The opinion
[Cite as Todor v. Ballesteros-Cuberos, 2024-Ohio-4525.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
TWELFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO
BUTLER COUNTY
ELENA TODOR, :
Appellee, : CASE NO. CA2024-02-025
: OPINION
- vs - 9/16/2024
:
ALVARO BALLESTEROS-CUBEROS, :
Appellant. :
CIVIL APPEAL FROM BUTLER COUNTY COURT OF COMMON PLEAS
DOMESTIC RELATIONS DIVISION
Case No. DR 2022 07 0498
Cornetet, Meyer, Rush & Spillane, and Karen P. Meyer, for appellee.
Caparella-Kraemer & Associates, LLC, and Bradley M. Kraemer, for appellant.
PIPER, J.
{¶ 1} Alvaro Ballesteros-Cuberos appeals from the divorce decree entered by the
Butler County Domestic Relations Court. He challenges the trial court's classification of
certain property as separate or marital property. Finding no error in the court's
classifications, we affirm.
Butler CA2024-02-025
I. Factual and Procedural Background
{¶ 2} Ballesteros-Cuberos and Elena Todor were married on August 20, 2006.
They have three children together. The parties separated in 2021, and in July 2022 Todor
filed for divorce.
{¶ 3} During the divorce proceedings, the parties disputed the classification of an
apartment in New Belgrade, Serbia, that Todor owned, and Ballesteros-Cuberos's Quilter
International Pension Fund (valued at €124,750 euros) and bank account in Spain
(containing €4,000 euros). After an evidentiary hearing, the trial court found that the
apartment was Todor's separate property, having been given as a gift to her alone by her
mother. And the court determined that the pension fund and bank account were marital
property.
{¶ 4} On January 26, 2024, the court entered the decree of divorce, which
awarded Todor the apartment and divided the pension fund and bank account equally.
{¶ 5} Ballesteros-Cuberos appealed.
II. Analysis
{¶ 6} Ballesteros-Cuberos presents two assignments of error challenging the
classification of the apartment in Serbia, the pension fund, and the bank account in Spain.
{¶ 7} The division of property in divorce proceedings follows a two-step process.
Smith v. Smith, 2023-Ohio-982, ¶ 28 (12th Dist.). The initial step requires the court to
classify the parties' property as either marital or separate. Id.; R.C. 3105.171(B). Then
the court equitably distributes the marital and separate property between the spouses.
Id. at ¶ 29; R.C. 3105.171(B).
{¶ 8} A trial court's classification of property as marital or separate is subject to
the manifest-weight-of-the-evidence standard of review and will be upheld if it is
supported by competent and credible evidence. Id. at ¶ 28. This standard reflects the
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deference given to the court's fact-finding role in these matters.
{¶ 9} Ohio law provides a statutory framework for distinguishing separate and
marital property. R.C. 3105.171(A)(3)(a)(i) defines "marital property" as encompassing
all real and personal property currently owned by either or both spouses that was acquired
during the marriage. Importantly, R.C. 3105.171(A)(3)(b) explicitly excludes separate
property from the definition of marital property. Assets that are considered "separate
property" are listed in R.C. 3105.171(A)(6)(a). The onus of proving that an asset qualifies
as separate property falls on the party making the claim to prove by a preponderance of
the evidence. Peck v. Peck, 96 Ohio App.3d 731, 734 (12th Dist. 1994). This standard
requires the claiming party to demonstrate that it is more likely than not that the asset in
question is indeed separate property, rather than marital property subject to division in
the divorce proceedings.
A. The apartment in Serbia
{¶ 10} Ballesteros-Cuberos's first assignment of error alleges:
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE
APARTMENT IN BELGRADE, SERBIA WAS MARITAL
PROPERTY.
{¶ 11} Ballesteros-Cuberos contends that the trial court erred in its determination
that Todor's apartment in Serbia was her separate property.
{¶ 12} The statutory list of "separate property" includes "any gift of any real . . .
property or of an interest in real . . . property that is made after the date of the marriage
and that is proven by clear and convincing evidence to have been given to only one
spouse." R.C. 3105.171(A)(6)(a)(vii). Todor met her burden of proving that the apartment
was a gift to her alone.
{¶ 13} Todor testified that her mother had purchased the apartment after the
parties' marriage as a gift for her and the children to live in. Todor also presented
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documentary evidence in support of her claim—a copy of the "deed" to the apartment
listing her as the sole rights holder,1 a payment order showing the transfer of money from
her mother to pay for the apartment, and a letter from her mother stating that she had
purchased the apartment.2 Todor also presented supporting testimony from her mother,
Rahilka Kukovska,3 who testified remotely from Macedonia.
{¶ 14} Ballesteros-Cuberos raises concerns about the credibility of Kukovska's
testimony due to the presence of an unidentified man in the room with her during her
remote testimony. Near the beginning of her testimony, Ballesteros-Cuberos's counsel
objected that someone else was in the room translating for Kukovska. The trial court
asked her to identify who was with her, and Kukovska explained that it was the man who
helped her with the remote connection. The court then ordered that the man should leave
the room. Kukovska asked the man to leave, and she confirmed that he had left the room.
{¶ 15} The concern here is about potential translation assistance and ensuring that
Kukovska was testifying independently without anyone else present who could influence
her testimony. When the potential problem became apparent early in her testimony, the
trial court immediately addressed it. Ballesteros-Cuberos did not raise any further
objection. Determinations of witness credibility are left to the trial court. We see no
problem in the trial court's assessment of Kukovska's credibility and its admission of her
testimony into evidence.
{¶ 16} Ballesteros-Cuberos does not really dispute that Todor's mother purchased
1. From the description in the transcript, it appears that this document was the Serbian equivalent of a real-
property deed.
2. None of these documents are before us, nor are any of the exhibits presented at the hearing. It appears
from the record that Ballesteros-Cuberos did not request copies of exhibits for purposes of this appeal.
3. This is how her name is spelled in the "Request for Remote Appearance AND Order for Remote
Appearance" found in the record. The spelling in the hearing transcript differs.
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the apartment and gave it to Todor as a gift. Rather, he contends that the apartment
should be classified as marital property because he contributed to its upkeep during the
marriage. Be that as it may, this does not transform the gift into marital property.
Ballesteros-Cuberos's contributions to the apartment's upkeep during the marriage, while
commendable, do not alter its fundamental character as separate property.
{¶ 17} Ballesteros-Cuberos's reliance on Ray v. Ray, 2003-Ohio-6323 (9th Dist.),
to support his contention is misplaced. That case does not stand for the proposition that
a spouse's contributions to the upkeep and expenses of real property render the property,
or any portion of it, marital. Indeed, the case says nothing about upkeep and expenses
at all. The case does suggest that the reduction of a mortgage during the marriage by
payment of marital funds would be marital property. But that is not analogous to
contributions to the upkeep of property, unless perhaps it could be shown that the
contributions affected the property's value. Regardless, there is no evidence before us
of what Ballesteros-Cuberos's contributions were or what effect they might have had on
the apartment's value.
{¶ 18} There is competent and credible evidence to support the trial court's finding
that the apartment was a gift to Todor alone. We find no error in the court's classification
of the apartment as her separate property.
{¶ 19} The first assignment of error is overruled.
B. The pension fund and bank account
{¶ 20} Ballesteros-Cuberos's second assignment of error alleges:
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE
APPELLANT'S PENSION FUND AND BANK ACCOUNT IN
SPAIN WERE MARITAL PROPERTY.
{¶ 21} Ballesteros-Cuberos next contends that the trial court erred in its
determination that his Quilter International Pension Fund and bank account in Spain were
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marital property, rather than his separate property.
{¶ 22} A spouse's "separate property" also encompasses any personal property,
or interest therein, acquired by the spouse before marriage. R.C. 3105.171(A)(6)(a)(ii).
In addition, passive income and appreciation derived from separate property during the
marriage retains its separate character. R.C. 3105.171(A)(6)(a)(iii). The statute
recognizes that separate property may be commingled with marital property without losing
its distinct status, provided, that is, it remains traceable. R.C. 3105.171(A)(6)(b). If
separate property is untraceable due to commingling, the property is usually "'transmuted'
into marital property," losing its separate quality. Smith, 2023-Ohio-982, at ¶ 31, quoting
Tyra v. Tyra, 2022-Ohio-2504, ¶ 15 (1st Dist.). See also Bauer v. Bauer, 2020-Ohio-425,
¶ 31 (12th Dist.) (holding that "[s]eparate property can lose its nonmarital quality when it
cannot be clearly traced because of extensive and repeated commingling"). The burden
falls on the party claiming separate property to present evidence that "overcomes the
effect of commingling" by tracing the separate property. Smith at ¶ 31. Ballesteros-
Cuberos failed to satisfy this burden.
{¶ 23} Ballesteros-Cuberos testified that the pension fund was established in 2005
and that it was funded solely by contributions from his mother. According to Ballesteros-
Cuberos, it was his mother who started the pension fund for him. She would deposit
funds into his bank account that were then transferred to the pension fund, which
continued during the marriage. He claims that these financial arrangements were in his
name alone and intended solely for his benefit.
{¶ 24} While it is undisputed that the pension fund was established in 2005,
predating the parties' 2006 marriage, Ballesteros-Cuberos's claim that his mother funded
the pension fund lacks any corroborating evidence beyond his own testimony, which itself
lacks much specificity. There is a notable absence of documentary evidence
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demonstrating his mother's deposits into his bank account or subsequent transfers to the
pension fund. Undoubtedly, this is why the trial court, in its written decision, characterized
Ballesteros-Cuberos's evidence of his mother's cash contributions to the pension fund as
"less than compelling."
{¶ 25} Although the funds contributed to the pension fund before the marriage
could be considered Ballesteros-Cuberos's separate property, he failed to provide any
evidence tracing those funds. In short, Ballesteros-Cuberos utterly failed to overcome
the effect of commingling that occurred after the marriage.
{¶ 26} Regarding his bank account in Spain, the record is devoid of evidence
supporting its classification as separate property. Ballesteros-Cuberos's testimony at the
hearing did not address the separate nature of this account. Nowhere in his testimony
did he say that the money in the bank account came from his mother. We note too that
his written closing arguments to the trial court were entirely silent on the bank account.
{¶ 27} In sum, Ballesteros-Cuberos did not present evidence that would have
allowed the trial court to classify either the pension fund or the bank account as his
separate property. Because he failed to prove his separate-property claims, the court
properly classified the property as marital.
{¶ 28} There is competent and credible evidence to support the trial court's finding
that the Quilter International Pension Fund and the bank account in Spain are marital
property. We find no error in the classification of either.
{¶ 29} The second assignment of error is overruled.
III. Conclusion
{¶ 30} Having overruled both assignments of error, we affirm trial court’s judgment.
BYRNE, P.J., and HENDRICKSON, J., concur.
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