“A right is ‘clearly established’ when its contours are sufficiently defined, such that ‘a reasonable official would understand that what he is doing violates that right.’” (quoting Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 615 (1999))
How later courts described this case
- “A right is ‘clearly established’ when its contours are sufficiently defined, such that ‘a reasonable official would understand that what he is doing violates that right.’” (quoting Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 615 (1999))
- setting forth standard of review for Rule 19 determinations
- setting forth standard of review and explaining 2 23-35253 that leave to amend may be denied when amendment would be futile
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS SEP 24 2024
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
CHARLES V. FARNSWORTH, No. 23-35253
Plaintiff-Appellant, D.C. No. 3:20-cv-05007-MJP
v.
MEMORANDUM*
TEDDI ARMSTRONG; JACKIE
BRENNAN; BRUCE C. GAGE, Doctor;
WASHINGTON STATE DEPARTMENT
OF CORRECTIONS; FIVE UNKNOWN
HEALTH CARE PROVIDERS,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Washington
Marsha J. Pechman, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted September 17, 2024**
Before: WARDLAW, BADE, and H.A. THOMAS, Circuit Judges.
Washington state prisoner Charles V. Farnsworth appeals pro se from the
district court’s summary judgment in his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs. We have jurisdiction under 28
U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo. Furnace v. Sullivan, 705 F.3d 1021, 1026
(9th Cir. 2013). We affirm.
The district court properly granted summary judgment to defendant Nee on
the basis of qualified immunity because Farnsworth failed to show that Nee
violated any clearly established constitutional right in treating Farnsworth. See
Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 232 (2009) (“Qualified immunity is applicable
unless the official’s conduct violated a clearly established constitutional right.”);
Foster v. Runnels, 554 F.3d 807, 815 (9th Cir. 2009) (“A right is ‘clearly
established’ when its contours are sufficiently defined, such that ‘a reasonable
official would understand that what he is doing violates that right.’” (quoting
Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 615 (1999))).
The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Farnsworth’s
requests to join additional defendants or amend his complaint to add the new
defendants because Farnsworth failed to show that the proposed defendants were
necessary parties or that amendment would not be futile. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 19
(setting forth requirements for joinder of parties); Deschutes River All. v. Portland
Gen. Elec. Co., 1 F.4th 1153, 1158 (9th Cir. 2021) (setting forth standard of review
for Rule 19 determinations); Cervantes v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 656
F.3d 1034, 1041 (9th Cir. 2011) (setting forth standard of review and explaining
2 23-35253
that leave to amend may be denied when amendment would be futile).
Farnsworth’s request that the reply brief be considered by the court prior to
its disposition (Docket Entry No. 15) is granted.
AFFIRMED.
3 23-35253