Opinion

Tennie Martin, et.al. v. Southern Railway Company, et.al. - Concurring

Court
Tennessee Supreme Court
Filed
Nov 14, 2008
Status
Published
On the bench
Justice William C. Koch, Jr.
Cited by
0 cases
Authority
More cited than 29.6%

The opinion

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF TENNESSEE

AT KNOXVILLE

May 7, 2008 Session

TENNIE MARTIN ET AL. v. NORFOLK SOUTHERN RAILWAY

COMPANY ET AL.

Appeal by Permission from the Court of Appeals, Eastern Section

Circuit Court for Anderson County

No. A2LA0325 Donald Ray Elledge, Judge

No. E2006-01021-SC-R11-CV - Filed November 14, 2008

WILLIAM C. KOCH , JR., J., concurring in part.

I concur with the result reached by the Court. Based on the current appellate record, there

exists a genuine factual issue regarding whether Conductor Danny Martin sounded the train’s whistle

as the train approached the crossing as required by Tenn. Code Ann. § 65-12-108(2) (2004).

Summary judgment proceedings have never been envisioned as substitutes for trials of

disputed factual issues. Fruge v. Doe, 952 S.W.2d 408, 410 (Tenn. 1997). A motion for summary

judgment should never be granted when genuine issues as to any material fact exist. Doe 1 ex rel.

Doe 1 v. Roman Catholic Diocese of Nashville, 154 S.W.3d 22, 41 (Tenn. 2005); Abbott v. Blount

County, 207 S.W.3d 732, 735 (Tenn. 2006). In addition, a summary judgment motion should not

be granted when there is any dispute regarding the reasonable inferences that can be drawn from the

undisputed facts. Brown v. Birman Managed Care, Inc., 42 S.W.3d 62, 66 (Tenn. 2001); Mason v.

Seaton, 942 S.W.2d 470, 473 (Tenn. 1997).

Tenn. Code Ann. § 65-12-108(2) imposes a statutory duty on the operator of a train to sound

the train’s whistle or bell “at a distance of one fourth (¼) of a mile from the crossing, and at short

intervals until the train has passed the crossing.” Mr. Martin testified that he sounded the train’s

whistle in accordance with his custom and practice, and two other witnesses confirmed that they

heard the train’s whistle. However, the plaintiffs produced another witness, Cecil Smith, who

testified that he was in a position to hear the whistle if it had been sounded but that he did not hear

the whistle. While there may be substantial doubt about the weight that a reasonable jury might give

to Mr. Smith’s testimony,1 it is sufficient for summary judgment purposes to create a genuine issue

with regard to whether Mr. Martin complied with his statutory duty to sound the train’s whistle as

it approached the intersection. This genuine issue of material fact should have been sufficient to

prevent granting the summary judgment in this case.

______________________________

WILLIAM C. KOCH, JR., JUSTICE

1

I concur with the Court’s conclusion that the evidence regarding Mr. M artin’s hearing impairment was not

presented to the trial court and, therefore, cannot be considered by this Court.

-2-

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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