The opinion
[J-8-2024] [MO: McCaffery, J.]
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA
MIDDLE DISTRICT
CIRCLE OF SEASONS CHARTER : No. 99 MAP 2022
SCHOOL, :
: Appeal from the Order of the
Appellee : Commonwealth Court dated March
: 14, 2022 at No. 1255 CD 2020
: Reversing the Order of the Lehigh
v. : County Court of Common Pleas,
: Civil Division, dated November 9,
: 2020 at No. 2019-C-3837 and
NORTHWESTERN LEHIGH SCHOOL : Remanding with directives to
DISTRICT, : transfer to the County of Lehigh
: Court of Assessment Appeals.
Appellant :
: ARGUED: March 5, 2024
CONCURRING OPINION
JUSTICE MUNDY DECIDED: September 26, 2024
Pursuant to the County Assessment Law (“Assessment Law”), 53 Pa.C.S.
§§ 8801-8868, a county assessment office has the authority to change the assessment
of an existing property so long as it provides the property’s owner notice in accordance
with Section 8844 of the statute. 58 Pa.C.S. § 8841(c). Section 8844 requires the county
assessment office to mail the property owner notice of any change in assessment, which
must include, inter alia, the notice’s mailing date. Id. at § 8844(a)(1). The notice must
also state “that any persons aggrieved by the assessment … may file an appeal to the
board within 40 days of the date of the notice.” Id. at § 8844(b). While a defective notice
will not be grounds for setting aside an assessment, “upon proof of defective notice, the
aggrieved party or taxing district shall have the right to a hearing before the board.” Id.
at § 8845.
It is undisputed that the Notices the county assessment board sent to the Charter
School changing the status of the school’s properties from “Non-Taxable Assessed” to
“Taxable Assessed” did not include the Notices’ mailing date. Therefore, under a plain
reading of the Assessment Law, the Notices were defective, and the Charter School was
entitled to a hearing before the board to challenge its new assessment. Based in part on
the defective nature of the Notices, the Commonwealth Court concluded the Charter
School was entitled to such a hearing in this matter.
The Majority criticizes the Commonwealth Court’s holding due to the fact that the
Charter School conceded it was aware of the change in the assessment as of November
2017 when it received the School District’s reminder notices and subsequently paid the
delinquent taxes. Maj. Op. at 20. The Assessment Law does not indicate that a taxpayer
is not entitled to a hearing as a result of a defective notice if they were aware of the
change in the assessment or if they paid the newly assessed taxes. Rather, the statute
simply states that a taxpayer is entitled to a hearing before the board if the new
assessment notice is defective. 58 Pa.C.S. § 8845 (“[U]pon proof of defective notice, the
aggrieved party or taxing district shall have the right to a hearing before the
board.”) (emphasis added). By focusing on this irrelevant detail, the Majority has created
a new hurdle taxpayers must overcome in order to receive the hearing they are entitled
to as a result of defective notices that does not have any foundation in the text of the
Assessment Law.
That being the case, as aptly observed by the Majority, the Charter School filed an
annual appeal and had a hearing in front of the board, where it failed to seek retroactive
application of its tax-exempt status, a redesignation of its 2017 and 2018 assessment
status, request a refund of the 2017 taxes paid, or seek a discharge of the 2018 tax
invoices. Maj. Op. at 20. The Charter School further failed to appeal the board’s decision
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granting its properties tax exempt status effective January 1, 2019. The Charter School
thus received the hearing before the board it was entitled to as a result of the defective
Notices and nothing in the Assessment Law provides that a defective notice entitles a
taxpayer to multiple hearings before the board. Thus, the Charter School’s failure to raise
all of its issues at that hearing resulted in waiver of those issues. Consequently, I agree
with the Majority’s determination that, under the specific circumstances of this case, the
Charter School is not entitled to nunc pro tunc relief in the form of another hearing before
the board.
While this outcome results in the School District being permitted to retain the taxes
erroneously paid by the Charter School, the School District is not without fault here. The
School District argues that “a charter school could presumably own property before they
obtain their charter or after their charter is revoked, and in those instances they would
absolutely not be entitled to [tax] exemption.” Appellant’s Reply Brief at 3. That is clearly
not the situation in this case, as the School District concedes the Charter School is entitled
to tax exemption. See Appellant’s Brief at 27. Indeed, the School District approved the
Charter School’s charter beginning in the 2013-2014 school year. Then in September
2016, the School District renewed the charter for an additional five-year term. At the time
of the charter’s renewal, it was operating its charter school from the subject properties,
then owned by Pennsylvania State University. As such, the School District knew the
Charter School was operating a charter school on the subject properties, and thus entitled
to a tax exemption, at the time it first sent the Charter School real estate tax bills in July
2017 and reminder invoices in November 2017, demanding $122,980.84 in taxes to which
it knew it was not entitled. The School District compounded its actions by sending the
Charter School an annual tax invoice in July 2018 for the 2018 tax year, at the same
[J-8-2024] [MO: McCaffery, J.] - 3
mailing address the Charter School had been operating at since the School District initially
granted the charter for the 2013-2014 school year.
After the Charter School paid the taxes and brought the issue to the School
District’s attention by filing an annual appeal challenging the assessment of the subject
properties as taxable in July 2018, the School District failed to acknowledge the Charter
School’s clear right to a tax exemption and return the tax payments it was not entitled to
have received. Instead, the School District has vigorously fought throughout the litigation
for the right to retain its undeserved financial windfall. The School District argues it would
be “unjust” to force it to return taxes paid by the Charter School. See Appellant’s Brief at
27. To the contrary, what is unjust is permitting taxing entities in this Commonwealth to
knowingly collect taxes they are not entitled to and then allowing them to retain those
monies simply because the taxpayer has already paid them, and the taxing entity has
already spent them. Unfortunately, due to the Charter School’s failure to raise the issue
at its hearing in front of the board or appeal the board’s decision, the School District will
receive the financial windfall it has been seeking. While I am constrained to join the
Majority’s disposition, I note my expectation that our public institutions, especially school
districts which are charged with educating our children, exercise good faith and candor in
taxing entities and individuals within their districts. In my view, the School District has
fallen short of this expectation.
[J-8-2024] [MO: McCaffery, J.] - 4