Marysville Exempted Village Schools Bd. of Edn. v. Union Cty. Bd. of Revision

[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as

Marysville Exempted Village Schools Bd. of Edn. v. Union Cty. Bd. of Revision, Slip Opinion No.

2024-Ohio-3323.]

NOTICE

This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in an

advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports. Readers are requested to

promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 65

South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or other

formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be made before

the opinion is published.

SLIP OPINION NO. 2024-OHIO-3323

MARYSVILLE EXEMPTED VILLAGE SCHOOLS BOARD OF EDUCATION,

APPELLEE, v. UNION COUNTY BOARD OF REVISION ET AL., APPELLEES;

RESIDENCE AT COOKS POINTE, L.L.C., APPELLANT.

[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it

may be cited as Marysville Exempted Village Schools Bd. of Edn. v. Union Cty.

Bd. of Revision, Slip Opinion No. 2024-Ohio-3323.]

Taxation—R.C. 5715.19—R.C. 5717.01—R.C. 5717.01 as amended effective

July 21, 2022, does not apply to cases in which a challenge to an auditor’s

real-property tax valuation was pending before a board of revision when the

amendment took effect—Court of appeals’ judgment affirmed and cause

remanded to Board of Tax Appeals.

(No. 2023-0964—Submitted March 26, 2024—Decided September 4, 2024.)

APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Union County,

No. 14-23-03, 2023-Ohio-2020.

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SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

STEWART, J., authored the opinion of the court, which KENNEDY, C.J., and

DEWINE, DONNELLY, BRUNNER, and DETERS, JJ., joined. FISCHER, J., dissented,

with an opinion.

STEWART, J.

{¶ 1} In this appeal, we are asked to determine whether a recent amendment

to R.C. 5717.01 that limits a political subdivision’s ability to appeal a county board

of revision’s determination of real estate value for tax purposes to the Board of Tax

Appeals (“BTA”) applies to cases that were pending before the county board of

revision when the amendment took effect. Because the language of the amended

statute is written in the present tense and ties the right of appeal to the moment a

complaint is filed with a board of revision, we determine that the amended statute

does not apply to cases that were pending before a board of revision when the

amendment took effect.

{¶ 2} We therefore affirm the decision of the Third District Court of

Appeals, which reversed the decision of the BTA dismissing a school board’s appeal

from a county board of revision’s tax valuation of an apartment complex, and we

remand this matter to the BTA to consider the appeal.

Facts and Procedural History

{¶ 3} On February 25, 2022, appellees Dean and Dave Cook, who are third-

party taxpayers, filed a complaint for the 2021 tax year with appellee the Union

County Board of Revision (“the board of revision”). In their complaint, the Cooks

sought an increase in the property valuation for tax purposes of an apartment

complex located in Marysville that is owned by appellant, The Residence at Cooks

Pointe, L.L.C. (“the property owner”). The Union County auditor had assessed the

true value (i.e., the fair-market value) for the subject property as $8,787,3101 for

1. This figure represents the total value of the subject property, which is split into two parcels—an

improved parcel on which the apartment complex sits, which is valued at $8,642,730, and a plot of

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the 2021 tax year. The Cooks alleged in their complaint that the property’s true

value was $24 million based on a “current loan amount [of] $24,000,000.00.”2 On

May 3, 2022, appellee the Marysville Exempted Village Schools Board of

Education (“the school board”) filed a counter-complaint regarding the tax

valuation of the same property. Although the school board’s calculation of the

apartment complex’s value differed slightly from the Cooks’ calculation, overall,

the school board agreed with the Cooks that the county auditor had significantly

undervalued the property for the 2021 tax year. The board of revision held a hearing

on August 1, 2022. On August 4, the board of revision determined that the Cooks

and the school board did not meet their evidentiary burden, citing a “lack of

competent or probative evidence” sufficient to change the auditor’s property

valuation.

{¶ 4} On September 30, the school board appealed the board of revision’s

denial of its requested increase in value to the BTA. The BTA, however, dismissed

the school board’s appeal in December 2022 for lack of jurisdiction. In so doing,

the BTA cited R.C. 5717.01—which had been amended effective July 21, 2022, see

2022 Am.Sub.H.B. No. 126 (“H.B. 126”)—as “permit[ting] boards of education to

appeal a decision of a county board of revision . . . only if the board of education

owns or leases the property at issue in the original complaint.” The BTA determined

that since there was no dispute that the school board in this case did not own or

lease the property in question, the school board could not appeal. The school board

appealed the BTA’s dismissal to the Third District and the Third District reversed.

See 2023-Ohio-2020 (3d Dist.). The court of appeals concluded that the July 21,

unimproved land that is also identified as property of The Residence at Cooks Point, L.L.C, which

is valued at $144,580.

2. Although the record does not make clear the type of loan referred to in the Cooks’ complaint, we

assume the loan referred to was one taken out by the property owner, using the property as the

security interest.

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2022 amendment to R.C. 5717.01 did not apply to the school board’s appeal from

the board of revision’s valuation decision here, because the school board’s counter-

complaint seeking an increase in the auditor’s property valuation was filed with the

board of revision before the effective date of the amendment. 2023-Ohio-2020 at

¶ 35-37 (3d Dist.). The property owner appealed to this court. We accepted

jurisdiction over the following three propositions of law:

Proposition of Law No. 1: Under the plain reading of

amended R.C. 5717.01, a board of education has no authority to

appeal a decision of a board of revision issued after July 21, 2022.

A court cannot delay the effectiveness of the legislation by reading

into the statute a later effective date not expressly provided by the

General Assembly.

Proposition of Law No. 2: Amended R.C. 5717.01 is

prospective as written.

Proposition of Law No. 3: Amended R.C. 5717.01 is

remedial legislation that is not a prohibited retroactive law.

See 2023-Ohio-3789.

{¶ 5} These three propositions of law raise the same issue: whether the BTA

erred in dismissing the school board’s appeal for lack of jurisdiction. Therefore,

we address these propositions of law together.

Real-Property Tax-Valuation Process and H.B. 126

{¶ 6} Under Article XII, Section 2 of the Ohio Constitution, “[l]and and

improvements thereon shall be taxed by uniform rule according to value.”

R.C. 5713.01 sets forth the criteria for assessing real-property values and provides

that county auditors are responsible for conducting appraisals of the real property

located within their respective counties. R.C. 5715.19 provides the procedure for

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January Term, 2024

challenging an auditor’s property valuation before a county board of revision, and

R.C. 5717.01 provides the procedure for appealing a board of revision’s decision to

the BTA.3

{¶ 7} In April 2022, while the valuation challenges were pending before the

board of revision in this case, the General Assembly enacted H.B. 126 with an

effective date of July 21, 2022. Section 1 of H.B. 126 amended R.C. 5715.19 and

5717.01, while Section 2 repealed the preexisting versions of those statutes.

Section 3 provided additional information about the effective date of amendments

to the statutory procedure for filing a complaint or counter-complaint with a board

of revision under R.C. 5715.19. Section 3 stated:

(A) The amendment by this act of section 5715.19 of the

Revised Code, except for the enactment by this act of division (I) of

that section, applies to any original complaint or counter-complaint,

as those terms are defined in that section, filed for tax year 2022 or

any tax year thereafter.

(B) The enactment by this act of division (I) of section

5715.19 of the Revised Code applies to any private payment

agreement, as defined in that division, entered into on or after the

effective date of that enactment.

3. County boards of revision are composed of the county treasurer, the county auditor, and a member

of the board of county commissioners. R.C. 5715.02. R.C. 5715.11 provides that a board of revision

“shall hear complaints relating to the valuation or assessment of real property as the same appears

upon the tax duplicate of the then current year.” County boards of revision are required to

“investigate all such complaints and may increase or decrease any such valuation or correct any

assessment complained of, or [they] may order a reassessment by the original assessing officer.” Id.

The BTA is a bipartisan state board composed of three members who are each appointed for six-

year terms by the governor with the advice and consent of the senate. R.C. 5703.03. R.C.

5703.02(A)(2) authorizes the BTA to “hear and determine all appeals of questions of law and fact

arising under the tax laws of this state in appeals from . . . [d]ecisions of county boards of revision.”

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{¶ 8} The repealed version of R.C. 5715.19(A) provided a list of persons

and entities that had the right to challenge an auditor’s property valuation by filing

a complaint with a board of revision. Those persons and entities included the

owners of the property in question, a local school board, and third-party taxpayers

who resided in the county where the property in question was located. Former

R.C. 5715.19(A), 2021 Sub.S.B. No. 57. Specifically, former R.C. 5715.19(A)

stated:

Any person owning taxable real property in the county or in

a taxing district with territory in the county; such a person’s spouse;

a tenant of the property owner, if the property is classified as to use

for tax purposes as commercial or industrial, the lease requires the

tenant to pay the entire amount of taxes charged against the property,

and the lease allows, or the property owner otherwise authorizes, the

tenant to file such a complaint with respect to the property; . . . the

board of county commissioners; . . . the board of township trustees

of any township with territory within the county; the board of

education of any school district with any territory in the county; or

the mayor or legislative authority of any municipal corporation with

any territory in the county may file such a complaint regarding any

such determination affecting any real property in the county . . . .

(Emphasis added.)

{¶ 9} Former R.C. 5715.19(B) provided a list of persons and entities that

had the right to receive notice that a complaint challenging an auditor’s property

valuation had been filed. Additionally, former R.C. 5715.19(B) provided that

certain persons and entities had the right to file a separate complaint in support of

or in objection to a property-valuation complaint. Former R.C. 5715.19(B) stated:

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January Term, 2024

Within thirty days after the last date . . . complaints may be

filed [under R.C. 5715.19(A)], the auditor shall give notice of each

complaint in which the stated amount of overvaluation,

undervaluation, discriminatory valuation, illegal valuation, or

incorrect determination is at least seventeen thousand five hundred

dollars to each property owner whose property is the subject of the

complaint, if the complaint was not filed by the owner or the owner’s

spouse and to each board of education whose school district may be

affected by the complaint. Within thirty days after receiving such

notice, a board of education . . . may file a complaint in support of

or objecting to the amount of alleged overvaluation, undervaluation,

discriminatory valuation, illegal valuation, or incorrect

determination stated in a previously filed complaint or objecting to

the current valuation.

(Emphasis added.) 2021 Sub.S.B. No. 57.

{¶ 10} Regarding the procedure for a party to appeal to the BTA after

receiving an unfavorable decision from a board of revision, former R.C. 5717.01,

2018 Sub.H.B. No. 34, stated:

An appeal from a decision of a county board of revision may

be taken to the board of tax appeals within thirty days after notice of

the decision of the county board of revision is mailed as provided in

division (A) of section 5715.20 of the Revised Code. Such an appeal

may be taken by the county auditor, the tax commissioner, or any

board, legislative authority, public official, or taxpayer authorized

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by section 5715.19 of the Revised Code to file complaints against

valuations or assessments with the auditor.

{¶ 11} While the persons and entities authorized to file complaints with a

board of revision did not change with H.B. 126’s amendments to R.C. 5715.19(A),

the legislation reworded the statute in such a way that it now refers to certain entities

differently. Specifically, the amendment deleted “the board of county

commissioners,” “the board of township trustees of any township with territory in

the county,” “the board of education of any school district with any territory in the

county,” and “the . . . legislative authority of any municipal corporation with any

territory in the county” from the list of entities authorized to challenge an auditor’s

property valuation and replaced those terms with the “legislative authority of a

subdivision.” The General Assembly defined “legislative authority” in the

amended statute as “a board of county commissioners, a board of township trustees

of any township with territory in the county, the board of education of any school

district with territory in the county, or the legislative authority of a municipal

corporation with territory in the county.” R.C. 5715.19(A). The General Assembly

also defined the terms “original complaint” and “counter-complaint” as they are

used in the amended statute. See id. An “original complaint” is defined as a

“complaint filed under division (A) of [R.C. 5715.19],” and a “counter-complaint”

is defined as a “complaint filed under division (B) [of R.C. 5715.19] in response to

an original complaint.” R.C. 5715.19(A).

{¶ 12} Regarding the legislation’s effect on R.C. 5717.01, H.B. 126 left

intact the list of parties that are authorized to appeal a board of revision’s decision

to the BTA. However, H.B. 126 amended R.C. 5717.01 to include an exception

that limits the circumstances under which a political subdivision may appeal to the

BTA to only those instances in which the subdivision owns or leases the property

in question. As amended, R.C. 5717.01 now states:

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January Term, 2024

An appeal from a decision of a county board of revision may

be taken to the board of tax appeals. . . by . . . any board, legislative

authority, public official, or taxpayer authorized by section 5715.19

of the Revised Code to file complaints against valuations or

assessments with the auditor, except that a subdivision[4] that files

an original complaint or counter-complaint under that section with

respect to property the subdivision does not own or lease may not

appeal the decision of the board of revision with respect to that

original complaint or counter-complaint.

(Emphasis added.)

Analysis

{¶ 13} This case requires us to determine whether the former version or the

amended version of R.C. 5717.01 applies to the school board’s appeal to the BTA.

This is a question of statutory interpretation. As with any question of statutory

interpretation, our primary objective is to ascertain and give effect to the

legislature’s intent. See Sarmiento v. Grange Mut. Cas. Co., 2005-Ohio-5410, ¶ 25.

“To determine the intent of the legislature, we first look to the plain language of the

statute.” State v. Gordon, 2018-Ohio-1975, ¶ 8, citing State ex rel. Burrows v. Indus.

Comm., 1997-Ohio-310, ¶ 5. “When a statute is plain and unambiguous, we apply

the statute as written.” Id., citing Portage Cty. Bd. of Commrs. v. Akron, 2006-

Ohio-954, ¶ 52. We hold that the plain language of amended R.C. 5717.01 makes

clear that the amended statute does not apply to cases in which a challenge to an

4. Although neither R.C. 5715.19 nor 5717.01 defines the term “subdivision,” there appears to be

no disagreement among the parties that “subdivision” is intended to mean “political subdivision”

and that a school district is a political subdivision. Accord Avon Lake City School Dist. v. Limbach,

35 Ohio St.3d 118, 122 (1988) (“We are persuaded that a school district is a political subdivision

created by the General Assembly . . . .”).

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auditor’s property valuation was pending before a board of revision when the

amendment took effect.

{¶ 14} The amendment to R.C. 5717.01 is written in the present tense and

states that an appeal from a decision of a county board of revision may be made to

the BTA by any legislative authority, “except that a subdivision that files an original

complaint or counter-complaint under [R.C. 5715.19] with respect to property the

subdivision does not own or lease may not appeal the decision of the board of

revision with respect to that original complaint or counter-complaint.” (Emphasis

and underlining added.). The fact that amended R.C. 5717.01 uses the present tense

“files” instead of the past tense “filed” or “has filed” indicates that the amendment

was intended by the legislature to apply prospectively, i.e., to cases filed with a

board of revision after the amendment took effect. Had the General Assembly used

the past tense in its phrasing, that would have indicated an intent that the statutory

amendment be applied to cases pending before a board of revision when the

amendment took effect. But that is not what the General Assembly did.

{¶ 15} Additionally, the phrasing of amended R.C. 5717.01 clearly ties the

right of appeal to the filing of a complaint or counter-complaint with a board of

revision and not to the filing of an appeal from a board of revision’s decision on a

complaint. This indicates that the point in time when the statute becomes effective

is the point in time when a political subdivision “files” a complaint or counter-

complaint with a board of revision. Since the school board in this case filed a

counter-complaint with the board of revision prior to the effective date of H.B. 126,

the former version of R.C. 5717.01 controls the school board’s right of appeal.

{¶ 16} Indeed, we reached a similar conclusion, albeit in a different context,

in State ex rel. Thomas v. Wood Cty. Bd. of Elections, 2024-Ohio-379. In that case,

we determined that when a statutory amendment ties itself to a specific operative

event, it is the occasion of the operative event that controls whether the amended

statute is applicable to a pending case or whether the prior version of the statute

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January Term, 2024

applies. If, for instance, the amended statute in this case had made the filing of an

appeal to the BTA the operative event on which the new prohibition on political-

subdivision appeals to the BTA was conditioned, then it might be said that the

General Assembly intended the amendment to apply to cases that were pending

before a board of revision when the amendment took effect. But again, that is not

how the General Assembly worded the amended statute.

{¶ 17} Lastly, our conclusion here that amended R.C. 5717.01 applies

prospectively, i.e., to cases that were not pending before a board of revision when

the amended statute took effect, is bolstered by the context in which the statutory

amendment was adopted—specifically, amended R.C. 5717.01’s relationship to the

amendments imposed by H.B. 126 on R.C. 5715.19. Amended R.C. 5717.01

provides an exception to the prior general rule that political subdivisions could

appeal decisions of a board of revisions as a matter of course. The amended statute

now restricts a subdivision’s appeal rights by stating that “a subdivision that files

an original complaint or counter-complaint under [R.C. 5715.19] with respect to

property the subdivision does not own or lease may not appeal the decision of the

board of revision with respect to that original complaint or counter-complaint.”

(Emphasis added.) R.C. 5717.01. However, the terms “original complaint” and

“counter-complaint,” which are present in the amended version of R.C. 5717.01,

were not present in former R.C. 5717.01 or 5715.19—the statutes that were in effect

when the school board in this case filed its counter-complaint.

{¶ 18} The terms “original complaint” and “counter-complaint” are new to

this statutory scheme and are a product of H.B. 126’s amendments to R.C. 5715.19.

Former R.C. 5715.19 did not distinguish an “original complaint” from a “counter-

complaint.” Instead, former R.C. 5715.19 simply used the term “complaint” to

refer to challenges to an auditor’s property valuation filed under division (A) of the

statute—which represented the first complaint initiating a challenge—as well as

complaints brought under division (B) of the statute—which represented

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complaints filed in support of or in opposition to the initial complaint. Given that

the appeal exception in amended R.C. 5717.01 is tied to the filing of an “original

complaint” or “counter-complaint”—terms that did not exist within the statutory

scheme when the school board filed its counter-complaint5 with the board of

revision under former R.C. 5715.19(B)—it cannot be said that the General

Assembly intended the appeal exception to apply to cases that were pending before

a board of revision when the amendment took effect. What is more is that Section

3 of H.B. 126 specifically states that the terms “complaint” and “counter-

complaint,” as defined in the amendments to R.C. 5715.19, are effective “for tax

year 2022 or any tax year thereafter.” Importantly, the school board’s counter-

complaint in this case concerned tax year 2021, not 2022 or any year thereafter.

Conclusion

{¶ 19} Based on the plain language of amended R.C. 5717.01, we hold that

the General Assembly did not intend for the appeals exception contained in the

amended statute to apply when a school board had filed a counter-complaint with a

board of revision prior to the amended statute’s effective date of July 21, 2022.

Because the school board in this case had filed a counter-complaint with the board

5. Throughout this opinion, we have referred to the complaint the school board filed as a “counter-

complaint.” We have done so because that is how the school board designated its filing with the

board of revision. It appears that even though former R.C. 5715.19(A) did not define an initial

complaint filed with a board of revision as an “original complaint” and former R.C. 5715.19(B) did

not classify a filing made in response to an initial complaint as a “counter-complaint,” these terms

were commonly used for such filings prior to the enactment of H.B. 126. Nevertheless, this court

has refused to recognize that these terms had any legal meaning under former R.C. 5715.19:

But although the official-complaint form uses the term

“countercomplaint,” as does our case law, that word does not appear in the statute

itself. Instead, both R.C. 5715.19(A) and 5715.19(B) authorize the filing of a

“complaint.” For that reason, we will refer to a complaint filed under division (A)

of R.C. 5715.19 as an “A complaint,” and we will refer to a complaint filed under

division (B) as a “B complaint.”

Licking Hts. Local Schools Bd. of Edn. v. Franklin Cty. Bd. of Revision, 2018-Ohio-3255, ¶ 9.

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January Term, 2024

of revision prior to the effective date of H.B. 126, it maintained the right to appeal

the board of revision’s decision to the BTA under former R.C. 5717.01.

Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the Third District Court of Appeals, which

reversed the decision of the BTA dismissing the school board’s appeal for lack of

jurisdiction, and we remand the matter to the BTA to consider the school board’s

appeal.

Judgment affirmed

and cause remanded.

__________________

FISCHER, J., dissenting.

{¶ 20} I would conclude that the plain language of R.C. 5717.01 as

amended effective July 21, 2022, see 2022 Am.Sub.H.B. No. 126, prohibits a

school board from appealing a decision of a county board of revision related to the

valuation of property that the school board does not own or lease, regardless of

when the underlying complaint or counter-complaint was filed. I thus respectfully

dissent and would reverse the decision of the Third District Court of Appeals.

{¶ 21} Amended R.C. 5717.01 provides that

[a]n appeal from a decision of a county board of revision may be

taken . . . by . . . any board . . . authorized by section 5715.19 of the

Revised Code to file complaints against valuations or assessments

with the auditor, except that a subdivision that files an original

complaint or counter-complaint under that section with respect to

property the subdivision does not own or lease may not appeal the

decision of the board of revision with respect to that original

complaint or counter-complaint.

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{¶ 22} In my view, the plain language of this statute clearly indicates the

General Assembly’s intent that a school board, like appellee the Marysville

Exempted Village Schools Board of Education (“the school board”), not be allowed

to appeal a board of revision’s decision regarding the valuation of property that the

school board does not own or lease. It seems to me that in concluding otherwise,

the majority opinion’s analysis overcomplicates this clear statutory provision.

{¶ 23} The first sentence of amended R.C. 5717.01 (which is the sentence

of that statute relevant to this appeal) begins by authorizing a broad range of

individuals and entities, namely “the county auditor, the tax commissioner, or any

board, legislative authority, public official, or taxpayer authorized by section

5715.19 of the Revised Code,” to appeal a decision of a county board of revision

by filing complaints against valuations or assessments with the county auditor. The

clause following this provision in the statute sets forth an exception to who may file

an appeal: “a subdivision that files an original complaint or counter-complaint

under [R.C. 5715.19] with respect to property the subdivision does not own or lease

may not appeal the decision of the board of revision with respect to that original

complaint or counter-complaint.”

{¶ 24} Significantly, the right-to-appeal exception in amended R.C.

5717.01 does not set forth when or how an appeal may be filed. Instead, the

exception merely identifies who may not file an appeal. Thus, in my view,

appellant, The Residence at Cooks Pointe, L.L.C., is correct that the phrase “a

subdivision that files an original complaint or counter-complaint” defines a class to

which the exception applies and does not function to delay the application of the

amended version of R.C. 5717.01 based on when the underlying complaint was

filed. In this case, it is undisputed that the school board is a subdivision under R.C.

5717.01 and that the school board filed a counter-complaint regarding the valuation

of property that it does not own or lease. See majority opinion, ¶ 3, 12, fn. 4.

Therefore, according to the plain language of amended R.C. 5717.01, the school

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January Term, 2024

board could not file an appeal from the board of revision’s decision pertaining to

that property.

{¶ 25} The majority opinion’s holding appears to be premised on three

aspects of the amended version of R.C. 5717.01, which are treated as compelling a

conclusion that the prior version of the statute, see 2018 Sub.H.B. No. 34, applies

in this case. First, the amended version of the statute is “written in the present

tense,” using the phrase “subdivision that files” (rather than the past tense

“subdivision that filed”). Majority opinion at ¶ 14. Second, “the phrasing of

amended R.C. 5717.01 clearly ties the right of appeal to the filing of a complaint

or counter-complaint with a board of revision.” Majority opinion at ¶ 15. Third,

“the context in which the statutory amendment was adopted” indicates that the prior

version of R.C. 5717.01 did not tie any appeal exception to the filing of an “original

complaint” or “counter-complaint,” so it cannot be said that the General Assembly

intended the appeal exception in the amended version of the statute to apply to cases

pending when the amendment took effect. Majority opinion at ¶ 17.

{¶ 26} Each of these points overcomplicates the analysis by essentially

treating the identifying phrase “a subdivision that files an original complaint or

counter-complaint,” R.C. 5717.01, as creating a right to appeal. Again, this phrase

is merely a descriptive term identifying “who” is subject to the limited exception to

the right of appeal established by R.C. 5717.01. First, the fact that the present-tense

word “files” is used rather than the past tense “filed” is a distinction without a

difference, because by the time the board of revision has issued its decision, the

complaint or counter-complaint will have already been filed, meaning the filing will

have always occurred in the past. Second, this identifying phrase does not tie the

right of appeal to the filing of a complaint or counter-complaint, because that right

is already established in the first clause of amended R.C. 5717.01, with this

particular identifying phrase merely setting forth the exception to that general right

to file an appeal. Third, the use of the terms “complaint” and “counter-complaint”

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in the amended version of R.C. 5717.01 do not impact this analysis, because as

noted in the majority opinion, the school board initiated its participation in this case

by filing a counter-complaint, see majority opinion at ¶ 3, a procedure that predated

the amendment to R.C. 5717.01, see 2018 Sub.H.B. No. 34.

{¶ 27} An illustration of the above points can be made by examining the

primary case relied on by the majority opinion, State ex rel. Thomas v. Wood Cty.

Bd. of Elections, 2024-Ohio-379. The majority opinion states that Thomas stands

for the proposition that “when a statutory amendment ties itself to a specific

operative event, it is the occasion of the operative event that controls whether the

amended statute is applicable to a pending case or whether the prior version of the

statute applies.” Majority opinion at ¶ 16. This court’s statutory analysis in

Thomas, however, undermines the analysis of the majority opinion in this case.

{¶ 28} In Thomas, we considered whether a previous version of R.C.

519.12(H) (setting forth a requirement that a referendum petition contain a number

of signatures equal to at least 8 percent of the total votes cast for governor in the

township at the most recent gubernatorial election) or an amended version of R.C.

519.12(H) (setting forth a requirement that a referendum petition contain a number

of signatures equal to at least 15 percent of the total votes cast for governor in the

township at the most recent gubernatorial election) applied to a proposed

referendum related to a zoning amendment adopted by a board of township trustees

two weeks before the amended version of the statute became effective. Thomas at

¶ 27-28. In our analysis, we noted that the amended version of the statute provided

that the proposed amendment would become effective 30 days after its adoption

unless a valid referendum petition was presented to the board within that 30-day

window. Id. at ¶ 29-30. We emphasized that because the requirements of the statute

were tied specifically to the date of the adoption of the zoning amendment, it was

logical to apply the amended version of R.C. 519.12(H) only to zoning amendments

adopted after the effective date of the amended statute. Thomas at ¶ 30.

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January Term, 2024

{¶ 29} If we are to apply the same rationale that we applied in Thomas to

this case, we must reverse the decision of the court of appeals. To use the phrase

employed by the majority opinion in this case, the “specific operative event,”

majority opinion at ¶ 16, in Thomas was the adoption of the zoning amendment,

which started the 30-day clock for submitting a referendum petition. Because that

“specific operative event” occurred before the effective date of the amended version

of the statute, the prior version of the statute applied in Thomas. In this case, the

“specific operative event” under the amended version of R.C. 5717.01 is the

mailing of notice of the county board of revision’s decision, which starts the 30-

day clock for one of the persons or entities identified in that statute to file an appeal

from that decision. Because that “specific operative event” occurred in September

2022, after the July 21, 2022 effective date of the amended version of R.C. 5717.01,

see 2022 Am.Sub.H.B. No. 126, we must apply the amended version of that statute

here and conclude that the school board was barred from filing its appeal. I

accordingly view the rationale applied by this court in Thomas as supporting the

conclusion that the decision of the court of appeals must be reversed in this case.

{¶ 30} Furthermore, I see no constitutional concerns that would prevent the

application of amended R.C. 5717.01 to cases like this. The amended version of

R.C. 5717.01 is clearly prospective in nature. It provides that after the statute’s

effective date, political subdivisions cannot file appeals from decisions of county

boards of revision related to the valuation of property that those subdivisions do not

own or lease. “Because the law in question applies only prospectively—that is, to

[appeals] after its effective date—and because it is a rule of procedure, it does not

implicate the Ohio Constitution’s prohibition against retroactive laws.” State v.

Brooks, 2022-Ohio-2478, ¶ 28, citing Ohio Const., art. II, § 28 (DeWine, J.,

concurring in judgment only). I accordingly conclude that no retroactivity concerns

exist here, because the amended version of R.C. 5717.01 applies only prospectively,

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SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

to cases in which a political subdivision seeks to appeal a decision of a board of

revision after the effective date of the statute.

{¶ 31} “When a statute is plain and unambiguous, we apply the statute as

written.” State v. Gordon, 2018-Ohio-1975, ¶ 8, citing Portage Cty. Bd. of Commrs.

v. Akron, 2006-Ohio-954, ¶ 52. In my view, this case does not need to be

overcomplicated and can be resolved based on the plain language of the amended

version of R.C. 5717.01, which provides that “a subdivision that files an original

complaint or counter-complaint under [R.C. 5715.19] with respect to property the

subdivision does not own or lease may not appeal the decision of the board of

revision with respect to that original complaint or counter-complaint.” Here, the

school board filed a counter-complaint with respect to the valuation of property that

it does not own or lease. It therefore may not appeal the board of revision’s decision

in this case. For these reasons, I respectfully dissent and would reverse the decision

of the Third District Court of Appeals.

__________________

Rich & Gillis Law Group, L.L.C., Mark H. Gillis, Kelley A. Gorry, and

Karol C. Fox, for appellee Marysville Exempted Village Schools Board of

Education.

Vorys, Sater, Seymour and Pease, L.L.P., Nicholas M.J. Ray, Steven L.

Smiseck, and Lauren M. Johnson, for appellant.

Zaino Hall & Farrin, L.L.C., Stephen K. Hall, Thomas M. Zaino, and Robert

C. Maier, urging affirmance for amicus curiae, Ohio Chamber of Commerce.

__________________

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