In Re: C.P.D., Appeal of: T.P.D.

J-S23016-24

2024 PA Super 201

IN RE: ADOPTION OF C.P.D., A : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

MINOR : PENNSYLVANIA

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APPEAL OF: T.P.D., FATHER : No. 719 EDA 2024

Appeal from the Decree Entered February 21, 2024

In the Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery County Orphans' Court at

No(s): 2021-A0015

IN RE: ADOPTION OF C.P.D., A : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

MINOR : PENNSYLVANIA

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APPEAL OF: A.J.D. AND G.O. : No. 720 EDA 2024

Appeal from the Decree Entered February 21, 2024

In the Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery County Orphans' Court at

No(s): 2021-A0015

IN RE: ADOPTION OF C.P.D., A : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

MINOR : PENNSYLVANIA

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APPEAL OF: ADOPTIONS FROM THE :

HEART : No. 792 EDA 2024

Appeal from the Decree Entered February 21, 2024

In the Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery County Orphans' Court at

No(s): 2021-A0015

J-S23016-24

BEFORE: STABILE, J., KING, J., and COLINS, J.*

OPINION BY KING, J.: FILED SEPTEMBER 6, 2024

In these consolidated cross-appeals, Appellant, T.P.D. (“Father”),

appeals at docket No. 719 EDA 2024 from the decree involuntarily terminating

his parental rights to his son, C.P.D. (“Child”) (born in September 2020),

based on the respective termination petitions filed by Adoptions from the

Heart (“AFTH”) and Child’s court-appointed legal counsel/guardian ad litem

(“GAL”), and joined by the pre-adoptive parents, A.J.D. and G.O. (“Pre-

Adoptive Parents”). Additionally, at dockets Nos. 720 EDA 2024 and 792 EDA

2024, Pre-Adoptive Parents and AFTH filed cross-appeals from the court’s

earlier orders that denied confirmation of J.S. (“Mother”) 1 and Father’s

consents to adoption and denied reconsideration of same. For the following

reasons, we affirm the involuntary termination of Father’s parental rights, but

we vacate the orders denying confirmation of Mother and Father’s consents to

adoption.

The relevant facts and procedural history of this case are as follows.

Child was born in September 2020. Mother and Father had prior negative

experiences with Children and Youth Services (“CYS”). Fearful of CYS

involvement concerning Child, Mother and Father placed Child with relatives

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* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.

1 Mother voluntarily relinquished her parental rights to Child on February 28,

2023, and she is not a party to this appeal.

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who had custody of their two older daughters, A.A.D. and A.J.D. 2 On October

11, 2020, Mother contacted AFTH regarding placement for Child, as Mother

and Father were having disagreements with the relatives caring for their

daughters because they had been denying Mother and Father contact with the

children. In late October 2020, Mother and Father conferred with two

caseworkers from AFTH, Jackie Lovell and Michaelina Bendig. On October 23,

2020, Ms. Lovell had a phone conversation with Mother, during which they

discussed the open adoption process and the availability of a Post Adoption

Contact Agreement (“PACA”).

The next day, Mother and Father met with Ms. Bendig. Ms. Bendig

indicated that AFTH would support them in seeking a PACA with respect to

their younger daughter, whose adoption had not yet been finalized.

Additionally, in response to their concerns, and to extinguish any potential for

CYS involvement, Ms. Bendig suggested Mother and Father consider

transferring custody of Child to AFTH. Mother and Father signed the forms

transferring custody to AFTH that same day. After Mother and Father

executed the transfer documents, they made an appointment to meet with

Ms. Bendig and Pre-Adoptive Parents, whom they had selected, at the offices

of AFTH on October 27, 2020.

On October 27, 2020, Mother and Father went to the AFTH office in

Wynnewood, Pennsylvania. Mother and Father met Pre-Adoptive Parents at

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2 This family had already adopted Mother and Father’s oldest daughter and

were in the process of adopting their younger daughter.

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that time. Additionally, Mother and Father signed consents to adoption, as

well as a PACA concerning Child, which Pre-Adoptive Parents also signed.

During this meeting, Ms. Bendig reiterated that she would help Mother and

Father obtain a PACA concerning their younger daughter. Additionally, Ms.

Bendig offered assistance to Mother and Father regarding a needed car battery

and cell phone minutes.

On October 28, 2020, Mother and Father again returned to the AFTH

office, where they spent some time with Child, who had been brought there

by a temporary guardian. On this day, Pre-Adoptive Parents took physical

custody of Child, and Child has remained with them ever since.

On Saturday, November 21, 2020, Father called AFTH’s evening

answering service, and left a message that he wished to revoke his consent

to adoption. Father left his cell phone number for a return call. The next day,

Ms. Bendig called and texted Father, offering to discuss his desire to revoke

his consent. Nevertheless, Father did not return Ms. Bendig’s call that day.

In response to her text, Father stated that he could not talk at the moment

but Mother or Father would call her back. Ms. Bendig texted Father that he

needed to call her and not the on-call answering service. However, Father did

not return Ms. Bendig’s phone call. Ms. Bendig did not write a letter formally

advising Father that a revocation of his consent must be in writing. Ms. Bendig

also did not remind Father of this requirement in her text messages.

On November 22 and 23, 2020, Ms. Bendig e-mailed Mother and Father

at an e-mail address they both used regarding whether they wanted to revoke

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their consents to adoption. Father did not respond to the e-mail. Mother

replied that she did not want to revoke her consent. Ms. Bendig did not receive

any communication from Father between November 22, 2020 and December

30, 2020 indicating that Father still wanted to revoke his consent.

AFTH filed petitions to confirm the consents of adoption by Mother and

Father on February 18, 2021.

[The c]ourt scheduled a hearing on the Petitions to Confirm

the Consents to Adoption on May 4, 2021, at which [Mother

and Father] appeared, but were not represented by counsel.

[Mother and Father] alleged that they were under duress

while signing their consents and expressed a desire to

revoke their consents. Following [Mother and Father’s]

request for the appointment of counsel, this [c]ourt

adjourned the hearing on the Petitions to Confirm Consents,

[and appointed counsel for Mother and Father.]

On June 22, 2021, this [c]ourt held a hearing at which …

Father and … Mother, now both represented by counsel,

indicated that they had consented to the adoption.

However, … Father maintained that he had validly and

timely revoked his consent. He also maintained that,

although he had agreed to a voluntary [PACA] with [Pre-

Adoptive Parents] that provided for an exchange of

photographs and letters and also three visits per year

between [Mother and Father], [Pre-Adoptive Parents], and

[Child], he also wanted to negotiate a PACA pursuant to

which [Child] would continue to have visits with his

daughters, A.A.D. and A.J.D. … Father testified that a PACA

fostering visits between [Child] and his birth sisters had

never been meaningfully explored. To permit consideration

of whether a PACA was in the interests of each of the

children, this [c]ourt appointed a GAL for Child and for

[Child’s birth sisters]. In light of Father’s revocation claim,

and despite his articulated desire to proceed with the

hearing …, the [c]ourt was constrained to schedule two

additional hearings on the, now contested, Petitions to

Confirm Consent for October 18, 2021 and October 25,

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2021.

A third hearing was scheduled, as expediently as feasible,

for January 6, 2022. At the conclusion of testimony, counsel

asserted the following legal issues: 1) whether the consents

were voluntary, intelligent, and knowing where [Mother and

Father] alleged that they were conditioned on execution of

a PACA (and a promise of a second PACA related to one of

their daughters), 2) whether [Mother and Father] attempted

to and, in fact, did revoke their consents in writing; 3)

whether AFTH’s advice and documents were confusing and

misleading as to the sufficiency of a verbal telephone call to

revoke consent; and 4) whether AFTH compounded the

confusion surrounding revocation of consents by failing to

remind [Mother and Father] that revocation must be in

writing, and exacerbated [Mother and Father’s] sense of

duress and intimidation by advising them that AFTH would

make a report to the office of [CYS] if they revoked their

consents.

(Orphans’ Court Opinion, 5/13/22, at 2-3) (internal footnotes omitted).

On May 13, 2022, the Orphans’ Court decided that Mother and Father’s

consents to adoption were invalid. Regarding the attempted revocation of

Mother and Father’s consents, the court explained that they failed to deliver a

written revocation of consent within 30 days following the execution of their

consents, and they failed to challenge the validity of the consents within 60

days, as required under the statute. (Id. at 22). The court expressly found

Father’s testimony concerning a purported written revocation incredible. (See

id. at 22-24).3 Nevertheless, the court found their consents to adoption were

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3 Notwithstanding these findings, the court was “troubled” by certain actions

of AFTH where AFTH provided Mother and Father a document describing

procedures for revocation which did not specify that revocation must be

written. Rather, the document stated that a birth parent who wished to revoke

(Footnote Continued Next Page)

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conditioned on an agreement for a PACA, and that a consent to adoption

conditioned on a PACA is not a voluntary, intelligent, and unconditional

consent, rendering the consents invalid. (Id. at 19).

On May 21, 2022, AFTH filed a motion for reconsideration, which the

court granted. Following additional briefing, the court entered an order on

September 23, 2022 denying the motion for reconsideration on the merits and

resting on the court’s May 13, 2022 decision.

While the petitions to confirm consents were pending, AFTH filed a

petition to involuntarily terminate Father’s parental rights on September 2,

2021, and a petition to involuntarily terminate Mother’s parental rights on

September 23, 2021. Child’s GAL also filed a petition for involuntarily

termination of Mother and Father’s parental rights on September 21, 2021.

The court had deferred scheduling an involuntary termination hearing pending

disposition of the petitions to confirm consents.

On October 11, 2022, Pre-Adoptive Parents filed a notice of appeal from

the court’s May 13, 2022 decision. AFTH also appealed this decision on

October 12, 2022. Nevertheless, this Court quashed those appeals on

December 9, 2022, based on the pendency of the petitions for involuntary

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a consent must call the caseworker. Additionally, the record indicated that

Ms. Bendig advised Mother and Father to call her, but she did not communicate

to them that a revocation must be in writing. Ms. Bendig also informed Mother

that if they wanted to revoke consent, she would have to notify CYS that they

reclaimed custody of Child. Given Mother and Father’s expressed fear that

CYS would become involved, the court found that this statement had the effect

of intimidating Mother from expressing her honest views about whether she

wanted to revoke consent. (Id. at 24-25).

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termination of Mother and Father’s parental rights.

As previously stated, Mother voluntarily relinquished her parental rights

to Child on February 27, 2023. On May 18, 2023 and May 22, 2023, the

Orphans’ Court conducted hearings regarding the petitions for involuntary

termination of Father’s parental rights. The court summarized the testimony

at the termination hearings as follows:

At the outset of the hearing on the contested Petitions for

Involuntary Termination of … Father’s parental rights, all

counsel stipulated that the [c]ourt may consider all of the

testimony and evidence, including the testimony and

evidence taken in the prior proceedings with respect to the

Petitions to Confirm Consents to adoption.

On May 22, 2023, this [c]ourt heard testimony of Dr. Erica

Williams, and admitted in evidence her evaluations of …

Father and her Supplemental Report as Exhibits P-7 and P-

11. Dr. Williams was qualified as an expert in psychology,

forensic psychology, and bonding and attachment

assessments and capacity evaluations.

Dr. Williams performed a parenting capacity evaluation of …

Father on March 31, 2023, which was admitted in evidence

as Exhibit P-7. Dr. Williams testified that it was difficult to

obtain a chronological timeline or history from … Father, as

he “had an inability or unwillingness to provide the

information as needed and to provide it in a structured,

consistent way.” Dr. Williams identified several areas of

concern, including a longstanding history of criminal legal

issues, as well as substance abuse issues, and … Father’s

inability to accept responsibility for this criminal record

history. According to Dr. Williams, … Father, rather than

being accountable for his own actions, tends to indicate that

these things happened to him and see himself as the victim.

Dr. Williams also identified chronic instability in … Father’s

housing, issues of domestic violence, and significant

employment instability. He described to Dr. Williams that

he was currently employed, but moving to a new job, but

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“couldn’t really explain what the new job was.” His

testimony in [c]ourt was similar, in that he would mention

having expectations of a new and better job, and at first

indicate it was a certainty, but when pressed[, he would]

mention two or three job possibilities that were uncertain,

or for which he had had an interview. Dr. Williams explained

that in trying to evaluate … Father’s circumstances and

identify solutions, he presents with “pervasive minimization,

… denial, [and] defensiveness.” These traits were confirmed

by administration of the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality

Inventory, according to Dr. Williams.

When Dr. Williams asked … Father whether he anticipated

any concerns about parenting [Child], or about removing

him from the home that he has known for more than two

years, … Father stated that he did not have any concerns

about parenting and that he did not foresee any issues. She

concluded that this attitude was further evidence of …

Father’s pattern of “denial, minimization, the inability to see

the actual reality of what may or may not happen.” Dr.

Williams testified that, when asked about removing [Child]

from the home where he has been residing for more than

two years, initially … Father “denied that there would be any

impact on [Child]. Then he thought about it and thought

perhaps there would be impact, but it will only take a matter

of days for [Child] to get over it and then it would be a

nonissue.... Again, it’s the denial and the minimization and

not understanding of the impact of real life events on others,

and it’s concerning that he couldn’t predict and then plan for

the support that [Child] would need given that severe

disruption of attachment.” Dr. Williams also testified, based

upon her expertise, that when a child has a secure

attachment for a period of years, if you abruptly change

that, it is going to be a severe disruption.

Dr. Williams also testified that … Father expressed that his

goal with respect to this case involving his son, [Child], was

initially to obtain custody of [Child], but then to turn over

the child to his family members who have adopted his two

older daughters.

Dr. Williams also observed patterns in … Father’s criminal

history and his decades-long substance abuse history of

placing himself and others at risk of harm, including by his

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substance abuse, and when he became violent with a police

officer, and incidents of domestic violence. Ultimately, Dr.

Williams testified that it was her opinion, to a reasonable

degree of psychological certainty, based upon her

evaluation, that … Father lacked the capacity to parent, and

also that he has not begun the process of remedying these

incapacities.

Dr. Williams also testified that she performed an assessment

of whether there was a parental bond between … Father and

[Child], which included observing them together, and

expressed her opinion that there is no parent-caregiver

bond between the two.

On examination by his own counsel, … Father acknowledged

that he had changed his mind multiple times about his goal

for these proceedings. Initially, when counsel was first

appointed for him, he supported the Petition to Confirm his

consent to the adoption, but desired to negotiate for more

visits under a [PACA]. At the hearing on the Petitions to

Confirm Consent, he took the position that he had revoked

his consent. At one time he advised Dr. Williams and others

that he intended to obtain custody of [Child] but then to

turn custody over to the family members who have adopted

[Child’s siblings]. Still later, at trial on these petitions, he

changed his position again, asserting that he wished to

obtain custody of [Child] and raise him himself.

… Father acknowledged that he had received from his

counsel the requests for discovery, as well as this [c]ourt’s

Order for him to provide discovery, but that although he

wished to comply, he had never dropped off any pay stubs,

tax returns, lease, documentation regarding his substance

use treatment or any other documentation to his counsel to

be delivered to opposing counsel before trial. Having not

produced these exhibits before trial as required, … Father

did bring with him to [c]ourt a tax return for 2022, some

pay stubs, and a lease, as well as, a document

demonstrating the support he is receiving towards his

housing through a program called HUD-VASH in Chester

County, Pennsylvania. These documents were admitted in

evidence as Exhibits F-1, F-2, F-3, F-4, and F-5.

Questions were raised about whether … Father had ever filed

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a custody petition in the Family Division of this Court, during

the pendency of these proceedings. Although his [c]ourt-

appointed counsel helped to draft a petition for him to file

to seek custody, he testified that he took it to the

Prothonotary intending to file it, but that he neither paid the

filing fee, nor filed a petition for leave to file without paying

the fee (I.F.P.). As a result, no petition for custody was ever

filed.

Regarding … Father’s housing, counsel for the child

established through cross-examination that … Father lived

in an apartment … in Paoli, Pennsylvania, at the time of

[Child’s] birth, and from approximately 2018 to 2021. He

acknowledged that he received several eviction notices

while living at that address but protested that he was not

evicted. After leaving that apartment in 2021, he lived for

a time in a Holiday Inn Express hotel, and then … in Paoli,

at a home owned by someone he worked for. Sometime

around July of 2022, he testified that he entered a program

through the VA for Homeless Veterans, called Fresh Start,

and moved into housing at the VA in Coatesville,

Pennsylvania. Although he acknowledged being admitted to

this program he was argumentative and evasive with

counsel and appeared to resist acknowledging that this was

a program for homeless veterans. [The GAL] offered in

evidence as Exhibit P-12, a letter from the VA dated April

24, 2023, confirming that … Father participated in a

program of supportive housing for homeless veterans called

Fresh Start, and lived there from July of 2022 through

November 28, of 2022. At the end of November 2022, he

moved to a two-bedroom cottage … in West Chester,

Pennsylvania, with support from the HUD-VASH program.

On cross-examination of … Father, counsel for the child

established that … Father had a criminal record stretching

back at least to 2006 in Pennsylvania. Criminal records of

… Father were admitted in evidence as Exhibits P-3(a), P-

3(b), P-3-(c), P-3(d), P-3(e) and P-3(f).

Asked about his substance abuse history, … Father

acknowledged a history of being addicted to Percocet. At

first he testified that his addiction began in 2011 or 2012,

but then he acknowledged that he was in a drug rehab in

2005 or 2006. Although his ability to clearly testify to the

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dates was limited, he acknowledged being released from jail

to a program called “Minsec” in 2005 or 2006, being

released from jail to a program in Valley Forge,

Pennsylvania, in 2009, and attending a third rehab called

Mirmont in 2019, after his release from incarceration. He

also acknowledged that after the first rehab stay in 2005, or

2006, he was prescribed Suboxone.

… Father’s testimony in [c]ourt on May 18, and May 22,

2023, consistent with the description by Dr. Erica Williams,

evidenced a pattern of minimization, denial and

defensiveness, particularly with respect to his criminal

record, his substance abuse history, and his housing

instability. His failure to provide documents, in response to

a discovery request and in response to a [c]ourt Order, prior

to trial on these subjects exacerbated the problem with

corroborating his claims to have achieved employment and

housing stability and sobriety.

… Father acknowledged that he has not provided any

financial support for [Child], nor sent him any cards or gifts,

except when having a visit with him, during the entire period

from October of 2020 until the hearing in May 2023.

… Father has had approximately 5 visits with the child …

between October 2020 and through the date of the hearings

in May 2023. According to the testimony of [the pre-

adoptive father G.O.], he attempted to but could not reach

… Father for much of 2022. Indeed, a visit was scheduled

for … Father with [Child] in the summer of 2022, but …

Father did not show. Although … Father stated that he

wished to have visits and contact with [Child], he typically

did not make a request to set up a visit on a specific date.

His attorney on some occasions was involved in assisting

him to set up visits. The most recent visit between … Father

and [Child] occurred [in] January of 2023, and was set up

on the initiative of the [P]re-[A]doptive [P]arents, although

… Father’s attorney had initially made a request for a visit

in December near Christmas.

(Orphans’ Court Opinion, 7/14/23, at 3-8) (internal citations omitted).

At the conclusion of the termination hearing on May 22, 2023, the

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Orphans’ Court granted the petitions for involuntary termination of Father’s

parental rights under 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(1), (a)(2), and (b).

Father timely appealed the termination decree, and AFTH and Pre-

Adoptive Parents subsequently filed cross-appeals challenging the earlier

orders denying confirmation of the adoption consents and reconsideration of

same. On January 4, 2024, however, this Court vacated the May 22, 2023

order terminating Father’s parental rights, and remanded with instructions for

the Orphans’ Court to expressly determine whether Child’s GAL had a conflict

of interest that prevented her from also serving as Child’s legal counsel in the

termination proceedings. This Court dismissed the cross-appeals without

prejudice. See In re Adoption of C.P.D., 1586 EDA 2023 (Pa.Super. filed

Jan. 4, 2024) (unpublished memorandum).

On February 21, 2024, the Orphans’ Court expressly determined that no

conflict of interest existed that prevented Child’s GAL from also serving as

Child’s legal counsel in the termination proceedings. Consequently, the

Orphans’ Court re-entered the decree involuntarily terminating Father’s

parental rights to Child. Father timely filed a notice of appeal on February 29,

2024, along with a concise statement of errors complained of on appeal per

Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a)(2)(i). Pre-Adoptive Parents and AFTH also timely filed

cross-appeals and respective Rule 1925(a)(2)(i) statements.

Father raises the following issues for our review:

Whether there is sufficient evidence to support the findings

of this Honorable Court that Petitioners proved by clear and

convincing evidence the requirements of 23 Pa.C.S. [§]

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2511(a)(1) for the involuntary termination of Birth Father’s

parental rights?

Whether there is sufficient evidence to support the findings

of this Honorable Court that Petitioners proved by clear and

convincing evidence the requirements of 23 Pa.C.S. [§]

2511(a)(2) for the involuntary termination of Birth Father’s

parental rights?

Whether this Honorable Court abused its discretion in

finding that the developmental, physical and emotional

needs and welfare of [Child] will be best served by the

termination of Birth Father’s parental rights pursuant to 23

Pa.C.S. [§] 2511(b), when there is a strong and loving bond

between Birth Father and the child, and severance of that

bond will cause irreparable harm to the child?

(Father’s Brief at 4).

Pre-Adoptive Parents raise the following issue for our review:

Whether the [Orphans’ C]ourt committed an error of law by

denying to confirm the consent to adoption of [Father], after

deciding that the consent was in compliance with 23 Pa.C.S.

§ 2711(a) and (d), and that he did not timely revoke his

consent or file a petition alleging fraud or duress in

accordance with 23 Pa.C.S. § 2711(c)?

(Pre-Adoptive Parents’ Brief at 11).

AFTH raises the following issues for our review:

Whether the [Orphans’ C]ourt committed an error of law by

denying confirmation [of] Father’s consent to adoption, after

finding that: (a) the consent complied with 23 Pa.C.S. §

2711(a) and (d); (b) Father did not timely revoke his

consent in accordance with § 2711(c)(1)(i); and (c) Father

did not timely challenge the validity of the consent on the

basis of fraud or duress in accordance with … 23 Pa.C.S. [§]

2711(c)(3).

Whether the [Orphans’ C]ourt’s decision to invalidate

consents signed by the Birthparents many months earlier

was manifestly unreasonable because it was contrary to the

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weight of [the] evidence.

(AFTH’s Brief at 13).

In his issues combined, Father disputes the Orphans’ Court’s finding that

he refused or failed to perform parental duties concerning Child. Father

emphasizes that at the outset of this case, he brought Child into the care of

AFTH for placement for an open adoption. Father argues that there was no

indication of abuse or neglect, nor was there a question of Father’s capacity

to care for Child. At the time of Child’s placement, AFTH had Mother and

Father sign consents to adoption and a PACA and made other promises to

Mother and Father. Father insists that Mother and Father revoked their

consent for adoption within 30 days. Father asserts that AFTH took no action

to return Child to Mother and Father, effectively ignoring their revocation.

Father submits that he had no counsel, had revoked his consent, and had no

idea how to secure Child’s return.

Father maintains that once AFTH filed for the adoption and confirmation

of consents, that opened the door for Father to assert his revocation. Father

contends that AFTH took no steps to set up visits between Father and Child

while the matter concerning the validity of the adoption consents was pending.

Father highlights that the court deemed his consent to adoption invalid on May

13, 2022. Father avers that he has never refused to perform parental duties.

Father stresses that he has acted appropriately with Child during visits and

attended to Child’s needs when he had the opportunity. Under these

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circumstances, Father submits that termination of his parental rights was

improper under Section 2511(a)(1).

Additionally, Father argues that no incapacity existed when Child was

placed with AFTH. Father asserts that he initially planned for an open

adoption, and there was no removal of Child from the home due to any

incapacity, abuse, or neglect by Father. To the contrary, Father emphasizes

that he was trying to assure Child would have the proper care and control by

meeting with and selecting Pre-Adoptive Parents. Father claims that he has

been employed and maintained housing throughout this litigation. Thus,

Father challenges any “claims and innuendos that Father was incapable of

caring for his son both physically and financially.” (Father’s Brief at 15).

Father insists that he has shown during visits that he can attend to Child’s

needs appropriately. Father avers that the lack of his “future plan” should not

be held against him, as a parent does not have to have a future plan to have

children. (Id. at 16). Under these circumstances, Father submits that

termination of his parental rights was also improper under Section 2511(a)(2).

With respect to Section 2511(b), Father reiterates that he revoked his

consent to adoption within 30 days. Father argues that AFTH and Pre-

Adoptive Parents should have returned Child to Father at that time. “Instead

they have held this child, requiring Father to go through extended court

hearings and the passing of valuable time in the life of a child so young.” (Id.

at 17). Father maintains that the court did not invalidate Father’s consent to

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adoption until May 2022; at that point, Child had been with Pre-Adoptive

Parents for 18 of his 20 months of life. Father complains that he did not have

a chance to develop a significant bond with Child during this time. Father

stresses that the “delay in time from the revocation [of the consent to

adoption] to present was caused by [AFTH’s] failure to properly address the

revocation of the consent in this case and created a situation whereby the

child, rather than be returned to the parents in less than 30 days, has now

been in the custody of the [Pre-Adoptive Parents] for in excess of 20 months.”

(Id. at 18). Father proclaims that neither he nor Child should be penalized in

such a harsh fashion due to AFTH’s inaction. Father concludes the court erred

by involuntarily terminating his parental rights, and this Court must grant

relief. We disagree.

Appellate review in termination of parental rights cases implicates the

following principles:

In cases involving termination of parental rights: “our

standard of review is limited to determining whether the

order of the trial court is supported by competent evidence,

and whether the trial court gave adequate consideration to

the effect of such a decree on the welfare of the child.”

In re Z.P., 994 A.2d 1108, 1115 (Pa.Super. 2010) (quoting In re I.J., 972

A.2d 5, 8 (Pa.Super. 2009)).

Absent an abuse of discretion, an error of law, or

insufficient evidentiary support for the trial court’s

decision, the decree must stand. … We must employ

a broad, comprehensive review of the record in order

to determine whether the trial court’s decision is

supported by competent evidence.

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In re B.L.W., 843 A.2d 380, 383 (Pa.Super. 2004) (en

banc), appeal denied, 581 Pa. 668, 863 A.2d 1141 (2004)

(internal citations omitted).

Furthermore, we note that the trial court, as the finder

of fact, is the sole determiner of the credibility of

witnesses and all conflicts in testimony are to be

resolved by [the] finder of fact. The burden of proof

is on the party seeking termination to establish by

clear and convincing evidence the existence of

grounds for doing so.

In re Adoption of A.C.H., 803 A.2d 224, 228 (Pa.Super.

2002) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). The

standard of clear and convincing evidence means testimony

that is so clear, direct, weighty, and convincing as to enable

the trier of fact to come to a clear conviction, without

hesitation, of the truth of the precise facts in issue. In re

J.D.W.M., 810 A.2d 688, 690 (Pa.Super. 2002). We may

uphold a termination decision if any proper basis exists for

the result reached. In re C.S., 761 A.2d 1197, 1201

(Pa.Super. 2000) (en banc). If the court’s findings are

supported by competent evidence, we must affirm the

court’s decision, even if the record could support an opposite

result. In re R.L.T.M., 860 A.2d 190, 191[-92] (Pa.Super.

2004).

In re Z.P., supra at 1115-16 (quoting In re Adoption of K.J., 936 A.2d

1128, 1131-32 (Pa.Super. 2007), appeal denied, 597 Pa. 718, 951 A.2d 1165

(2008)).

The court granted involuntary termination of Father’s parental rights to

Child on the following grounds:

§ 2511. Grounds for involuntary termination

(a) General Rule.―The rights of a parent in regard to

a child may be terminated after a petition filed on any of the

following grounds:

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(1) The parent by conduct continuing for a period of at

least six months immediately preceding the filing of the

petition either has evidenced a settled purpose of

relinquishing parental claim to a child or has refused or

failed to perform parental duties.

(2) The repeated and continued incapacity, abuse,

neglect or refusal of the parent has caused the child to

be without essential parental care, control or subsistence

necessary for his physical or mental well-being and the

conditions and causes of the incapacity, abuse, neglect

or refusal cannot or will not be remedied by the parent.

* * *

(b) Other considerations.―The court in terminating

the rights of a parent shall give primary consideration to the

developmental, physical and emotional needs and welfare

of the child. The rights of a parent shall not be terminated

solely on the basis of environmental factors such as

inadequate housing, furnishings, income, clothing and

medical care if found to be beyond the control of the parent.

With respect to any petition filed pursuant to subsection

(a)(1), (6) or (8), the court shall not consider any efforts by

the parent to remedy the conditions described therein which

are first initiated subsequent to the giving of notice of the

filing of the petition.

23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(1), (2), and (b). “Parental rights may be involuntarily

terminated where any one subsection of Section 2511(a) is satisfied, along

with consideration of the subsection 2511(b) provisions.” In re Z.P., supra

at 1117. When conducting a termination analysis:

Initially, the focus is on the conduct of the parent. The party

seeking termination must prove by clear and convincing

evidence that the parent’s conduct satisfies the statutory

grounds for termination delineated in Section 2511(a). Only

if the court determines that the parent’s conduct warrants

termination of…his parental rights does the court engage in

the second part of the analysis pursuant to Section 2511(b):

determination of the needs and welfare of the child under

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the standard of best interests of the child.

In re L.M., 923 A.2d 505, 511 (Pa.Super. 2007) (internal citations omitted).

Termination under Section 2511(a)(1) involves the following:

To satisfy the requirements of [S]ection 2511(a)(1), the

moving party must produce clear and convincing evidence

of conduct, sustained for at least the six months prior to the

filing of the termination petition, which reveals a settled

intent to relinquish parental claim to a child or a refusal or

failure to perform parental duties. In addition,

Section 2511 does not require that the parent

demonstrate both a settled purpose of relinquishing

parental claim to a child and refusal or failure to

perform parental duties. Accordingly, parental rights

may be terminated pursuant to Section 2511(a)(1) if

the parent either demonstrates a settled purpose of

relinquishing parental claim to a child or fails to

perform parental duties.

Once the evidence establishes a failure to perform parental

duties or a settled purpose of relinquishing parental rights,

the court must engage in three lines of inquiry: (1) the

parent’s explanation for his or her conduct; (2) the post-

abandonment contact between parent and child; and (3)

consideration of the effect of termination of parental rights

on the child pursuant to Section 2511(b).

In re Z.S.W., 946 A.2d 726, 730 (Pa.Super. 2008) (internal citations omitted)

(emphasis added).

The grounds for termination of parental rights under Section

2511(a)(2), due to parental incapacity that cannot be remedied, are not

limited to affirmative misconduct; to the contrary those grounds may include

acts of refusal as well as incapacity to perform parental duties. In re Z.P.,

supra at 1117. “Parents are required to make diligent efforts towards the

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reasonably prompt assumption of full parental responsibilities.” Id. at 1117-

18. Under Section 2511(a)(2), “the petitioner for involuntary termination

must prove (1) repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal;

(2) that such incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal caused the child to be

without essential parental care, control or subsistence; and (3) that the causes

of the incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal cannot or will not be remedied.”

In Interest of Lilley, 719 A.2d 327, 330 (Pa.Super. 1998).

Under Section 2511(b), the court must consider whether termination

will meet the child’s needs and welfare. In re C.P., 901 A.2d 516, 520

(Pa.Super. 2006). “Intangibles such as love, comfort, security, and stability

are involved when inquiring about the needs and welfare of the child. The

court must also discern the nature and status of the parent-child bond, paying

close attention to the effect on the child of permanently severing the bond.”

Id. Significantly:

In this context, the court must take into account whether a

bond exists between child and parent, and whether

termination would destroy an existing, necessary and

beneficial relationship.

When conducting a bonding analysis, the court is not

required to use expert testimony. Social workers and

caseworkers can offer evaluations as well. Additionally,

Section 2511(b) does not require a formal bonding

evaluation.

In re Z.P., supra at 1121 (internal citations omitted).

Further, our Supreme Court has recently clarified that, in making a

Section 2511(b) determination, a trial court must analyze: (1) whether the

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parental bond is “necessary and beneficial to the child;” (2) “the child’s need

for permanency and length of time in foster care;” (3) “whether the child is in

a pre-adoptive home and bonded with foster parents;” and (4) “whether the

foster home meets the child’s developmental, physical, and emotional needs,

including intangible needs of love, comfort, security, safety and stability.”

Interest of K.T., ___ Pa. ___, ___, 296 A.3d 1085, 1113 (2023). Moreover,

the Court explained that, when reviewing the nature of the parental bond, a

court must consider “whether maintaining the bond serves the child’s

developmental, physical, and emotional needs and welfare.” Id. Importantly,

the K.T. Court’s decision is particularly relevant to an analysis of an existing

parental-bond. “In cases where there is no evidence of any bond between the

parent and child, it is reasonable to infer that no bond exists. The extent of

any bond analysis, therefore, necessarily depends on the circumstances of the

particular case.” In re K.Z.S., 946 A.2d 753, 762-63 (Pa.Super. 2008)

(citation omitted).

Instantly, at the conclusion of the termination hearings, the court

discussed Father’s history of unstable employment, unstable housing,

unstable relationships, criminal conduct, substance abuse, and “inadequate

self-knowledge about each of these things that would enable him to prevent

continuation of these unfortunate interactions, inadequate recognition of his

own responsibility for the criminal activities, excessive focus on himself as a

victim of [CYS]…” (N.T. Termination Hearing, 5/22/23, at 113-14). Based

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upon this history, Dr. Williams opined to a reasonable degree of psychological

certainty that at the present time, Father lacks the capacity to parent Child.

(Id. at 113).

Further, the court noted that Father minimized any concern for Child

that would arise from removing him from Pre-Adoptive Parents’ home,

indicating a lack of ability to appreciate the reasonably foreseeable

consequences to Child. (Id. at 116). The court also highlighted that Father

did not ever send Child cards, gifts, letters, or provide financial support for

Child. (Id. at 117). Although Father stated that he opened a bank account

for Child, the account was in Father’s name and was not restricted in any form

or designated for the benefit of Child. (Id.) The court emphasized that Father

sought visits with Child and negotiated a voluntary PACA that provided for

visits, as well as letters and e-mails. Nevertheless, Father did not consistently

seek visitation with Child and visited with him only five times in total. (Id. at

117). Although Pre-Adoptive Parents set up an e-mail account to share

pictures and updates about Child, Father did not make use of that account or

communicate via that account to receive updates. (Id. at 118).

Under these circumstances, the court concluded that Father failed to

perform any parental duties for a period of more than six months prior to the

filing of the termination petitions, and Father is not capable of performing

parental duties and taking care of Child. (Id. at 121-22). Thus, the court

found termination was proper under Section 2511(a)(1) and (2). (Id. at 122).

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(See also Orphans’ Court Opinion, 7/14/23, at 8-9) (finding that “Father has

failed and refused to perform parenting responsibilities, and has an incapacity

to parent. These findings are supported by the lengthy record and the expert

testimony of Dr. Erica Williams”).

Our review of the record supports the court’s analysis under Section

2511(a)(1).4 As the Orphans’ Court noted, Father has not provided for Child

financially, sent Child cards or gifts, kept apprised of updates concerning Child

via the e-mail account specifically set up for that purpose, or consistently

visited with Child. Rather, the record confirms that Pre-Adoptive Parents

perform all parental duties. Although Father claims AFTH did not set up visits

for Father and that litigation concerning the validity of the adoption consents

delayed Father’s reunification with Child, Father fails to articulate what steps

he took to care for Child during the pendency of litigation. Indeed, the

evidence shows that Father did not file a custody petition following his

purported revocation of his adoption consent even though his counsel had

drafted one, did not request visits, and did not seek updates on Child’s well-

being during this time. Additionally, Dr. Williams made clear that terminating

Father’s parental rights would not cause irreparable harm to Child. Thus, the

record supports the court’s decision that for at least six months prior to the

filing of the termination petitions, Father failed to perform parental duties for

____________________________________________

4 We need only discuss one subsection of Section 2511(a), along with Section

2511(b). See In re Z.P., supra.

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Child. See 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(1); In re Z.S.W., supra.

Regarding Section 2511(b), the court explained:

In this case the [c]ourt finds that there is no parental bond

between the child, … and … Father. … Father has not

provided for the child emotionally or financially, has not

acted in a parental role with the child, and has attended only

approximately 5 visits with the child in over two-and-a-half

years. Based upon his own testimony, and the extensive

record, as well as the expert testimony of Dr. Erica Williams,

this [c]ourt concludes that there is no parental bond

between [Child] and … Father and that termination of …

Father’s parental rights will not cause irreparable harm to

the child.

The child is placed in a loving and nurturing home where all

of his needs are being met, and he is bonded to [Pre-

Adoptive Parents]. In addition to their own testimony, this

is supported in the expert testimony of Dr. Erica Williams.

Indeed, … Father’s inability to appreciate the profound

disruption and harm that would occur for [Child] were he to

be removed from this loving home is one of many indicators

of … Father’s incapacity to appreciate and anticipate the

needs and welfare of the child, and to place the child’s

welfare ahead of his own desires, demonstrates his

incapacity to parent.

(Orphans’ Court Opinion, 7/14/23, at 9). The record supports the court’s

analysis concerning Section 2511(b). See In re Z.P., supra. Further, the

court’s analysis confirms the court considered all relevant factors regarding

whether a bond exists between Father and Child. See Interest of K.T.,

supra. On this record, we see no error of law or abuse of discretion

concerning the court’s termination of Father’s parental rights under Section

2511(a)(1) and (b). See In re Z.P., supra.

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Thus, we turn to the cross-appeals. 5 For purposes of disposition, we

consider the arguments of Pre-Adoptive Parents and AFTH together. Pre-

Adoptive Parents argue that both Mother and Father executed consents to

Child’s adoption on October 27, 2020 that complied with 23 Pa.C.S.A. §

2711(a) and (d). Pre-Adoptive Parents assert that neither Mother nor Father

delivered to AFTH a written revocation of those consents at any time. Pre-

Adoptive Parents contend that neither parent filed a petition to revoke the

____________________________________________

5 We observe that by affirming the trial court’s decision to involuntarily

terminate Father’s parental rights, and in light of Mother’s voluntary

relinquishment of her parental rights, the issues raised by Pre-Adoptive

Parents and AFTH appear to be moot. See In re D.A., 801 A.2d 614, 616

(Pa.Super. 2002) (en banc) (explaining general rule that actual case or

controversy must exist at all stages of judicial process or case will be

dismissed as moot; issue before court is moot if in ruling upon issue, court

cannot enter order that has any legal force or effect). Although no party

expressly raises an exception to the mootness doctrine, AFTH notes that the

Orphans’ Court’s decision to invalidate Father’s adoption consent has the

potential to impact permanency for other children. Specifically, AFTH

maintains that “[i]f the [Orphans’ C]ourt’s reasoning in this case remains on

the docket undisturbed, it will endure as a viable roadmap for other

birthparents to use to challenge their consents, long after statutory deadlines

have passed and bonds have attached between the child and their adopting

parent.” (AFTH’s Brief at 16-17). AFTH acknowledges that although the

record in this case is not available for public view, any of the lawyers involved

in this case are familiar with the decision and could use it when representing

clients in other adoption cases. (Id. at 17 n.5). AFTH insists that the court’s

ruling “would turn Pennsylvania adoption practice on its head, undermining

the legislature’s clear and unequivocal intent to provide certainty and

permanency for children.” (Id. at 17). Thus, even if the issues raised in the

cross-appeals are moot, we decline to dismiss the cross-appeals and proceed

to address the merits of those issues. See In re D.A., supra (explaining that

we will decide questions otherwise rendered moot when case involves question

of great public importance; question presented is capable of repetition and apt

to elude appellate review; or party to controversy will suffer some detriment

due to decision of trial court).

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consents based upon fraud or duress during the 60-day period required under

23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2711(c). Pre-Adoptive Parents emphasize the Orphans’ Court’s

finding that the testimony of Mother and Father was not entirely credible

concerning the circumstances surrounding their consents. Nevertheless, the

Orphans’ Court found the consents to adoption invalid because they were not

voluntary and unconditional in light of AFTH’s promises of a PACA with respect

to Child. Because Mother and Father did not revoke their consents to adoption

in a timely manner, however, Pre-Adoptive Parents contend that the Orphans’

Court was precluded from addressing the issue of the validity of their

consents. Pre-Adoptive Parents submit that the Orphans’ Court relied on

cases involving voluntary relinquishment of parental rights rather than cases

concerning consents to adoption under Section 2711.

In AFTH’s issues combined, AFTH echoes the same arguments advanced

by Pre-Adoptive Parents. Additionally, AFTH argues that by ruling that the

signing of a PACA was a basis to invalidate the adoption consents, the court

effectively nullified another Pennsylvania statute, 23 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2731-2742

(“Act 101”).6 AFTH asserts that the Orphans’ Court essentially ruled that using

____________________________________________

6 Chapter 27, Subchapter D of the Adoption Act, commonly referred to as “Act

101” sets forth the procedures related to PACAs at Sections 2731-2742:

The purpose of this subchapter is to provide an option for

adoptive parents and birth relatives to enter into a voluntary

agreement for ongoing communication or contact that:

(Footnote Continued Next Page)

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the statutory tool created for court-enforceable future contact canceled out

the adoption consent, which is the opposite of Act 101’s purpose. AFTH

maintains that the purpose of Act 101 is to give birthparents the assurance of

knowing if, when, and how often they will see their child in the future if they

choose voluntary adoption. Thus, AFTH maintains that Act 101 was intended

to be used in conjunction with the adoption consent and not as a separate

“transaction” as the Orphans’ Court suggested. AFTH insists that the court’s

“reliance on the absence of an express statement in Act 101 that a consent

cannot be conditional upon a PACA is misplaced where the legislative history

shows that PACA and voluntary consent are fundamentally connected.”

____________________________________________

(1) is in the best interest of the child;

(2) recognizes the parties’ interests and desires for ongoing

communication or contact;

(3) is appropriate given the role of the parties in the child’s

life; and

(4) is subject to approval by the courts.

23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2731. Section 2732 defines a PACA (called an “Agreement”

under the statute) as a “voluntary written agreement between an adoptive

parent and a birth relative that is approved by a court and provides for

continuing contact or communication between the child and the birth relative

or between the adoptive parent and the birth relative as provided under this

subchapter.” 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2732. The PACA must be filed with the court

that finalizes the adoption of the child. See 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2735(a). Further,

the court shall approve the PACA if it has been entered into knowingly and

voluntarily by all parties, and is in the best interest of the child. See 23

Pa.C.S.A. § 2735(b). The PACA shall not be legally enforceable unless

approved by the court, which the court shall approve when the statutory

conditions are satisfied. See 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2735(b), (c).

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(AFTH’s Brief at 49). AFTH submits that the Orphans’ Court’s decision creates

an impossible dilemma for adoption agencies who must counsel clients about

the opportunity to sign a PACA as part of their adoption options. Under the

court’s rationale, AFTH posits that professionals will need to advise

birthparents of Act 101 and then ask them to forsake the opportunity to sign

a PACA at the time of signing consent and only later try to get the parties to

sign one.

Further, AFTH avers that any suggestion that it misled or induced Father

to signing the adoption consent is contrary to the overwhelming weight of the

evidence. AFTH emphasizes testimony from Ms. Bendig, who affirmed that

she did not make promises to deliver benefits unrelated to Child’s adoption or

that Father could have believed his consent was conditioned on any such

promises. Although AFTH acknowledges that it tried to help Father with some

problems such as securing funds to help Father replace his car battery, AFTH

insists that its offer to help could not have reasonably been perceived as an

inducement to encourage Father to sign the adoption consent. AFTH also

contends that it did not promise to get a PACA for Father’s daughter if Father

signed the adoption consent for Child. AFTH highlights that Father was

familiar with the adoption and revocation process because he went through it

a year before these proceedings for his daughter. As well, AFTH points to

Mother’s testimony confirming that she signed her adoption consent because

she did not want Child to be placed in the foster care system, and not in

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reliance on having a PACA or any promise from AFTH. Pre-Adoptive Parents

and AFTH conclude that the court erred in refusing to confirm the consents to

adoption, and this Court must grant relief. We agree with AFTH and Pre-

Adoptive Parents’ position.

At the outset, we note:

The aim of statutory interpretation is to give effect to the

intent of our General Assembly. The plain language of a

statute is the best indicator of the General Assembly’s

intent, and only where the language is not clear and free

from ambiguity do we turn to principles of statutory

construction to aid our interpretation. When interpreting a

statute, we must always read the words of a statute in

context, not in isolation, and give meaning to each and

every provision and our interpretation must not render any

provision extraneous.... We must presume that the General

Assembly did not intend a result that is absurd or

unreasonable or which violates the Constitutions of the

United States or this Commonwealth, and that it intend for

the entire statute to be effective and certain.

In re J.W.B., 659 Pa. 561, 577-78, 232 A.3d 689, 698-99 (2020) (internal

citations and quotation marks omitted).

Section 2504 of the Adoption Act describes the procedure whereby a

parent executes a consent to adoption, and an agency or adoptive parent files

a petition to confirm that consent:

§ 2504. Alternative procedure for relinquishment

(a) Petition to confirm consent to adoption.—If

the parent or parents of the child have executed consents

to an adoption, upon petition by the intermediary or, where

there is no intermediary, by the adoptive parent, the court

shall hold a hearing for the purpose of confirming a consent

to an adoption upon expiration of the time periods under

section 2711 (relating to consents necessary to adoption).

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The original consent or consents to the adoption shall be

attached to the petition.

(b) Hearing.—Upon presentation of a petition filed

pursuant to this section, the court shall fix a time for a

hearing which shall not be less than ten days after filing of

the petition. Notice of the hearing shall be by personal

service or by registered mail or by such other means as the

court may require upon the consenter and shall be in the

form provided in section 2513(b) (relating to hearing).

Notice of the hearing shall be given to the other parent or

parents, to the putative father whose parental rights could

be terminated pursuant to subsection (c) and to the parents

or guardian of a consenting parent who has not reached 18

years of age. The notice shall state that the consenting

parent’s or putative father’s rights may be terminated as a

result of the hearing. After hearing, which shall be private,

the court may enter a decree of termination of parental

rights in the case of a relinquishment to an adult or a decree

of termination of parental rights and duties, including the

obligation of support, in the case of a relinquishment to an

agency.

23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2504(a) and (b).

Further, Section 2711 of the Adoption Act governs the content, form,

and validity of consents necessary for an adoption. See 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2711.

Regarding the validity and revocation of a consent for adoption, the statute

provides:

§ 2711. Consents necessary to adoption

* * *

(c) Validity of consent.—No consent shall be valid if it was

executed prior to or within 72 hours after the birth of the

child. A putative father may execute a consent at any time

after receiving notice of the expected or actual birth of the

child. Any consent given outside this Commonwealth shall

be valid for purposes of this section if it was given in

accordance with the laws of the jurisdiction where it was

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executed. A consent to an adoption may only be revoked

as set forth in this subsection. The revocation of a consent

shall be in writing and shall be served upon the agency or

adult to whom the child was relinquished. The following

apply:

(1) Except as otherwise provided in paragraph (3):

(i) For a consent to an adoption executed by a birth

father or a putative father, the consent is irrevocable

more than 30 days after the birth of the child or the

execution of the consent, whichever occurs later.

(ii) For a consent to an adoption executed by a birth

mother, the consent is irrevocable more than 30 days

after the execution of the consent.

(2) An individual may not waive the revocation period

under paragraph (1).

(3) Notwithstanding paragraph (1), the following apply:

(i) An individual who executed a consent to an

adoption may challenge the validity of the consent

only by filing a petition alleging fraud or duress within

the earlier of the following time frames:

(A) Sixty days after the birth of the child or the

execution of the consent, whichever occurs later.

(B) Thirty days after the entry of the adoption

decree.

(ii) A consent to an adoption may be invalidated only

if the alleged fraud or duress under subparagraph (i)

is proven by:

(A) a preponderance of the evidence in the case of

consent by a person 21 years of age or younger; or

(B) clear and convincing evidence in all other

cases.

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23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2711(c). “[T]his Section describes the timeline for revocation

of a consent to adoption, as well as a challenge to its validity (and only on the

grounds of fraud or duress). This Section further makes clear that a

revocation and/or a challenge to the validity of a consent to adoption must be

in conformity with the Act.” In re Adoption of J.A.S., 939 A.2d 403, 407-

08 (Pa.Super. 2007), appeal denied, 598 Pa. 750, 954 A.2d 577 (2008)

(internal citations omitted).

In In re Adoption of J.A.S., the birth mother revoked her consent to

adoption 100 days after she had authorized an amended consent. The

Orphans’ Court determined that birth mother’s consent to adoption was void

ab initio, because it had originally omitted information required under Section

2711(d) (detailing content of consent to adoption). 7 “Essentially, the court

____________________________________________

7 Section 2711(d) provides in full:

(d) Contents of consent.—

(1) The consent of a parent of an adoptee under 18 years of

age shall set forth the name, age and marital status of the

parent, the relationship of the consenter to the child, the

name of the other parent or parents of the child and the

following:

I hereby voluntarily and unconditionally consent to the

adoption of the above named child.

I understand that by signing this consent I indicate my

intent to permanently give up all rights to this child.

I understand such child will be placed for adoption.

(Footnote Continued Next Page)

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____________________________________________

I understand I may revoke this consent to permanently give

up all rights to this child by placing the revocation in writing

and serving it upon the agency or adult to whom the child

was relinquished.

If I am the birth father or putative father of the child, I

understand that this consent to an adoption is irrevocable

unless I revoke it within 30 days after either the birth of the

child or my execution of the consent, whichever occurs later,

by delivering a written revocation to (insert the name and

address of the agency coordinating the adoption) or (insert

the name and address of an attorney who represents the

individual relinquishing parental rights or prospective

adoptive parent of the child) or (insert the court of the

county in which the voluntary relinquishment form was or

will be filed).

If I am the birth mother of the child, I understand that this

consent to an adoption is irrevocable unless I revoke it

within 30 days after executing it by delivering a written

revocation to (insert the name and address of the agency

coordinating the adoption) or (insert the name and address

of an attorney who represents the individual relinquishing

parental rights or prospective adoptive parent of the child)

or (insert the court of the county in which the voluntary

relinquishment form was or will be filed).

I have read and understand the above and I am signing it

as a free and voluntary act.

(2) The consent shall include the date and place of its

execution and names and addresses and signatures of at

least two persons who witnessed its execution and their

relationship to the consenter. The consent of an

incarcerated parent of an adoptee may be witnessed by a

correctional facility employee designated by the correctional

facility. Any consent witnessed by a correctional facility

employee shall list the address of the correctional facility on

the consent.

(Footnote Continued Next Page)

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concluded a ‘valid’ consent to adoption was a necessary predicate under the

statute before the timeliness provisions for revoking and/or challenging the

validity of the consent were triggered.” Id. at 408.

On appeal, this Court reversed, explaining:

The statute does not explicitly state it is subject to strict

construction; but it does plainly provide for time constraints

to revoke and/or challenge the validity of a consent to

adoption. The practical consequence of the court’s

interpretation effectively permitted Birth mother to

challenge the validity of her consent to adoption at any time,

based upon the existence of a technical omission in the form

of the initial consent. This lack of finality is exactly the

mischief the legislature intended to remedy with the revision

to Section 2711 of the Adoption Act in 2004, the purpose of

which was to afford finality to the adoption process.1 Hence

the statute renders a consent to adoption irrevocable more

than thirty (30) days after execution. See 23 Pa.C.S.A. §

2711(c)(1)(ii).2 Additionally, the statute precludes a

challenge to the validity of the consent to adoption after

sixty (60) days following the birth of the child or the

execution of the consent, whichever occurs later, and only

upon the grounds of fraud or duress. See 23 Pa.C.S.A. §

2711(c)(3)(i)(A). Thus, the unambiguous language of the

statute required the Orphans’ [C]ourt in this case to

consider the timeliness of Birth mother’s petition to revoke

and/or challenge the validity of her consent before it

considered the merits of her claim. Contrary to the

court’s interpretation, the threshold act that triggers

these provisions of Section 2711 is the timely filing of

the petition to revoke and/or challenge the validity of

the consent to adoption. Whether Birth mother’s

consent to adoption was valid could be addressed

only if her petition had been timely filed. Essentially,

the untimeliness of Birth mother’s petition precluded

____________________________________________

(3) In lieu of two witnesses a consent may be acknowledged

before a notary public.

23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2711(d).

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the court from addressing the issue of validity.

1 The legislature rewrote subsection (c), effective May

24, 2004, which applies to all adoption proceedings

initiated after that date.

2 Nothing in the statute presupposes the “validity” of

the consent.

Here, Birth mother signed a consent to adoption on April 12,

2006. She signed an amendment on July 12, 2006.

Assuming without deciding the later date triggered the

statutory time limits, Birth mother’s petition was still out of

time with respect to both her attempt to revoke her consent

and her attempt to challenge its validity. The Orphans’

[C]ourt erred when it reached the validity issue first, found

the “form” of the consent flawed, and refused to address the

timeliness requirement, under the guise of strict

construction. We hold Section 2711 required the court first

to review the timeliness of Birth mother’s petition before

addressing whether the consent to adoption technically

conformed to the statute. Accordingly, we reverse the

court’s order overruling Appellant’s preliminary objections

to Birth mother’s petition to revoke and/or challenge the

validity of her consent to adoption and remand for further

proceedings.

In re Adoption of J.A.S., supra at 408-09 (emphasis added). See also In

re R.I., 172 A.3d 665, 667-68 (Pa.Super. 2017) (vacating order which

dismissed father’s petition for voluntary relinquishment of parental rights and

consent to adoption based on father’s verbal revocation of consent made 72

days after he executed consent to adoption; father’s oral revocation of his

consent to adoption that occurred more than 30 days after his execution of

petition for voluntary relinquishment did not meet requirements of Section

2711(c) and court erred in considering its merits).

In In re J.W.B., supra, the father told the mother of his children that

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he wanted to terminate his parental rights and that the mother’s husband

could adopt them. The father executed the consent document and returned

it to their attorney. Nevertheless, the father later told the attorney that he

changed his mind and no longer consented to the adoption. The mother and

the father subsequently obtained separate counsel, and the mother filed a

petition to confirm the father’s consent to adoption. The father opposed the

petition, claiming that his consent was invalid because it did not meet the

requirements of Colorado law (where the father was residing) for a consent to

adoption. The court held a hearing, at which time the father conceded that

although he verbally had informed the attorney that he wanted to revoke his

consent to the adoption, he never reduced his revocation to writing. The

father also presented testimony from a Colorado attorney, who testified that

the consent the father had executed would not be valid and enforceable under

Colorado law, because Colorado law imposes requirements for a consent to

adoption that are not required by Pennsylvania law. The Colorado attorney

further testified that Colorado law provides that consents to adoption may be

revoked at any time prior to the adoption.

At oral argument, the father suggested that because the consent was

invalid under Colorado law, it could not be deemed valid under Pennsylvania

law, and he was not required to comply with the timing requirements under

Section 2711(c) governing the revocation of consent. The mother relied on

In re Adoption of J.A.S., supra, to support her argument that the filing of

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a timely revocation petition triggers an inquiry into the validity of a consent,

and the father’s failure to file a timely revocation precluded his challenge to

the validity of his consent. Ultimately, the Orphans’ Court agreed with the

mother’s position and found that the father’s failure to timely revoke his

consent or challenge the validity of his consent barred his challenge to the

validity of his consent.

The father appealed, and this Court affirmed, relying on its prior decision

in In re Adoption of J.A.S. The Supreme Court subsequently granted

allowance of appeal. Our High Court disagreed with the Orphans’ Court and

this Court’s analyses, explaining:

The Superior Court’s ruling that the merits of Father’s

arguments regarding the validity of his consent could not be

considered because he failed to comply with the timing

requirements in Section 2711(c) ignores the timing

requirement in Section 2504(a), which provides that a

hearing on a petition to confirm consent cannot take place

until after the expiration of the time periods under Section

2711—thirty days for revocation and sixty days for a validity

challenge based on fraud or duress. Despite the

requirement that the court must confirm consent at a

hearing after the expiration of these time frames, the

Superior Court effectively concluded that a relinquishing

parent could not be heard at the Section 2504(a) hearing.

Under the Superior Court’s interpretation, there is no

opportunity to challenge, or the court to confirm, that the

previously executed consent complied with the

technical requirements to effectuate a legally

sufficient consent, including those set forth in

Sections 2711(c) and (d) or in the adoption laws of

another state. Here, Father has not attempted to revoke

his prior consent and he has not alleged that his prior

consent was the result of fraud or duress. Instead, Father

contends that his execution of the consent document

prepared by Attorney Wiest did not constitute a legally valid

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consent under Colorado law and was therefore void ab initio,

thereby precluding any need to revoke or otherwise

challenge it. In other words, there was no consent to

adoption. The Superior Court’s conclusion that there is no

opportunity to raise this challenge does not comport with

the Adoption Act.

Although the exclusivity language in Subsection 2711(c)(3)

suggests that challenges to the validity of a previously

executed consent are limited to those timely filed and based

upon fraud or duress, thereby precluding a challenge to the

sufficiency of the consent, we decline to so interpret the

statutory framework of the Adoption Act. Because it is our

obligation to give meaning to all provisions of the statute,

we must read the time frames in Section 2711(c)(3) in

harmony with Section 2504(a), which provides a different

time frame for the court to confirm a consent to adoption.

In conducting statutory interpretative analysis, the General

Assembly has instructed that courts must presume that it

did not intend a result that violates the Constitutions of the

United States or this Commonwealth. Termination of

parental rights implicates due process rights under the

Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.

Parents have a fundamental liberty interest in the care,

custody, and management of their children, and before

those rights are terminated the person must be given due

process of law. On at least two occasions, this Court has

held that due process requires that the grounds for

termination of parental rights must be established by clear

and convincing evidence. As such, consistent with the

demands of due process, a parent must be provided with an

opportunity to raise a challenge to the fact of consent, in

accordance with applicable law, to the termination of his

parental rights before the entry of a decree of adoption.

The Adoption Act expressly provides a forum to raise such a

challenge. Section 2504(a) of the Adoption Act provides

that if a parent or parents of a child have executed consents

to an adoption, the adoption intermediary or the adoptive

parent shall file a petition requesting that the trial court hold

a hearing “for the purpose of confirming a consent to an

adoption.” 23 Pa.C.S. § 2504(a). The hearing may not take

place until after the thirty and sixty day time periods in

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Section 2711 have expired. Id. The consent or consents to

be confirmed must be attached to the petition. Id. The

parties must be provided with notice of the hearing by

personal service or registered mail, and the notice must

advise the consenting parent that his or her parental rights

may be terminated as a result of the hearing. 23 Pa.C.S. §

2504(b).

Section 2504(a) is entitled “Petition to confirm consent to

adoption,” and as this title makes clear, it requires the trial

court to confirm the validity of consent(s) to an adoption.

While the statute requires that the hearing may not be held

until after the expiration of the time limits in Section 2711,

it does not indicate that the trial court’s function at the

hearing is limited to confirming that those time limits have

passed. If the trial court’s task was so perfunctory, no

hearing would be necessary because a certification would

suffice. Instead, the consent(s) at issue must be attached

to the petition, and the obvious import of this

requirement is that the trial court must review the

consents and consider any and all arguments raised

by the parties challenging their conformity with the

Adoption Act. For instance, Section 2711(c) includes

timing requirements (no consent is valid if executed within

seventy-two hours after the birth of the child, although a

putative father may consent at any time after receiving

notice of the expected or actual birth), and Section 2711(d)

includes an exhaustive list of the information that must be

included in the consent document. In this regard, if Father’s

hypothetical text message: “I’m tired of the little monsters,

you can have them” was advanced in a petition to confirm

consent, it could be challenged at the Section 2504(a)

hearing for lack of conformity to the statute’s requirements.

Such a challenge goes to compliance with the

statutory mandates for a valid consent, which are

designed to assure the relinquishing parent’s

understanding of the nature of the proceedings and

the consequences. The specific provisions of Section

2711, including in particular the time limitations for

revocation or a validity challenge based upon fraud or

duress, are premised on the execution of a consent

that complies with the legislature’s statutory

requirements. Otherwise, there is nothing to

invalidate.

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While the Superior Court should not have disregarded

Father’s challenge to the validity of his consent on timeliness

grounds, we take no issue with that court’s determination

that Father has not presented any grounds for relief in this

appeal. …

* * *

[A] consent executed outside of Pennsylvania will be

deemed to be valid in a Pennsylvania adoption proceeding if

it complies with the consent requirements set forth in either

Sections 2711(c) and (d) or the Adoption Act or the laws of

the state which the consenting parent resides at the time of

the execution of the consent. Pennsylvania’s validity

requirements do not yield to those of the state in which the

consenting parent resides; instead the laws of both states

provide alternative means to effectuate a valid consent to

terminate parental rights and permit an adoption in

accordance with Pennsylvania’s Adoption Act.

For these reasons, we must reject Father’s argument that

the Superior Court was required to consider whether his

consent was valid pursuant to Colorado law. Father does

not contest that the consent that he executed complied in

all respects with Pennsylvania’s validity requirements,

including the inclusion of the necessary understandings and

acknowledgments set forth in Section 2711(d) of the

Adoption Act. Because the consent that Father executed is

valid under Pennsylvania law, it is immaterial whether it is

also valid under Colorado law.

In re J.W.B., supra at 578-83, 232 A.3d at 699-702 (some citations and

quotation marks omitted; some emphasis added; internal footnote omitted).

In In re C.P.R., No. 726 MDA 2021, 2021 WL 5314743 (Pa.Super. filed

Nov. 16, 2021) (unpublished memorandum),8 the mother appealed from the

____________________________________________

8 See Pa.R.A.P. 126(b) (explaining that we may rely on unpublished decisions

of this Court filed after May 1, 2019 for their persuasive value).

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trial court’s decree confirming her consent to adoption. The mother argued

that her consent was invalid as it was signed pursuant to an ex parte

communication with opposing counsel when she was represented by her own

counsel. The mother further maintained that if she knew she had

representation at that time, she would have sought counsel’s advice before

deciding to sign the consent. The mother further testified that she believed

that by signing the documentation she would still be able to see her child. The

trial court decided that it could not reach the merits of the mother’s challenge

to her consent because the challenge was untimely. Even if she could

establish fraud or duress, the trial court noted that she was foreclosed from

raising such claims by the statutory time limits.

On appeal, this Court agreed with the trial court. In doing so, this Court

noted that the mother did not file a praecipe with respect to revocation of

consent until six months after initially executing her consent and almost two

months after the maternal grandparents had filed to confirm said consent.

“This was beyond the statutory limits at which time [the m]other’s consent

was irrevocable.” Id. at *8. See also Interest of A.H., Nos. 266 MDA 2021,

267 MDA 2021, 268 MDA 2021 (Pa.Super. filed Aug. 13, 2021) (unpublished

memorandum) (holding mother’s attempt to revoke consent to adoption was

untimely under Section 2711 where mother filed petition to revoke 98 days

after signing consent; noting that mother’s reliance on In re J.W.B. afforded

no relief; In re J.W.B. was distinguishable because father in that case argued

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that execution of consent document did not constitute legally valid consent

and was void ab initio; thus, issue in that case did not involve revocation of

consent, but whether there was legal consent at all).

Instantly, the Orphans’ Court explained:

Although … Father testified that he attempted to revoke his

consent in writing, and attempted to deliver a written

revocation to the offices of AFTH, and was prevented from

delivering it, after extensive consideration of the conflicting

testimony, this [c]ourt determined that [Mother and Father]

did not establish that they had revoked these consents in a

writing delivered to AFTH within the 30 day period following

the execution of the consents on October 27, 2020.

* * *

As noted in this [c]ourt’s prior Opinion, dated May 13, 2022,

… Father’s account of when and to whom he attempted to

deliver a written revocation of his consent changed

significantly each time he recounted it and was contradicted

by the testimony of witnesses who had been employed by

AFTH and who could document that they were not present

at the offices on the dates he testified that he saw them and

spoke to them about his revocation.

(Supplemental Orphans’ Court Opinion, 11/30/22, at 6-8). As well, the

Orphans’ Court conceded that Mother and Father “did not file a petition

challenging the validity of their consents within 60 days following the

execution of the consents, alleging fraud or duress in accordance with 23

Pa.C.S. [§] 2711(c).” Id.

Notwithstanding its findings regarding Mother and Father’s failure to

comply with the procedures outlined in Section 2711(c), the Orphans’ Court

relied on In re J.W.B., supra to hold that Mother and Father were still

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permitted to challenge the validity of their consents to adoption. (See id. at

9). The Orphans’ Court opined:

Pursuant to [In re J.W.B., supra], this [c]ourt properly

held a hearing as required under [S]ection 2504(b) of the

statute, and properly provided an opportunity for [Mother

and Father] to be heard with respect to their assertions that

their consents, when signed on October 27, 2020, were

invalid and void ab initio.

(Id. at 10).

In deciding that Mother and Father’s consents were invalid, the Orphans’

Court reasoned:

In this case, [Mother and Father] understood that they were

promised a PACA with respect to [Child] and this enforceable

agreement was a condition of their decision to sign their

consents to the adoption of [Child]. Both Ms. Lovell and Ms.

Bendig also understood that a PACA was so important to

[Mother and Father] that it had to be prepared to be signed

on the same date as the consents to adoption. In this case,

the promise of a PACA with respect to [Child] was met;

however, the fact that this promise was met does not mean

that the consents to adoption were unconditional.

To compound the concerns in this case, [Mother and Father]

also both had an understanding that AFTH was committed

to assisting them in obtaining a PACA with respect to their

younger daughter. This was also a promise, and although

she tried to distinguish this as unrelated to the adoption of

[Child], Ms. Bendig acknowledged that this was important

to [Mother and Father] and that she had made a promise to

them to help them obtain this other PACA. This promise

was not met.

In light of these promises to [Mother and Father], which

[they] considered to be essential, the consents signed on

October 27, 2020 by [Mother and Father] were not

unconditional and therefore are not valid and cannot be

confirmed.

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(Orphans’ Court Opinion, 5/13/22, at 19-20).9

For the following reasons, we cannot agree with the Orphans’ Court’s

analysis. As this Court has stated, Section 2711 “makes clear that a

revocation and/or a challenge to the validity of a consent to adoption must be

in conformity with the Act.” In re Adoption of J.A.S., supra. Indeed, the

statute renders a consent to adoption irrevocable more than 30 days after

its execution. See 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2711(c)(1)(ii). Further, the statute

precludes a challenge to the validity of the consent (which may be based only

on grounds of fraud or duress) after 60 days following the execution of the

consent. See 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2711(c)(3)(i)(A). This statutory language is

clear and unambiguous. See In re J.W.B., supra. As this Court has

previously held, “the threshold act that triggers these provisions of Section

2711 is the timely filing of the petition to revoke and/or challenge the validity

of the consent to adoption. Whether [Mother or Father’s] consent to adoption

was valid could be addressed only if [a] petition had been timely filed.

Essentially, the untimeliness of [a revocation] petition precluded the court

from addressing the issue of validity.” In re Adoption of J.A.S., supra at

____________________________________________

9 In so holding, the Orphans’ Court relied on two cases involving a voluntary

relinquishment of parental rights wherein this Court stated that the parent’s

purported voluntary relinquishment of parental rights was not intelligent or

voluntary where it was conditioned on the promise or belief of a PACA with

the child. See In re Adoption of A.W., 230 A.3d 1139 (Pa.Super. 2020) and

In re C.M.C., 140 A.3d 699 (Pa.Super. 2016), which we discuss in greater

detail infra.

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409. Thus, this Court has consistently declined to address a challenge to the

validity of a consent to adoption where the proffered revocation of consent

was not timely filed in compliance with the statute. See id. See also In re

R.I., supra; In re C.P.R., supra; Interest of A.H., supra.

Although we recognize the Orphans’ Court’s reliance on In re J.W.B.,

supra, we disagree with the court’s interpretation of our Supreme Court’s

pronouncements therein. We reiterate that the Supreme Court clarified that

at a hearing to confirm a consent to adoption, “the trial court must review the

consents and consider any and all arguments raised by the parties challenging

their conformity with the Adoption Act.” In re J.W.B., supra at 580-81, 232

A.3d at 700. The Supreme Court went on to state that “[t]he specific

provisions of Section 2711, including in particular the time limitations for

revocation or a validity challenge based upon fraud or duress, are premised

on the execution of a consent that complies with the legislature’s

statutory requirements.” Id. at 581, 232 A.3d at 701 (emphasis added).

Thus, our Supreme Court held in In re J.W.B., that at the hearing to confirm

the adoption consent, the Orphans’ Court must consider whether the consent

complies with the statutory framework delineated in Section 2711.

Here, the record makes clear that neither Father nor Mother revoked

their consent to adoption in writing within 30 days, or alleged fraud or duress

within 60 days, of execution of their consents. See 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2711(c)(1),

(3). Further, there is no dispute that the consents complied with the statutory

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mandates of Section 2711, including the contents of the consents. See 23

Pa.C.S.A. § 2711(d). See also In re J.W.B., supra. Therefore, Mother and

Father’s belated attempt to revoke their consents to adoption was time-barred

under the statute, and the court could not consider challenges to the validity

of the consents that were not based on non-conformity with the statute. See

id. We agree with Pre-Adoptive Parents that “if [Mother or Father] felt that

[they were] under duress to sign the consent due to a fraudulent

misrepresentation of securing a PACA, [they] had to file a petition to revoke

the consent challenging the validity of the consent within sixty (60) days of

its execution.”10 (Pre-Adoptive Parents’ Brief at 40-41). Based upon the

____________________________________________

10 Moreover, we disagree that Mother and Father’s consents were necessarily

invalid based on promises of a PACA concerning Child and Mother and Father’s

younger daughter. In re C.M.C. and In re Adoption of A.W. (the cases on

which the Orphans’ Court relied) are distinguishable from the case at bar

because the cases governing voluntary relinquishment implicate different

statutes than Section 2711 which could be relevant to a PACA.

Notably, the Adoption Act provides two alternative procedures for voluntary

relinquishment of parental rights: (1) by the parent filing a petition to

relinquish parental rights under Sections 2501 (relinquishment to agency) or

2502 (relinquishment to adult intending to adopt child); or (2) by the adoptive

parent filing a petition to confirm a birth parent’s consent to adoption under

Section 2504—the procedure which took place in this case. Under Sections

2501 and 2502, “the natural parent first files a petition in the trial court

seeking permission to permanently relinquish his or her parental rights to the

minor child. The Adoption Act[, per Section 2503,] requires the trial court to

hold a hearing, and for the relinquishing parent to ratify his or her consent to

termination, no less than ten days after the petition is filed.” In re C.M.C.,

supra at 708-09. The comment to Section 2503(a) explains that “[t]he

petitioner’s in-court ratification of consent assures due process requirements

(Footnote Continued Next Page)

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foregoing, we disagree with the Orphans’ Court’s denial of the petitions to

confirm Mother and Father’s consents to adoption. Accordingly, we affirm the

involuntary termination of Father’s parental rights, but we vacate the orders

denying confirmation of Mother and Father’s consents to adoption.

Decrees affirmed in part; vacated in part. Jurisdiction is relinquished.

Date: 9/6/2024

____________________________________________

in view of the finality of the termination decree as to the parent.” Id. at 709

(citing 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2503(a), Comment).

As discussed in In re C.M.C., the principal holding of this Court was that the

mother’s voluntary relinquishment of parental rights was invalid because the

court failed to comply with the statutory procedures mandated in voluntary

relinquishment cases. Specifically, the court did not provide the mother with

the requisite ten-day notice period so that she could consider her choice before

ratifying that decision. Conversely, in this case, the parties proceeded under

Section 2711 of the Adoption Act, which permits the parent 30 days to revoke

a consent to adoption for any reason, and 60 days to file a petition to revoke

based on fraud or duress. Thus, a voluntary relinquishment of parental rights

filed under Section 2501 or 2502 that is conditioned on a PACA may constitute

an invalid relinquishment where the petitioner would be deprived of an ability

to revoke the relinquishment based on non-fulfillment of the PACA. Under

Section 2711, however, the same concerns are not necessarily present

because the petitioner would have 30 or 60 days to revoke the adoption

consent if the agreed-upon PACA did not come to fruition.

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