Eadie v. Complete Co., Inc.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF TENNESSEE

AT NASHVILLE

June 2, 2004 Session

CHRISTOPHER A. EADIE v. COMPLETE CO., INC., ET AL.

An Appeal from the Supreme Court Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel

Circuit Court for Williamson County

No. I-98373 R. E. Lee Davies, Judge

No. M2002-02010-SC-WCM-CV - Filed August 27, 2004

We granted review in this case to consider whether an employee is barred from seeking workers’

compensation benefits in Tennessee because the employee made a binding election of remedies by

pursuing benefits for the same injury in another state. We hold that the employee’s filing of a claim

in South Carolina, his request for a hearing there, and the taking of depositions in that matter

constitute affirmative acts to obtain benefits in another state sufficient to constitute a binding election

of remedies that bars the employee’s Tennessee claim. Therefore, we reject the conclusion of the

Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel on this issue and affirm the judgment of the trial

court.

Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-225(e) Appeal as of Right; Findings of Fact and

Conclusions of Law of the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel Rejected;

Judgment of the Trial Court Affirmed

JANICE M. HOLDER, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which E. RILEY ANDERSON , ADOLPHO

A. BIRCH , JR., and WILLIAM M. BARKER, JJ., and JERRY L. SMITH , SP .J., joined. FRANK F.

DROWOTA , III, C.J., not participating.

James R. Tomkins, Nashville, Tennessee, for the appellants-defendants, Complete Company, Inc.

and Westfield Insurance Companies.

Phillip R. Newman, Franklin, Tennessee, for the appellee-plaintiff, Christopher A. Eadie.

OPINION

Factual and Procedural Background

In June of 1997, Christopher A. Eadie (“the employee”), a South Carolina resident, sustained

serious and permanent injuries arising out of a motor vehicle accident that occurred in Georgia. At

the time of the accident, the employee was working for Complete Company, Inc. (“Complete”), a

Tennessee corporation. Complete had an agreement with The Home Depot U.S.A., Inc. (“Home

Depot”) to make concrete repairs to its stores in multiple states. When the accident occurred, the

employee was hauling a load of cement through Georgia to be used in a concrete repair job at a

Home Depot store in North Carolina.

In the fall of 1997, the employee filed an original and an amended claim in South Carolina

seeking “any and all rights he is entitled to under the workers’ compensation laws of South

Carolina.” He specifically requested a hearing in that proceeding. Depositions were taken in the

South Carolina matter in February of 1998, with employee’s counsel deposing the owner of

Complete. In June of 1998, the employee filed a claim with the Georgia State Board of Workers’

Compensation. Shortly thereafter, the employee filed suit in Tennessee seeking workers’

compensation benefits from both Home Depot and Complete. After the Tennessee claim was filed,

the employee filed an additional claim in the North Carolina Industrial Commission seeking medical

and disability benefits under that state’s laws. There has been no activity in the Georgia and North

Carolina cases beyond the filing of claims. The employee has not received benefits as a result of his

claims in any of the four states.

Complete and its workers’ compensation insurance carrier, Westfield Insurance Companies

(“Westfield”), filed a motion for summary judgment in this case, contending: 1) the employee was

an independent contractor; and 2) the employee was precluded from pursuing benefits in Tennessee

because he made a binding election of remedies by seeking benefits in other states. Home Depot

also filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that the employee was an independent contractor

of Home Depot.

The trial court granted the defendants’ motions for summary judgment and dismissed the

case. The trial court determined that the employee was an independent contractor of Home Depot

and that Home Depot was not liable for workers’ compensation benefits. The trial court did not rule

on Complete and Westfield’s assertion that the employee was also an independent contractor of

Complete.1 Instead, the trial court found that the employee made a binding election of remedies and

therefore was barred from recovering benefits from Complete or Westfield in Tennessee. The

employee appealed.

The Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel affirmed the trial court’s finding that the

employee was an independent contractor of Home Depot. The employee does not contest this

determination. The Panel reversed the trial court’s finding that the employee made a binding

election of remedies by pursuing benefits in other states and remanded the case to the trial court.

Complete and Westfield filed a motion for review pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section

50-6-225(e)(5)(B). We granted full Court review.

1

This case has been pending since 1998. Given the importance of expediting workers’ compensation cases, see

Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-225(f) (Supp. 2003), we encourage trial courts to address each ground alleged in a motion for

summary judgment. If the trial court addresses each ground that is raised, an injured worker’s case will not be

unnecessarily delayed due to a remand for findings on alternate grounds.

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ANALYSIS

A trial court’s grant of a motion for summary judgment presents a question of law. Goodloe

v. State, 36 S.W.3d 62, 65 (Tenn. 2001). An appeal from a grant of summary judgment is governed

by Rule 56 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure (“Rule 56”). Id. Under Rule 56, an appellate

court must review the record without a presumption of correctness to determine whether the absence

of genuine and material factual issues entitles the moving party to judgment as a matter of law. See

Tenn. R. Civ. P. 56.04; Goodloe, 36 S.W.3d at 65.

The material facts in this case are not in dispute. There is no question that the employee filed

claims for benefits in three states in addition to the claim filed in Tennessee. In the South Carolina

matter, the employee requested a hearing and participated in depositions, including the deposition

of Complete’s owner. There has been no activity in furtherance of the claims in Georgia or North

Carolina. None of these claims has been denied, and the employee has received no workers’

compensation benefits.

The employee contends that his actions with regard to his claims for workers’ compensation

benefits in other states are not sufficient to constitute a binding election. We disagree.

An employee who suffers a compensable injury in another state may be barred from

recovering benefits under Tennessee law through the election of remedies doctrine. This doctrine

is designed to prevent forum shopping, vexatious litigation, and double recovery for the same injury.

Bradshaw v. Old Republic Ins. Co., 922 S.W.2d 503, 506 (Tenn. 1996) (quoting Gray v. Holloway

Constr. Co., 834 S.W.2d 277, 282 (Tenn. 1992)). For the doctrine to apply, it is not necessary that

the employee actually receive benefits in another state. See id. at 507. Rather, the employee is

precluded from receiving benefits in Tennessee if the worker “(a) affirmatively acted to obtain

benefits in another state; or (b) knowingly and voluntarily accepted benefits under the law of another

state.” Id. “[T]he circumstances of each case must be considered in determining whether the

employee has made a binding election.” Perkins v. BE & K, Inc., 802 S.W.2d 215, 217 (Tenn.

1990).

In this case, it is clear that the employee “affirmatively acted to obtain benefits in another

state.” Bradshaw, 922 S.W.2d at 507. In particular, he actively initiated proceedings seeking to

obtain benefits by filing a claim in the State of South Carolina, requesting a hearing, and

participating in depositions in that matter. We construe these actions of the employee as affirmative

conduct constituting a binding election of remedies.

The election of remedies doctrine is not intended either as a trap or a penalty for a mere

mistake. Id. This is not a case of an employee mistakenly proceeding or signing documents without

adequate notice or knowledge. See, e.g., Gray, 834 S.W.2d at 282; Hale v. Fraley’s Inc., 825 S.W.2d

690, 692 (Tenn. 1990). The employee was represented by counsel at all times; each filing was a

conscious decision to pursue benefits, and in one of the claims affirmative action was taken to obtain

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these benefits. Thus, the present case is unlike cases in which we have held that there was no

binding election of remedies.

CONCLUSION

We hold that the filing of a claim in South Carolina, the request for a hearing there, and the

taking of depositions in that matter constitute affirmative acts to obtain benefits in another state

sufficient to constitute a binding election of remedies that bars the employee’s Tennessee claim.

Therefore, we reject the conclusion of the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel on this

issue and affirm the judgment of the trial court. Costs are taxed to the appellant, Christopher A.

Eadie, and his surety, for which execution may issue if necessary.

___________________________________

JANICE M. HOLDER, JUSTICE

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