State v. Meeks

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF TENNESSEE

AT NASHVILLE

May 28, 2008 Session Heard at Cookeville1

STATE OF TENNESSEE v. RANDY LEE MEEKS ET AL.

Appeal by Permission from the Court of Criminal Appeals

Circuit Court for Coffee County

No. 34,241 Jerry Scott, Senior Judge and L. Craig Johnson, Judge

No. M2006-01385-SC-R11-CO - Filed September 2, 2008

This appeal involves the warrantless search of a motel room containing an actively operating

methamphetamine laboratory. After the occupants of the room were indicted for manufacturing

methamphetamine and for possessing methamphetamine and drug paraphernalia, they filed a motion

in the Circuit Court for Coffee County seeking to suppress the evidence found in the motel room.

The trial court granted the motion to suppress and dismissed the indictment. The State appealed, and

the Court of Criminal Appeals reversed the trial court’s decision to suppress the evidence and

vacated the order dismissing the indictment. State v. Meeks, No. M2006-01385-CCA-R3-CO, 2007

WL 1987797 (Tenn. Crim. App. July 10, 2007). We granted the defendants’ Tenn. R. App. P. 11

application for permission to appeal to address more fully the principles applicable to warrantless

searches of actively operating methamphetamine laboratories when the State asserts that the officers

were acting to avert a serious and immediate risk of injury to themselves or others. Like the Court

of Criminal Appeals, we have determined that the trial court erred by granting the motion to suppress

and by dismissing the indictment.

Tenn. R. App. P. 11 Appeal by Permission; Judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals

Affirmed

WILLIAM C. KOCH , JR., J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which WILLIAM M. BARKER, C.J.,

JANICE M. HOLDER, CORNELIA A. CLARK, and GARY R. WADE, JJ., joined.

Robert T. Carter and Eric J. Burch, Tullahoma, Tennessee, for the appellants, Randy Meeks and

Ernest L. Snyder, Jr.

Robert E. Cooper, Jr., Attorney General and Reporter; Michael E. Moore, Solicitor General; Mark

A. Fulks, Senior Counsel; C. Michael Layne, District Attorney General; and Felecia Walkup,

Assistant District Attorney General, for the appellee, State of Tennessee.

1

Oral argument was heard in this case in Cookeville, Putnam County, Tennessee, as part of this Court’s

S.C.A.L.E.S. (Supreme Court Advancing Legal Education for Students) project.

OPINION

I.

At approximately 11:45 p.m. on March 6, 2005, one of the occupants of Room 109 of the

Park Motel in Manchester, Tennessee telephoned the Manchester Police Department to report a

strange odor in her motel room. When Officer Scott Peterson returned the call, the caller told him

that the odor appeared to be coming from an adjoining room and that the odor was causing her and

her mother to have burning eyes and headaches.

The caller also asked Officer Peterson “[w]hat does a meth lab smell like? What does

making methamphetamine smell like?” Officer Peterson informed her that an actively operating

methamphetamine laboratory has a distinct odor that is difficult to describe. After talking with the

caller for approximately five minutes, Officer Peterson decided to follow up on the call. Even

though the Manchester Police Department had received other similar calls that ultimately did not

involve a methamphetamine laboratory, Officer Peterson was aware that other methamphetamine

laboratories had been found at the Park Motel.

Officer Peterson met with the caller in Room 109 of the Park Motel. Upon entering the

room, he discovered that the odor, particularly in the bathroom area, was instantly recognizable and

unmistakable. The odor indicated that the occupants of Room 110 were manufacturing

methamphetamine. Officer Peterson also noted that the caller and her elderly mother were still

complaining of burning eyes and headaches – symptoms consistent with the effects of the toxic

fumes produced when methamphetamine is being manufactured.

Officer Stuart Caldwell arrived at the Park Motel shortly after Officer Peterson. Officer

Caldwell is certified as an expert regarding the production of methamphetamine. He has examined

more than two hundred laboratories making methamphetamine, and he has been involved in more

than one hundred and fifty methamphetamine prosecutions. Simply by standing in front of the door

to Room 110, Officer Caldwell “could smell what [he] knew to be a meth lab.”

Officers Peterson and Caldwell decided to knock on the door of Room 110 to speak with the

occupant or occupants of the room. The officers received no response to their knocks, but with every

knock, the odor intensified because the door was quite flimsy. In fact, the odor was so strong that

Officer Peterson was forced to stand beside, rather than directly in front of, the door in order to avoid

the fumes. While Officers Peterson and Caldwell were knocking on the door, they were joined by

Corporal Ronny Gray who also immediately noticed the extremely strong odors of the ongoing

manufacture of methamphetamine. The occupants of Room 110 did not respond to the officers’

knocking, but the officers heard someone’s voice inside the room and also heard the sound of

breaking glass.

The officers then discussed their next course of action in light of the intensity of the odors

emanating from Room 110. Officer Peterson understood that methamphetamine manufacturing

-2-

created dangerous fumes and a risk of explosion. Officer Stuart was aware that the “presence of the

chemicals there are dangerous in themselves, but when you start mixing those chemicals, it starts

producing phosphine gas, hydrochloric gas, several gases that in just one part per million can kill

you.” He also feared the possibility of fatalities because the occupants of Room 110 and persons in

the vicinity of the room risked inhaling the toxic fumes, explosion, and fire. Corporal Gray agreed

that the situation posed a “threat.” Collectively, the officers agreed that they should enter Room 110

because of the dangers posed by manufacturing methamphetamine. The officers made this decision

approximately five to ten minutes after Officer Peterson first arrived at the Park Motel.

Corporal Gray obtained a key to Room 110 from the motel manager. When the officers

unlocked the door, it still would not open completely because of a chain lock on the interior of the

door. However, a large cloud of fumes escaped from the room through the partially opened door.

The officers identified the fumes as a chemical cloud and concluded that the conditions in the room

were extremely hazardous. Officer Peterson indicated that the air inside the room was not something

that he “really want[ed] to be breathing” and that it posed a danger to others nearby. Officer

Caldwell noted that the chemicals were capable of creating a fire. The officers continued to identify

themselves in loud voices and to demand that the occupants of the room come to the door. Despite

these commands, the occupants of the room still did not comply.

After receiving no response, the officers kicked in the door to Room 110. A hot plate with

a glowing red heating element and bottles of peroxide and other unidentified liquids were near the

door. Two men were in the room. Ernest Snyder stood in the bathroom with one of his hands

behind his back. Randy Meeks was lying unconscious on the bed. When Mr. Snyder refused to

comply with their commands to put his hands up, the officers removed him from the room. The

intensity of the fumes in the room prevented the officers from re-entering.

Before removing Mr. Meeks from the room, Officer Caldwell and Corporal Gray donned air

suits they had obtained from the fire department. When they re-entered the room, Mr. Meeks was

still lying unconscious on the bed. The officers dragged him from the room, and paramedics were

able to resuscitate him. Mr. Meeks remained incoherent at the scene and was in intensive care for

an extended period of time. Mr. Snyder also required hospitalization. Approximately ten minutes

elapsed between the officers’ first entry into Room 110 and their removal of Mr. Meeks.

After Messrs. Meeks and Snyder were removed from the room, the officers called a

hazardous materials team to the motel and placed an exhaust fan in Room 110. The persons who

had been in the rooms adjacent to Room 110, including the person who placed the original telephone

call to the police and her elderly mother, were relocated to other motels in Manchester. Later, when

he was cross-examined regarding the decision not to evacuate the motel before entering Room 110,

Officer Caldwell conceded that failing to remove the other motel occupants was “poor judgment”

and that “[w]e should have done that first.”

Using the information obtained from their warrantless entry of Room 110, the officers

secured a search warrant. When the authorities searched Room 110, they found methamphetamine

-3-

on the dresser, as well as evidence of a methamphetamine laboratory, including an HCL gas

generator, plastic tubing, aluminum foil, a bottle of iodine crystals, a bottle containing muriatic acid,

a Mason jar containing separating liquids, a plastic container of ephedrine, a gallon jug of iodine,

and disposable plastic gloves.

In April 2005, a Coffee County grand jury indicted Messrs. Meeks and Snyder for

manufacturing methamphetamine, possessing methamphetamine, and possessing drug paraphernalia.

In July 2005, Messrs. Meeks and Snyder filed a motion in the Circuit Court for Coffee County

seeking to suppress the evidence seized in Room 110 on the ground that the warrantless entry was

not justified by exigent circumstances. Following an October 10, 2005 hearing, the trial court

entered an order on November 9, 2005, granting the motion to suppress. Placing great significance

on the fact that the officers had not evacuated the occupants of the adjoining rooms before they

entered Room 110, the trial court concluded that the State had failed to demonstrate the existence

of the sort of exigent circumstances that would justify a warrantless search.

The State sought review of the trial court’s November 9, 2005 order by the Court of Criminal

Appeals. On July 10, 2007, the Court of Criminal Appeals filed an opinion reversing the trial court’s

suppression order and vacating the order dismissing the indictment. State v. Meeks, No. M2006-

01385-CCA-R3-CO, 2007 WL 1987797 (Tenn. Crim. App. July 10, 2007). Relying on one of its

unreported opinions,2 the Court of Criminal Appeals held that the warrantless entry and search of

Room 110 was proper because the actions of Messrs. Meeks and Snyder “did indeed present an

immediate threat to public safety.” State v. Meeks, 2007 WL 1987797, at *8. The court also held

that the “probable cause to search was present and accompanied by exigent circumstances – the

dangers associated with the active production of methamphetamine in a hotel room.” State v. Meeks,

2007 WL 1987797, at *8.

Messrs. Meeks and Snyder filed a Tenn. R. App. P. 11 application for permission to appeal.

They assert (1) that the Court of Criminal Appeals violated their due process rights by invoking

Tenn. R. App. P. 4(a) to permit the State to file a notice of appeal after the expiration of the thirty-

day deadline and (2) that the Court of Criminal Appeals erred by reversing the trial court’s

November 9, 2005 order granting their motion to suppress the evidence found in Room 110. We

granted Messrs. Meeks and Snyder permission to appeal to address more fully the principles

applicable to warrantless searches of actively operating methamphetamine laboratories when the

State asserts that the officers were acting to avert a serious and immediate risk of injury to

themselves or others.

II.

Messrs. Meeks and Snyder assert that the Court of Criminal Appeals erred by permitting the

State to pursue its appeal from the trial court’s November 9, 2005 suppression order. They argue

2

State v. Castile, No. M2004-02572-CCA-R3-CD, 2006 W L 1816371 (Tenn. Crim. App. June 28, 2006) (No

Tenn. R. App. P. 11 application filed).

-4-

that the appeal is not timely and that the Court of Criminal Appeals’ decision to permit the State to

pursue the appeal “in the interest of justice” violates their due process rights. The State, arguing in

the alternative, insists that its appeal was timely but, if it was not, that the Court of Criminal Appeals

properly invoked Tenn. R. App. P. 4(a) to allow the appeal to proceed. We have determined that

invoking the relief provisions in Tenn. R. App. P. 4(a) was unnecessary because the State filed a

timely notice of appeal.

A.

On July 11, 2005, Messrs. Meeks and Snyder filed a joint motion to suppress the evidence

seized in Room 110. Following a hearing on October 10, 2005, the trial court entered an order on

November 9, 2005, granting the motion to suppress. The order did not purport to dismiss the

pending indictments against Messrs. Meeks and Snyder.

On November 17, 2005, the State filed a motion in the trial court seeking permission to

pursue an interlocutory appeal under Tenn. R. App. P. 9. The State asserted in this motion that

pursuing an interlocutory appeal was “necessary to prevent the State from suffering irreparable injury

in that the State would be unable to successfully maintain prosecution of the defendants unless this

motion is granted.”3 On March 2, 2006, the trial court entered an order granting the State permission

to pursue an interlocutory appeal. The court found explicitly in this order that “the suppression of

the evidence gathered in this case from room 110 of the Park Place Motel could present irreparable

harm to the State’s case in chief and is dispositive to the case.”

For some reason not apparent in this record, the State did not file an application for

permission to appeal with the Court of Criminal Appeals by the deadline in Tenn. R. App. P. 9(c).4

However, on March 14, 2006, the day following the deadline for filing the application for an

interlocutory appeal, the State, through an assistant district attorney general, asked the trial court to

place the case on its March 17, 2006 docket, apparently for the purposes of withdrawing the

application for an interlocutory appeal and dismissing the indictments against Messrs. Meeks and

Snyder. On May 19, 2006, the trial court filed an agreed order dismissing the cases against Messrs.

Meeks and Snyder “without prejudice.” In this order, the trial court reiterated its earlier finding that

“the suppression of the evidence gathered in this case from Room 110 of the Park Place Motel does

present irreparable harm to the State’s case in chief and is dispositive of the case.”

The assistant district attorney general thereafter filed a notice of appeal on June 16, 2006.

Despite the fact that the parties had agreed to the dismissal of the State’s interlocutory appeal

pursuant to Tenn. R. App. P. 9, this notice states that the State is seeking an appeal pursuant to Tenn.

3

This representation by the assistant district attorney general who prepared the Tenn. R. App. P. 9 motion

contradicts the assertion in the State’s brief filed in this Court that it was not until much later that the district attorney

determined that the suppression of the evidence would be fatal to the case against Messrs. Meeks and Snyder.

4

At this stage of the proceeding, the responsibility for pursuing the appeal shifted from the Office of the District

Attorney General to the Office of the Attorney General and Reporter. Tenn. Code Ann. § 8-6-109(b)(2) (Supp. 2007).

-5-

R. App. P. 9, rather than Tenn. R. App. P. 3. The defendants detected this procedural anomaly.

They argued to the Court of Criminal Appeals that the State’s appeal was untimely and improperly

filed under Tenn. R. App. P. 9. The Office of the Attorney General and Reporter treated the case as

a routine Tenn. R. App. P. 3 appeal and did not bother to address the argument that the appeal was

improperly filed under Tenn R. App. P. 9.

In its opinion filed on July 10, 2007, the Court of Criminal Appeals concluded that the trial

court’s November 9, 2005 suppression order “had the substantive effect of dismissing the indictment

against the Defendants” and, therefore, that it was immediately appealable under Tenn. R. App. P.

3(c)(1). State v. Meeks, 2007 WL 1987797, at *4. The court also held that even though the State

should have filed its notice of appeal within thirty days after the entry of the November 9, 2005

order, it would waive this procedural deficiency “in the interests of justice” in accordance with Tenn.

R. App. P. 4(a) and consider the substance of the State’s appeal. State v. Meeks, 2007 WL 1987797,

at *4.

B.

Under the common law, as understood and applied in the United States, neither a state nor

the United States had a right to appeal in a criminal prosecution, unless the right is expressly

conferred by a constitutional provision or by statute. Arizona v. Manypenny, 451 U.S. 232, 246

(1981); United States v. Sanges, 144 U.S. 310, 312 (1892); State v. Reynolds, 5 Tenn. (4 Hayw.) 110,

110 (1817). A general grant of appellate jurisdiction does not satisfy this requirement. United States

v. Sanges, 144 U.S. at 322-23; State v. Reynolds, 5 Tenn. (4 Hayw.) at 110-11. When a statute

affords a state or the United States the right to an appeal in a criminal proceeding, the statute will

be strictly construed to apply only to the circumstances defined in the statute. Carroll v. United

States, 354 U.S. 394, 400 (1957); State v. Adler, 92 S.W.3d 397, 400 (Tenn. 2002).

The first Tennessee statutes giving the State a right to appeal in criminal cases appeared in

1858.5 These statutes provided the state with a broad right to appeal from final orders, subject to the

double jeopardy protections in Article I, Section 10 of the Constitution of Tennessee and the Fifth

Amendment to the United States Constitution. However, this Court, construing these statutes

narrowly, concluded that they did not confer on the state the right to appeal from preliminary or

interlocutory orders in criminal cases. State v. Bonhart, 223 Tenn. 582, 590-91, 448 S.W.2d 669,

672-73 (1969).6

5

Code of Tennessee §§ 5244 to 5250 (Return J. Meigs & W illiam F. Cooper eds., E.G. Eastman & Co. 1858)

(later codified at Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 40-3401 to -3404, 40-3409 to -3410 (1975) (repealed 1981)).

6

Tennessee’s courts later held that the State could obtain limited review of an interlocutory suppression order

using a petition for writ of common-law certiorari in cases where the suppression order had the effect of completely and

effectively ending the prosecution. State v. Johnson, 569 S.W .2d 808, 814-15 (Tenn. 1978); State v. Gant, 537 S.W .2d

711, 712-14 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1975).

-6-

Tennessee’s statutes governing the State’s right to appeal in criminal cases were replaced by

the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure, which became effective on July 1, 1979.7 With regard

to the State’s appeal as of right, Tenn. R. App. P. 3(c) provided:

In criminal actions an appeal as of right by the state lies only

from an order or judgment entered by a trial court from which an

appeal lies to the Supreme Court or Court of Criminal Appeals: (1)

the substantive effect of which results in dismissing an indictment,

information, or complaint; (2) setting aside a verdict of guilty and

entering a judgment of acquittal; (3) arresting judgment; (4) granting

or refusing to revoke probation; or (5) remanding a child to the

juvenile court.

In 1980, Tenn. R. App. P. 3(c) was amended to state explicitly that the State was also entitled to an

appeal as of right from final judgments in habeas corpus, extradition, and post-conviction

proceedings.

With regard to the State’s right to an appeal from an interlocutory order in criminal cases,

Tenn. R. App. P. 9(g) explicitly states that both the State and the accused have a right to pursue an

appeal from an interlocutory order under Tenn. R. App. P. 9. Similarly, Tenn. R. App. P. 10(e)

explicitly permits both the State and the accused to pursue an extraordinary appeal under Tenn. R.

App. P. 10.8

Unlike other states, Tennessee does not have a statute or rule that specifically applies to

orders suppressing or excluding evidence.9 Thus, the courts and the litigants have been left to work

through the application of the Tenn. R. App. P. 3(c), 9, and 10 to orders granting an accused’s

motion to suppress or exclude evidence. The results have produced procedural confusion because

of the differing impacts that a suppression order can have.

An order suppressing or excluding evidence is not a final order or judgment because it does

not formally terminate the prosecution. While such an order may have the same practical effect as

an order of dismissal, an order suppressing or excluding evidence leaves the State with the option

of proceeding with the prosecution with its remaining evidence or of dismissing the indictment under

Tenn. R. Crim. P. 48. Under Tenn. R. App. P. 3(c)(1), the State has an appeal as of right only when

the “substantive effect” of the order suppressing or excluding the evidence “results in dismissing an

indictment, information, or complaint.”

7

In 1981, the Tennessee General Assembly expressly repealed the statutes pertaining to the State’s right to

appeal in criminal cases. Act of June 3, 1981, ch. 449, § 1(13), 1981 Tenn. Pub. Acts 667, 669.

8

The grounds for seeking an extraordinary appeal under Tenn. R. App. P. 10 are similar to the grounds for

seeking a common-law writ of certiorari. State v. Willoughby, 594 S.W .2d 388, 392 (Tenn. 1980).

9

7 W ayne R. LaFave, et al., Criminal Procedure § 27.3(c), at 39-42 (3d ed. 2007) (“Criminal Procedure”).

-7-

Interpreting Tenn. R. App. P. 3(c)(1), the Court of Criminal Appeals requires only that the

suppression order have the “substantive effect of dismissing the indictment.”10 Thus, the Court of

Criminal Appeals holds that Tenn. R. App. P. 3(c)(1) does not require an order dismissing the

indictment, information, or complaint as a prerequisite to an appeal by the State. See, e.g., State v.

Holladay, No. E2004-02858-CCA-R3-CD, 2006 WL 304685, at *2 (Tenn. Crim. App. Feb. 8, 2006)

(No Tenn. R. App. P. 11 application filed); State v. Copeland, No. 03C01-9402-CR-00079, 1996 WL

368209, at *3 (Tenn. Crim. App. June 28, 1996) (No Tenn. R. App. P. 11 application filed); State

v. Udzinski, No. 01C01-9212-CC-00380, 1993 WL 473308, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App. Nov. 18, 1993)

(No Tenn. R. App. P. 11 application filed).

The Court of Criminal Appeals’ interpretation of Tenn. R. App. P. 3(c)(1) misapprehends

the plain language of the rule because it overlooks the word “results.” The State may appeal as of

right from an order suppressing or excluding evidence only when the substantive effect of that order

“results” in the dismissal of the indictment, information, or complaint. When used as a verb, the

word “result” means “[t]o arise as a consequence, effect, or conclusion from some action, process,

etc.” or “to end or conclude in a specified manner.” 13 Oxford English Dictionary 761 (2d ed.

1989).11 Thus, to trigger Tenn. R. App. P. 3(c)(1), the order suppressing or excluding the evidence

must produce the entry of an order dismissing an indictment, information, or complaint.

Even though the entry of a final order dismissing the indictment, information, or complaint

is required for an appeal as of right under Tenn. R. App. P. 3(c)(1), it does not necessarily follow that

the State cannot appeal from an order suppressing or excluding evidence when an order of dismissal

has not been entered. In the absence of an order of dismissal, the State may still seek interlocutory

appellate review of a trial court’s order suppressing or excluding evidence using either Tenn. R. App.

P. 9 or Tenn. R. App. P. 10. These sorts of appeals from pre-trial rulings in criminal cases are not

favored. State v. Scarborough, 201 S.W.3d 607, 612 n.2 (Tenn. 2006); State v. Gilley, 173 S.W.3d

1, 5 (Tenn. 2005). They address themselves to the courts’ discretion, and thus, it is incumbent on

the party seeking the appeal – in this case the State – to satisfy the court or courts that there are

appropriate grounds for an interlocutory appeal.

Notwithstanding the appellate courts’ disinclination to grant appeals under Tenn. R. App. P.

9 and Tenn. R. App. P. 10, the State should be able to carry its burden of persuasion in cases of this

sort with little difficulty. When an order suppresses or excludes evidence and thereby eliminates the

heart of the State’s case, requiring the State to proceed to trial without the suppressed evidence could

result in irreparable injury to the public’s interest if the accused is acquitted. In that circumstance,

the State could not obtain meaningful appellate review of the suppression order because the Double

10

See, e.g., State v. Saine, No. M2007-01277-CCA-R3-CD, 2008 W L 918511, at *5-6 (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr.

4, 2008); State v. Copeland, No. 03C01-9402-CR-00079, 1996 W L 368209, at *3 (Tenn. Crim. App. June 28, 1996)

(No Tenn. R. App. P. 11 application filed).

11

See also The American Heritage College Dictionary 1164 (3d ed. 2000) (result means “[t]o come about as

a consequence” or “to end in a particular way”).

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Jeopardy Clauses of the federal and state constitutions12 would prevent the State from trying the

accused a second time. Thus, a suppression order that eliminates any reasonable probability of a

successful prosecution provides a basis for an interlocutory appeal under Tenn. R. App. P. 9(a)(1),

(3)13 or an extraordinary appeal under Tenn. R. App. P. 10(a).14

A second justification for granting Tenn. R. App. P. 9 or Tenn. R. App. P. 10 appeals from

suppression orders arises from the fact that the legal principles relating to searches and seizures and

interrogations fluctuate and are heavily fact-dependent. Giving the parties an opportunity for

immediate appellate review of suppression orders not only affords them with a chance to obtain

review of questionable rulings, but it also decreases the repetition of similar errors by law

enforcement officials before the challenged conduct can be reviewed by the courts pursuant to an

appeal as of right. Criminal Procedure § 27.3(c), at 39-40.

C.

The entry of the trial court’s suppression order on November 9, 2005 was not accompanied

by an order dismissing the indictment against Messrs. Meeks and Snyder. Accordingly, the State

was not entitled to an appeal as of right under Tenn. R. App. P. 3(c)(1) at that time. It was, however,

entitled to pursue a discretionary appeal under Tenn. R. App. P. 9. This is precisely what the State

did. However, after the State obtained the trial court’s permission to request the Court of Criminal

Appeals to hear the interlocutory appeal, it did not file the required application with the intermediate

appellate court in the manner required by Tenn. R. App. P. 9(c). Instead, the State apparently

abandoned the interlocutory appeal and decided to request dismissal of the indictments against

Messrs. Meeks and Snyder and then to pursue an appeal as of right under Tenn. R. App. P. 3(c)(1).

While the wisdom or necessity of the State’s tactics might reasonably be questioned, the

State’s decision to abandon the interlocutory appeal in favor of an appeal as of right does not

undermine the State’s right to pursue an appeal following the entry of the May 19, 2006 order

dismissing the indictments. The Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure do not contain an “election

of remedies” provision that causes an appellant to forego all other appellate remedies once it decides

to pursue one particular appellate remedy. Nor do the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure state

that persons who request a Tenn. R. App. P. 9 interlocutory appeal on a particular issue are not

12

U.S. Const. amend. V; Tenn. Const. art. I, § 10.

13

Interlocutory appeals may be granted under Tenn. R. App. P. 9(a)(1) or (3) to “prevent irreparable injury,

giving consideration to the severity of the potential injury, the probability of its occurrence, and the probability that

review upon entry of final judgment will be ineffective” and to address questions that “will not otherwise be reviewable

upon entry of final judgment.”

14

Extraordinary appeals under Tenn. R. App. P. 10(a) are permitted whenever they are “necessary for complete

determination of the action on appeal as otherwise provided in these rules.” If a trial court declines to grant a Tenn. R.

App. P. 9 interlocutory appeal following the entry of a suppression order that eliminates any reasonable probability of

a successful prosecution, the Court of Criminal Appeals may grant an extraordinary appeal if it determines that the State

would not otherwise have a meaningful opportunity to obtain appellate review of the suppression order.

-9-

entitled to raise that same issue on an appeal as of right if they fail to follow through on the Tenn.

R. App. P. 9 interlocutory appeal.

After the State decided against pursuing the interlocutory appeal from the November 9, 2005

suppression order, it requested the trial court to dismiss the indictments against Messrs. Meeks and

Snyder, apparently because the District Attorney General had concluded that the suppression of the

evidence found in Room 110 eliminated any reasonable probability of a successful prosecution. In

its May 19, 2006 order dismissing the indictments, the trial court specifically found that “the

suppression of the evidence . . . does present irreparable harm to the State’s case in chief.” This

order is a final order, and, by its own terms, it resulted from the entry of the November 9, 2005

suppression order. Accordingly, following the entry of that order, the State was entitled to an appeal

as of right under Tenn. R. App. P. 3(c)(1).

Tenn. R. App. P. 4(a) requires that a notice of appeal must be filed within thirty days after

the date of the entry of the judgment appealed from. The State filed its notice of appeal in this case

on June 16, 2006. This notice of appeal was timely because it was filed within thirty days after the

entry of the May 19, 2006 order dismissing the case against Messrs. Meeks and Snyder. In light of

the fact that the State’s notice of appeal was timely filed, this case did not require the Court of

Criminal Appeals to exercise its discretion under Tenn. R. App. P. 4(a) to excuse the State from the

timely filing of a notice of appeal. Therefore, the arguments by Messrs. Meeks and Snyder regarding

the propriety of the Court of Criminal Appeals’ invocation of its power under Tenn. R. App. P. 4(a)

to excuse the State from filing a timely notice of appeal are without merit.

III.

Messrs. Meeks and Snyder also assert that the Court of Criminal Appeals erred by reversing

the trial court’s November 9, 2005 suppression order. While they concede that the law enforcement

officers had probable cause on the evening of March 6, 2005 to enter Room 110 at the Park Motel,

they insist that the officers were not confronted with exigent circumstances sufficient to justify

entering the room before obtaining a search warrant. We disagree. The circumstances of this case

provide a textbook example of the sort of exigent circumstances that require immediate action by

law enforcement officers.

A.

In reviewing suppression rulings, the assessment of witness credibility, the weight and value

of evidence, and the resolution of evidentiary conflicts are entrusted to the trial court as a fact-finder.

State v. Scarborough, 201 S.W.3d at 615. When a trial court makes findings of fact in the course

of ruling upon a motion to suppress, those findings are binding on appeal unless the evidence in the

record preponderates against them. State v. Berrios, 235 S.W.3d 99, 104 (Tenn. 2007). A trial

court’s conclusions of law are reviewed de novo without any presumption of correctness. State v.

Hayes, 188 S.W.3d 505, 510 (Tenn. 2006). The question of whether circumstances were sufficiently

exigent to justify a warrantless search is a mixed question of law and fact. See, e.g., United States

-10-

v. Andrews, 442 F.3d 996, 1000 (7th Cir. 2006); United States v. Russell, 436 F.3d 1086, 1089 n.2

(9th Cir. 2006); United States v. Davis, 290 F.3d 1239, 1241 (10th Cir. 2002). Review of mixed

questions of law and fact is de novo without any presumption of correctness. Vaughn v. State, 202

S.W.3d 106, 115 (Tenn. 2006); State v. Rogers, 188 S.W.3d 593, 629 (Tenn. 2006).

B.

Both the Constitution of the United States and the Constitution of Tennessee prohibit

unreasonable searches and seizures. U.S. Const. amend. IV; Tenn. Const. art. I, § 7. Thus, as a

general matter, law enforcement officials cannot conduct a search without having first obtained a

valid warrant. California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386, 390 (1985); R.D.S. v. State, 245 S.W.3d 356, 365

(Tenn. 2008).

However, because the contours of these constitutional protections are shaped by the concept

of “reasonableness,” the courts have recognized exceptions to the general requirement of the

issuance of a warrant prior to conducting a search. Brigham City, Utah v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 403

(2006); State v. Scarborough, 201 S.W.3d at 616-17. Among the commonly recognized exceptions

to the requirement of a warrant are: (1) a search incident to an arrest, (2) the plain view doctrine, (3)

a consent to the search, (4) a Terry15 stop and frisk, and (5) the existence of exigent circumstances.

State v. Berrios, 235 S.W.3d at 104; State v. Cox, 171 S.W.3d 174, 179 (Tenn. 2005). Where a

warrantless search is conducted, the government bears the burden of demonstrating that the search

was conducted pursuant to one of the exceptions to the warrant requirement. Vale v. Louisiana, 399

U.S. 30, 34 (1970); State v. Hayes, 188 S.W.3d 505, 511 (Tenn. 2006).

This appeal focuses on the exigent circumstances justification for a warrantless search.

Exigent circumstances arise where “the needs of law enforcement [are] so compelling that the

warrantless search is objectively reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.” Brigham City, Utah v.

Stuart, 547 U.S. at 403 (quoting Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 394 (1978)). Given the

importance of the warrant requirement in safeguarding against unreasonable searches and seizures,

a circumstance will be sufficiently exigent only where the State has shown that the search is

imperative. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 454-55 (1971); State v. Hayes, 188 S.W.3d

at 514; State v. Yeargan, 958 S.W.2d 626, 641 (Tenn. 1997) (Reid, J., concurring). Although not

an exclusive list, the following are frequently-arising situations that have been found to be

sufficiently exigent to render a warrantless search of a domicile reasonable: (1) hot-pursuit, (2) to

thwart escape, (3) to prevent the imminent destruction of evidence, (4) in response to an immediate

risk of serious harm to the police officers or others, and (5) to render emergency aid to an injured

person or to protect a person from imminent injury.16 Brigham City, Utah v. Stuart, 547 U.S. at 403;

15

Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).

16

Professor LaFave has counseled that “[t]hough this ‘emergency aid exception’ is one of many ‘community

caretaking functions’ of the police, it must be assessed separately and by a distinct test, as all such functions are not

‘judged by the same standard;’ moreover, they must be distinguished from ‘the exigent circumstances exception.’” 3

(continued...)

-11-

Minnesota v. Olson, 495 U.S. 91, 100 (1990); United States v. Huffman, 461 F.3d 777, 782 (6th Cir.

2006); State v. Adams, 238 S.W.3d 313, 321 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2005).

Exigent circumstances are those in which the urgent need for immediate action becomes too

compelling to impose upon governmental actors the attendant delay that accompanies obtaining a

warrant.17 Thus, in assessing the constitutionality of a warrantless search, the inquiry is whether the

circumstances give rise to an objectively reasonable belief that there was a compelling need to act

and insufficient time to obtain a warrant.18 The exigency of the circumstances is evaluated based

upon the totality of the circumstances19 known to the governmental actor at the time of the entry.20

Mere speculation is inadequate;21 rather, the State must rely upon specific and articulable facts22 and

the reasonable inferences drawn from them.23 The circumstances are viewed from an objective

perspective; the governmental actor’s subjective intent is irrelevant.24 The manner and the scope of

16

(...continued)

W ayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 6.6(a) n.6, at 451 (4th ed. 2004). The United States Supreme Court, however,

in Brigham City, Utah v. Stuart 547 U.S. at 402-03, embedded the emergency aid exception deep within the exigent

circumstance exception to the warrant requirement. See, e.g., United States v. Snipe, 515 F.3d 947, 951-52 (9th Cir.

2008); United States v. Najar, 451 F.3d 710, 718 (10th Cir. 2006).

17

State v. Inghram, No. M2006-00818-CCA-R3-CD, 2007 W L 2011132, at *4 (Tenn. Crim. App. July 11,

2007) (No T enn. R. App. P. 11 application filed); see also, e.g., DeMayo v. Nugent, 517 F.3d 11, 15 (1st Cir. 2008);

McClish v. Nugent, 483 F.3d 1231, 1240-41 (11th Cir. 2007); United States v. Marshall, 157 F.3d 477, 482 (7th Cir.

1998).

18

State v. Davis, No. M 2004-03060-CCA-R3-CD, 2005 W L 2255968, at *5-6 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 15,

2005) (No Tenn. R. App. P. 11 application filed); State v. McCall, 698 S.W .2d 643, 650 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1985); see

also, e.g., United States v. Bell, 500 F.3d 609, 613 (7th Cir. 2007).

19

State v. Davis, 2005 W L 2255968, at *4-7; see also, e.g., United States v. Atchley, 474 F.3d 840, 850 (6th

Cir. 2007); United States v. Maldonado, 472 F.3d 388, 395 (5th Cir. 2006).

20

State v. Davis, 2005 W L 2255968, at *6; see also, e.g., United States v. Brown, 449 F.3d 741, 745 (6th Cir.

2006); United States v. Hernandez Leon, 379 F.3d 1024, 1029 (8th Cir. 2004).

21

Bailey v. Newland, 263 F.3d 1022, 1033 (9th Cir. 2001); United States v. Anderson, 154 F.3d 1225, 1234

(10th Cir. 1998).

22

State v. Lovell, No. M2002-02379-CCA-R3-CD, 2003 W L 22142499, at *6 (Sept. 17, 2003) (No Tenn. R.

App. P. 11 application filed); see also, e.g., United States v. Reid, 226 F.3d 1020, 1028 (9th Cir. 2000); State v. Warren,

949 So. 2d 1215, 1225 (La. 2007).

23

State v. Inghram, 2007 W L 2011132, at *5; see also, e.g., United States v. Licata, 761 F.2d 537, 543 (9th

Cir. 1985); State v. Eberly, 716 N.W .2d 671, 679 (Neb. 2006); Howe v. State, 916 P.2d 153, 159 (Nev. 1996).

24

See, e.g., United States v. Uscanga-Ramirez, 475 F.3d 1024, 1028 (8th Cir. 2007); State v. Shriner, ___

N.W .2d ___, ___, 2008 WL 2229490, at *4 (Minn. 2008).

The U nited States Supreme Court, interpreting the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution,

(continued...)

-12-

the search must be reasonably attuned to the exigent circumstances that justified the warrantless

search, or the search will exceed the bounds authorized by exigency alone.25 Where the asserted

ground of exigency is risk to the safety of the officers or others, the governmental actors must have

an objectively reasonable basis for concluding that there is an immediate need to act to protect

themselves and others from serious harm.26

C.

Methamphetamine laboratories are regarded as highly dangerous. United States v. Purcell,

526 F.3d 953, 960 (6th Cir. 2008); United States v. Walsh, 299 F.3d 729, 734 (8th Cir. 2002). In

2000, the United States House of Representatives explained:

The methamphetamine epidemic in America differs in kind

from the threat of other illegal drugs because methamphetamine can

be made from readily available and legal chemicals and substances,

and because it poses serious dangers to both human life and the

environment. Additionally, these chemicals and substances are

utilized in a manufacturing process that is unstable, volatile, and

highly combustible. Even small amounts of these chemicals, when

mixed improperly, can cause explosions and fires. For every one

pound of methamphetamine that is produced, approximately five

pounds of toxic and often lethal waste products may be left behind at

the laboratory site, or disposed of in rivers, kitchen sinks, or sewage

systems in an effort to conceal evidence of illegal manufacturing.

More disturbing is that most of these laboratories are situated in

24

(...continued)

determined that subjective motivation is irrelevant even with regard to the emergency aid exception. Brigham City, Utah

v. Stuart, 547 U.S. at 404. Insofar as this exception can reach beyond criminal investigatory purposes to broader

“community caretaker” police activities, the Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals has sounded a cautionary note. In

response to the State’s assertion that it was exercising its community caretaker function, Judge W illiams stated that

“[s]uch actions are justifiable and laudable so long as the aid is actually needed or sought by the citizen. Otherwise, it

is merely a guise for unwanted official intrusion into the privacy of the affected citizen.” State v. Waters, No.

M2006-01468-CCA-R3-CD, 2007 W L 2744996, at *4 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 21, 2007) (No Tenn. R. App. P. 11

application filed). W hether the constitutional protections afforded by Tenn. Const. art. I, § 7 are any broader in terms

of not allowing police officers when acting in a community caretaker, rather than a criminal law enforcement, role to

knowingly and purposefully use the emergency aid exception as a criminal investigation tool is not an issue before this

Court but may in subsequent cases warrant consideration.

25

Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. at 393 (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. at 25-26) (indicating that “a warrantless

search must be ‘strictly circumscribed by the exigencies which justify its initiation’”); United States v. Najar, 451 F.3d

at 718, 720; Shamaeizadeh v. Cunigan, 338 F.3d 535, 550 (6th Cir. 2003).

26

See, e.g., United States v. Snipe, 515 F.3d at 951-52; United States v. Layman, 244 Fed. Appx. 206, 210 (10th

Cir. 2007); United States v. Huffman, 461 F.3d at 783; United States v. Williams, 354 F.3d 497, 505 (6th Cir. 2003).

-13-

residences, motels, trailers, and vans, and often times are operated in

the presence of children.

H.R. Rep. No. 106-878, Part I, at *22 (Sept. 21, 2000).27 In addition to being highly combustible,28

the vapors or fumes that are generated in the production of methamphetamine pose further dangers.

For example, exposure to the toxic fumes or vapors produced during the manufacture of

methamphetamine, some of which are carcinogenic, can cause serious inhalation injuries to those

at the laboratory site and sometimes even to neighbors.29

The hazards posed by an actively operating methamphetamine laboratory are so significant

that a number of state and federal courts have determined that the discovery of an actively operating

methamphetamine laboratory, in and of itself, creates an exigent circumstance justifying immediate

action without the attendant delays that accompany obtaining a search warrant. See, e.g., United

States v. Lloyd, 396 F.3d 948, 954 (8th Cir. 2005); Williams v. State, No. CR-06-1752, 2008 WL

2223068, at *6 (Ala. Crim. App. May 30, 2008); Barth v. State, 955 So.2d at 1118; State v. White,

886 N.E.2d 904, 911 (Ohio Ct. App. 2008). Other courts that have recognized the dangers of

actively operating methamphetamine laboratories have stopped short of adopting a per se rule.

Rather, they have based their finding of exigency on the location of the particular laboratory. United

27

See http://www.congress.gov/cgi-bin/cpquery/R?cp106:FLD010:@1(hr878) (last visited July 30, 2008). This

House Report was issued with regard to the Methamphetamine and Club Drug Anti-Proliferation Act of 2000 which was

enacted as Section 3612 of the Methamphetamine Anti-Proliferation Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-310, 114 Stat. 1101.

28

Approximately fifteen percent of all methamphetamine laboratories that are discovered in the United States

are found as a result of an explosion or fire. See Dep’t of Justice, Dangers to Children Living at Meth Labs, available

at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/ovc/publications/bulletins/children/pg5.html (last visited July 30, 2008) (“Dangers to

Children Living at Meth Labs”). The Tennessee General Assembly has even imposed a reporting requirement on

hospitals, clinics, sanitariums, doctors, physicians, surgeons, nurses, pharmacists, undertakers, embalmers, and other

persons called upon to render aid to persons suffering from any wound or other injury to report when the injury or wound

results from exposure to a methamphetamine laboratory or a methamphetamine laboratory-related fire, explosion, or

chemical release. Tenn. Code Ann. § 38-1-101(a) (2006). See also

http://www.methfreetn.org/meth101/recipe_for_disaster.php (last visited July 30, 2008) (“Making meth can be as

dangerous as taking it. Meth lab explosions shatter buildings, burning and incinerating everything in sight. W hy?

Meth’s ingredients contain a hazardous combination of poisonous and flammable chemicals, which are heated on a stove

or hot plate. A slight miscalculation with ingredients or cooking temperature, and meth becomes a deadly bomb.”)

29

See generally United States v. Layne, 324 F.3d 464, 470 (6th Cir. 2003); Barth v. State, 955 So. 2d 1115,

1118 (Fla. Ct. App. 2006); Centers for Disease Control & Prevention, Public Health Consequences Among First

Responders to Emergency Events Associated with Illicit Methamphetamine Laboratories - Selected States, 1996-1999,

49 Morbidity & Mortality W kly. Rep. 1021, 1023 (2000), available at http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/pdf/wk/mm4945.pdf

(last visited July 30, 2008); Dangers to Children Living at Meth Labs, supra note 32; W is. Dep’t of Health and Family

S erv s., C le a n in g U p H a za rd o u s C h e m ic a ls a t F o rm e r M e th L a b s, a v a ila b le a t

http://dhfs.wisconsin.gov/eh/ChemFS/fs/MethClnUp.htm (last visited July 30, 2008); W yo. Dep’t of Health, Cleaning

Up Hazardous Chemicals at Methamphetamine Laboratories, available at

http://wdh.state.wy.us/phsd/epiid/methcleanup.html (last visited July 16, 2008); Jean C. O’Connor et al., Developing

Lasting Legal Solutions to the Dual Epidemics of Methamphetamine Production and Use, 82 N.D. L. Rev. 1165, 1172

(2006); Anna S. Vogt, Note, The Mess Left Behind: Regulating the Cleanup of Former Methamphetamine Laboratories,

38 Idaho L. Rev. 251, 258-60 (2001).

-14-

States v. Atchley, 474 F.3d 840, 851 n.6 (6th Cir. 2007); State v. Chapman, 813 P.2d 557, 560-61

(Or. Ct. App. 1991). These courts have focused on whether there were people in the vicinity of the

actively operating methamphetamine laboratory, notably neighbors, law enforcement officials, and

those manufacturing the methamphetamine. United States v. Atchley, 474 F.3d at 851; State v.

Simmons, 714 N.W.2d 264, 273-74 (Iowa 2006); Bishop v. Commonwealth, 237 S.W.3d 567, 570

(Ky. Ct. App. 2007). Regardless of the approach taken, whether a per se rule or a determination

based upon the presence of others in the vicinity, the scope of a permissible warrantless search

remains limited to the scope of the exigency. United States v. Layman, 244 Fed. Appx. at 211; State

v. Bilynsky, 932 A.2d 1169, 1176 (Me. 2007); Coffey v. State, 99 P.3d 249, 252 (Okla. Crim. App.

2004).30

D.

There is no issue in this case regarding the law enforcement officers having probable cause

to believe that the occupants of Room 110 at the Park Motel were actively manufacturing

methamphetamine in their room on the evening of March 6, 2005.31 Messrs. Meeks and Snyder

concede that they did.

The undisputed facts clearly establish the sort of exigent circumstances that justified the

officers’ decision to enter Room 110 of the Park Motel without first obtaining a search warrant.

They knew that an actively operating methamphetamine laboratory posed a serious danger not only

to the persons in the room itself but also to all persons in the immediate vicinity. The distinct odor

30

This case does not require us to address the legality of a warrantless search of an actively operating

methamphetamine laboratory where the sole of risk of danger is to the persons who are actually manufacturing the

methamphetamine or where there is a significant delay between the time the law enforcement officers had probable cause

to believe they had discovered an actively operating methamphetamine laboratory and the time the officers conducted

the warrantless search. Neither of these circumstances are present in this case.

31

In addition to the existence of an exigent circumstance, the search generally must also be supported by

probable cause. Kirk v. Louisiana, 536 U.S. 635, 637 (2002); United States v. McClain, 444 F.3d 556, 562 (6th Cir.

2005); State v. Henning, 975 S.W .2d 290, 300 (Tenn. 1998); see also R.D.S. v. State, 245 S.W .3d at 366 n.4 (noting that

one of the primary exceptions to the warrant requirement is “probable cause to search with exigent circumstances”).

Interpreting the Fourth Amendment, the United States Supreme Court ruled in 2006 that “law enforcement officers may

enter a home without a warrant to render emergency assistance to an injured occupant or to protect an occupant from

imminent injury.” Brigham City, Utah v. Stuart, 547 U.S. at 403. Notably, absent from the Supreme Court’s analysis

was any reference to the existence of probable cause. Bruce A. Antkowiak, Saving Probable Cause, 40 Suffolk U. L.

Rev. 569, 575 (2007); Ricardo J. Bascuas, Fourth Amendment Lessons From the H ighway and the Subway: A

Principled Approach to Suspicionless Searches, 38 Rutgers L.J. 719, 778-79 (2007). The Supreme Court “failed to

conduct any traditional probable cause inquiry. Instead, the Court assumed that probable cause to associate the

emergency with the place to be searched exists whenever law enforcement officers have an objectively reasonable basis

for concluding that an emergency is unfolding in that place.” United States v. Snipe, 515 F.3d at 952; United States v.

Najar, 451 F.3d at 718 (10th Cir. 2006) (noting that the Court did not “require probable cause in this type of exigent

circumstances”). In considering the emergency aid exception under the Fourth Amendment, probable cause is not a

necessary element. The inter-relationship between probable cause and the various permutations of the emergency aid

exception under Article I, Section 7 of the Tennessee Constitution is not before the Court in the present case but may

warrant consideration in future cases.

-15-

surrounding Room 110, the intensity and strength of the odor, the fumes emanating from Room 110,

and the effects of the odor and fumes on the inhabitants of Room 109 provided the officers with

enough facts to believe that the persons in Room 110 were actively manufacturing

methamphetamine. This conclusion provided the officers with an objectively reasonable basis for

concluding that there was an immediate need to act to protect themselves and others from serious

harm. The fact that the officers overlooked clearing the adjoining rooms before they entered Room

110 does not undermine the reasonableness of their decision to enter Room 110 without waiting for

a search warrant. Accordingly, the officers’ warrantless entry into and search of Room 110 was not

an unreasonable search under either the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution or

Article I, Section 7 of the Constitution of Tennessee.32

IV.

The judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals reversing the trial court’s November 9, 2005

order suppressing the evidence found in Room 110 and vacating the order dismissing the indictments

is affirmed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. Because

Messrs. Meeks and Snyder are indigent, the costs of this appeal shall be paid by the State of

Tennessee.

______________________________

WILLIAM C. KOCH, JR., JUSTICE

32

Messrs. Meeks’ and Snyder’s argument that State v. Carter, 160 S.W .3d 526 (Tenn. 2005) requires a finding

that this search was unreasonable is unpersuasive. State v. Carter did not require this Court to address the pivotal

question raised in this case – whether an actively operating methamphetamine laboratory provides a sufficiently exigent

circumstance to justify a warrantless entry into the place where the laboratory was located. In State v. Carter, the State

argued that destruction of evidence, an exigent circumstance created by the police officers themselves, justified the

warrantless entry. The State did not argue that the officers acted in response to the risk posed to the officers or others

from the methamphetamine manufacturing process. Nor did the State present evidence indicating that the officers were

aware at the time of entry of the dangers posed by the active manufacturing of methamphetamine. See generally State

v. Carter, 160 S.W .3d 526; State v. Carter, No. W 2002-00947-CCA- R3-CD, 2003 W L 22213225 (Tenn. Crim. App.

Sept. 24, 2003).

-16-