Vicki Marlene (Almonrode) Taylor v. Jack Elmer Taylor, Jr.

10/01/2024

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT NASHVILLE

May 7, 2024 Session

VICKI MARLENE (ALMONRODE) TAYLOR v. JACK ELMER TAYLOR,

JR.

Appeal from the Chancery Court for Cannon County

No. 20-477 Bonita Jo Atwood, Judge

___________________________________

No. M2022-01254-COA-R3-CV

___________________________________

Husband appeals aspects of the trial court’s classification, valuation, and division of

property in its order of absolute divorce. The trial court’s decision is affirmed in part,

vacated in part, and reversed in part, and the matter is remanded to the trial court for further

consideration.

Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Chancery Court Affirmed

in Part, Vacated in Part, and Reversed in Part

J. STEVEN STAFFORD, P.J., W.S., delivered the opinion of the court, in which FRANK G.

CLEMENT, JR., P.J., M.S., and ANDY D. BENNETT, J., joined.

Benjamin Lewis, Murfreesboro, Tennessee, for the appellant, Jack Elmer Taylor, Jr.

L. Jeffery Payne and Laurie Y. Young, Murfreesboro, Tennessee, for the appellee, Vicki

Marlene (Almonrode) Taylor.

OPINION

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

This appeal arises from a complaint for divorce filed by Plaintiff/Appellee Vicki

Marlene (Almonrode) Taylor (“Wife”) in the Cannon County Chancery Court (“the trial

court”) in September 2020. Therein, Wife alleged that irreconcilable differences had arisen

between herself and Defendant/Appellant Jack Elmer Taylor, Jr. (“Husband”) and that

Husband was guilty of inappropriate marital conduct. Wife requested an absolute divorce,

an equitable division of the parties’ property, both pendente lite and permanent alimony,1

and her attorney’s fees.

Husband’s answer denied any irreconcilable differences in the parties’ marriage and

any inappropriate marital conduct on his behalf. Husband also raised the affirmative

defenses of provocation and unclean hands.

Wife filed a motion for pendente lite relief in December 2020, seeking either

assistance with feeding the parties’ livestock or permission to sell the livestock, and either

permission to sell the marital residence or assistance with paying the mortgage. Wife also

requested a temporary order related to the payment of marital expenses, farm and livestock

expenses, and temporary spousal support.

The motion was heard in June 2021. By order of July 9, 2021, the trial court found

that Husband was not credible and did not know his own expenses or the expenses required

to maintain the marital residence. The trial court further found that Husband could not

afford to maintain the parties’ farm property or refinance the parties’ marital residence.

Accordingly, the trial court directed that both the marital residence and the farm plot be

sold, with the proceeds deposited with the Clerk and Master, who was appointed Special

Commissioner over the sales. The parties’ livestock would also be sold, with those

proceeds and the proceeds Wife had previously received for other animal sales deposited

with the Clerk and Master.

As Special Commissioner, the Clerk and Master entered her report of the sale in

August 2021. The report indicated that the marital residence plot was sold for a total of

$305,000.00, and the farm plot was sold for $300,000.00. After costs and expenses were

paid, $582,348.80 would be deposited with the Clerk and Master pending further orders

from the trial court. On Wife’s motion, the trial court entered an order approving the sales

in September 2021.

The matter was set to be heard July 19, 2022. Both parties filed statements of issues,

income, and expenses, and statements of assets and liabilities prior to trial. Wife testified

to two incidents of violence against her by Husband in September and November 2020 and

requested the reimbursement of $2,049.85 in medical bills.2 Wife explained that she took

over the mortgage payment for the parties’ marital residence after Husband was arrested in

relation to these incidents in September 2020. As she moved out of the property based on

Husband’s actions, Wife requested to be reimbursed for paying the entire $2,045.00 per

month for fourteen months. Wife also asked to be reimbursed for her payment of the entire

electricity bill during that same time. Wife requested the reimbursement of several

additional expenses, including for feeding the livestock, maintaining the farm, adding

1

At trial, Wife voluntarily withdrew her request for alimony.

2

On cross-examination, Wife admitted that this amount included some bills twice.

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security features to the property, and getting both the farm and the residence ready for sale.

Wife provided copies of her paystubs for April through June 2022, and testified to having

paid a total of $8,500.13 in premiums to cover Husband’s health insurance since filing for

divorce. Wife also requested $17,666.00 in attorney’s fees.

Wife explained that Husband was allowed back into the marital residence for a

three-week period in July 2021. Wife testified that Husband took several items from the

home that she had marked as wanting to keep, as well as his own tools and several pieces

of farm equipment.3 Wife explained that multiple items of marital property were listed for

sale online by Husband and were not on the property when he left; she did not know if

these items were sold or what happened to any sale proceeds. Wife also provided

photographs of the derelict state the property was in when Husband left at the end of the

three weeks. Wife further explained that the electric bill was usually only $60.00–$120.00

per month, but that Husband kept all of the lights on and the thermostat set very low during

his time in the home, resulting in a bill of approximately $169.00 for those three weeks.

Wife requested reimbursement of this amount.

Wife testified that she took from the home several pieces of heirloom furniture,

some dishes and knives, and the other assorted items she brought into the marriage. Wife

removed twelve firearms and assorted ammunition from the residence after the first

domestic violence incident.4 Wife testified that she attempted to bring the firearms to the

Sheriff’s Department but eventually stored them with her brother instead.5 She explained

that no firearms had been sold or otherwise disposed of, despite Husband listing seventeen

firearms in his pre-trial documentation. Wife testified that most of these firearms were

Husband’s separate property but that several were acquired during the marriage. Wife

testified that she was “[t]errified” of the firearms being returned to Husband and requested

that the trial court arrange for the sale of the firearms and award Husband the proceeds.

Wife testified to an annual income of approximately $65,000 or $70,000.00. Wife

provided a June 2022 statement showing $8,733.90 in stock provided as a benefit of her

employment. Wife also provided statements reflecting a balance of $12,848.80 in her

401(k) account prior to the marriage and a balance of $103,488.01 at the time of the

hearing. Wife explained that a total of $63,000.00 was withdrawn from her 401(k) account

during the divorce action to pay for “legal fees and to maintain the farm. Basically, living

expenses.” Wife paid a total of $12,600.00 in taxes on these withdrawals. Wife further

3

Wife testified as to the types of tools Husband owned and explained that “$50,000.00 is probably

an understatement for the value of those tools. I just pulled it out of the air, but it -- he had a lot of tools.”

Similarly, Wife testified that she did not know the value of the parties’ vehicles and farm equipment but

that she had looked the values up online.

4

Wife presented a photograph of those firearms she found and removed from the residence, and

Husband was able to identify the firearms pictured.

5

Wife explained that she had retained one pistol for personal safety, but that she did not want to

keep the pistol after the divorce.

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testified to having a total of approximately $555.00 in her two bank accounts, such that the

funds withdrawn were fully utilized. There was testimony regarding Wife’s tax filing

status, as she often filed as a single status during the majority of the marriage. Wife

explained that Husband identified as a “sovereign citizen,” believed he did not have to pay

taxes, and did not provide her with his social security number to be able to file under a

married status. Wife explained that she did not alert the government to Husband’s failure

to pay his taxes based on her desire to avoid legal trouble for Husband.

Husband explained that he was self-employed primarily through his sole

proprietorship business. Husband testified that his average gross income was $15,000.00

per month, but that his earnings each month “varie[d] dramatically” and his net income

was somewhere between $5,000.00 and $6,000.00 a month.6 Husband requested that his

tax debt of $46,363.00 from 2018–2020 be considered marital debt, as he had believed that

Wife had been filing tax returns for both of the parties during the marriage. Husband denied

considering himself a “sovereign citizen” but admitted that he had not filed his taxes from

2001 to 2020.

Husband consistently requested that the marital property be split evenly. Husband

also requested that the $63,000.00 withdrawn from Wife’s 401(k) account be included back

into the balance of the account for distribution purposes. Husband explained that Wife had

never before asked him to pay her back for his health care premiums, and that the parties

had always paid the mortgage and utility bills out of a joint account. Husband testified that

he had been wholly responsible for the upkeep and running of the farm prior to the divorce

petition. Husband admitted that he did not contribute to the mortgage payment or to the

farm expenses during the pendency of the divorce action. Although Husband did not

“begrudge [Wife] what she spent to feed the animals[,]” he considered the amount to be

“exorbitant.” Husband also disputed that some of Wife’s purchases needed to be made and

did not want to split those costs, including the costs for Wife to add additional security

features to the property. Husband explained that his tools had all been acquired prior to the

marriage, and that even his provided value of $15,000.00 was “a very high estimate.”

Husband admitted that he guessed at or made up the values of several items.

Husband testified that he only returned to the marital residence to remove his

property prior to the sale of the house for nine days in July or August 2021. He explained

that he removed some furniture, the majority of his tools, and multiple vehicles from the

residence. Husband testified that he sold the farm truck, a four-wheeler, two lawn mowers,

and several pieces of farm equipment, and that he put the proceeds into his bank account

6

Husband later agreed with his counsel that his net monthly income was somewhere between

$4,500.00 and $5,000.00. Husband provided a 2020 tax return filed as married but filing separately,

indicating $58,104.00 in income.

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because he did not think these items were marital property.7 Husband explained that he

uses the farm equipment remaining in his possession for his business.

Husband explained that his son, his brother, and Wife each possessed some of his

guns, as he was currently prohibited from possessing them himself. Husband was

eventually able to identify each of the twelve firearms included in the picture provided by

Wife, noting that one firearm had not been included in his pre-trial disclosures. Husband

admitted that he had not previously disclosed the firearms held by his brother and son.

Husband explained that his wish was for the firearms to be returned to a family member or

his pastor, and that he had not asked Wife to return the firearms to him directly. He testified

that only three of the eighteen firearms were purchased during the marriage. Husband

stated that he would be willing to provide Wife with half of the value of the marital-

property firearms if he could keep the firearms themselves.

The trial court entered its final order of divorce on August 9, 2022. An amended

final judgment of divorce was entered September 1, 2022. Therein, the trial court granted

Wife a divorce on the ground of inappropriate marital conduct, and classified, valued, and

distributed the parties’ property. The trial court found that Wife’s testimony was credible

and Husband’s testimony was not credible, with Husband’s answers being “evasive, vague,

inconsistent, deceptive, untruthful, dishonest, antagonistic and problematic.” The trial

court also outlined the violence by Husband against Wife in 2020.

The trial court found that Wife provided evidentiary support for her testimony that

her net monthly income was $3,574.66 and that although Husband testified to $15,000.00

in gross monthly income and $4,500.00–$5,000.00 in net monthly income, he did not

provide proper evidentiary support. The trial court found that Wife made $28,635.88 in

mortgage payments and $1,400.00 in electrical services payments during the pendency of

the divorce action without contribution from Husband. The trial court described several

other payments made by Wife during the litigation, including $169.45 for electrical

services while Husband was living alone in the residence, $8,500.13 for insurance for

Husband’s benefit, $15,347.30 in farm expenses, and $2,477.90 spent to ready the parties’

residence for sale. As separate property, the trial court awarded Wife the $12,848.80 pre-

marital balance of her 401(k) account; Husband was awarded eight firearms.

In its consideration of the statutory factors relevant to the distribution of marital

property, the trial court found that the parties had similar financial needs, abilities to earn

future income, and contributions to the marital estate. The trial court found that Wife

earned less during the marriage, and that Wife had less disposable income. The trial court

also found that Husband removed and sold marital property without accounting for the

proceeds or recalling which property he removed. The trial court noted that the parties had

7

Husband testified that he was “on medication” and “so confused and emotionally disturbed that

week[,]” that he did not “remember what was sold, to whom it was sold, [or] how much it was sold for.”

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provided conflicting testimony as to the value of several items of marital property, but that

Wife explained that her values came from the Kelley Blue Book and Husband did not

provide testimony or evidentiary support as to his values.

The trial court made the following initial valuation and division of the parties’

marital property:

Marital Property Awarded to

Marital Property Awarded to Wife Husband

Post-marital 401(k) Balance $90,639.21 Pinnacle Account $2,000.00

2013 Acura -$3,139.008 Pinnacle Account $10,000.00

Pinnacle Account $400.00 2014 Mercedes $11,000.009

Outreach FCU Account $155.93 2000 Ford $10,000.00

Livestock Sale Proceeds $3,155.56 2014 Ford $14,000.00

Plants -- 2000 Mercedes $2,500.00

2000 Kubota $10,000.00

2018 Kioti $20,000.0010

2014 Polaris $4,000.00

2017 Trailer $2,00.00

John Deere $650.00

Farm Truck $1,000.00

Tools $32,500.00

Total $91,211.70 Total $119,750.00

Although the trial court listed several additional firearms as marital property, these items

were not included in the court’s distribution. The parties were responsible for any debts in

their individual names and their own attorney’s fees.

The trial court then awarded both parties $135,634.70 in proceeds from the sale of

the marital real property. Husband’s award was reduced, and Wife’s award increased, by

the following amounts, associated with Wife’s payments during the pendency of the action:

Full Mortgage Payment Reimbursement $28,635.88

Half Electrical Services Reimbursement $700.00

Full Husband’s Electrical Services Reimbursement $169.45

Full Insurance Reimbursement $8,500.13

8

This award includes the trial court’s finding of a $10,190.00 fair market value for the vehicle and

a $13,329.00 debt associated with the vehicle.

9

This award includes the trial court’s finding of an $18,000.00 fair market value for the vehicle

and a $7,000.00 debt associated with the vehicle.

10

This award includes the trial court’s finding of a $30,000.00 fair market value for the tractor and

a $10,000.00 debt associated with the tractor.

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Full Farm Expenses Reimbursement $7,673.65

Half House Sale Expenses Reimbursement $1,238.95

Total $46,918.06

The trial court also noticed that Husband received $28,538.30 more in the division of the

parties’ marital personal property and awarded Wife an additional $28,538.30 from the

proceeds of the sale of the real property. Accordingly, from the $271,269.40 in real

property proceeds, Husband was actually awarded $60,178.34 and Wife was actually

awarded $211,091.06.

Altogether, the trial court’s order valued the parties’ marital estate at $482,231.10.

Wife received $302,302.76, or approximately sixty-three percent of the estate. Husband

received $179,928.24, or approximately thirty-seven percent of the estate. Husband

subsequently filed this appeal.

II. ISSUES PRESENTED

Husband raises the following issues, taken directly from his brief:

I. Whether the trial court erred in classifying property as marital or separate

property and valuing that property, and if the trial court failed to classify

certain items entirely.

II. Whether the trial court erred in making an equitable distribution of the

parties’ marital assets and debts.

III. STANDARD OF REVIEW

The Tennessee Supreme Court has explained the applicable standard of review in

cases concerning the proper classification and distribution of assets incident to a divorce

as follows:

This Court gives great weight to the decisions of the trial court in dividing

marital assets and “we are disinclined to disturb the trial court’s decision

unless the distribution lacks proper evidentiary support or results in some

error of law or misapplication of statutory requirements and procedures.”

Herrera v. Herrera, 944 S.W.2d 379, 389 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1996). As such,

when dealing with the trial court’s findings of fact, we review the record de

novo with a presumption of correctness, and we must honor those findings

unless there is evidence which preponderates to the contrary. Tenn. R. App.

P. 13(d); Union Carbide Corp. v. Huddleston, 854 S.W.2d 87, 91 (Tenn.

1993). Because trial courts are in a far better position than this Court to

observe the demeanor of the witnesses, the weight, faith, and credit to be

given witnesses’ testimony lies in the first instance with the trial court.

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Roberts v. Roberts, 827 S.W.2d 788, 795 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1991).

Consequently, where issues of credibility and weight of testimony are

involved, this Court will accord considerable deference to the trial court’s

factual findings. In re M.L.P., 228 S.W.3d 139, 143 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2007)

(citing Seals v. England/Corsair Upholstery Mfg. Co., 984 S.W.2d 912, 915

(Tenn. 1999)). The trial court’s conclusions of law, however, are accorded

no presumption of correctness. Langschmidt v. Langschmidt, 81 S.W.3d

741, 744–45 (Tenn. 2002).

Keyt v. Keyt, 244 S.W.3d 321, 327 (Tenn. 2007). As such, our role is simply to “determine

whether the trial court applied the correct legal standards, whether the manner in which the

trial court weighed the factors in [Tennessee Code Annotated section] 36-4-121(c) is

consistent with logic and reason, and whether the evidence preponderates against the trial

court’s division of the marital property.” Farnham v. Farnham, 323 S.W.3d 129, 141

(Tenn. Ct. App. 2009) (citations omitted).

IV. ANALYSIS

In Tennessee, the division of a marital estate is essentially a three-step process. The

trial court (1) “must first identify all of the assets possessed by the divorcing parties as

either separate property or marital property”; (2) then “value the marital property”; and

finally, (3) “equitably divide the marital property in accordance with the factors provided

in Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-4-121(c), because ‘following this approach

generally yields consistent and equitable results.’” Snapp v. Snapp, No. E2023-00251-

COA-R3-CV, 2024 WL 3221027, at *3 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 28, 2024) (quoting Melvin v.

Johnson-Melvin, No. M2004-02106-COA-R3-CV, 2006 WL 1132042, at *10 (Tenn. Ct.

App. Apr. 27, 2006) (Koch, J., dissenting)). Husband argues that the trial court’s order

contained errors at each step in relation to various items of the parties’ property. We will

address each aspect of the division process in turn.

A. Classification

The classification of property as either separate or marital is a question of fact. Id.

(citing Cutsinger v. Cutsinger, 917 S.W.2d 238, 241 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1995)). Determining

whether an asset is separate property or marital property “is an important threshold matter

because courts do not have the authority to make a distribution of separate property.”

Summer v. Summer, 296 S.W.3d 57, 60 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2008).

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Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-4-121(b)(2)11 defines the separate property

of divorcing parties, which includes, but is not limited to, property acquired by a spouse

prior to the marriage. Marital property is defined in relevant part as follows:

all real and personal property, both tangible and intangible, acquired by either

or both spouses during the course of the marriage up to the date of the final

divorce hearing and owned by either or both spouses as of the date of filing

of a complaint for divorce, except in the case of fraudulent conveyance in

anticipation of filing, and including any property to which a right was

acquired up to the date of the final divorce hearing, and valued as of a date

as near as reasonably possible to the final divorce hearing date.

Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-4-121(b)(1)(A). As to the trial court’s classification of property,

Husband asserts two errors: the misclassification of several firearms as marital property

and the failure to classify stock provided as a benefit of Wife’s employment.

Husband argues that the trial court erred in not classifying all but the three firearms

he admittedly purchased during the marriage as his separate property. A discussion of the

proper classification of the firearms as asserted by Husband requires a review of the

firearms at issue. In his pre-trial disclosures, Husband provided a list of seventeen firearms.

Husband then identified another firearm at trial. The following chart contains the name of

each of the firearms listed by Husband and the trial court’s classification of each firearm:

Ruger GP-100 .357 mag revolver Marital

Heckler & Koch 9mm handgun Marital

Ruger MKII .22 caliber pistol Separate

Remington Model 512 .22 caliber rifle Marital

Savage .270 caliber rifle Separate

Marlin Model 336.30 .30/.30 lever rifle Separate

Winchester Model 70 30.06 rifle Separate

Remington Model 12a .22 caliber pump rifle Marital

Remington Model 870 12-gauge pump shotgun Separate

Iver Johnson .410-gauge single shotgun Marital

Daniel Defender AR15 .223 caliber rifle Marital

Arms AR15 .223 caliber rifle Marital

Glock 19 9mm handgun Separate

J.C. Higgins 12-gauge single shotgun Marital

J.C. Higgins 20-gauge single shotgun Separate

J.C. Higgins .410-gauge single shotgun Not Classified

Unknown make .22 caliber derringer Not Classified

11

The Legislature amended this statute in 2022. We cite to the version of the statute in effect when

Wife filed the divorce complaint throughout this Opinion.

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Beretta 20-gauge shotgun Separate

The trial court expressed its dissatisfaction with Husband’s testimony as to the

classification of the firearms, noting that:

Husband presented conflicting testimony as to the Firearms and

Miscellaneous Ammunition listed [as] being his separate property. Husband

admitted he had made the list of Firearms and Miscellaneous Ammunition

from his memory and for the first time disclosed there were a substantial

number of firearms being held by his brother and son. Husband did not

provide proper evidentiary proof to support his narrative that the remaining

Firearms or Miscellaneous Ammunition listed . . . were his separate property.

The main line of delineation between separate and marital property firearms appears to

have been whether Husband was able to identify the firearm in the photograph provided by

Wife: the trial court specifically classified the firearms “identified by Husband during

testimony” as his separate property, with “the remaining firearms . . . which Husband could

not identify” classified as marital property.

However, “separate property cannot, by definition, be included in the marital

estate,” and “[p]roperty should not be included in the marital estate unless a party can prove

that it is marital property[.]” Kinard v. Kinard, 986 S.W.2d 220, 232 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1998)

(citing Cutsinger, 917 S.W.2d at 241 (noting that, “as a threshold matter, property must

first qualify as marital property under T.C.A. § 36-4-121(b)(1)(A) or T.C.A. § 36-4-

121(b)(1)(B) before it can be subject to the court’s powers of equitable division under

T.C.A. § 36-4-121(a)(1)”)). Here, Husband testified that he owned the majority of the

firearms prior to the marriage. Wife also admitted that most of the firearms were Husband’s

separate property. Although a receipt for the Daniel Defender AR15 was the only proof of

purchase entered into evidence, Husband admitted that the Daniel Defender AR15, the

Arms AR15, and the Heckler & Koch 9mm handgun were purchased during the marriage.

Having failed to establish when the remaining firearms were purchased, Wife, as the

nonowner spouse, was unable to prove that the remaining firearms were marital property.

As such, “the trial court ha[d] no authority to make an equitable division of the property.”

Cutsinger, 917 S.W.2d at 241 (finding error where the trial court awarded the wife a

portion of the value of the husband’s chiropractic practice where she failed to provide proof

of an increase in value during the marriage).

The trial court’s classification of the Ruger GP-100 .357 mag revolver, the

Remington Model 12a .22 caliber pump rifle, the Iver Johnson .410-gauge single shotgun,

and the J.C. Higgins 12-gauge single shotgun as marital property is therefore reversed, for

lack of proof that these firearms were purchased during the marriage. We also note the trial

court’s failure to classify the .410-gauge J.C. Higgins shotgun and the .22 caliber derringer

of unknown make. See Pope v. Pope, No. M2010-00067-COA-R3-CV, 2010 WL 4272690,

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at *5 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 28, 2010) (noting that “it is the court’s responsibility to classify

all property as part of the equitable division; the failure to do so is error”). As no proof was

presented to establish that these firearms were purchased during the marriage, they should

also be classified as Husband’s separate property. See Clement v. Clement, No. W2003-

02388-COA-R3-CV, 2004 WL 3396472, at *8 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 30, 2004) (finding

that “in the absence of fact-finding we will evaluate the trial proof on [the classification

and valuation] issue de novo”).

Husband next argues that the trial court failed to classify the $8,733.90 in stock

owned by Wife as either separate or marital property. See Pope, 2010 WL 4272690, at *5.

Wife’s testimony at trial that the stock was a benefit of employment that began in 2016,

and that its value was accumulated during the marriage went uncontested. The proof thus

establishes that the stock also falls under the definition of marital property within

Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-4-121(b)(1) and should be included in the trial

court’s distribution of the marital estate. See Clement, 2004 WL 3396472, at *8; Kinard,

986 S.W.2d at 232.

B. Valuation

As this Court has explained concerning a trial court’s valuation of marital property:

The value of marital property is a question of fact, and a trial court’s decision

with regard to the value of a marital asset should be given great weight on

appeal. See Wallace v. Wallace, 733 S.W.2d 102, 107 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1987);

Lunn [v. Lunn], [No. E2014-00865-COA-R3-CV,] 2015 WL 4187344, at

*4 [(Tenn. Ct. App. June 29, 2015)]. A trial court’s decision with respect to

the valuation of a marital asset will be presumed to be correct unless the

evidence preponderates otherwise. See Wallace, 733 S.W.2d at 107. The trial

court should determine the value of a marital asset by considering all relevant

evidence regarding value, and the parties are bound by the evidence they

present. Id. The trial court, in its discretion, is free to place a value on a

marital asset that is within the range of the evidence submitted. Id.

Chase v. Chase, 670 S.W.3d 280, 302–03 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2022). Husband assigns error to

many of the trial court’s valuations, including for most of his marital property, as well as

the trial court’s failure to value the firearms classified as marital property.

We look first to the marital property that Husband asserts was valued too highly by

the trial court. The following indicates the values assigned to the disputed items by the

parties, and the trial court’s ultimate valuation of the property:

Item Husband’s Value Wife’s Value Trial Court’s Value

2014 Mercedes $15,000.00 $18,000.00 $18,000.00

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2014 Ford F-150 $8,000.00 $14,000.00 $14,000.00

2000 Kubota $6,000.00 $10,000.00 $10,000.00

2014 Polaris $2,500.00 $4,000.00 $4,000.00

Tools $15,000.00 $50,000.00 $32,500.00

Husband argues that, despite Wife’s testimony that she did not actually know how much

the items were worth, the trial court simply relied on the values provided by Wife for

several items.

To be sure, Wife was very candid in her testimony that she did not personally know

how much any of the vehicles were worth. However, Wife also testified that she used

Google and the Kelley Blue Book to arrive at the values she provided. As to the tools, Wife

admittedly “just pulled [her value] out of the air[.]”

On the other hand, Husband’s values were not always reliable either. Husband

provided no basis for his valuation of the 2014 Mercedes, and he agreed that his value for

the 2014 Ford was made up. Husband testified that the 2000 Kubota would be worth

$10,000.00, “[i]f it was in good condition,” but that it was currently worth only $6,000.00

because it had been wrecked and rebuilt in 2020, after the divorce was filed and while in

his sole possession. Husband testified that he sold the 2014 Polaris for $2,500.00, but later

admitted that based on being “on medication” and “so confused and emotionally disturbed”

that he could not “remember what was sold, to whom it was sold, [or] how much it was

sold for.” Husband also explained that the value he provided for his tools was an estimate.

Thus, the trial court was faced with evidence of value that was both conflicting and

admittedly not especially credible. In such situations, the trial court is within its discretion

to assign a value within the range of values provided, and we presume its findings to be

correct unless the evidence preponderates against them. See Chase, 670 S.W.3d at 302–03.

So too do we afford the trial court’s implicit credibility determinations significant

deference. See Kautz v. Berberich, No. E2019-00796-COA-R3-CV, 2021 WL 1034987, at

*7 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 18, 2021) (“We will not overturn a trial court’s credibility

determination—be it implicit or explicit—absent clear and convincing evidence to the

contrary.”). We do not conclude that the trial court erred in assigning values to these items

of marital property within the ranges provided by the parties.

Husband also argues that the trial court assigned too low of a value to certain debts.

He explains that his testimony regarding the $8,000.00 debt on the 2014 Mercedes went

uncontested, yet the trial court found the debt to be $7,000.00. Similarly, Husband’s

testimony regarding the $20,000.00 debt on the 2018 Kioti was not disputed by Wife, yet

the trial court found the debt to be $10,000.00. The trial court’s order does not include any

findings as to the value of these debts, and our review of the record has not uncovered any

explanation for these discrepancies. See Tenn. R. Civ. P. 52.01 (requiring that courts in

bench trials “shall find the facts specially and shall state separately its conclusions of law”).

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Accordingly, we vacate these values and remand the matter to the trial court for the entry

of written findings reevaluating these issues and/or explaining the valuation chosen. See

Wilson v. Wilson, 2021 WL 516980 at *5 (Tenn. Ct. App., 2021) (providing that in the

absence of factual findings as to the value of certain marital property, we may either vacate

and remand the decision or conduct a de novo review based on “the particular

circumstances of the case”).

Finally, we note that the trial court neglected to include the value of any of the

firearms in its final order. Pursuant to our earlier classification of the majority of the

firearms as Husband’s separate property, this failure is rendered harmless. As to the three

marital firearms, we look to the record to determine where the preponderance of the

evidence lies. See id. Here, Husband’s values were the only ones submitted; according to

Husband, the three marital property firearms are worth a total of $5,100.00. Wife did not

offer any values for the firearms and testified that Husband could “have the money” if the

firearms were sold as she requested. We determine that it would thus be reasonable for the

three marital property firearms to be valued at $5,100.00. See Blevins v. Blevins, No.

M2002-02583-COA-R3-CV, 2003 WL 23094162, *3 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 30, 2003)

(“Husband and Wife both had the burden of bringing forth evidence regarding the value of

marital assets, and they are bound by the evidence they present[ed], or in this case, did not

present.”). This amount should therefore be reflected in the calculation of the parties’ total

marital property awards after the firearms are distributed.

C. Distribution

As for the final step in the division of a marital estate, Tennessee Code Annotated

section 36-4-121 requires an equitable distribution of marital property, not an equal

distribution. See Tenn. Code. Ann. § 36-4-121(a)(1) (“In all actions for divorce or legal

separation, the court having jurisdiction thereof may . . . equitably divide, distribute or

assign the marital property between the parties without regard to marital fault in

proportions as the court deems just.”). Indeed, “[a] trial court’s decision regarding equitable

division of marital property ‘is not a mechanical one and is not rendered inequitable

because it is not precisely equal or because both parties did not receive a share of each

piece of property.’” Green v. Green, No. W2019-01416-COA-R3-CV, 2021 WL 1343569,

at *4 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 12, 2021) (quoting Brown v. Brown, 913 S.W.2d 163, 168

(Tenn. Ct. App. 1994)). “The trial court is empowered to do what is reasonable under the

circumstances and has broad discretion in the equitable division of the marital estate.” Keyt,

244 S.W.3d at 328. Section 36-4-121 provides a non-exhaustive list of factors to be

considered by the trial court in creating an equitable division of marital property. See Tenn.

Code Ann. § 36-4-121(c) (including eleven specific factors and a twelfth factor directing

the court to consider “[s]uch other factors as are necessary to consider the equities between

the parties”); see also Manis v. Manis, 49 S.W.3d 295, 306 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2001) (holding

that appellate courts reviewing a distribution of marital property “ordinarily defer to the

trial judge’s decision unless it is inconsistent with the factors in Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-4-

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121(c) or is not supported by a preponderance of the evidence”).

In its order, the trial court considered the majority of the section 36-4-121(c) factors

to be neutral. The trial court found that this was the second marriage for both parties and

that the parties are of a similar age and state of wellbeing, with similar earning capacities

and financial needs. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-4-121(c)(1), (2), (4), (8). The trial court

found that neither party contributed to the education or business of the other and that both

parties contributed to the acquisition of marital property. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-4-

121(c)(3), (5), (10). The main differences the trial court found included the value of the

parties’ separate property, as Husband did not provide a complete accounting of his

firearms, and the parties’ disposable income, based on Husband’s failure to provide proof

of having filed taxes and his failure to account for the proceeds of his sale of various marital

property. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-4-121(c)(6), (7), (12). Considering the similarity of

the parties under this analysis, Husband argues that the trial court’s “completely one-sided

distribution” of the marital estate “bent over backwards to punish [] Husband” and was

therefore not equitable.

Husband’s main argument as to the distribution of the marital estate is that Wife

received too great a share of the proceeds from the sale of the parties’ real property.

Specifically, Husband points to the trial court (1) awarding Wife $28,538.30 as an

“equalizing adjustment” to rectify Husband receiving the same amount more than Wife “in

the division of the parties’ personal marital property”; and (2) awarding Wife $28,635.88

as reimbursement in full for mortgage payments made during the litigation. Husband also

argues that the trial court erred by not considering the $63,000.00 in withdrawals from

Wife’s 401(k) account during the litigation at all in its analysis. We begin with this last

argument, as its resolution impacts that of the prior two.

Husband argues that the trial court erred in not including the 2020 and 2021

withdrawals from Wife’s 401(k) account in the value assigned to the account. There is no

dispute that the $12,848,80 balance in the account prior to the parties’ marriage constituted

Wife’s separate property. Instead, Husband asserts that the $63,000.00 withdrawn from the

account during the divorce proceedings should have been factored into the marital portion

of the account’s balance. Husband emphasizes that Wife admitted that this money was used

to maintain the parties’ farm property and to cover legal fees associated with the divorce.

Yet, Wife was awarded $7,673.65 extra in proceeds from the sale of the marital property

as reimbursement in full for the money spent to maintain the farm property. And although

Wife requested $17,666.00 in attorney’s fees, the trial court found that “[e]ach party has

sufficient assets to pay their respective attorney’s fees and each party shall pay their own

attorney’s fees.” Thus, Husband argues, the trial court’s failure to consider the withdrawals

from Wife’s 401(k) account, allowed Wife to (1) receive marital funds in recompense for

expenses that Wife had already paid with marital funds, and (2) use marital funds for an

expense that the trial court later found should not be paid for with marital funds. Husband

also posits that factoring this additional $63,000.00 into the marital property award

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received by Wife would call into question the equitability of the $28,538.30 “equalizing

adjustment” Wife received to rectify the trial court’s finding that Husband received a

greater share of the parties’ marital property.

We note that the trial court’s order is silent as to the withdrawals from the 401(k)

account, despite Husband raising this issue at trial. It is arguably possible to read the trial

court’s order as implicitly rejecting Husband’s argument by virtue of the trial court not

including this $63,000.00 in its valuation and distribution of the marital portion of the

account. See Morgan Keegan & Co. v. Smythe, 401 S.W.3d 595, 608 (Tenn. 2013)

(“[W]hen construing orders and judgments, effect must be given to that which is clearly

implied, as well as to that which is expressly stated.”). In bench trials, however, trial courts

are required to do more than address arguments by implication. Specifically, Rule 52.01 of

the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure states that “[i]n all actions tried upon the facts

without a jury, the court shall find the facts specially and shall state separately its

conclusions of law[.]” Moreover, as this Court’s jurisdiction is appellate only, we are

limited to consideration of only “those issues that have been formulated and passed upon

in some inferior tribunal.” State v. Bristol, 654 S.W.3d 917, 925 (Tenn. 2022) (internal

quotation marks, brackets, and citation omitted).

Even if we were to attempt to soldier on and consider this issue in the first instance,

we are without sufficient evidence to properly consider the effect of these withdrawals on

the distribution of the parties’ marital estate. Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-4-121

is clear that withdrawals from a retirement account containing marital property must be

considered in the distribution of the account incident to divorce. Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-4-

121(b)(1)(B)(iii) (explaining that the purposes to which withdrawn funds are put influence

how the funds are classified). This in turn relies on the intricate classification of the funds

in the account. Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-4-121(b)(1)(B)(iii) (requiring trial courts to separate

as best as possible the “postmarital appreciation to the value of the premarital benefits,”

from the “contributions made during the marriage, if made as a result of employment

during the marriage and the appreciation attributable to these contributions”).12 Without an

understanding of how much of the account was actually marital property, we cannot say

how the $63,000.00 in withdrawals affects Wife’s award. In turn, without an accurate

accounting of the value of the marital property received by Wife, we do not have a full

picture of the distribution of the marital estate, thus hampering our ability to determine

whether the division was equitable. See Kinard, 986 S.W.2d at 233 (noting that while the

division of retirement benefits “need not be mathematically precise[,]” it must “reflect

essential fairness in light of the facts” (citations omitted)).

12

See Erdman v. Erdman, No. M2018-01668-COA-R3-CV, 2019 WL 6716305, at *3 (Tenn. Ct.

App. Dec. 10, 2019) (noting that the specificity in classification required by subsection (iii) was a new

directive to trial courts, and that “[p]reviously, it was the law that any gain to such a 401(k) account that

accrued during the marriage would be deemed marital property”).

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Given the substantial value of the withdrawals from the account, the potential effect

of including this amount into the analysis of the parties’ awards, the intricacies of properly

evaluating both the account and the withdrawals as directed by section 36-4-121, and the

lack of factual findings as to these questions, the trial court’s classification, valuation, and

distribution of Wife’s 401(k) account must be vacated. See Wilson, 2021 WL 516980 at *5

(including “the adequacy of the record [and] the fact-intensive nature of the case” among

the “particular circumstances” that would support the vacating of a trial court’s decision

not sufficiently supported by factual findings); Mumford, 2004 WL 483213, at *9 (“A trial

court’s discretionary decision must take into account applicable law and be consistent with

the facts before the court.”). The trial court, in its discretion, may hear additional proof,

including expert proof, to resolve this issue. Erdman, 2019 WL 6716305, at *3.

In light of the unresolved 401(k) matter, we must also vacate the trial court’s

distribution of marital property at large. See id. (vacating the overall division of property

after reversing the classification of the husband’s retirement accounts based on the

requirements of section 36-4-121(b)(1)(B)(iii)). As discussed in detail, supra, several

aspects of this Opinion will also affect the ultimate distribution of the parties’ marital

estate. The three firearms classified as marital property need to be distributed to a party,

adding $5,100.00 to that party’s award. The $8,733.90 in marital property stock must also

be distributed, with its value included in the receiving party’s total award. See Hill v. Hill,

No. M2011-02253-COA-R3-CV, 2012 WL 4762110, at *3 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 5, 2012)

(noting that “this court cannot evaluate the equity of the trial court’s division of the marital

assets (and debts) without a valuation and division” of all of the parties’ assets); Pope, 2010

WL 4272690, at *6 (“In light of the court’s failure to classify and assign values to all

marital property, there is insufficient evidence to support the division of marital

property.”). So too might Husband’s award need to be adjusted based on the trial court’s

consideration of the discrepancies in the value of certain debts and the various

reimbursements made to Wife out of the proceeds of the marital residence.13 See Anderton

v. Anderton, 988 S.W.2d 675, 679 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1998) (“The dissolution of a marriage

requires the courts to engage in the orderly disentanglement of the parties’ personal and

financial affairs. Many of the issues that must be addressed during this process are

interrelated, and the disposition of earlier issues directly influence the decision on later

issues.”). We therefore vacate the distribution of marital property ordered by the trial court

and remand for further proceedings in light of this Opinion. The trial court, in its discretion,

may consider additional evidence, as necessary, to resolve these issues.

V. CONCLUSION

13

As “the justness of a particular division of the marital property and allocation of marital debt

depends on its final results[,]” Husband’s argument regarding the trial court awarding Wife the entire

$28,635.88 in mortgage payments made during the course of this litigation is pretermitted by our decision

to vacate the trial court’s division of marital property. King v. King, 986 S.W.2d 216, 219 (Tenn. Ct. App.

1998) (quoting Roseberry v. Roseberry, No. 03A01-9706-CH-00237, 1998 WL 47944, at *4 (Tenn. Ct.

App. Feb. 9, 1998)).

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The judgment of the Cannon County Chancery Court is affirmed in part, vacated in

part, and reversed in part, and this matter is remanded to the trial court for proceedings

consistent with this Opinion. Costs of this appeal are taxed one-half to Appellant Jack

Elmer Taylor, Jr., and one-half to Appellee Vicki Marlene (Almonrode) Taylor, for which

execution may issue if necessary.

S/ J. Steven Stafford

J. STEVEN STAFFORD, JUDGE

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