J.Z. v. Y.C.L.

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the

internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-3500-21

J.Z.,1

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

Y.C.L.,

Defendant-Appellant.

_______________________

Submitted January 30, 2024 – Decided September 10, 2024

Before Judges Gooden Brown and Puglisi.

On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey,

Chancery Division, Family Part, Morris County,

Docket No. FM-14-1106-14.

Y.C.L., appellant pro se.

J.Z., respondent pro se.

PER CURIAM

1

We use initials to protect the privacy of the parties in accordance with Rule

1:38-3(d)(1).

Defendant/ex-wife appeals from provisions of a May 26, 2022, dual final

judgment of divorce (DJOD) pertaining to equitable distribution, alimony,

retroactive pendente lite support, and maintenance of a life insurance policy to

secure payment obligations. We affirm.

I.

We glean these facts from the evidence presented at the six-day bench trial

that commenced on March 20, 2019, and concluded on October 28, 2021. Both

parties testified during the trial.

Plaintiff/ex-husband and defendant were married on March 14, 1998.

When the trial began, plaintiff was fifty-three years old, and defendant was fifty-

four years old. Plaintiff had been a police officer with the City of Clifton since

1996, and defendant had been a practicing attorney in private practice. By 2004,

defendant had given birth to the parties' first son, and the couple began fostering

a second boy whom they later adopted in 2006.

In 2004, defendant left private practice and began working at the Office

of Foreclosure. However, within a few months, defendant suffered a medical

episode that resulted in an extended leave and her eventual termination. As a

result, defendant began collecting monthly disability payments of $3,750 under

a private MetLife insurance policy that was payable until 2029 when she turned

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sixty-five. Eventually, defendant also applied for Social Security disability

benefits and received an award in 2007 of about $1,760 per month, retroactive

to December 2005, with a retroactive lump sum child benefit for each child of

$40,913 and $34,634.

Around Thanksgiving 2005, the parties separated when defendant asked

plaintiff to move out of the marital residence and plaintiff began living with his

brother. Defendant became the primary caretaker of the children during the

week, sending the children to school where she lived, while plaintiff saw the

children on weekends. Both parties continued to share expenses, including

vacations with the children.

In 2006, plaintiff filed a complaint for divorce. However, he withdrew

the complaint after defendant convinced him that it would be financially

advantageous to maintain the marriage considering taxes, health insurance, and

defendant's ability to take the survivor benefit under plaintiff's Police and

Firemen's Retirement System (PFRS) pension.

In 2007, plaintiff was injured on the job while responding to an

automobile incident involving a semi-incapacitated driver. During the incident,

the driver accelerated toward plaintiff, injuring plaintiff's shoulder. Plaintiff

responded by firing his weapon and injuring the driver. As a result, plaintiff

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3

suffered both physical and mental injuries and was approved for monthly PFRS

accidental disability retirement benefits beginning in December 2008. Plaintiff

also received a $100,000 personal injury settlement from the vehicle driver, plus

$124,203 from the parties' uninsured/underinsured motorist automobile policy,

less fees and costs.

With his pension in pay status, plaintiff, who had an undergraduate degree

and an MBA prior to the marriage, went back to school to pursue a nursing

degree. After obtaining his teaching certification and teaching high school

business classes, plaintiff eventually earned a master's degree in nursing science

and started working as a nurse in 2013.

On March 19, 2014, plaintiff filed a new complaint for divorce. After

defendant filed an answer and counterclaim, the parties entered a consent order

on November 30, 2015, resolving custody and parenting time issues and leaving

the remaining financial issues for resolution at trial. On July 20, 2016, a

pendente lite order temporarily directed plaintiff to pay defendant fifty percent

of his PFRS disability pension subject to equitable distribution pursuant to

Sternesky v. Salcie-Sternesky, 396 N.J. Super. 290 (App. Div. 2007). All Pro

QDRO, an expert evaluator, determined that defendant's monthly share of the

pension benefit was $1,125. The pendente lite order also denied defendant's

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4

request for child support, citing "the similar incomes of the parties and the split

custody arrangement," and denied spousal support due to the "general parity of

[the parties'] monthly incomes."

The parties' remaining financial issues primarily involved their

development and sale of multiple properties acquired over the course of the

marriage, often using the proceeds from one property to fund the purchase of

another. Even prior to the parties' marriage, plaintiff had owned a home with

his two sisters located on East Shore Road in Denville. After the marriage,

defendant moved into plaintiff's house with his one younger sister who

continued residing in a basement apartment. The same year, the parties

purchased a two-family home and an empty lot, both located on Thompson

Avenue in Dover. The purchases initiated the long chain of property

acquisitions over the ensuing years. Plaintiff worked to develop the properties,

while defendant handled the legal work for the transactions.

In August 1999, plaintiff mortgaged the Thompson Avenue empty lot for

$80,000 to build a family home on the property. In 2000, the parties purchased

three properties on Woodland Avenue in Denville. In 2001, the parties

remortgaged the East Shore Road home, purchasing both of plaintiff's sisters'

shares in the property and recording title in both plaintiff's and defendant's

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5

names. The parties used a portion of the mortgage proceeds to pay off

defendant's student loans that had been incurred prior to the marriage. By then,

the parties' first son was born.

In 2002, the parties took out a second mortgage on the East Shore Road

home to fund the development of the Woodland Avenue properties. In April

2003, the parties sold the East Shore Road home for $285,000 and used a portion

of the proceeds, in addition to a new mortgage and joint-checking account

monies, to purchase their new marital home located on Lockley Court in

Mountain Lakes. Defendant described the Lockley Court home as "the house of

[her] dreams." In August 2004, the parties sold the two-family Thompson

Avenue property and split the proceeds.

By then, the parties had become foster parents and hired a nanny to take

care of the children and their home. They later received monthly payments from

the State for the adoption. After defendant's medical episode, she became the

primary caretaker of the children while plaintiff continued to develop the

investment properties and maintain his employment. In July 2005, the parties

sold the Lockley Court home and moved into an apartment located on Gates

Court in Morris Plains. They netted approximately $256,000 from the Lockley

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Court sale, which the parties used to deposit about $99,302 into plaintiff's bank

account and about $157,533 into the parties' joint bank account.

According to plaintiff, his share of the proceeds together with proceeds

from the Thompson Avenue sale were used to develop a modular home on one

of the Woodland Avenue properties. In October 2005, plaintiff mortgaged the

subject Woodland Avenue property for approximately $293,500 to continue

improving the Woodland Avenue properties. The parties had already invested

about $487,128 in the property. Because of her discomfort with the continued

investment of funds into the Woodland Avenue property, defendant deposited

"the remaining $100,000 from [the parties'] joint checking account" into "[her]

checking account."

After the parties separated in late 2005, plaintiff deposited $1,200 per

month into the parties' joint checking account, from which defendant paid joint

expenses. The parties also kept a joint auto insurance policy for financial

reasons until 2015. Defendant continued to live at the Gates Court apartment

and plaintiff lived with his brother while working on the Woodland Avenue

property. By October 2008, defendant withdrew from the parties' real estate

investment decisions. Plaintiff sold the last of the Woodland Avenue properties

in August 2010 and used the proceeds for a downpayment on a rental property

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7

located on Washington Street in Boonton. Defendant maintained that she was

unaware of the Washington Street transaction until the divorce proceedings.

In December 2010, plaintiff and his father purchased a property in Tarpon

Springs, Florida, and rented it to plaintiff's niece and nephew. Plaintiff later

received $27,500 for the Florida property, netting a $2,500 profit on his initial

$25,000 contribution to the investment. In January 2013, defendant bought a

home located on Edgefield Drive in Morris Plains for $370,642. The funds for

the purchase came from personal investment funds, the Social Security

Disability Insurance (SSDI) child benefit she received, and a $288,000

mortgage. On occasion, plaintiff stayed at the Edgefield Drive home as the

parties had a history of occasional cohabitation and residence swapping during

their separation. In May 2013, plaintiff purchased a home on Sommerfield

Avenue in Mount Tabor, using funds from his personal injury settlements and a

$266,400 mortgage.

Following the bench trial, on May 26, 2022, the trial judge entered a

DJOD accompanied by a comprehensive written opinion. In the written opinion,

the judge assessed credibility, made detailed factual findings, and drew legal

conclusions based on her application of the governing legal principles. In

assessing the credibility of the parties, the judge was impressed by plaintiff's

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8

candor but found that defendant's attempts "to discredit plaintiff" served instead

"to discredit [defendant]." As a result, the judge rejected defendant's assertion

"that any money received by plaintiff during the marriage was dissipated or

otherwise used for non-marital purposes."

Pertinent to this appeal, in the DJOD, among other things, the judge

divided plaintiff's PFRS pension benefit "equally between the parties," requiring

plaintiff to pay defendant $1,125.03 per month together with arrearages of

$9,000.24 "for the [eight] months for which [plaintiff] owe[d] defendant her

share of [the] pension payment." Under the DJOD, all marital assets, including

interests and equity in real property, were equally divided between the parties.

The DJOD also required plaintiff to pay defendant "open durational alimony" in

the amount of $2,000 per month "until either party dies or . . . defendant

remarries." Additionally, the DJOD required plaintiff to "maintain insurance on

his life with a face value of at least $250,000," naming "defendant as the

sole . . . beneficiary of the death benefit" for the duration of plaintiff's alimony

obligation.

In this ensuing appeal, defendant raises the following points for our

consideration:

I. THE TRIAL JUDGE COMMITTED REVERSIBLE

ERROR IN CONCLUDING AS A MATTER OF LAW

A-3500-21

9

THAT THE "STERNESKY FORMULA" APPLIED

TO ALL PFRS DISABILITY PENSIONS.

II. THE LARRISON2 AND STERNESKY

HOLDINGS ARE BASED ON MISTAKES OF LAW

[AND] FACT AND ALL PFRS DISABILITY

PENSIONS SUBJECT TO EQUITABLE

DISTRIBUTION SHOULD BE DECIDED UNDER

THE STANDARDS SET IN KRUGER3 AND

AVALLONE.4

III. THE ALIMONY DETERMINATION WAS AN

ABUSE OF DISCRETION AND THE TRIAL JUDGE

FAILED TO CONSIDER THE CONTROLLING

LEGAL PRINCIPLES AND MADE MISTAKEN

FINDINGS OF FACT AND LAW.

IV. THE TRIAL JUDGE ERRED AS A MATTER OF

LAW BY NOT AWARDING RETROACTIVE

PENDENTE LITE SUPPORT.

V. THE TRIAL JUDGE ERRED AS A MATTER OF

LAW BY INCLUDING IN EQUITABLE

DISTRIBUTION FUNDS HELD IN TRUST FOR THE

PARTIES' SONS.

VI. THE TRIAL JUDGE ABUSED HER

DISCRETION IN NOT ORDERING [PLAINTIFF] TO

PAY THE EXISTING LIFE INSURANCE POLICY.

2

Larrison v. Larrison, 392 N.J. Super. 1 (App. Div. 2007).

3

Kruger v. Kruger, 73 N.J. 464 (1977)

4

Avallone v. Avallone, 275 N.J. Super. 575 (App. Div. 1994)

A-3500-21

10

II.

Our standard of review of a Family Part judge's determinations following

a bench trial are well-settled. We defer to a trial judge's factual findings "when

supported by adequate, substantial, credible evidence." Cesare v. Cesare, 154

N.J. 394, 411-12 (1998) (citing Rova Farms Resort, Inc. v. Invs. Ins. Co., 65

N.J. 474, 484 (1974)). "Deference is especially appropriate 'when the evidence

is largely testimonial and involves questions of credibility.'" Id. at 412 (quoting

In re Return of Weapons to J.W.D., 149 N.J. 108, 117 (1997)). As such, we will

"not weigh the evidence, assess the credibility of witnesses, or make conclusions

about the evidence." M.G. v. S.M., 457 N.J. Super. 286, 293 (App. Div. 2018)

(quoting Mountain Hill, LLC v. Twp. of Middletown, 399 N.J. Super. 486, 498

(App. Div. 2008)). However, "legal conclusions, and the application of those

conclusions to the facts, are subject to our plenary review." Reese v. Weis, 430

N.J. Super. 552, 568 (App. Div. 2013).

Still, the Family Part has "special jurisdiction and expertise in family

matters," which often requires the exercise of reasoned discretion. Cesare, 154

N.J. at 413. Family Part judges have broad discretion to allocate assets subject

to equitable distribution, Clark v. Clark, 429 N.J. Super. 61, 71 (App. Div.

2012), make alimony determinations, Martindell v. Martindell, 21 N.J. 341, 355

A-3500-21

11

(1956), and decide income imputations, Storey v. Storey, 373 N.J. Super. 464,

474-75 (App. Div. 2004). If we conclude there is satisfactory evidentiary

support for the trial judge's findings, our "task is complete" and we will not

disturb the result. Beck v. Beck, 86 N.J. 480, 496 (1981) (quoting State v.

Johnson, 42 N.J. 146, 162 (1964)).

Applying these principles, we will not disturb the judge's rulings, and

affirm substantially for the reasons stated by the judge in her well-reasoned

written decision. Defendant argues the judge misapplied the formula for

equitable distribution of a pensioner spouse's accidental disability pension

benefit established in Sternesky. Specifically, she asserts the Sternesky court

did not intend the formula to be employed to exempt the entire PFRS disability

pension from equitable distribution absent "diminished earning capacity, pain,

suffering, or disability." Instead, defendant claims that the entirety of plaintiff's

pension is subject to equitable distribution because he did not satisfactorily

provide evidence to support his claim that the entire award was exempt.

The law governing equitable distribution of a pension in this State is clear:

The party seeking exemption from equitable

distribution bears the burden of proof. Landwehr v.

Landwehr, 111 N.J. 491, 504 (1988). Ordinarily, the

"portion of a pension legally or beneficially acquired

by either party during marital coverture is subject to

equitable distribution." Claffey v. Claffey, 360 N.J.

A-3500-21

12

Super. 240, 255 (App. Div. 2003) (citing Kikkert v.

Kikkert, 88 N.J. 4, 5 (1981)).

[Larrison v. Larrison, 392 N.J. Super. 1, 13-14 (App.

Div. 2007).]

To fairly determine the portion of a pension acquired during marital

coverture, we established the "coverture fraction" as "the appropriate tool to

utilize in attempting to determine an appropriate allocation of spouses'

respective interests in a pension." Faulkner v. Faulkner, 361 N.J. Super. 158,

165 (App. Div. 2003).

"The coverture fraction is the proportion of years

worked during the marriage to total number of years

worked." Eisenhardt v. Eisenhardt, 325 N.J. Super.

576, 580 (App. Div. 1999). The numerator of the

fraction is the period during the marriage in which the

employed spouse participates in the pension plan and

the denominator of the fraction is the total period of

time in which the spouse participates in the plan.

[Id. at 165-66.]

But not all pensions are equal. We have long recognized a distinction in

equitable distribution of pensions based on whether its purpose serves as a

retirement benefit, a payment to alleviate the effects of a disability, or both. See

Avallone , 275 N.J. Super. at 581-83 (discussing the case law of other states that

"have also recognized the multiple functions served by a disability pension" and

holding "in light of the unique nature of a disability pension" that "a number of

A-3500-21

13

factors . . . should be taken into consideration before settling on a final

distributable amount").

Regarding disability pensions, we have specifically held "that the portion

that serves to compensate . . . pensioner-spouses for [their] disability and

economic loss should not be subject to equitable distribution." Larrison, 392

N.J. Super. at 16. And we have acknowledged that while "non-pensioner

spouses 'should not be deprived of [their] right to participate in such a significant

asset merely because it has been characterized as a disability pension rather than

a retirement pension[,]'" they are "only entitled to share the 'portion of

[pensioner-spouses'] disability pension[s] which represents a retirement

component,' but not the 'portion which represents compensation for [pensioner -

spouses'] personal disability and personal economic loss.'" Id. at 16-17 (quoting

Avallone, 275 N.J. Super. at 583-84).

In Sternesky, we enunciated a methodology to equitably distribute

disability pension payments. 396 N.J. Super. at 304-05. Absent "specific

evidence or official guidance permitting a more precise segregation of the

components of an accidental disability pension," the Sternesky formula

"segregate[s] the marital portion of the allowance from the portion best viewed

as compensation to the individual for the disabling injury." Id. at 305.

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In this context, the measure that reasonably recognizes

the relationship between efforts during the marriage

and total efforts required for return on that investment

is the length of service that would have been required

for an ordinary retirement allowance but for the

disabling injury. Setting aside a disabling injury, the

non-employee spouse's reasonable expectation, while

[the employee] spouse is earning retirement credits, is

no greater than a share of a retirement allowance based

on service during the marriage in proportion to the

years of service needed for an ordinary pension.

[Id. at 303-04.]

Stated differently, "the court should identify the marital component by

multiplying the ordinary retirement allowance by a fraction, with a numerator

equivalent to service during the marriage and a denominator equivalent to

service required for an ordinary retirement allowance." Id. at 304. "The results

will recognize . . . 'non-pensioner spouse[s'] legitimate claims to a marital asset,

without attaching funds intended to compensate . . . pensioner-spouse[s] for

[their] disabilities.'" Ibid. (quoting Larrison, 392 N.J. Super. at 18). This

formula, which provides for the parties based on "reasonable expectation[s],"

has remained the standard for equitable distribution of a disability pension since

its enunciation nearly two decades ago. See id. at 303.

Here, applying this standard, the judge explained:

This is a defined benefit plan that is in pay status and

has been since December 1, 2008. Plaintiff receives

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[$5,598.22] monthly, tax free. In [p]laintiff's case this

pension is a disability pension which means that it was

awarded earlier than the [twenty] years of service

required for a member to qualify for the retirement

pension.

. . . . For the purposes of equitable distribution, it is the

portion of the pension that was earned by plaintiff

during the parties' marriage that was included. Painter

v. Painter, 65 [N.J.] 196 [(1974)]; Innes v. Innes, 117

[N.J.] 496 (1990). Per the [Sternesky] decision, only

the retirement portion of plaintiff's pension was valued,

not the disability component. The lump sum value of

that portion was found by [All Pro QDRO] to be

$404,098, and the monthly benefit was valued at

[$2,250.06]. However, the lump sum form of this asset

is not available for offset as the pension is in pay status

and has been paid to plaintiff for over thirteen years.

In rejecting defendant's contention that use of the Sternesky formula failed

to account for plaintiff's new career "earning more than he did as a law

enforcement officer," the judge stated:

The [Sternesky] opinion addresses this objection

squarely:

An employee qualifies for an accidental

disability retirement allowance only if, "as

a direct result of a traumatic event"

occurring during and resulting from

performance of duties, the employee is

"incapacitated" for his or her present duty

or any other duty that the police or fire

department is willing to assign. [N.J.S.A.

43:16A-7(1)].

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Plaintiff qualified because his post-traumatic

stress disorder makes him unfit to work in law

enforcement or as a firefighter, as found by the pension

board. That he is able to work as a nurse practitioner

or teacher is not the point. His chosen profession was

law enforcement, a career of public service that is

highly dangerous and generally enjoys an aura of

authority and respect. Our legislature has chosen to

compensate those who enter this risky career, and are

injured in the performance of their duty, as a matter of

public policy, not a matter of earnings. For these

reasons, the court finds that the Sternesky case is

applicable here.

Rejecting defendant's criticism of the coverture fraction used by All Pro

QDRO, the judge stated:

All Pro QDRO determined the coverture fraction to be

[3,915] days/[7,305] days, or 53.59 [percent]. The

concept behind the coverture fraction here is

complicated by the fact that in order to qualify for the

retirement pension, which is the only component of a

disability pension that is subject to equitable

distribution, plaintiff would have to be employed in his

job for [twenty] years. Thus, while the numerator of

the coverture fraction is the length of time that the

parties were married and plaintiff was working, as

would be the case in all coverture fraction

determinations, the denominator is the length of time

from plaintiff's first day on the job to a date [twenty]

years later. Otherwise, there would be no component

of the pension that would qualify for equitable

distribution. The denominator is a necessary artificial

construct, devised by the Sternesky court for these

circumstances, so that a spouse of an officer injured

before having [twenty] years of service can receive a

share of the pension by way of equitable distribution.

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Both spouses typically rely on the PFRS pension for

their future security. Moore v. Moore, 114 N.J. 147,

157 (1989).

The judge also rejected defendant's proposed coverture fractions, stating

in-part:

Defendant's proposed coverture fraction,

amounting to 87.41[ percent], contains a denominator

that represents only [twelve] years and [three] months

of service, far short of the [twenty] years required for a

retirement pension. That would preclude

plaintiff[ from] being eligible for a retirement pension.

As such, defendant would receive no part of an asset

that the parties expected, rightfully, to help support

them in their retirement. Clearly defendant does not

intend to use a coverture fraction that deprives her of

any part of plaintiff's pension.

The judge concluded, "All Pro QDRO['s] valuation follow[ed] the

Sternesky formula faithfully." Thus, the judge "adopt[ed] the value of the

benefit subject to equitable distribution, [$2,250.06,]" and awarded defendant

half of plaintiff's monthly PFRS pension benefit, amounting to $1,125.03. Both

the record and the State's settled case law amply support the judge's decision.

Defendant argues that Sternesky and its preceding case law are based on

"a gross mistake of the laws governing [PFRS] disability pensions ." Defendant

proffers instead that Kruger and Avallone are the more appropriate standards by

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which plaintiff's pension should be subjected to equitable distribution. We

disagree.

In Avallone, we noted that Kruger "is not controlling . . . for several

reasons." 275 N.J. Super. at 580. First, "[t]he disability pension at issue in

Kruger was a military disability pension to which special principles apply."

Ibid. Second, that case "was decided prior to McCarty v. McCarty, 453 U.S.

210 (1981), which reached a contrary result." Ibid. "Finally, as the Supreme

Court noted in Landwehr, Kruger was based upon a version of our equitable

distribution statute which the Legislature subsequently amended." Id. at 580-

81.

Next, defendant argues the $93,911 in SSDI child benefits she received as

"the chosen 'representative payee'" were "exempt from equitable distribution" as

a matter of law. Therefore, according to defendant, the Edgefield Drive home,

which she paid for in part with the children's SSDI benefits, should not be

equitably distributed but retained entirely by her. In support, defendant cites 42

U.S.C. § 407, which limits the transfer or assignment of payments made under

the statute.

Under 42 U.S.C. § 407,

The right of any person to any future payment under

this subchapter shall not be transferable or assignable,

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at law or in equity, and none of the moneys paid or

payable or rights existing under this subchapter shall be

subject to execution, levy, attachment, garnishment, or

other legal process, or to the operation of any

bankruptcy or insolvency law.

[42 U.S.C. § 407(a).]

Defendant also cites federal regulations which require a "representative

payee," who receives the Social Security benefits on a beneficiary's behalf,

among other things, to:

(a) Use the benefits received on [the beneficiary's]

behalf only for [the beneficiary's] use and benefit in a

manner and for the purposes he or she determines,

under the guidelines in this subpart, to be in [the

beneficiary's] best interests;

(b) Keep any benefits received on [the beneficiary's]

behalf separate from [the representative payee's] own

funds and show [the beneficiary's] ownership of these

benefits unless [the payee] is [the

beneficiary's] . . . natural or adoptive parent . . . and

lives in the same household with [the beneficiary] . . . ;

[and]

(c) Treat any interest earned on the benefits as [the

beneficiary's] property . . . .

[20 C.F.R. § 404.2035(a)–(c).]

See also Wash. State Dep't of Soc. & Health Servs. v. Guardianship Est. of

Keffeler, 537 U.S. 371, 376-77 (2003) (citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.2035).

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In Philpott v. Essex County Welfare Board, 409 U.S. 413 (1973), the

United States Supreme Court held that section 407 "imposes a broad bar against

the use of any legal process to reach all social security benefits" by "all

claimants, including a State." Id. at 417. There, the Court prohibited this State

from reimbursing itself for payments made by its welfare agency, the Essex

County Welfare Board, to the recipient from the recipient's future real or

personal property. Id. at 413-14, 417. The Philpott Court analogized the anti-

reassignment clause of 42 U.S.C. § 407 to that exempting veterans' benefits

under 38 U.S.C. § 3101. Id. at 416-17 (citing Porter v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co.,

370 U.S. 159, 161-62 (1962)). The Court reasoned that because "the funds on

deposit were readily withdrawable and retained the quality of 'moneys' within

the purview of [section] 407," this State could not employ legal process to

recoup its funds from the recipient's Social Security benefits. Ibid.

In Porter, a U.S. Air Force veteran "suffered a judgment at the hands of"

Aetna Casualty and Surety Company, which sought attachment of "a checking

account and two accounts in local federal savings and loan associations." 370

U.S. at 160. The accounts were established "with funds received from the

[United States] Veterans' Administration as disability compensation" pursuant

to 38 U.S.C. § 3101(a). Id. at 159-60. As the Court explained, it has long "been

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21

the policy of the Congress to exempt veterans' benefits from creditor actions as

well as from taxation." Id. at 159-60. Citing a distinction between the holdings

of Trotter v. Tennessee, 290 U.S. 354 (1933) and Lawrence v. Shaw, 300 U.S.

245 (1937), the question before the Court was whether the funds deposited in

the savings and loan associations made the deposited funds "permanent

investments" or "moneys" that were "subject to demand." Id. at 160-62. Only

the latter was subject to the exemption. Id. at 161. The Porter Court reasoned

that because "the funds were subject to immediate and certain access[,]" "were

not of a speculative character," and "plainly had 'the quality of moneys,'" the

funds "should remain inviolate." Id. at 161-62.

In Keffeler, the Supreme Court addressed whether a state agency receiving

Social Security funds on behalf of children under its care violated section 407

when it reimbursed itself with those funds. 537 U.S. at 375. The Court

considered whether the agency employed "other legal process" in the

recoupment of expenses while it was in possession of the Social Security

benefits. Id. at 383. The Keffeler Court defined the term "other legal process"

in relation to the preceding terms "execution, levy, attachment, garnishment, or

other legal process" under the interpretive cannons of noscitur a sociis and

ejusdem generis. Id. at 383-84 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 407(a)).

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The Court concluded that

"other legal process" should be understood to be

process much like the processes of execution, levy,

attachment, and garnishment, and at a minimum, would

seem to require utilization of some judicial or quasi-

judicial mechanism, though not necessarily an

elaborate one, by which control over property passes

from one person to another in order to discharge or

secure discharge of an allegedly existing or anticipated

liability.

[Id. at 385.]

Because the state agency was in possession of the Social Security funds, the

Keffeler Court held it had not employed a legal process violative of the anti-

reassignment clause in section 407. Id. at 386, 392.

Furthermore, in Lamb v. Connecticut General Life Insurance Co., 643

F.2d 108 (3d Cir. 1981), the Third Circuit held that the unfrozen offset of an

insured individual's private insurance policy payment by the cost -of-living

increase in the individual's Social Security benefit did not violate the anti -

reassignment clause of section 407. Id. at 111. Since Lamb received her full

Social Security payment and did not transfer any portion to the company, and

section 407 "does not address itself to the level of benefits that a private

insurance program must pay to augment federal programs," the offset did not

violate the federal law. Ibid.

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Still, federal courts have held that Social Security benefits are exempt

even when commingled in deposit accounts. See, e.g., S & S Diversified Servs.,

L.L.C. v. Taylor, 897 F. Supp. 549, 552 (D. Wyo. 1995) (holding that Social

Security benefits deposited with another individual's annuity funds are

"absolutely exempt"); NCNB Fin. Servs., Inc., v. Shumate, 829 F. Supp. 178,

180-81 (W.D. Va. 1993), aff'd 45 F.3d 427 (4th Cir. 1994) (concluding that

reasonably traceable Social Security benefits commingled with other funds were

entitled to protection).

Here, the SSDI benefits defendant received for her two children were

commingled with personal funds in defendant's investment account, which was

declared part of the marital property and used to purchase the Edgefield Drive

home where defendant lived with the children. In addressing defendant's

argument that the funds were exempt, the judge explained:

[Defendant] believes that it should not be equitably

distributed, but rather entirely retained by her, because

she paid for it in part with the children's Social Security

lump sum benefits received by her when she went on

Social Security Disability in 2012. However, she

provides no authority for that position. Additionally,

the lump sum award represented the parties' children's

entitlements to Social Security monthly payments

retroactive to when defendant qualified for Social

Security disability. As such the lump sum payments

were to reimburse both parties for part of their cost of

maintaining the children after defendant became

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disabled. Both parties contributed to the support and

care of the children. Defendant provided their home

and the majority of their day-to-day needs, and plaintiff

paid for half of the children's separate expenses and

some of defendant's expenses. The court must take into

account the source of the funds that were used to

purchase this home, in determining an equitable

distribution of this asset. However, contrary to

defendant's claim, the source here, the children's Social

Security benefits, neither renders the property exempt

from distribution nor favors defendant over plaintiff. In

addition, defendant's argument ignores the fact that part

of the purchase price came from her Oppenheimer

Fund, which she admits was a marital asset.

We agree with the judge that the Edgefield Drive home is not categorically

exempt from equitable distribution merely because a portion of the funds used

to purchase the property were Social Security disability benefits. We are

satisfied that the funds are no longer "moneys," and the legal process—the

distribution—is not directly against the Social Security benefit payment. Cf.

Philpott, 409 U.S. at 416-17; NCNB Fin. Servs., Inc., 829 F. Supp. at 180. Using

Social Security funds to purchase a home is more analogous to a "permanent

investment[]" "of a speculative character" and less like a checking account.

Porter, 370 U.S. at 160-62. Further, as the judge recounted, "[t]he parties

agree[d] that the value of this asset for equitable distribution purposes [was]

$82,642." Defendant also made a profit of $154,261.85 on the property from

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25

the total proceeds of $429,000. Therefore, even if the Social Security benefits

were exempted, enough funds remained to cover the initial investment.

Next, defendant challenges the judge's application of certain alimony

factors codified in N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23(b). Specifically, defendant takes issue

with the judge's assessment of the "marital standard of living," "[her] primary

care of the children while [plaintiff] pursued advanced education and training,"

"the devastating effect of the equitable distribution determination," the denial of

"retroactive [p]endente [l]ite support," and "failing to award reimbursement

alimony . . . due to [defendant's] contributions to [plaintiff's] education and

subsequent earnings . . . and the [p]arties' ages at the time of the alimony award."

"The basic purpose of alimony is the continuation of the standard of living

enjoyed by the parties prior to their separation." Innes, 117 N.J. at 503. "[T]he

goal of a proper alimony award is to assist the supported spouse in achieving a

lifestyle that is reasonably comparable to the one enjoyed while living with the

supporting spouse during the marriage." Crews v. Crews, 164 N.J. 11, 16

(2000). It "is neither a punishment for the payor nor a reward for the payee."

Mani v. Mani, 183 N.J. 70, 80 (2005).

Pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23, a court may order alimony "as the

circumstances of the parties and the nature of the case shall render fit, reasonable

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26

and just." See Gnall v. Gnall, 222 N.J. 414, 429 (2015) (concluding alimony

awards are "governed by distinct, objective standards defined by the Legislature

in N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23(b)"). As such, N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23(b) enumerates the

following factors for consideration:

(1) The actual need and ability of the parties to pay;

(2) The duration of the marriage or civil union;

(3) The age, physical and emotional health of the

parties;

(4) The standard of living established in the marriage

or civil union and the likelihood that each party can

maintain a reasonably comparable standard of

living, with neither party having a greater

entitlement to that standard of living than the other;

(5) The earning capacities, educational levels,

vocational skills, and employability of the parties;

(6) The length of absence from the job market of the

party seeking maintenance;

(7) The parental responsibilities for the children;

(8) The time and expense necessary to acquire

sufficient education or training to enable the party

seeking maintenance to find appropriate

employment, the availability of the training and

employment, and the opportunity for future

acquisitions of capital assets and income;

(9) The history of the financial or non-financial

contributions to the marriage or civil union by each

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27

party including contributions to the care and

education of the children and interruption of

personal careers or educational opportunities;

(10) The equitable distribution of property ordered

and any payouts on equitable distribution, directly

or indirectly, out of current income, to the extent

this consideration is reasonable, just and fair;

(11) The income available to either party through

investment of any assets held by that party;

(12) The tax treatment and consequences to both

parties of any alimony award, including the

designation of all or a portion of the payment as a

non-taxable payment;

(13) The nature, amount, and length of pendente lite

support paid, if any; and

(14) Any other factors which the court may deem

relevant.

The statute continues:

In each case where the court is asked to make an award

of alimony, the court shall consider and assess evidence

with respect to all relevant statutory factors. If the

court determines that certain factors are more or less

relevant than others, the court shall make specific

written findings of fact and conclusions of law on the

reasons why the court reached that conclusion. No

factor shall be elevated in importance over any other

factor unless the court finds otherwise, in which case

the court shall make specific written findings of fact

and conclusions of law in that regard.

[N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23(b).]

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"An alimony award that lacks consideration of the [above] factors . . . is

inadequate . . . ." Crews, 164 N.J. at 26.

As to the fourth factor, "'[t]he standard of living during the marriage is the

way the couple actually lived, whether they resorted to borrowing and parental

support, . . . [or] limited themselves to their earned income,' or if they chose to

accumulate savings." S.W. v. G.M., 462 N.J. Super. 522, 531 (App. Div. 2020)

(alterations in original) (internal citations omitted) (first quoting Glass v. Glass,

366 N.J. Super. 357, 371 (App. Div. 2004); and then citing Lombardi v.

Lombardi, 447 N.J. Super. 26, 36-37 (App. Div. 2016)). Nevertheless, the

determination of the marital budget is not formulaic. Id. at 533 (citing N.J.S.A.

2A:34-23(b)).

Contained in most marital budgets are expenses, which

may not be associated with either the alimony payor or

payee, including those associated with children who

have since emancipated or whose expenses are met by

an asset or a third-party source having no bearing on

alimony. There are also circumstances where an

expense is unrelated to either the payor or the payee but

is met by that party on behalf of a child.

[Id. at 533-34.]

In S.W., we addressed whether the trial judge properly determined the

"numerical" "marital lifestyle." Id. at 530-31. There, "the judge's starting point

was defendant's current budget, as opposed to the marital lifestyle." Id. at 529.

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Although the judge reviewed the parties' testimony and case information

statements and defendant's pendente lite budget, id. at 529, we concluded that

"the trial judge disregarded the marital budget altogether and instead

supplemented defendant's current budget with some expenses she once enjoyed

during the marriage." Id. at 532. That methodology was "problematic because

it ignored the judge's own findings that the marital lifestyle 'subsumed' the

entirety of plaintiff's earnings." Id. at 532-33. We remanded the issue,

instructing that "consider[ation of] the supported spouse's ability to contribute

[the supported spouse's] own expenses and the amount of alimony necessary to

meet the uncovered sum" may only be considered once the marital lifestyle was

calculated. Id. at 534 (citing Crews, 164 N.J. at 32-33).

In determining an alimony award, the court may impute a party's income

from the "usual or former occupation," "the average earnings for that occupation

as reported by the New Jersey Department of Labor," or the "most recent wage

or benefit record." Elrom v. Elrom, 439 N.J. Super. 424, 435 (App. Div. 2015)

(quoting Child Support Guidelines, Pressler & Verniero, Current N.J. Court

Rules, cmt. 12, Appendix IX–A to R. 5:6A, at 2635 (2015)) ("These legal

precepts equally apply when establishing a party's obligation to pay alimony.").

However, "income from pension benefits that have been treated as an asset for

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30

equitable distribution purposes (those benefits reflecting work during the

marriage partnership) is not to be considered in determining alimony." Innes,

117 N.J. at 505. The opposite is true for income from pension benefits, or

portions thereof, not subject to equitable distribution. See ibid.

Here, in awarding defendant $2,000 per month in alimony, the judge

separately considered each factor under N.J.S.A. 2A:23-34(b), in conjunction

with the equitable distribution of the parties' property. The judge concluded

"that alimony, not equitable distribution, [was] the appropriate vehicle for

addressing defendant's declining income, now and in the future." The judge also

supported the alimony award by determining that variable future circumstances

would be more easily remedied through a modification of alimony based "upon

a substantial change in . . . circumstances."

Critically, in assessing the marital lifestyle, the judge stated:

[T]his marriage of medium duration saw an

unconventional living arrangement in the latter half, but

the parties remained a cohesive financial unit. They

also continued their manner of sharing the care of their

children, with defendant having the majority of the day-

to-day care, and plaintiff helping directly with expenses

and taking the children on weekends. While living

apart frequently, they cooperated in their business

activities until shortly before the end-date in 2014 . . . .

The parties amassed the marital estate largely

through their mutual industry. Each had training and

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31

skills that well served their real estate investment

business. Plaintiff went back to school and trained for

a new career during the marriage, at some cost to the

marital estate. Defendant's primary care of the children

enabled plaintiff to work at his law enforcement career

and carry on their real estate activities. Later it enabled

him to return to school, work at teaching and then

nursing, all while continuing the real estate

development and management through the end-date of

their marriage.

Plaintiff's career-ending incident caused a hiatus

in their otherwise continuous success with their

respective professional careers and investments.

However, in a remarkably short time he recovered

enough to make a plan and commence training for a

new career. Although defendant suffers from an

ongoing mental health disorder, there was only one

week during the marriage when she was hospitalized

for it. There is no evidence that it otherwise affected

the parties' day to day life or her care of the children.

The parties had a very comfortable standard of

living. One of the boys went to parochial school at

some point. Defendant had a series of high-end cars

including an Acura, a Jaguar and a Mercedes. They

vacationed in Costa Rica annually for two weeks. They

had the ability to own their home, although they chose

to rent for several years. They owned investment real

estate. Each ended up buying a high-end middle-class

home by the end of the marriage. Plaintiff is in a

position to sustain this standard of living on his income.

Defendant cannot do so on her income.

Overall, it is the mutuality of the parties' financial

success that stands out in this marriage. While they

encountered devastating occurrences, they overcame

them with surprising ease and carried on as a high-

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32

functioning partnership. They each ended the marriage

with comparable equity in their homes in addition to

other assets.

Defendant specifically challenges the judge's assessment of the factors

enumerated under N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23(b)(4), 9, 10, 13, and 14. In addressing the

marital standard of living under N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23(b)(4), the judge explained:

The parties purchased a two-family home and vacant

lot in Dover, N.J.[,] shortly after they married, and

leveraged that property and subsequent properties to

purchase and improve nine properties, selling them at a

profit. These investments, plaintiff's personal injury

awards, defendant's Social Security awards for herself

and the children, and their salaries . . ., enabled them to

have savings, at times, over [$100,000], to have defined

contribution retirement funds worth almost [$200,000],

. . . and save well over [$100,000] in college education

funds for their sons. . . . [Defendant] listed the marital

standard of living in her June 2015 Case Information

Statement as requiring [$9,734] per month.

The judge recounted the parties' respective incomes, noting that "[a]t the

beginning of the marriage, defendant's earnings were greater than plaintiff's.

Then when she went on disability and plaintiff lost his law enforcement career,

they lived on comparable disability incomes, including defendant's SSDI, until

plaintiff started earning money as a nurse in 2012." The judge pointed out that

"[a]fter plaintiff's traumatic event, defendant's income, at approximately

$100,000 annually from her private disability, Social Security, the children's

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33

Social Security and [the] adoption subsidy, equaled or exceeded plaintiff's

income, including his pension, for a few years." Then, after "the adoption

stipend . . . terminated on [the child's eighteenth] birthday," defendant's annual

income "decreased from approximately $100,000 to $70,000." The judge also

considered the potential future decrease in defendant's income "upon her [sixty-

fifth] birthday, when her private disability insurance contract terminates " and

her income would be decreased by "$45,000 per year from that policy."

Meanwhile, according to the judge, "[p]laintiff enjoy[ed] an annual income of

approximately $216,9005 from his salary" as "a [p]sychiatric [n]urse

[p]ractitioner in a correctional facility" and "will collect his PFRS pension for

life."

The judge concluded that plaintiff had "enough income" to maintain the

marital standard of living after the divorce. On the other hand,

[d]efendant has decreased her housing cost by

purchasing a farm in upstate New York, but she no

longer has high-end multiple cars, her ability to

contribute to savings has been eliminated, and these and

other discretionary spending items have been replaced

by higher expenses for necessities such as healthcare

and health insurance. She was covered by [p]laintiff's

ealth insurance throughout the marriage.

5

The judge's opinion identifies slightly different estimations of plaintiff's

salary, ranging from $215,000 to $216,900. At the time of the opinion, the judge

identified "his current income [as] $216,880."

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34

Turning to the financial and non-financial contributions to the marriage

under N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23(b)(9), the judge explained:

Both parties participated actively in the

acquisition of most of the properties, making the

decisions together. Defendant performed the legal

work for purchases and sales, and plaintiff was in

charge of the construction of improvements. . . .

Through work, earnings and disability incomes, both

parties contributed substantially to the marital estate.

Defendant did most of the parenting of the boys

after she became disabled in 2004, and a nanny was no

longer needed. When the parties lived apart, the boys

lived and went to school where defendant lived. They

would spend most weekends with plaintiff unless they

had an activity such as sports or camping that prevented

them from going to his residence. Defendant's primary

responsibility for the boys enabled plaintiff to spend a

lot of time during the week at construction sites on the

parties' properties.

The judge further acknowledged that "[d]efendant's care of the children's basic

needs during the week and her steady disability income enabled plaintiff to

attain an education for a new career and launch that career."

Considering the equitable distribution of the marital assets under N.J.S.A.

2A:34-23(b)(10), the judge recounted:

The equitable distribution of those assets that are

subject to distribution will have left the parties in

comparable positions. Each owns a home; plaintiff's is

worth more and he has a mortgage on it. Defendant has

no debt. The equity each party had in their respective

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35

homes at the end-date of the marriage is comparable.

Other assets will have been divided equally or close to

it. Each party received approximately $70,000 from the

proceeds of sale of their last investment property.

Defendant will have to pay plaintiff for his share of

. . . defendant's 401K plan, $37,426, within [ninety]

days.

In addition, the judge noted that "the portion of plaintiff's PFRS pension

that was not equitably distributed [was] eligible for the court to consider with

respect to alimony." Finally, considering pendente lite support under N.J.S.A.

2A:34-23(b)(13), the judge acknowledged that "[n]one was ordered." The judge

concluded that the "disparate picture of the parties' financial circumstances after

th[e] divorce is over" compelled an award of open durational alimony to

defendant "to cover her shortfall and provide some savings on an ongoing basis."

The judge found "extraordinary circumstance[s]" by virtue of "defendant's

disability and the [upcoming] termination of her disability income policy"

sufficient to take the case out of the limitations otherwise imposed by N.J.S.A.

2A:34-23(c) (limiting "the total duration of alimony" for any marriage "less than

[twenty] years in duration" "except in exceptional circumstances").

Contrary to defendant's claim, the judge employed the methodology we

endorsed in S.W., 462 N.J. Super. at 531, and we discern no basis to intervene.

We also reject defendant's assertion that the judge erred by failing to award

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36

reimbursement alimony. This is not a case where one spouse invested more into

household expenses while the other attended schooling and advanced in a

profession. Cf., e.g., Lynn v. Lynn, 91 N.J. 510, 512-13, 518 (1982) (holding

that an award of reimbursement alimony was warranted where the ex-wife, a

research analyst, supported the household "with the expectation" that her ex-

husband, a medical school student who made substantially lower contributions

to the household, would have greater earning potential to benefit both spouses).

Here, both spouses suffered devastating disabilities that prevented them from

engaging in their chosen professions. Furthermore, while pursuing a new

profession, plaintiff continuously contributed to the household expenditures.

Likewise, we reject defendant's claim that the judge erred by declining to

award retroactive pendente lite support to defendant despite noting "the gross

disparity between [the parties'] income . . . for . . . six years" and the current and

future "drop" in defendant's income. "The State has long recognized the power

of the judiciary to prevent irreparable harm and to preserve the status quo

through the device of awarding temporary financial support pending a full

investigation of the case." Mallamo v. Mallamo, 280 N.J. Super. 8, 11-12 (App.

Div. 1995) (italicization omitted). The Legislature has specifically authorized

pendente lite support awards to provide temporary financial support in pending

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37

matrimonial litigation. Id. at 12 (citing N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23). Pendente lite

support orders are subject to modification at the time final judgment is entered.

Ibid. "Any changes in the initial orders rest with the trial judge's discretion."

Slutsky v. Slutsky, 451 N.J. Super 332, 368 (App. Div. 2017).

In the July 20, 2016, order, the motion judge denied defendant's request

for pendente lite support, citing "the period of time in which the parties have

lived separate and apart, and given the general parity of their monthly incomes ."

At the time, the judge noted "it may ultimately be necessary to issue a spousal

support award" due to defendant's future loss of "several of the benefits

(derivative or otherwise) that she currently receives."

Subsequently, however, the trial judge found "no reason to order either

form of support retroactively," explaining:

Hindsight does not weigh those circumstances

differently from how they were considered at that time.

The alimony that the court orders now is prospective

and is based on facts that exist now and in the future.

Indeed, the judge who heard the [pendente lite] motion

foretold the possible need for alimony in the future.

We agree with the judge's decision and discern no basis to overturn the judge's

denial of retroactive pendente lite support.

Finally, defendant argues the judge abused her discretion by denying her

request to order plaintiff to maintain an existing $500,000 life insurance policy,

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38

in effect since 1999. She submits that the pension statute, as amended in 1967,

"eliminat[ed] the election of a designated beneficiary in favor of a survivor

benefit for the member's spouse" and that the amended statute contain s no

provision for a divorced spouse. Therefore, according to defendant, "no

provision was made for the loss of the PFRS pension upon [plaintiff]'s death ."

Plaintiff's PFRS pension is governed by N.J.S.A. 43:16A-1 to -68.

N.J.S.A. 43:16A-1(24)(b), as amended, defines widow as a "woman to whom a

member or retirant was married on the date of his death and who has not

remarried." "Thus, to be entitled to a widow's pension, the widow must have

been married to the member on the day he died and not remarried. No provision

is included for divorced spouses . . . ." La Sala v. La Sala, 335 N.J. Super. 1, 8

(App. Div. 2000); see also N.J.S.A. 43:16A-12.1(a) ("Upon the death after

retirement of any member of the retirement system there shall be paid to the

member's [surviving spouse] a pension of [fifty percent] of final compensation

for the use of [the surviving spouse], to continue [until death or remarriage]

. . . .").

Separate from a survivor benefit, under N.J.S.A. 43:16A-12.3, a PFRS

pension recipient may elect a beneficiary upon his or her death. Under that

provision, the "designation of beneficiary by a member or retirant shall be made

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39

in writing on a form satisfactory to the retirement system, and filed with the

retirement system." Ibid. Furthermore, "[t]he provisions of this section shall be

construed separately with respect to each of the death benefits for which a

beneficiary is designated by the member or retirant." Ibid.

In Larrison, we reversed the trial court order requiring the pensioner-

spouse to maintain life insurance to protect the non-pensioner spouse's equitably

acquired share of pension benefits in the event of the pensioner-spouse's death

where the pension plan did not provide for survivor benefits to an ex-spouse.

392 N.J. Super. at 18-19. We began our analysis by

noting that "[a] deferred distribution . . . amounts to a

contingency distribution dependent upon the survival

of the pensioner spouse." Accordingly, if the pension

does not provide survivor benefits to an ex-spouse, then

[the ex-spouse's] benefits cease when defendant dies.

As this court stated, "when he gets, she gets; when he

dies, so does her benefit."

[Id. at 18 (first alteration in original) (quoting Claffey,

360 N.J. Super. at 261).]

We reasoned that because the pensioner-spouse's "pension plan [did] not provide

for survivor benefits to an ex-spouse," if the pensioner-spouse predeceased the

non-pensioner spouse, then the non-pensioner spouse would "no longer receive

her share of his pension benefit" and there was "no legal support for the trial

court's order directing otherwise." Id. at 19.

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40

Here, in her written opinion, the judge explained:

[D]efendant should have the security of life insurance

or a survivor benefit to meet defendant's needs should

plaintiff predecease her. The testimony was unclear as

to whether defendant will be cut off from the survivor

benefit connected to plaintiff's PFRS pension once the

parties are divorced. If in fact defendant is no longer

eligible for that benefit after this divorce, plaintiff shall

name defendant as beneficiary of at least $250,000 of

the life insurance in place now on his life. If defendant

does not have proof of her status with respect to the

survivor benefit, she shall inform counsel who shall

provide the proof to defendant. If defendant remains

eligible for the survivor benefit, plaintiff shall provide

proof that she is the named beneficiary. If she is no

longer eligible, plaintiff shall provide proof that she is

the named beneficiary of insurance on his life with a

face value of at least $250,000.

Under N.J.S.A. 43:16A-1(24)(b) and -12.1, it is clear that defendant is no

longer eligible for the survivor benefit. However, the judge did not require

plaintiff to maintain a $250,000 life insurance policy securing defendant's

equitably acquired share of plaintiff's PFRS pension benefits in the event of

plaintiff's death. Instead, the judge imposed the requirement to secure

defendant's alimony award as permitted by law. See Konczyk v. Konczyk, 367

N.J. Super. 512, 515 (App. Div. 2004) (noting that "parties may use various

devices, such as life insurance or trusts, to secure an alimony obligation"); see

also N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23. In the DJOD, the judge specified:

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41

Plaintiff shall maintain insurance on his life with a face

value of at least $250,000 with defendant as the sole,

named beneficiary of the death benefit, so long as

plaintiff has an alimony obligation to defendant. This

provision can be satisfied by proof to defendant and the

court that defendant is the named recipient of the

survivor benefit on plaintiff's pension and that she

remains eligible after the parties are divorced.

[(Emphasis added).]

Accordingly, there was no error by the judge and no abuse of discretion in the

judge's decision to limit the life insurance policy to $250,000.

Affirmed.

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