The opinion
Rel: September 6, 2024
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance sheets of Southern Reporter.
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ALABAMA COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS
SPECIAL TERM, 2024
_________________________
CL-2024-0041
_________________________
Gene McLaurin
v.
City of Birmingham and Markeith Aaron Williams
Appeal from Jefferson Circuit Court
(CV-17-904029)
HANSON, Judge.
Gene McLaurin appeals from a summary judgment entered by the
Jefferson Circuit Court ("the trial court") discussing his action against
the City of Birmingham ("the City") and Markeith Aaron Williams.
Before McLaurin filed his appeal, he filed a post judgment motion
CL-2024-0041
directed to the summary judgment; that post judgment motion was
denied by operation of law and without a hearing. For the reasons set
forth below, we reverse the denial by operation of law of McLaurin's
postjudgment motion and remand the cause for the trial court to conduct
a hearing on that motion.
Facts and Procedural History
On September 25, 2017, McLaurin sued the City and Williams
alleging:
"1. On or about September 10, 2016, at about 11:03 p.m.,
plaintiff was driving his motor vehicle on Oporto Madrid
Boulevard at the I-20 exit ramp east, in the City of
Birmingham, Jefferson County, Alabama, where he had a
right to be.
"2. At that time and at that place, defendant Markeith
Aaron Williams was employed by defendant City of
Birmingham as a police officer and was acting within the line
and scope of his employment. Williams was driving a vehicle
owned by Birmingham.
"3. Williams was driving north on Oporto Madrid, [and]
negligently or willfully ran a red light at the intersection of
the I-20 exit ramp and struck a southbound vehicle which was
turning left under a green left turn arrow. After this collision,
Williams continued north until his vehicle came to rest.
"4. Williams negligently or willfully exited his vehicle
without putting it in park. Williams collapsed in the
pavement and his vehicle started rolling so that it was about
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to roll over him. To keep Williams from being more seriously
injured, Mclaurin drove his vehicle into Williams's vehicle.
"5. As the proximate consequence of Williams's
negligence or willfulness, plaintiff was severely injured. He
suffered constant neck pain, radiating to his shoulders,
traumatic cervical and mid back pain, headaches, bruises and
contusions. He will have future pain. He had substantial
medical expenses. His vehicle was damaged and rendered less
valuable."
McLaurin requested $45,000 in damages and demanded a jury trial. On
November 1, 2017, the City and Williams filed an answer and pleaded
the applicability of certain affirmative defenses including assumption of
the risk and contributory negligence.
On April 13, 2018, McLaurin filed a motion seeking mediation,
which the trial court subsequently denied. From April 2018 to October
2018, the parties engaged in discovery. On February 27, 2020, the trial
court set the case for a status-review conference. The parties engaged in
further discovery and the case was set for trial on several occasions with
the most recent trial setting scheduled for July 17, 2023.
On June 29, 2023, the City and Williams filed a summary-judgment
motion arguing that
"[the City and Williams] did not owe a duty to McLaurin,
did not breach any alleged duty to McLaurin and were not the
proximate cause of McLaurin's alleged injuries. Also, [the City
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and Williams] assert McLaurin was contributorily negligent
and assumed the risk as to his actions."
In support of their motion, the City and Williams attached photographs
from the collisions along with testimony from depositions taken of
McLaurin, Williams, and Birmingham police officer Michelle Pruitt.
The City and Williams also asserted that McLaurin was judicially
estopped from pursuing his action against the City and Williams because
he had failed to disclose the action as an asset during his bankruptcy
proceedings.1
In his deposition, McLaurin testified that he had seen the patrol car
driven by Williams, which had been traveling north on Oporto Madrid
Boulevard, when that car had struck another vehicle traveling south on
Oporto Madrid Boulevard. He stated that the southbound vehicle had
1In support of their assertion that McLaurin was judicially estopped
from pursing his action because McLaurin allegedly failed to disclose the
action as an asset during his bankruptcy proceedings, the City and
Williams reference McLaurin's testimony from his deposition. During
his deposition, McLaurin indicated that he had not disclosed this lawsuit
in his bankruptcy proceedings; however, he also said that his wife had
handled several of the aspects of the bankruptcy proceedings. Also,
McLaurin's attorney objected to the question on the ground that such
information would be within the purview of McLaurin's bankruptcy
attorney. No other support for which assets were included in McLaurin's
bankruptcy proceedings was attached to the City and Williams's
summary-judgment motion.
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been stopped in the left-hand turn lane at a red traffic light. McLaurin
said that when the traffic light had changed to green, the southbound
vehicle had begun to turn left. At that point, Williams, who had been
traveling north on Oporto Madrid Boulevard, turned on his police lights
without using a siren and traveled through the intersection. According
to McLaurin, Williams's patrol car struck the other vehicle. McLaurin
testified that after Williams's patrol car had struck the other vehicle,
Williams had exited his patrol car and had then collapsed on the street.
Williams testified that he had made a U-turn towards the intersection
where the cars had collided. McLaurin said that he had seen Williams's
patrol car rolling towards Williams's body and that McLaurin had then
used his automobile to stop Williams's patrol car from running over
Williams.
McLaurin stated that Williams had failed to put his patrol car in
park after the collision with the other vehicle and that Williams's patrol
car then had begun to roll backwards. McLaurin testified that he had
not been thinking about any potential danger to himself when he used
his car to stop Williams's patrol car. He stated that he could have
avoided damage to himself and his car if he had not helped Williams.
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Williams testified that, at the time of the collision, he was employed
by the Birmingham Police Department. Williams testified that, after
the collision, he had passed out and fallen from his patrol car into the
roadway. Williams said that he did not see his patrol car rolling towards
him because he was "somewhat unconscious" and "disoriented." Williams
did not know the distance between the spot where he fell and where his
patrol car was located. He testified that he did not see his patrol car start
rolling away from the initial point of collision. Williams testified that he
had not been on an emergency call when he had used the lights on his
patrol car to go through the intersection. He stated that he had earlier
seen men jumping over a fence in an area known for burglaries and that
he had been using his lights while going towards that location when he
the collision occurred.
Officer Michelle Pruitt testified that McLaurin had stated that
when he had used his car to stop Williams's patrol car, Williams's patrol
car had been rolling. She also stated that there was no evidence that
Williams's patrol car was stopped when McLaurin ran into Williams's
patrol car.
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McLaurin responded to the summary-judgment motion, arguing
that Williams had a duty to operate his patrol car in a safe manner; that
the use of police lights without reason and entering an intersection when
there was a red traffic light violated police-department policy; that
McLaurin's actions in acting to preserve life and safety were a normal
reaction and not an intervening act; that McLaurin was not
contributorily negligent because he had acted immediately without
considering the potential risk to himself or others to aid Williams; and
that McLaurin did not assume the risk when he used his car to stop
Williams's patrol car because there was no evidence that McLaurin's
reaction constituted a voluntary act or that it was based on a decision
that he had made with knowledge and appreciation of the risks.
McLaurin further argued that injuring himself in an effort to
render assistance to Williams, whose acts McLaurin posited had caused
the incident, was reasonably foreseeable under Hillburn v. Shirley, 437
So. 2d 1252 (Ala. Civ. App. 1983). McLaurin also argued that, as a third
party to the original collision his actions to rescue Williams were not an
intervening and superseding cause of McLaurin's injuries but were a
normal response to an emergency created by Williams and did not relieve
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Williams and the City of liability. McLaurin stated in his response that
he had attached a copy of the police report from the incident, his own
affidavit, and certain pages of the Birmingham Police Department's rules
and regulations. With regard to judicial estoppel, McLaurin asserted
that he and his wife were participating in a debt-consolidation plan
through the bankruptcy courts as opposed to a debt-liquidation plan.
On August 23, 2023, the trial court entered the following judgment:
"This case involves a motor vehicle accident and a third
party's intervention to prevent further injury from that
accident. The Plaintiff [McLaurin] sues Defendants [the City
and Williams], concerning alleged injuries he sustained while
attempting to prevent injuries to City of Birmingham Police
Officer Williams. Officer Williams was driving north bound on
Oporto Madrid Boulevard when he struck a south bound
vehicle which attempted to turn east at an intersection. After
the accident, upon exiting his police vehicle, Officer Williams
collapsed nearby, and the vehicle began to roll toward him.
Seeing Officer Williams lying in peril, [McLaurin] collided his
vehicle with the police vehicle in an attempt to stop it from
rolling over Officer Williams. [McLaurin] has now sued the
City of Birmingham and Officer Williams for damages
associated with the injuries he received from the
aforementioned collision.
"….
"The threshold issue in this case is whether the City of
Birmingham and Officer Williams owed a duty to the
[McLaurin]. [McLaurin] has launched a negligence claim
against [the City and Williams]. The elements required for
recovery under a negligence theory are: (1) duty, (2) breach of
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duty, (3) proximate cause and (4) damages. John R Cowley &
Bros., Inc. v. Brown, 569 So. 2d 375, 379 (Ala. 1990). The
Court finds that [the City and Williams] did not owe a duty to
[McLaurin]. [The City and Williams] were not the proximate
cause of [McLaurin's] injuries; in fact, [McLaurin] caused his
own injuries. [McLaurin] exposed himself to the risk of his
damages by voluntarily colliding into the police vehicle to
prevent further harm to Officer Williams. While such an
action is commendable, it does not place a duty upon the [the
City and Williams].
Conclusion
"Based on the foregoing, the Court finds that [the City
and Williams] did not owe a duty to the [McLaurin] and that
the [McLaurin] caused his own injuries. The Court finds that
there exists no genuine issue of material fact and [the City
and Williams] are therefore entitled to judgment as a matter
of law. Accordingly, [the City and Williams's] Motion for
Summary Judgment is due to be granted."
On September 22, 2023, McLaurin filed a motion to alter, amend,
or vacate the judgment, arguing that the trial court had erred in
determining that he had intentionally collided with Williams's patrol car
by using his car to stop Williams's car from running over Williams, and
reiterating his argument that McLaurin's actions were not an
intervening act relieving the City and Williams of liability. McLaurin
argued that the issue of any alleged contributory negligence on his part
should be for a jury to determine. He also asserted that Williams had
been negligent in causing the original collision and in allowing his car to
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roll away from the collision and that each situation had created an
emergency. McLaurin further argued that the trial court erred in
concluding that he had assumed the risk and had caused his own injuries
because there was a factual question as to whether his actions were made
with knowledge and appreciation of the risk of harm. McLaurin posited
that his actions in protecting Williams from death or further injury were
not an intervening and superseding cause of his own injuries, citing
Simmons v. Carwell, 10 So. 3d 576 (Ala. Civ. App. 2008).
McLaurin requested a hearing on his postjudgment motion. The
trial court did not hold the requested hearing on the motion, and, on
December 21, 2023, McLaurin's postjudgment motion was denied by
operation of law. See Rule 59.1, Ala. R. Civ. P. On January 17, 2024,
McLaurin timely filed a notice of appeal.
Discussion
On appeal, McLaurin contends that the trial court erred by allowing
his postjudgment motion to be denied by operation of law without
conducting a hearing. McLaurin also argues that the trial court erred in
entering the summary judgment in favor of the City and Williams
because, he says, his actions in aiding Williams were not a superseding
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cause relieving the defendants of liability. McLaurin argues that he was
not contributorily negligent and that he did not assume the risk of his
injuries when he acted to rescue Williams. He further argues that the
sudden-emergency doctrine and the rescue doctrine establish a legal
basis under which Williams's alleged negligence could support
McLaurin's monetary recovery for his injuries. We find the first
argument dispositive.
This court stated in Isbell v. Rogers Auto Sales, 72 So. 3d 1258,
1260-61 (Ala. Civ. App. 2011), that:
"Rule 59(g), Ala. R. Civ. P., provides:
" 'Presentation of any post-trial motion to a
judge is not required in order to perfect its making,
nor is it required that an order continuing any
such motions to a date certain be entered. All such
motions remain pending until ruled upon by the
court (subject to the provisions of Rule 59.1), but
shall not be ruled upon until the parties have had
opportunity to be heard thereon.'
"(Emphasis added.) Describing the effect of the emphasized
part of that rule, our supreme court has held that when a
party requests a hearing on its postjudgment motion, 'the
court must grant the request.' Flagstar Enters., Inc. v. Foster,
779 So. 2d 1220, 1221 (Ala. 2000). However, although a trial
court errs when it fails to hold a requested hearing on a Rule
59 postjudgment motion, the supreme court has explained
that such error does not always require reversal:
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" 'Harmless error occurs, within the context
of a Rule 59(g) motion, where there is either no
probable merit in the grounds asserted in the
motion, or where the appellate court resolves the
issues presented therein, as a matter of law,
adversely to the movant, by application of the
same objective standard of review as that applied
in the trial court.'
"Greene v. Thompson, 554 So. 2d 376, 381 (Ala. 1989)."
See also Ellis v. Duncan, 380 So. 3d 1045, 1047-1048 (Ala. Civ. App.
2023); Rogers v. Rogers, 260 So. 3d 840, 844-45 (Ala. Civ. App. 2018).
In his postjudgment motion, McLaurin argued that the affirmative
defenses of assumption of the risk and contributory negligence did not
relieve the City and Williams of liability because, he said, McLaurin's
actions were not a superseding cause of his injuries. McLaurin argued
that he had acted on an emergency basis to save Williams from further
injury and that genuine issues of material fact existed rather than pure
questions of law to be decided pursuant to the summary-judgment
process.
In Hillburn v. Shirley, supra, the plaintiff claimed that another
driver's vehicle had negligently darted in front of his tractor-trailer rig,
causing collision. The plaintiff injured his back following the collision
when he jumped out of his tractor (instead of using the steps on the
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tractor) to see if the other driver was safe. The circuit court in that case
granted the defendant's motion for a summary judgment; our supreme
court held that issues relating to the cause of the accident and the issue
of whether the truck driver's jumping out of his vehicle immediately
following the collision was the natural and normal response flowing from
the other driver's alleged negligence presented questions for a jury,
precluding a summary judgment.
In Simmons v. Carwell, supra, a plurality of this court held that
genuine issues of material fact precluded a summary judgment when the
plaintiff had alleged that the defendant had negligently caused his
unoccupied vehicle to roll down a driveway, thereby creating a sudden
emergency that had prompted the plaintiff to enter the vehicle to try to
stop it. In Carwell, the issues were (1) whether the plaintiff's attempt to
stop the vehicle was an intervening and superseding cause of the
plaintiff's injuries, (2) whether the plaintiff's alleged contributory
negligence and assumption of the risk precluded summary judgment, and
(3) whether the plaintiff should be considered a rescuer and, if so,
whether his actions were rash and reckless or reasonable given the
emergency circumstances presented.
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In the present case, we conclude that there is probable merit to
McLaurin's postjudgment motion, and this court cannot resolve the issue
adversely to McLaurin as a matter of law. Therefore, the trial court's
failure to hold a hearing on McLaurin's postjudgment motion cannot
properly be deemed harmless error. We reverse the denial by operation
of law of McLaurin's post judgment motion, and we remand that cause to
the trial court to conduct a hearing on that motion. We pretermit
discussion of the substantive arguments raised by McLaurin.
REVERSED AND REMANDED WITH INSTRUCTIONS.
Moore, P.J., and Edwards, Fridy, and Lewis, JJ., concur.
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