Terazze Taylor v. Washington Department of Corrections

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS SEP 23 2024

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

TERAZZE A TAYLOR, No. 23-35046

Plaintiff-Appellant, D.C. No. 3:21-cv-05224-RJB

v.

MEMORANDUM*

WASHINGTON DEPARTMENT OF

CORRECTIONS; ALYSSA KEKOA-

OSHIRO; JAQUELINE NELSON; DAVID

SATHERS NELSON; JEFF KINNE;

DANIELLE ARMBRUSTER; STEPHEN

SINCLAIR; MAURO PARTIDA; GWIN

PENSROSE; JOHN DOES 1-50,

Defendants-Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Washington

Robert J. Bryan, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted September 23, 2024**

Before: FERNANDEZ, KLEINFELD, and SILVERMAN, Circuit Judges.

*

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent

except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

**

The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

Plaintiff-appellant Terazze Taylor appeals the district court’s summary

judgment in his action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, in favor of defendants-appellees

Washington Department of Corrections (“DOC”) and several prison officials and

employees. We review de novo. Stewart v. Aranas, 32 F.4th 1192, 1195 (9th Cir.

2022) (qualified immunity); Hamby v. Hammond, 821 F.3d 1085, 1090 (9th Cir.

2016) (summary judgment). We affirm.

The district court properly dismissed Taylor’s claims against the Washington

DOC and prison officials in their official capacities, because these defendants are

not “persons” for purposes of § 1983. See Flint v. Dennison, 488 F.3d 816, 824-25

(9th Cir. 2007) (explaining that states or governmental entities that are considered

“arms of the State” for Eleventh Amendment purposes are not “persons” under

§ 1983; a suit against a state official in their official capacity is no different from a

suit against the State itself).

The district court properly dismissed Taylor’s state-law claims against the

Washington DOC and prison official in their official capacities based on Eleventh

Amendment immunity. See Yakama Indian Nation v. State of Wash. Dep’t of

Revenue, 176 F.3d 1241, 1245 (9th Cir. 1999) (recognizing that Eleventh

Amendment bars suits against state or its agencies unless state unequivocally

consents to waiver of immunity).

2

The district court properly dismissed Taylor’s claims against the individual

defendants based on qualified immunity. See Inouye v. Kemna, 504 F.3d 705, 712

(9th Cir. 2007) (as amended) (protecting government officials performing

discretionary functions if their conduct does not violate clearly established

statutory or constitutional rights of which reasonable person would have known).

The district court correctly dismissed Taylor’s claim under the Health

Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA), because HIPAA does not

contain a private cause of action. See Garmon v. Cty. of Los Angeles, 828 F.3d

837, 847 (9th Cir. 2016).

The district court did not abuse its discretion in declining to exercise

supplemental jurisdiction over Taylor’s remaining state law claims. See 28 U.S.C.

§ 1367(c); Arroyo v. Rosas, 19 F.4th 1202, 1210 (9th Cir. 2021) (citing standard of

review and considerations of economy, convenience, fairness, and comity).

We decline to review any remaining issues that were not raised before the

district court. Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 986 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).

AFFIRMED.

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