Eddie Hill v. State Operated School District of the City of Paterson

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the

internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-2061-22

EDDIE HILL,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

STATE OPERATED SCHOOL

DISTRICT OF THE CITY OF

PATERSON, PATERSON

PUBLIC SCHOOLS, DONNIE

W. EVANS, and JAMES

SMITH,

Defendants-Respondents.

____________________________

Submitted April 9, 2024 – Decided September 11, 2024

Before Judges Gooden Brown and Bergman.

On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law

Division, Essex County, Docket No. L-1949-17.

Linder Wing Law Group, attorneys for appellant (Ryan

Linder, on the briefs).

The Murray Law Firm, LLC, attorneys for respondent

(Karen A. Murray, on the brief).

PER CURIAM

Plaintiff Eddie Hill appeals from the January 30, 2023, Law Division

order denying reconsideration of an August 4, 2022, order denying plaintiff's

motion to reinstate his complaint by vacating a March 11, 2019, order of

dismissal. We affirm.

On March 16, 2017, plaintiff filed a five-count complaint alleging various

causes of action against defendants State Operated School District of the City

of Paterson (the District), Paterson Public Schools, Donnie W. Evans, and James

Smith. Plaintiff was a tenured special education teacher in the District. Evans

was the superintendent of schools, and Smith served as the executive director of

security for the District. The complaint arose from the entry of a memorandum

of understanding (MOU) to resolve claims between plaintiff and the District.

According to the complaint, plaintiff and Evans entered into the MOU on

February 24, 2014, to resolve claims that plaintiff overstated the number of

hours worked while providing at-home instruction to students with

individualized education programs. As part of the MOU, plaintiff agreed to

resign without contesting the charges, repay the District the amount received for

his overstated work hours, and release and waive all claims he had against the

District. As consideration, the District would provide neutral employment

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references, remove mention of the incident from plaintiff's personnel file, and

maintain confidentiality of the MOU and underlying incident, in addition to not

"tak[ing] any further action" against plaintiff or his teaching certifications .

In the complaint, plaintiff alleged that in February 2016, after he obtained

a similar job with the Union Township Board of Education (UBOE), the District

violated the MOU when Smith "contacted the State Board of Education, Passaic

County Prosecutor['s] Office and other governmental agencies" to alert them to

the incident. As a result, the Passaic County Prosecutor charged plaintiff by

way of accusation with third-degree theft by deception. In resolving the charge,

plaintiff agreed to disqualification from public office or position,1 severed his

employment with the UBOE,2 and surrendered his professional license.

1

N.J.S.A. 2C:51-2(a) requires a public employee to forfeit his or her

employment if convicted "of an offense involving dishonesty or of a crime of

the third degree" or "involving or touching such office, position or

employment." Under N.J.S.A. 2C:51-2(d), upon conviction, a public employee

"shall be forever disqualified from holding any office or position of honor, trust

or profit" in the State.

2

The record contains two court orders concerning plaintiff's forfeiture of his

public employment and future disqualification. In the first order, dated

December 23, 2015, plaintiff agreed to forfeit his present employment with the

UBOE. In the second order, dated February 19, 2016, plaintiff agreed "to be

forever disqualified from holding any office or position of honor, trust, or profit

under this State or any of its administrative or political subdivisions ."

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Defendants filed a contesting answer on July 10, 2017. Thereafter, the

parties conducted initial discovery, during which plaintiff, Smith, and one of the

District's former in-house counsel were deposed. Further, between late 2017

and December 2018, the parties attended court-ordered mediation sessions. On

December 18, 2018, plaintiff's attorney wrote to defendants' attorney "to confirm

that the . . . matter ha[d] been resolved at a mediation session."

In the December 18, 2018, letter, plaintiff's counsel wrote that the

proposed terms included, among other things, that:

Th[e] accord [wa]s contingent on approval by the

[District's Board]. The Board shall make its decision

no later than its February 2019 regularly scheduled

meeting[;]

. . . If . . . plaintiff is unable to secure comparable

employment with the [D]istrict, . . . plaintiff will be

free to resume litigating th[e] matter[; and]

. . . The parties shall contact the [c]ourt and ask[] that

the litigation be stayed pending the Board's

consideration of the . . . accord.

In a January 9, 2019, letter, plaintiff's attorney informed the court that

"[the] matter was resolved at a mediation session that took place in

December . . . 2018." In the letter, plaintiff's counsel requested that "all

proceedings in th[e] matter be stayed until the settlement is finalized" because

"the settlement is contingent on approval by the [District's Board]" and

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"plaintiff's ability to reapply for and secure his professional license." On

February 15, 2019, the parties entered a consent order for enlargement of time

pursuant to Rule 1:3-4, staying "all proceedings . . . pending the approval and

implementation of a settlement agreement" and further ordering the parties to

"report [the status of the settlement] to the court in [sixty] days."

On March 11, 2019, the presiding judge entered an order of disposition

stating the matter had been "settled" and eCourts marked the case as dismissed. 3

Nothing in the record shows any communication by either party to the court

updating it on the status of the settlement agreement in accordance with the

February 15 consent order. Nevertheless, the parties' attorneys continued to

communicate with each other about the case by email. Specifically, between

February 2019 and April 2021, the attorneys discussed different lump sum

payments as part of the settlement agreement and alternative scenarios should

plaintiff be unsuccessful in vacating his conviction. During the exchanges,

defendants' attorney reminded plaintiff of the requirement that the District's

Board approve the agreement and alerted plaintiff that the litigation had been

dismissed.

3

The eCourts entry specified that an "Order Of Dismissal/Case Settled" was

"granted" by the trial court on March 11, 2019.

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On January 19, 2022, plaintiff moved to enforce the settlement agreement.

Following oral argument, the motion judge denied plaintiff's motion in an April

18, 2022, order. In an oral statement of reasons on the record, the judge

determined that despite there being evidence of "some discussion" of a

settlement agreement, "the last thing filed by the parties was not . . . a

settlement" but "a request for a stay." The judge reasoned that "a settlement

means there are no outstanding issues between the parties," and thus plaintiff's

proffered "conditional settlement mean[t] there [wa]s no settlement."

The judge further explained that "[e]verything [plaintiff's attorney] ha[d]

said and filed indicate[d] the exact opposite" of a settlement, especially in light

of the requirement that the settlement receive "approval . . . from the [District's

B]oard" and the "caveat that if [plaintiff was] not reinstated," negotiations would

continue. Additionally, the judge noted that both parties should have alerted the

court of a mistake when they received notice of the March 11, 2019, order of

disposition. Therefore, the judge refused to reopen the matter for "relitigat[ion]"

until "there[ was] a motion filed that provide[d] a basis for it to be reopened."

Plaintiff did not timely appeal the April 18, 2022, order.

Thereafter, plaintiff moved to reopen and reinstate the case. On August

4, 2022, the judge heard oral argument on plaintiff's motion. Plaintiff requested

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that the court reinstate the matter to the active trial calendar under Rule 1:1-2

for "good cause" shown and "an absence of prejudice to . . . defendant." In

support, plaintiff primarily relied on Audubon Volunteer Fire Co. No. 1 v.

Church Construction Co., 206 N.J. Super. 405 (App. Div. 1986), and Ghandi v.

Cespedes, 390 N.J. Super. 193 (App. Div. 2007).

The judge rejected plaintiff's argument and found that Rule 1:1-2 did not

provide the court with a mechanism to reopen a dismissed matter. The judge

explained:

[Rule 1:1-2] is a rule of construction, it is not a rule that

provides a mechanism for someone to challenge an

order[.] . . . . [A]nd I do[ not] believe the cases you

cited do that. I[ am] not aware of any case

that . . . reopened a matter or reinstated a matter or

dealt with a dismissal under [Rule ]1:1-2 as the

triggering rule.

After unsuccessfully prodding plaintiff's counsel to cite a rule under which

the motion could advance, the judge stated,

[B]y default, we[ are] going to assume it[ is] [Rule

]4:50-1 . . . . [A]nd to be fair, [you] did sort of address

that in your reply papers, so it[ is] not as if it[ is] coming

out of left field . . . . [Y]ou kn[e]w it [was] likely the

[c]ourt would look at that as the rule.

After reviewing Rule 4:50-1(a) through (f), and hearing arguments from

both parties, the judge denied plaintiff's motion. The judge explained:

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Rule 4:50-1 is a rule that provides for relief from a

judgment in six enumerated circumstances. . . . Rule

4:50-1 is not a pathway to reopen litigation. . . . [I]t[ is]

a carefully crafted vehicle intended to underscore the

need for repose while achieving a just result. . . . [T]he

rule denominates with specificity the narrow band of

triggering events that will warrant relief from judgment

if justice is to be served. And only the existence of one

of those triggers will allow a party to challenge the

substance of the judgment.

The judge noted that although the March 11, 2019, order of disposition

may have been entered in error, relief under Rule 4:50-1(a) for "mistake,

inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect" required plaintiff to file a motion

within one year of the order. See R. 4:50-2. The judge also found that a motion

supported by Rule 4:50-1(b) through (e) was time barred, and rejected plaintiff's

argument that the COVID-19 pandemic created exceptional circumstances for

which any time limitation under the Rule should be expanded.

Specifically rejecting plaintiff's reliance on the "catch-all" provision of

Rule 4:50-1(f), the judge commented:

[D]espite its expansive parameters of any other reason,

[Rule 4:50-1(f)] does not provide the [c]ourt with the

authority to grant relief when the moving party has not

demonstrated that it itself is not guilty of inexcusable

neglect. Because, if that were true, then subsection (f)

would completely render the remaining subsections

meaningless.

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For that reason, I . . . find that even

giving . . . plaintiff the most extreme

benefit[,] . . . there is simply nothing presented that

would even approach the exceptional circumstances

requirement under Rule 4:50-1(f).

In addition to the fact that that standard was not

even argued in the papers by . . . plaintiff, it was

considered by the [c]ourt, but there . . . is . . . nothing

that has been pointed to that would allow me to grant

the very extraordinary relief being sought here three

years after the entry of the order by the [c]ourt.

The judge entered an order of the same date memorializing her decision denying

plaintiff's motion to reinstate.

Thereafter, plaintiff moved for reconsideration. On January 30, 2023,

following oral argument, the judge denied plaintiff's motion pursuant to Rule

4:49-2. In an accompanying oral statement of reasons, the judge determined

plaintiff failed to meet the standard for reconsideration. This appeal followed. 4

Plaintiff raises the following points for our consideration:

POINT ONE

4

Plaintiff's March 15, 2023, notice of appeal identified three trial court orders:

(1) the April 18, 2022, order denying plaintiff's motion to enforce the settlement

agreement; (2) the August 4, 2022, order denying plaintiff's motion to set aside

the court's March 11, 2019, order dismissing the matter as "settled"; and (3) the

January 30, 2023, order denying reconsideration. We denied plaintiff's motion

to file as within time his appeal of the April 18, 2022, order, noting that " the

time to appeal a final order may not be extended beyond thirty days" pursuant

to Rule 2:4-4(a). We therefore limit our review to the remaining two orders.

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THE UNDERLYING CASE SHOULD HAVE BEEN

REINSTATED[] BECAUSE THE PLAINTIFF

DEMONSTRATED THE EXISTENCE OF GOOD

CAUSE AND THE ABSENCE OF PREJUDICE TO

THE DISTRICT.

POINT TWO

PURSUANT TO [RULE] 1:1-2, PLAINTIFF'S CASE

SHOULD BE REINSTATED TO AVOID A

MANIFEST INJUSTICE.

POINT THREE

THE PLAINTIFF DEMONSTRATED THE

EXISTENCE OF EXCEPTIONAL

CIRCUMSTANCES AND THAT THE

APPLICATION OF THE ORDER WOULD BE

INEQUITABLE, AS SUCH HIS COMPLAINT

SHOULD BE RESTORED TO THE ACTIVE TRIAL

CALENDAR PURSUANT TO R[ULE] 4:50-1(F).

We review a trial judge's denial of a motion to set aside an order under

Rule 4:50-1 for an abuse of discretion, guided by equitable principles. Hous.

Auth. of Morristown v. Little, 135 N.J. 274, 283 (1994). An abuse of discretion

arises when a decision was "made without a rational explanation, inexplicably

departed from established policies, or rested on an impermissible basis." Flagg

v. Essex Cnty. Prosecutor, 171 N.J. 561, 571 (2002) (quoting Achacoso-Sanchez

v. I.N.S., 779 F.2d 1260, 1265 (7th Cir. 1985)).

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We likewise review a trial judge's decision to grant or deny a motion for

reconsideration under the abuse of discretion standard. Branch v. Cream-O-

Land Dairy, 244 N.J. 567, 582 (2021). Under Rule 4:49-2, reconsideration is

appropriate for a "'narrow corridor'" of cases in which the court's decision was

made upon a "'palpably incorrect or irrational basis,'" or where "'it is obvious

that the [c]ourt either did not consider, or failed to appreciate the significance

of probative, competent evidence.'" Fusco v. Bd. of Educ., 349 N.J. Super. 455,

462 (App. Div. 2002) (quoting D'Atria v. D'Atria, 242 N.J. Super. 392, 401 (Ch.

Div. 1990)). We are not, however, bound by the trial court's legal conclusions

or its "'interpretation of the law and the legal consequences that flow from

established facts.'" Alfano v. BDO Seidman, LLP, 393 N.J. Super. 560, 573

(App. Div. 2007) (quoting Manalapan Realty, L.P. v. Twp. Comm. of

Manalapan, 140 N.J. 366, 378 (1995)).

Based on our review of the record in light of the governing legal

principles, we discern no abuse of discretion in the determinations made by the

judge and affirm substantially for the reasons stated in the judge's cogent and

well-reasoned oral opinions. Plaintiff reprises his argument that the underlying

matter should be reinstated from the "administrative dismiss[al]" based on "good

cause" because he was entirely blameless and defendant suffered no prejudice.

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Plaintiff also contends that he "demonstrated the existence of exceptional

circumstances" required under Rule 4:50-1(f) to vacate the dismissal because

the March 11, 2019, order "is beyond ambiguous."

Under Rule 4:50-1, the trial court may relieve a party from a final

judgment or order for "(a) mistake; (b) newly discovered evidence; (c) fraud;

(d) because the judgment or order is void; (e) the judgment or order has been

satisfied, released, reversed, or otherwise vacated; or (f) 'any other reason

justifying relief from the operation of the judgment or order.'" MTAG v. Tao

Invs., LLC, 476 N.J. Super. 324, 333 (App. Div. 2023) (quoting R. 4:50-1(a) to

(f)), certif. denied, 255 N.J. 447 (2023). A motion under subsections (a), (b),

and (c) of the Rule must be made within one year of the judgment or order, and

"within a reasonable time" under any other subsection. R. 4:50-2. In

determining whether a motion was made within a reasonable time, the court

must consider "the surrounding circumstances including the length of time that

has passed and a due consideration for competing rights and interests which have

come to exist." Friedman v. Monaco & Brown Corp., 258 N.J. Super. 539, 543

(App. Div. 1992).

Rule 4:50-1 "[was] designed to reconcile the strong interests in finality of

judgments and judicial efficiency with the equitable notion that courts should

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have authority to avoid an unjust result in any given case." BV001 REO

Blocker, LLC v. 53 W. Somerset St. Props., LLC, 467 N.J. Super. 117, 123

(App. Div. 2021) (quoting Manning Eng'g, Inc. v. Hudson Cnty. Park Comm'n,

74 N.J. 113, 120 (1977)). As such, a motion for relief under Rule 4:50-1 should

be granted "'sparingly [and only] in exceptional situations . . . in which, were it

not applied, a grave injustice would occur.'" Badalamenti by Badalamenti v.

Simpkiss, 422 N.J. Super. 86, 103 (App. Div. 2011) (alterations in original)

(quoting Little, 135 N.J. at 289). The movant bears the burden of demonstrating

his or her entitlement to relief under the rule. See Jameson v. Great Atl. & Pac.

Tea Co., 363 N.J. Super. 419, 425-26 (App. Div. 2003).

On appeal, plaintiff relies solely on subsection (f) of Rule 4:50-1. We

acknowledge that plaintiff did not voluntarily dismiss his action but that he and

defendants were engaging in settlement discussions during a stay of the

litigation when the court entered the March 11, 2019, dismissal order. However,

we conclude the judge did not abuse her discretion in finding that plaintiff's

nearly three-year delay in seeking relief was not reasonable as required under

Rule 4:50-1(f).

Regardless of whether plaintiff received notice of the March 11, 2019,

order effectively dismissing his action, a three-year delay was not reasonable

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especially in light of the parties' obligation to report to the court within sixty

days of the February 15, 2019, consent order staying the litigation and

defendants' counsel's repeated references to the dismissal. Once plaintiff's

counsel was made aware of the dismissal order, it was incumbent upon him to

take affirmative steps to reinstate his client's claims. Denial of plaintiff's motion

to reinstate was, therefore, warranted under Rule 4:50-2.

Even if we consider the merits, we agree with the judge that plaintiff failed

to articulate "any other reason justifying relief from the operation of the . . .

order." R. 4:50-1(f). Other than a general claim that the disruption of court

proceedings during the COVID-19 pandemic caused confusion or delay,

plaintiff provided no other compelling reason on which the judge could find

"exceptional circumstances." See Badalamenti, 422 N.J. Super. at 103 ("When

an application is made under Rule 4:50-1(f), 'the party requesting relief must

show that enforcement of the judgment would be unjust, oppressive or

inequitable.'" (quoting Linek v. Korbeil, 333 N.J. Super. 464, 474 (App. Div.

2000))). We do not find plaintiff's contentions that the entry of the March 11

order was "confusing" or that "[t]he nature of the settlement took more than a

year" convincing reasons for relief from a final order.

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We also reject plaintiff's contention that his motion was governed by Rule

1:1-2 and a "good cause" standard. We agree with the judge that Rule 1:1-2 is

"a rule of construction" and not "a mechanism for someone to challenge an

order." Indeed, the Rule expressly provides that "[u]nless otherwise stated, any

rule may be relaxed or dispensed with by the court in which the action is pending

if adherence to it would result in an injustice." R. 1:1-2(a). The Rule does not

provide that any order may be relaxed or dispensed with by the court. Indeed,

Rule 4:50-1 is the clear mechanism by which a party may move to vacate a final

order he or she believes imposes an unjust result. See BV001 REO Blocker, 467

N.J. Super. at 123.

Contrary to plaintiff's argument, Audubon and Ghandi are inapplicable

here. In Audubon, the defendant sought to file a late answer after lengthy

settlement discussions. 206 N.J. Super. at 405-06. After the trial court rejected

the parties' proposed consent order extending the time to answer, the defendant

filed an unopposed formal motion. Id. at 406. Despite there being no clear

prejudice to the plaintiff, the trial court denied the defendant's motion by

telephone. Ibid. The plaintiff then obtained a default, and the trial court entered

a judgment against the defendant after a proof hearing. Ibid. We reversed,

observing that "the shepherding function we serve is abused by unnecessarily

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closing the courtroom doors to a litigant whose only sin is to retain a lawyer

who delays filing an answer during settlement negotiations." Id. at 406-07. In

referencing other means short of dismissal available to the court in "performing

[its] shepherding function," we cited Rule 1:1-2, among others. Id. at 407.

In Ghandi, the plaintiff's attorney prepared a request for entry of default

against the defendants who failed to timely answer plaintiff's October 2003

complaint. 390 N.J. Super. at 195. However, the plaintiff's attorney

inadvertently failed to file it. Ibid. In May 2004, the court entered an

administrative order dismissing the matter pursuant to Rule 1:13-7(a) for lack

of prosecution. Ibid. In August 2005, the plaintiff filed an unopposed motion

to restore, which the trial judge denied. Ibid. In reversing, we concluded that

the plaintiff's motion to reinstate his administratively dismissed action under

Rule 1:13-7, which governs the dismissal of civil cases for lack of prosecution

and the requirements for reinstatement, should have been granted for "good

cause." Id. at 196-98. We stated that "absent a finding of fault by the plaintiff

and prejudice to the defendant, a motion to restore under the rule should be

viewed with great liberality." Id. at 197.

We applied the principles articulated in Audubon to relax Rule 1:13-7,

stating:

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Because, with certain exceptions not applicable here,

"any rule may be relaxed or dispensed with by the court

in which the action is pending if adherence to it would

result in an injustice," R. 1:1-2, "courts should be

reluctant to penalize a blameless client for the mistakes

of the attorney." Familia v. Univ. Hosp. of Univ. of

Med. & Dentistry of N.J., 350 N.J. Super. 563, 568

(App. Div. 2002).

[Ghandi, 390 N.J. Super. at 198.]

Here, plaintiff makes no reference to Rule 1:13-7 either in his merits brief

or before the trial court. Moreover, unlike Audubon and Ghandi, defendants

assert they would be "substantially prejudiced" if the case was reinstated.

Defendants would now be called upon to defend against a complaint arising from

events that occurred approximately eight years ago after nearly three years of

inactivity. Such an outcome would be untenable.

Affirmed.

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