United States v. Quinton Pete

USCA11 Case: 23-14112 Document: 29-1 Date Filed: 09/04/2024 Page: 1 of 9

[DO NOT PUBLISH]

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Eleventh Circuit

____________________

No. 23-14112

Non-Argument Calendar

____________________

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

QUINTON L. PETE,

Defendant-Appellant.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Florida

D.C. Docket No. 3:22-cr-00048-TKW-1

____________________

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2 Opinion of the Court 23-14112

Before JILL PRYOR, BRANCH, and BLACK, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

Quinton L. Pete appeals his convictions for attempted

Hobbs Act robbery and possession of a firearm and ammunition by

a convicted felon. First, Pete asserts the district court reversibly

erred by denying his request for a Daubert1 hearing to test the ad-

missibility of the Government’s ballistics toolmark identification

evidence and testimony. Second, Pete contends the court reversi-

bly erred by excluding or restricting testimony from his firearms

ballistics expert who was qualified to testify on the subject. Third,

Pete asserts the court violated his rights under the Confrontation

Clause by admitting, over his objection, hearsay testimony that an

unidentified, independent toolmark examiner reached the same

conclusion as the Government’s expert toolmark witness. We ad-

dress each of his challenges in turn, and after review, affirm his con-

victions.

I. DAUBERT HEARING

Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence allows a witness

who is qualified as an expert to give testimony so long as:

(a) the expert’s scientific, technical, or other special-

ized knowledge will help the trier of fact to under-

stand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue;

1 Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993).

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23-14112 Opinion of the Court 3

(b) the testimony is based on sufficient facts or data;

(c) the testimony is the product of reliable principles

and methods; and (d) the expert has reliably applied

the principles and methods to the facts of the case.

Fed. R. Evid. 702 (version effective to November 30, 2023). In this

Circuit, scientific expert testimony is admissible if:

(1) the expert is qualified to testify competently re-

garding the matters he intends to address; (2) the

methodology by which the expert reaches his conclu-

sions is sufficiently reliable as determined by the sort

of inquiry mandated in Daubert; and (3) the testimony

assists the trier of fact, through the application of sci-

entific, technical, or specialized expertise, to under-

stand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue.

United States v. Ware, 69 F.4th 830, 845-46 (11th Cir. 2023), cert. de-

nied, 144 S. Ct. 1395 (2024) (quotation marks omitted). The party

seeking to introduce the expert opinion has the burden of establish-

ing the three prongs: qualification, reliability, and helpfulness. Id.

at 846. District courts consider four factors within the reliability

prong “(1) whether the expert’s theory can be and has been tested;

(2) whether the theory has been subjected to peer review and pub-

lication; (3) the known or potential rate of error of the particular

scientific technique; and (4) whether the technique is generally ac-

cepted in the scientific community.” Id. (quotation marks omit-

ted). Courts are not required to hold a Daubert hearing in every

case where a party challenges the admissibility of expert testimony.

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Id. The Daubert inquiry provides the district courts, which are

much more familiar with the facts and needs of a case, the flexibility

“to manage their dockets and counsels’ time to provide the most

efficient and just resolution of issues.” Id.

In Ware, prior to trial, the defendant sought to exclude ex-

pert testimony regarding fingerprint evidence because new re-

ports, from the National Research Council (NRC) and the Presi-

dent’s Council of Advisors on Science and Technology (PCAST),

stated that fingerprint analysis was unreliable and susceptible to

cognitive biases. Id. at 840. The district court denied Ware’s mo-

tion and determined that a hearing under Daubert was unnecessary,

in part, because he failed to present a case from our Court or an-

other district court in the Circuit that favored excluding fingerprint

evidence under Daubert. Id. Ware asserted the district court

abused its discretion by admitting the challenged evidence without

holding a formal Daubert hearing. Id. at 835. He challenged the

reliability of the fingerprint analysis generally, and not the qualifi-

cations of the Government’s expert or the helpfulness of his testi-

mony. Id. at 846. This Court held the district court was not re-

quired to hold a Daubert hearing before admitting the Govern-

ment’s fingerprint expert and did not abuse its discretion in decid-

ing such a hearing was unnecessary. Id. at 847. Noting the district

court had “considered the reports and arguments presented and

found that fingerprint evidence was reliable enough as a general

matter to be presented to the jury,” we reasoned fingerprint evi-

dence has long been accepted in our Circuit and that the cure for

questionable, but admissible, evidence is cross-examination, not

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exclusion. Id. at 847-48. This Court added the PCAST and NRC

reports may cast doubt on the error rates of the fingerprint analysis

but they go to the weight given to the analysis rather than the le-

gitimacy of the practice. Id. at 848.

The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying

Pete’s request for a Daubert hearing regarding the admissibility of

the Government’s ballistics toolmark identification evidence and

testimony. See Ware, 69 F.4th at 845 (reviewing the district court’s

decisions regarding the admissibility of expert testimony, the relia-

bility of an expert opinion, and the denial of a Daubert hearing for

abuse of discretion). The court held a conference on the issue, per-

mitted the parties to submit any additional documents and argu-

ments on the issue, and decided the issue in a detailed order dis-

cussing each of the Daubert factors. The court also determined the

parties’ schedules did not permit time for a Daubert hearing prior

to trial, and, therefore, the trial would have been pushed back if the

court had conducted a Daubert hearing. Although Ware revolved

around the admissibility of fingerprint evidence, the court did not

err in relying on Ware in deciding whether to hold a Daubert hear-

ing, because Ware also involved a challenge to the reliability of a

commonly used forensic science method. Ware, 69 F.4th at 846. In

the order, the court looked to Ware on the issue, but conducted its

own detailed Daubert analysis based on the unique facts, evidence,

and arguments the parties presented. Ware supports the district

court’s finding that Firearm Toolmark Identification (FTI) evi-

dence is sufficiently reliable to present to the jury and that cross-

examination was the proper means to attack the expert testimony’s

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6 Opinion of the Court 23-14112

reliability. Id. at 847-48. Particularly, FTI evidence continues to be

used in federal courts after the PCAST Report and NRC Report

criticized the existing studies of its reliability, and Pete did not pro-

vide a federal court decision that prohibited FTI evidence based on

Daubert. Additionally, other courts of appeals have upheld the ad-

missibility of FTI evidence. See United States v. Hunt, 63 F.4th 1229,

1249 (10th Cir. 2023); United States v. Brown, 973 F.3d 667, 704 (7th

Cir. 2020); United States v. Johnson, 875 F.3d 1265, 1280-81 (9th Cir.

2017); United States v. Williams, 506 F.3d 151,162 (2d Cir. 2007).

In his motion for a Daubert hearing and to exclude the Gov-

ernment’s FTI evidence, Pete attacked the reliability of FTI broadly

and contended it was not credible enough to meet the Daubert reli-

ability requirements. The court adequately addressed that argu-

ment in analyzing the proposed evidence under each of the Daubert

considerations. The court found that Andrew Pike was qualified

to provide the FTI testimony of his findings because of his training

and experience, including his role as a firearms toolmark examiner

with Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF).

It found that Pike’s testimony on the connection between the fire-

arm found in Pete’s possession and the shell casings found at the

scene of the shooting would help the jury, particularly because

such information was relevant to the crimes charged and was be-

yond the expertise of the jury. See Fed. R. Evid. 702; Ware, 69 F.4th

at 845-46. The court’s extensive reliability analysis considered the

four factors under the reliability prong. Ware, 69 F.4th at 846.

While acknowledging the critiques, the court found the methodol-

ogy had been tested, subjected to peer review and publication, and

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had a known error rate. The court found the Association of Fire-

arm Toolmark Examiners methodology continued to be generally

accepted in the firearm expert community, despite the criticisms

raised in the report and studies on which Pete relied.

In sum, the district court did not apply an incorrect legal

standard, follow improper procedures in making its determination,

or make findings of fact that were clearly erroneous. See United

States v. Harris, 989 F.3d 908, 911 (11th Cir. 2021) (“A district court

abuses its discretion if it applies an incorrect legal standard, follows

improper procedures in making the determination, or makes find-

ings of fact that are clearly erroneous.” (quotation marks omitted)).

Accordingly, we affirm as to this issue.

II. LIMITING EXPERT TESTIMONY

Daubert’s gatekeeping function applies to all expert testi-

mony. Kumho Tire Co., Ltd. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 147 (1999).

The helpfulness prong of the Daubert analysis looks to whether ex-

pert testimony “concerns matters that are beyond the understand-

ing of the average lay person.” United States v. Frazier, 387 F.3d

1244, 1262 (11th Cir. 2004). Further, “[p]roffered expert testimony

generally will not help the trier of fact when it offers nothing more

than what lawyers for the parties can argue in closing arguments.”

Id. at 1262-63.

The district court did not abuse its discretion in limiting J.

Christopher McKee’s expert testimony. The district court followed

the Daubert analysis, conducted a hearing on the issue, and made

reasonable findings that some of McKee’s proposed testimony was

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8 Opinion of the Court 23-14112

beyond his expert scope and some of it was unhelpful to the jury,

and therefore, the court did not apply an incorrect legal standard,

follow improper procedures in making its determination, or make

findings of fact that were clearly erroneous. See Harris, 989 F.3d at

911. Additionally, on appeal, Pete asserts new topics on which

McKee would have testified that he failed to raise in the district

court. Accordingly, we affirm as to this issue.

III. CONFRONTATION CLAUSE

We examine whether a statement is testimonial under the

Confrontation Clause de novo. United States v. Caraballo, 595 F.3d

1214, 1226 (11th Cir. 2010). We will excuse a violation of the Con-

frontation Clause if the error is harmless beyond a reasonable

doubt. Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 684 (1986). Whether

error is harmless depends upon numerous factors, including “the

importance of the witness’ testimony in the prosecution’s case,

whether the testimony was cumulative, the presence or absence of

evidence corroborating or contradicting the testimony of the wit-

ness on material points, the extent of cross-examination otherwise

permitted, and . . . the overall strength of the prosecution’s case.”

Id. Further, “[t]o require a new trial . . . [a] significant possibility

must exist that, considering the other evidence presented by both

the prosecution and the defense, the . . . statement had a substantial

impact upon the verdict of the jury.” United States v. Ransfer,

749 F.3d 914, 927 (11th Cir. 2014) (quotation marks omitted).

Even assuming without deciding that Pete’s rights under the

Confrontation Clause were violated when Pike testified on redirect

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examination that an unidentified, independent toolmark examiner

reached the same conclusion as he did, any potential error was

harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, because the Government

presented substantial evidence of Pete’s guilt. The Government’s

evidence included information extracted from Pete’s cellphone

that the phone was in the parking lot of the Coyote Sports Bar at

the time of the shooting and then traveled west. The phone also

showed a google search for “Two Shot Outside of Pensacola Bar”

around 5:30 p.m. on the day of the shooting and revealed that two

articles on the Coyote Sports Bar shooting were viewed. Pete was

also found with the same type of gun and ammunition that was

used in the shooting, and he met the general description provided

by the victims. There is not a significant possibility that Pike’s

statement confirming the peer-reviewer’s findings at the end of his

re-direct examination had a substantial impact on the guilty ver-

dict, such that a new trial should be required. See Ransfer, 749 F.3d

at 927. Notably, Pete does not challenge any other portion of Pike’s

testimony as violating the Confrontation Clause, and therefore, the

jury properly heard Pike’s finding, as an ATF examiner, that the

gun found at Pete’s arrest was the gun used to shoot the victims.

Based on the overall strength of the prosecution’s case, any poten-

tial Confrontation Clause violation was harmless beyond a reason-

able doubt.

Accordingly, we affirm as to this issue.

AFFIRMED.