidence in the FPD’s secure property room. On June 16, 2023, the State filed

an information alleging Young qualified for a habitual offender sentence

enhancement.

[7] On July 20, 2023, Young moved to suppress the narcotics and syringes found

inside his vehicle alleging the search of his vehicle was unconstitutional. The

trial court held a hearing on Young’s motion on July 21, 2023. During the

hearing, Young explained he was not seeking to suppress evidence of the drugs

found on his person or in the magnetic black box found near the instrument

cluster. He clarified that he was only seeking to suppress the evidence found

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inside the door panel. Young argued that taking apart the door was an

“invasive search” that required a warrant. (Id. at 43.)

[8] On July 24, 2023, the trial court issued an order denying Young’s motion to

suppress. The trial court ruled that a warrant was unnecessary because of the

automobile exception to the warrant requirement. The trial court noted that the

vehicle was in a public place and was operational. In addition, the police had

already arrested Young and were preparing to take him to jail. The trial court

also ruled that removal of the loose door panel did not exceed the scope of a

lawful warrantless search: “Having found the rolling tray where [the police dog]

indicated and the partially hidden metal box containing additional narcotics,

noticing that the door panel was only secured by a single screw gave rise to the

officer’s suspicion that additional illegal substances may be hidden in that

compartment[.]” (App. Vol. 2 at 61.)

[9] The trial court held Young’s jury trial from August 8, 2023, to August 10, 2023.

During Detective Martin’s testimony, Young objected to admission of the

portion of Detective Martin’s bodycam footage that showed him pulling on the

loose interior door panel on the basis that that portion of the search was

unconstitutional, but the trial court overruled Young’s objection. Young

further objected on the same basis when the State sought to admit the evidence

discovered inside the loose door panel, and the trial court overruled each of

Young’s objections. Dakota Altepeter testified he sold the Trailblazer at issue

to Young in January 2023, he cleaned out the vehicle before attempting to sell

it, the door panel was not loose at that time, and there were no illegal drugs in

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the vehicle when he sold it. In addition, the State entered into evidence several

recordings of phone calls Young had made while incarcerated in the Johnson

County Jail. During these phone calls, Young stated officers “found all my

shit,” “they got me with an ounce almost . . . yeah they got me,” and that he

knew he “did this[.]” (Ex. 19 at 1:27-29; Ex. 20 at 1:23-30; Ex. 22 at 00:33-36).

The jury found Young guilty of both Level 2 felony dealing in

methamphetamine and Level 6 felony unlawful possession of a syringe. After

the jury read its verdict, Young pled guilty to the habitual offender sentence

enhancement.

[10] On September 25, 2023, the trial court held Young’s sentencing hearing. The

trial court found Young’s criminal history and Young’s commission of these

offenses while on bond to be aggravating circumstances. The trial court noted

Young seemed remorseful but stated “I can’t give you any credit for being

remorseful at this point because it’s one thing to be remorseful before your

sentence and another thing to sit there and go I’m lookin’ at 50 years and now

I’m really remorseful.” (Tr. Vol. 3 at 152.) The trial court also observed that

Young twice had been ordered to receive drug treatment but continued to abuse

drugs. The trial court found as a mitigating factor that Young pled guilty in two

other cases and that Young pled guilty to the habitual offender enhancement in

the instant case. For Young’s Level 2 felony dealing in methamphetamine

conviction, the trial court sentenced Young to twenty-five years and enhanced

that sentence by ten years because of the habitual offender finding. The trial

court also sentenced Young to a term of one year for his Level 6 felony

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unlawful possession of a syringe conviction. The trial court ordered Young to

serve the sentences concurrently for an aggregate term of thirty-five years. The

trial court also recommended that Young participate in the Recovery While

Incarcerated program and stated “I’m gonna give you a chance to modify at

some point.” (Id. at 154.)

Discussion and Decision

1. Vehicle Search

[11] Young contends the officers’ search of his vehicle violated his rights under both

the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution5 and Article 1,

section 11 of the Indiana Constitution.6 He asserts “the police’s action in

dismantling Young’s vehicle and conducting a warrantless search of it was

unreasonable.” (Appellant’s Br. at 9.) While Young filed a motion to suppress

challenging the constitutionality of the vehicle search prior to trial, which the

5

The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution provides:

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against

unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue, but

upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the

place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.

6

Article 1, section 11 of the Indiana Constitution states:

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against

unreasonable search or seizure, shall not be violated; and no warrant shall issue, but upon

probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to

be searched, and the person or thing to be seized.

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trial court denied, he subsequently proceeded to trial and renewed his objection

to the constitutionality of the search at trial. Therefore, Young’s “appeal is best

framed as challenging the admission of evidence at trial.” Clark v. State, 994

N.E.2d 252, 259 (Ind. 2013).

[12] We generally review a trial court’s decision regarding the admission of evidence

at trial for an abuse of discretion. Id. at 260. An abuse of discretion occurs

when the trial court’s decision “is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts

and circumstances and the error affects a party’s substantial rights.” Id.

“When, however, admissibility turns on questions of constitutionality relating

to the search and seizure of that evidence, our review is de novo.” Jacobs v.

State, 76 N.E.3d 846, 849 (Ind. 2017).

1.1 Fourth Amendment

[13] Young asserts the officers “exceeded the bounds” of the Fourth Amendment

“by dismantling the door panel.” (Appellant’s Br. at 15.) The Fourth

Amendment protects citizens from search or seizure absent a warrant supported

by probable cause unless a well-delineated exception to the warrant requirement

applies. Tigner v. State, 142 N.E.3d 1064, 1068 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020). “The

State bears the burden of proving that an exception to the warrant requirement

applies for evidence obtained during a warrantless search to be admissible at

trial.” Id. One such exception to the warrant requirement is the automobile

exception, which our Indiana Supreme Court discussed in State v. Hobbs:

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The ‘automobile exception’ to the warrant requirement allows

police to search a vehicle without obtaining a warrant if they

have probable cause to believe evidence of a crime will be found

in the vehicle. This doctrine is grounded in two notions: 1) a

vehicle is readily moved and therefore the evidence may

disappear while a warrant is being obtained, and 2) citizens have

lower expectations of privacy in their vehicles than in their

homes. One reason for this diminished expectation of privacy in

a car and its contents is that cars travel along public highways

and are subject to pervasive government regulation.

933 N.E.2d 1281, 1285 (Ind. 2010) (internal citations omitted).

[14] A search pursuant to the automobile exception “is not defined by the nature of

the container in which the contraband is secreted. Rather, it is defined by the

object of the search and the places in which there is probable cause to believe

that it may be found.” U.S. v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 824 (1982). The scope of a

search pursuant to the automobile exception “is no broader and no narrower

than a magistrate could legitimately authorize by warrant. If probable cause

justifies the search of a lawfully stopped vehicle, it justifies the search of every

part of the vehicle and its contents that may conceal the object of the search.”

Id. at 825. This includes the contents of closed containers inside the vehicle.

California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 580-81 (1991). “When there is probable

cause to search for contraband in a car, it is reasonable for police officers . . . to

examine packages and containers without a showing of individualized probable

cause for each one.” Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 302 (1999).

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[15] Young argues the officers at the scene “should not have dismantled the door

panel of the vehicle without a search warrant,” (Appellant’s Br. at 15), and he

likens his case to Bell v. State, 818 N.E.2d 481 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004), reh’g denied,

trans. denied. In Bell, the police conducted a traffic stop of Bell’s vehicle because

Bell’s passenger had an outstanding warrant for his arrest. Id. at 482. The

officers handcuffed Bell and his passenger and placed them in separate police

cruisers. Id. at 483. The officers then searched Bell’s vehicle. Id. During the

search, the officers “dismantled” Bell’s glove compartment “enabling the

officers to look behind the glove box and into the chassis of the vehicle.” Id.

The officers found a bag of cocaine inside the vehicle’s chassis. Id.

[16] Bell filed a motion to suppress arguing that the search of his car was

unconstitutional, and the trial court denied Bell’s motion. Id. at 483-84. The

State argued on appeal that the warrantless search of Bell’s vehicle fell within

the Fourth Amendment’s search incident to arrest exception because it followed

the arrest of Bell’s passenger. Id. at 484-85. We held the search was

unconstitutional because it went beyond “the opening and searching of the

closed glove box, consoles, receptacles, luggage, boxes and bags found within

the vehicle’s passenger compartment,” the officers “dismantled the glove box to

view behind it into the vehicle’s chassis.” Id. at 485.

[17] However, Bell is readily distinguishable from the instant case. Whereas the

officers in Bell exceeded the scope of a lawful warrantless search incident to

arrest by searching beyond the immediate area where Bell’s passenger was

seated, id. at 485, the officers who searched Young’s vehicle did not exceed the

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scope of a lawful search pursuant to the automobile exception. “Where there is

probable cause to search a vehicle, a search is not unreasonable if it is based on

facts that would justify the issuance of a warrant, even though a warrant has not

been obtained.” Meister v. State, 933 N.E.2d 875, 879 (Ind. 2010). “Probable

cause to issue a search warrant exists where the facts and circumstances would

lead a reasonably prudent person to believe that a search would uncover

evidence of a crime.” Id.

[18] Before Detective Martin pulled on the loose door panel, the police had found

drugs on Young’s person, a police dog had alerted to the presence of drugs

inside Young’s vehicle, the officers had found a marijuana-branded rolling tray

near the rear passenger-side door, and the officers had also found a magnetic

box containing narcotics and paraphernalia secreted inside a dismantled air

vent near the vehicle’s instrument cluster. Moreover, prior to police arriving,

the vehicle’s center console had been disassembled, and there were wires and

tools scattered over the two front seats of the vehicle. Thus, a reasonably

prudent person could conclude additional drugs could be hidden behind a loose

door panel. Because probable cause existed to justify looking behind the door

panel, Detective Martin’s act of pulling on the loose door panel did not violate

Young’s rights under the Fourth Amendment. 7 See, e.g., Cheatham v. State, 819

7

Young also asserts on appeal that the search did not fall within the search incident to arrest exception to the

Fourth Amendment warrant requirement and that “[a]s for any alleged probable cause established by the

canine, the search was unreasonable because the purpose of the stop was complete prior to the dog sniff.”

(Appellant’s Br. at 18.) However, Young did not raise these arguments before the trial court, and therefore,

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N.E.2d 71, 76 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004) (holding probable cause existed to justify

search of defendant’s car pursuant to the automobile exception when officers

observed rolling papers in plain view and smelled the odor of marijuana, and a

police dog alerted to the presence of narcotics in the vehicle).

1.2 Article 1, section 11

[19] Young also argues the search was unreasonable under Article 1, section 11 of

the Indiana Constitution. While the text of Article 1, section 11 is nearly

identical to the text of the Fourth Amendment to the United States

Constitution, “we evaluate a search under our state constitution based on the

reasonableness of the conduct of the law enforcement officers under the

circumstances, rather than on the expectation of privacy that is commonly

associated with analysis under the Fourth Amendment.” State v. Jones, 191

N.E.3d 878, 891 (Ind. Ct. App. 2022) (quotation marks omitted), trans. denied.

We evaluate whether a search is unconstitutional under the Indiana

Constitution by balancing three factors: “1) the degree of concern, suspicion, or

he is precluded from raising them for the first time on appeal. See Finnegan v. State, 201 N.E.3d 1186, 1197

(Ind. Ct. App. 2023) (“A party may not raise an argument or objection on appeal that was not raised before

the trial court.”). Waiver notwithstanding, a warrantless search is constitutional if it fits into one exception

to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement. See M.O. v. State, 63 N.E.3d 329, 331 (Ind. 2016) (“the

State bears the burden to show that one of the well-delineated exceptions to the warrant requirement

applies”) (internal quotation marks omitted). Because the State proved the search fell within the automobile

exception, the State did not also need to prove the search fell within the search incident to arrest exception.

In addition, when the dog sniff occurred, the vehicle was parked on a public street, and the police had already

arrested Young because of the outstanding warrant. The dog sniff did not prolong Young’s detention, and

officers are permitted to walk dogs past vehicles parked in public because a dog sniff is not a protected search.

See Danh v. State, 142 N.E.3d 1055, 1063 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020) (“A dog sniff sweep of a vehicle is not a search

protected by the Fourth Amendment.”) (internal quotation marks omitted), trans. denied.

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knowledge that a violation has occurred, 2) the degree of intrusion the method

of the search or seizure imposes on the citizen’s ordinary activities, and 3) the

extent of law enforcement needs.” Litchfield v. State, 824 N.E.2d 356, 361 (Ind.

2005).

[20] Young argues the warrantless search of his vehicle is similar to the search our

Indiana Supreme Court held violated the Indiana Constitution in Brown v. State,

653 N.E.2d 77 (Ind. 1995). In Brown, an individual robbed a drug store in

Indianapolis, and a witness reported seeing the getaway car. Id. at 78-79. The

next day, officers found a vehicle matching the witness’s description of the

getaway car parked outside of Brown’s house. Id. at 79. The officers

“impounded and ‘inventory-searched’” the vehicle and found several pieces of

incriminating evidence. Id. Brown argued the search was unconstitutional, the

trial court overruled his objection, and this court affirmed the trial court. Id.

However, our Indiana Supreme Court reversed. Id. at 80. The Court held that

the search was unreasonable under the Indiana Constitution and the officers

should have obtained a warrant before conducting the search. Id. The Court

noted the car was parked in a residential neighborhood and was surrounded by

police cars. Id. For that reason, it was unlikely the car would have been

moved while the officers sought a warrant, and there was neither a shortage of

time nor an emergency that would have made seeking a warrant impractical.

Id. While Brown did not explicitly evaluate the search of Brown’s vehicle in

light of the Litchfield factors, our Supreme Court clarified in Hardin v. State that

the search of Brown’s vehicle was unconstitutional because of “low police

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suspicion or concern and a lack of law-enforcement needs (Litchfield factors one

and three)[.]” 148 N.E.3d 932, 945 (Ind. 2020), cert. denied 141 S. Ct. 2468

(2021).

[21] In contrast, in Hobbs, our Indiana Supreme Court held the Litchfield factors

supported finding the search of Hobbs’s vehicle was reasonable. 933 N.E.2d at

1287. The police arrested Hobbs on an outstanding warrant when Hobbs was

inside the Pizza Hut restaurant where he worked. Id. at 1284. When Hobbs

refused to consent to a police search of his vehicle, the police summoned a K-9

officer to the scene. Id. The police dog alerted, and the police then searched

Hobbs’s vehicle. Id. The officers found marijuana and paraphernalia inside the

car. Id. Hobbs challenged the search, but our Indiana Supreme Court held the

search did not violate the Indiana Constitution. Id. at 1287. The Court

explained police had a high degree of suspicion or concern that a violation of

law occurred when the police dog alerted to the presence of narcotics in Hobb’s

vehicle. Id. In addition, the Court noted the search of Hobb’s vehicle did not

disrupt his normal activities because he was already under arrest on an

outstanding warrant at the time of the search, and the Court explained “the

same considerations underlying the federal automobile exception support

permitting the officers to secure the evidence without delay.” Id. The Court

distinguished the search of Hobbs’s vehicle from the search in Brown because

“although the car [in Brown] appeared to be the one used in the robbery, there

was no probable cause to believe the car contained evidence of a crime, and

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there was no certainty that detaining the car would not inconvenience its

owner.” Id.

[22] With respect to the search of Young’s vehicle, the police had a high degree of

suspicion or concern that a violation of law occurred when a police dog alerted

to the presence of drugs in Young’s vehicle, and that concern only heightened

as the police found drugs and drug paraphernalia inside the vehicle. Like

Hobbs, Young was already under arrest on an outstanding warrant at the time

of the search of his vehicle, and therefore, the search constituted a minimal

disruption of his normal activities. In addition, the police have a significant

need to intervene and remove illicit drugs because “distributing or possessing

even small amounts of drugs threatens society.” State v. Timbs, 169 N.E.3d 361,

373 (Ind. 2021). Therefore, the warrantless search of Young’s vehicle was not

unreasonable under the Indiana Constitution. See, e.g., McKinney v. State, 212

N.E.3d 697, 707-08 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023) (holding search of defendant’s vehicle

was reasonable under the totality of the circumstances when dog alerted to the

presence of drugs in vehicle, defendant’s vehicle was already set to be

impounded at the time of the search, and law enforcement need to find

evidence of drug activity was high), reh’g denied, trans. denied.

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2. Chain of Custody

[23] Young also asserts the trial court erred in admitting the evidence Detective

Martin collected at the scene 8 because the State did not sufficiently prove the

chain of custody for that evidence. Our standard of review regarding chain-of-

custody claims is well-settled:

An adequate foundation establishing a continuous chain of

custody is established if the State accounts for the evidence at

each stage from its acquisition, to its testing, and to its

introduction at trial. Under the chain of custody doctrine, an

adequate foundation is laid when the continuous whereabouts of

an exhibit is shown from the time it came into the possession of

the police.

To establish a proper chain of custody, the State must give

reasonable assurances that the evidence remained in an

undisturbed condition. However, the State need not establish a

perfect chain of custody, and once the State strongly suggests the

exact whereabouts of the evidence, any gaps go to the weight of

the evidence and not to admissibility. Moreover, there is a

presumption of regularity in the handling of evidence by officers,

and there is a presumption that officers exercise due care in

handling their duties. To mount a successful challenge to the

chain of custody, one must present evidence that does more than

raise a mere possibility that the evidence may have been

tampered with.

8

Specifically, Young challenged Exhibit 4 (scale), Exhibit 5 (syringes), Exhibit 6 (latex band), Exhibit 7

(black magnetic boxes), Exhibit 8 (baggies), Exhibit 9 (methamphetamine found in the door panel), Exhibit

10 (methamphetamine found in Young’s pocket), and Exhibit 11 (baggies found in Young’s pocket).

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Espinoza v. State, 859 N.E.2d 375, 382 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006) (internal citations

and quotation marks omitted).

[24] In K.W. v. State, we discussed the varying foundational requirements the State

must prove to establish an adequate chain of custody for fungible and

nonfungible items:

“For fungible items such as blood and drugs, an adequate

foundation is laid when the whereabouts of an exhibit is shown

from the time it came into the possession of the police.” Mateo v.

State, 981 N.E.2d 59, 66 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012), trans. denied. For

fungible items, the State lays a proper foundation when “a

witness is able to identify the item, . . . the item is relevant to the

disposition of the case[,] . . . [and the State] provid[es] a

reasonable assurance that the evidence was undisturbed as it

passed from the custody of one person to the next.” Id. at 66-67.

“If the State presents evidence that strongly suggests the exact

whereabouts of the evidence at all times, that is sufficient.” Id. at

67. In contrast, for “nonfungible items like guns and vehicles,

the State need only show that the item is what it is purported to

be and that it is in a substantially unchanged state” from when it

was initially collected by police. Id.

216 N.E.3d 505, 516 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023) (all quotation marks, citations, and

brackets in original), trans. denied.

[25] Young notes that, although the police arrested him on March 8, 2023, the first

entry on the chain of custody form Young received on the eve of trial was dated

March 16, 2023. Young relies on Graham v. State, 255 N.E.2d 652 (Ind. 1970),

to argue that the State’s proof of the chain of custody was insufficient. In

Graham, our Indiana Supreme Court held that an unexplained six-day break in

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the chain of custody “precluded a finding that the white powder substance

allegedly received by a ‘buyer’ from appellant was in fact the same white

powder found to contain heroin in the police laboratory.” Id. at 653.

[26] However, unlike Graham, there is not an unexplained absence in Young’s case.

Detective Martin testified that he took possession of the items at the scene,

bagged them, and personally transported them to FPD headquarters. Narcotics

Detective Harris testified that he received the items from Detective Martin,

packaged and sealed the items, placed an evidence tag with an incident number

and date on each item, and placed the evidence in a secure drop box. Evidence

Technician Riley testified he removed the evidence from the secure drop box on

March 16, 2023. He processed the items, including starting a chain of custody

form, and placed the items in storage in the secure property room. Thus, officer

testimony established the whereabouts of the bagged evidence between March

8, 2023, and March 16, 2023, and we hold the State laid an adequate

foundation regarding chain of custody to support admission of the bagged

evidence at trial. See, e.g., Jones v. State, 218 N.E.3d 3, 10 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023)

(holding State met burden of establishing chain of custody of fungible DNA

samples through officer testimony), trans. denied.

3. Sufficiency of Evidence

[27] Young contends the State presented insufficient evidence to sustain his

convictions of dealing in methamphetamine and unlawful possession of a

syringe. When faced with challenges to the sufficiency of evidence, we apply a

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“well settled” standard of review that leaves determination of the weight of the

evidence and credibility of the witnesses to the fact-finder. Teising v. State, 226

N.E.3d 780, 783 (Ind. 2024). “We consider only the evidence most favorable to

the trial court’s ruling and will affirm a defendant’s conviction unless ‘no

reasonable fact-finder could find the elements of the crime proven beyond a

reasonable doubt.’” Id. (quoting Jenkins v. State, 726 N.E.2d 268, 270 (Ind.

2000)).

[28] A person who knowingly or intentionally possesses, with intent to deliver, at

least ten grams of methamphetamine commits Level 2 felony dealing in

methamphetamine. Ind. Code § 35-48-4-1.1. Likewise, a person who possesses

with the intent to commit a drug offense a hypodermic syringe or needle or an

instrument adapted for the use of a controlled substance or legend drug by

injection in a human being commits Level 6 felony unlawful possession of a

syringe. Ind. Code § 16-42-19-18. “We have long recognized that a conviction

for possession of contraband may be founded upon actual or constructive

possession.” Griffin v. State, 945 N.E.2d 781, 783 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011). “Actual

possession occurs when a person has direct physical control over an item.

Constructive possession occurs when a person has (1) the capability to maintain

dominion and control over the item; and (2) the intent to maintain dominion

and control over it.” Eckrich v. State, 73 N.E.3d 744, 746 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017)

(internal citation and quotation marks omitted).

[29] “In cases where the accused has exclusive possession of the premises on which

contraband is found, an inference is permitted that he or she knew of the

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presence of contraband and was capable of controlling it.” Griffin, 945 N.E.2d

at 784. “A trier of fact may likewise infer that a defendant had the intent to

maintain dominion and control over contraband from the defendant’s

possessory interest in the premises, even when that possessory interest is not

exclusive.” Gray v. State, 957 N.E.2d 171, 174 (Ind. 2011). However, in the

case of non-exclusive possession of the premises on which the contraband is

found, the State must support the inference that the defendant intended to

exercise dominion and control over the contraband “with additional

circumstances pointing to the defendant’s knowledge of the presence and the

nature of the item.” Id. at 174-75. Such additional circumstances include:

(1) a defendant’s incriminating statements; (2) a defendant’s

attempting to leave or making furtive gestures; (3) the location of

contraband like drugs in settings suggesting manufacturing; (4)

the item’s proximity to the defendant; (5) the location of

contraband within the defendant’s plain view; and (6) the

mingling of contraband with other items the defendant owns.

Id. at 175. In addition, other factors beyond the six listed above may support a

finding that the defendant had constructive possession of contraband. Canfield

v. State, 128 N.E.3d 563, 573 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019), trans. denied.

[30] Young argues that while “he had been in the proximate area where the drugs

and paraphernalia were found inside the door panel of the SUV, there was no

evidence he knew of their existence.” (Appellant’s Br. at 12.) Young notes that

Altepeter testified that someone had lived in the vehicle before it was

abandoned in the tow yard. Young contends that “[a]lthough Altepeter stated

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that he did not observe any issues with the doors and that nothing was loose, he

acknowledged that he had not taken the panel off, did not know what was

there, and he didn’t know if the previous owner put something in there.” (Id.)

[31] However, we agree with the State that “several circumstances allowed the jury

to find that [Young] had the intent and capability to maintain dominion and

control over the items” found behind the driver’s door panel. (Appellee’s Br. at

14.) Young was the only person in the vehicle when the police arrested him,

and he had been sitting in the driver’s seat for at least an hour before the police

arrested him. Further, Young does not challenge the drugs and paraphernalia

police found on his person and in a magnetic box concealed in a missing air

vent near the vehicle’s instrument cluster, and the items found in the door panel

are of the same character as those items. Young also appeared to be actively

disassembling the center console of the vehicle at the time of his arrest,

presumably because he was trying to create additional places in the vehicle to

hide contraband. While the vehicle was still registered to Altepeter at the time

of Young’s arrest, Altepeter testified he had not transferred title to Young at

that point because Young had not yet paid the full purchase price to Altepeter

[32] Young also made incriminating statements in his phone calls to friends and

family from the jail. For example, Young’s statement “they got me with an

ounce almost . . . yeah they got me,” (Ex. 20 at 1:23-30), implicitly

acknowledges his possession of the large amount of methamphetamine found

behind the door panel because the total weight of methamphetamine found in

Young’s possession only approaches an ounce if that amount is included in the

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calculation. Therefore, a reasonable jury could conclude Young constructively

possessed the methamphetamine and syringes found in the door panel, and

consequently, we hold the State presented sufficient evidence to sustain

Young’s convictions. See, e.g., Parks v. State, 113 N.E.3d 269, 274 (Ind. Ct.

App. 2018) (holding the State presented sufficient evidence defendant

constructively possessed gun and drugs found in the backseat of his car given

the defendant’s proximity to the items, his incriminating statements, the strong

odor of marijuana, and the presence of items suggestive of manufacturing or

dealing).

4. Inappropriate Sentence

[33] Last, Young asserts his aggregate sentence of thirty-five years is inappropriate

given the nature of his offenses and his character. Pursuant to Indiana

Appellate Rule 7(B), we may revise a sentence “if, after due consideration of the

trial court’s decision, [we] find that the sentence is inappropriate in light of the

nature of the offense and the character of the offender.” Our determination

“turns on our sense of the culpability of the defendant, the severity of the crime,

the damage done to others, and myriad other factors that come to light in a

given case.” Cardwell v. State, 895 N.E.2d 1219, 1224 (Ind. 2008).

Our review is deferential to the trial court’s decision, and our

goal is to determine whether the appellant’s sentence is

inappropriate, not whether some other sentence would be more

appropriate. We consider not only the aggravators and

mitigators found by the trial court, but also any other factors

appearing in the record. The appellant bears the burden of

demonstrating his sentence [is] inappropriate.

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George v. State, 141 N.E.3d 68, 73-74 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020) (internal citations

omitted), trans. denied. Our review is “holistic” and takes into consideration

“the whole picture before us.” Lane v. State, 232 N.E.3d 119, 127 (Ind. 2024).

Appellants need not prove their sentence is inappropriate for both their

character and offense, but “to the extent the evidence on one prong militates

against relief, a claim based on the other prong must be all the stronger to justify

relief.” Id.

[34] “Our analysis of the nature of the offense requires us to look at the nature,

extent, heinousness, and brutality of the offense.” Pritcher v. State, 208 N.E.3d

656, 668 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023). As our Indiana Supreme Court has explained,

“compelling evidence portraying in a positive light the nature of the offense

(such as accompanied by restraint, regard, and lack of brutality)” may lead to a

downward revision of the defendant’s sentence. Stephenson v. State, 29 N.E.3d

111, 122 (Ind. 2015).

[35] “When considering the nature of the offense, we first look to the advisory

sentence for the crime.” McHenry v. State, 152 N.E.3d 41, 46 (Ind. Ct. App.

2020). A Level 2 felony is punishable by imprisonment “for a fixed term of

between ten (10) and thirty (30) years, with the advisory sentence being

seventeen and one-half (17 ½) years.” Ind. Code § 35-50-2-4.5. Here, Young’s

twenty-five-year sentence for Level 2 felony dealing in methamphetamine was

above the advisory term for that level of offense, but it was below the maximum

sentence. That sentence was subject to an enhancement of between six and

twenty years because the trial court adjudicated him to be a habitual offender,

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Ind. Code § 35-50-2-8(i)(1) (2017), but the trial court only enhanced his

sentence by ten years. In addition, the trial court imposed the advisory sentence

for Young’s Level 6 felony illegal possession of a syringe conviction. See Ind.

Code § 35-50-2-7 (Level 6 felony punishable by imprisonment “for a fixed term

of between six (6) months and two and one-half (2 ½) years, with the advisory

sentence being one (1) year.”).

[36] Young argues the nature of his offenses merits a lesser sentence because he

“acknowledged ownership of the drugs on his person” and “[n]o one was

injured regarding these offenses.” (Appellant’s Br. at 23-24.) We disagree.

Young possessed twenty-two grams of methamphetamine, which is over twice

the amount required for his offense, and he possessed other paraphernalia and

items consistent with drug dealing. He also made significant efforts to hide his

criminal activity from police by concealing his contraband in the voids of his

vehicle. Young moreover committed these crimes while released on bond. All

these facts render the nature of Young’s offenses worse than the “typical”

versions of each offense. See, e.g., Murray v. State, 182 N.E.3d 270, 278 (Ind. Ct.

App. 2022) (holding nature of defendant’s offense was more egregious than a

typical version of that offense because of the large amount of

methamphetamine defendant sold). Thus, we cannot say Young’s sentence is

inappropriate for his offenses.

[37] With respect to an offender’s character, one relevant fact is the defendant’s

criminal history. Johnson v. State, 986 N.E.2d 852, 857 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013).

Young’s criminal history is significant. He has two prior felony convictions and

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ten misdemeanor convictions, and Young’s history also includes violations of

his terms of probation. While Young has a long history of substance abuse and

expressed a desire at his sentencing to receive treatment, his history shows

continued abuse of substances even after receiving treatment. Young contends

he is employable because he has a GED and various work-related certifications.

He also stated at sentencing that he worked as a cook while incarcerated in jail.

However, Young’s employment history does not merit a lesser sentence. See

Jones, 218 N.E.3d at 16 (“Lastly, Jones claims that his gainful employment is

evidence of his positive character. We have held before that most people are

employed such that this consideration does not warrant a lesser sentence.”).

Therefore, we hold Young’s sentence also is not inappropriate for his character.

See, e.g., Murray, 182 N.E.3d at 279 (defendant’s twenty-five-year sentence was

not inappropriate given his character, particularly his prior criminal history and

repeated failures to abide by his terms of probation).

Conclusion

[38] The search of Young’s vehicle, which included pulling on the loose door panel

attached to Young’s front driver’s side door, was permissible pursuant to the

Fourth Amendment’s automobile exception, and the search was also

reasonable under the Indiana Constitution. Moreover, the testimony of

Detective Martin, Detective Harris, and Evidence Technician Riley laid an

adequate foundation regarding the chain of custody of the items Detective

Martin collected for those items to be admissible at trial. In addition, the State

presented sufficient evidence to prove Young constructively possessed the drugs

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and paraphernalia found in the vehicle’s door panel. Finally, Young’s

aggregate thirty-five-year sentence is not inappropriate in light of the nature of

his offenses and his character. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court.

[39] Affirmed.

Brown, J., and Foley, J., concur.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

Carlos I. Carrillo

Carrillo Law LLC

Greenwood, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Theodore E. Rokita

Indiana Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana

Justin F. Roebel

Supervising Deputy Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana

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