The opinion
[Cite as Dublin City Schools Bd. of Edn. v. Union Cty. Bd. of Revision, 2024-Ohio-3368.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
UNION COUNTY
DUBLIN CITY SCHOOLS
BOARD OF EDUCATION, CASE NO. 14-24-02
APPELLANT,
v.
UNION COUNTY BOARD OPINION
OF REVISION, ET AL.,
APPELLEES.
DUBLIN CITY SCHOOLS
BOARD OF EDUCATION, CASE NO. 14-24-03
APPELLANT,
v.
UNION COUNTY BOARD OPINION
OF REVISION, ET AL.,
APPELLEES.
MARYSVILLE EXEMPTED VILLAGE
SCHOOLS BOARD OF EDUCATION, CASE NO. 14-24-04
APPELLANT,
v.
UNION COUNTY BOARD OPINION
OF REVISION, ET AL.,
APPELLEES.
Case Nos. 14-24-02, 03, 04, 05, 06, 07, 08, 09
DUBLIN CITY SCHOOLS
BOARD OF EDUCATION, CASE NO. 14-24-05
APPELLANT,
v.
UNION COUNTY BOARD OPINION
OF REVISION, ET AL.,
APPELLEES.
DUBLIN CITY SCHOOLS
BOARD OF EDUCATION, CASE NO. 14-24-06
APPELLANT,
v.
UNION COUNTY BOARD OPINION
OF REVISION, ET AL.,
APPELLEES.
MARYSVILLE EXEMPTED VILLAGE
SCHOOLS BOARD OF EDUCATION, CASE NO. 14-24-07
APPELLANT,
v.
UNION COUNTY BOARD OPINION
OF REVISION, ET AL.,
APPELLEES.
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Case Nos. 14-24-02, 03, 04, 05, 06, 07, 08, 09
MARYSVILLE EXEMPTED VILLAGE
SCHOOLS BOARD OF EDUCATION, CASE NO. 14-24-08
APPELLANT,
v.
UNION COUNTY BOARD OPINION
OF REVISION, ET AL.,
APPELLEES.
DUBLIN CITY SCHOOLS
BOARD OF EDUCATION, CASE NO. 14-24-09
APPELLANT,
v.
UNION COUNTY BOARD OPINION
OF REVISION, ET AL.,
APPELLEES.
Appeals from Union County Common Pleas Court
General Division
Trial Court Nos. 2023-CV-0163, 2023-CV-0168, 2023-CV-0167, 2023-CV-
0165, 2023-CV-0166, 2023-CV-0161, 2023-CV-0162 and 2023-CV-0164
Judgments Affirmed
Date of Decision: September 3, 2024
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Case Nos. 14-24-02, 03, 04, 05, 06, 07, 08, 09
APPEARANCES:
Kelley A. Gorry for Appellants
Catherine A. Cunningham for Appellee Pulte Homes of Ohio, LLC
Cecilia Hyun for Appellee for Jabell Realty, LLC
Jason P. Lindholm for Appellee Marysville Cherry, LLC
Philip D. Williamson for Appellee Arbors of Marysville Holdings, LLC
WALDICK, J.
{¶1} In these consolidated appeals, the plaintiffs-appellants, Dublin City
Schools Board of Education and Marysville Exempted Village School District
Board of Education (the “school boards”), appeal the judgments entered against
them in eight cases in the Union County Court of Common Pleas, wherein the trial
court dismissed the school boards’ appeals from decisions of the Union County
Board of Revision. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm.
Procedural Background
Case No. 14-24-02 (Trial Court Case No. 2023-CV-0163)
Case No. 14-24-03 (Trial Court Case No. 2023-CV-0168)
Case No. 14-24-04 (Trial Court Case No. 2023-CV-0167)
Case No. 14-24-05 (Trial Court Case No. 2023-CV-0165)
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Case Nos. 14-24-02, 03, 04, 05, 06, 07, 08, 09
Case No. 14-24-06 (Trial Court Case No. 2023-CV-0166)
Case No. 14-24-07 (Trial Court Case No. 2023-CV-0161)
Case No. 14-24-08 (Trial Court Case No. 2023-CV-0162)
Case No. 14-24-09 (Trial Court Case No. 2023-CV-0164)
{¶2} In each of the eight cases at issue in this appeal, either the Dublin City
Schools Board of Education or the Marysville Exempted Village School District
Board of Education filed a valuation complaint with the Union County Board of
Revision (“BOR”) for the tax year 2022. In those complaints, the school boards
challenged the value of certain real property owned by the appellees-property
owners, and raised constitutional challenges to several recently amended statutory
provisions that impact the right of the school boards to file such complaints. In each
case, the BOR dismissed or denied the complaint filed by the school board. In each
case, the plaintiff school board appealed the BOR decision to the Union County
Court of Common Pleas. The common pleas court subsequently dismissed the
appeal in each case, finding that the school board lacked statutory standing to bring
the appeal. The school boards then filed the instant appeals of the trial court’s
decisions of dismissal. This Court subsequently ordered that the eight appeals be
consolidated for transcript of proceedings, briefing and oral argument, with filings
to be in Case No. 14-24-02.
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Case Nos. 14-24-02, 03, 04, 05, 06, 07, 08, 09
{¶3} In these consolidated appeals, the appellants raise two assignments of
error.
First Assignment of Error
The Union County Common Pleas Court erred in holding that
R.C. 5717.05 prohibited the Board of Educations’ appeals
pursuant to R.C. 2506.01 because the Supreme Court has
repeatedly held that an appeal pursuant to R.C. 2506.01 is
available unless directly prohibited by another subsequently
enacted statute.
Second Assignment of Error
The Union County Common Pleas Court erred in failing to
recognize that the Boards of Education have statutory authority
to appeal pursuant to R.C. 2506.01.
{¶4} The issue raised in both assignments of error, which we shall jointly
address, is whether R.C. 2506.01 grants standing to a board of education to appeal
a county board of revision decision to the common pleas court when the real
property at issue in the case is not owned by the board of education.
{¶5} The issue before us in these appeals stems from the passage of H.B. 126
in April of 2022. That legislation, effective July 21, 2022, contained amendments
to Ohio Revised Code Chapter 5717 which imposed significant restrictions on the
activities of local boards of education in pursuing real estate valuation appeals.
{¶6} One statutory section amended by H.B. 126, R.C. 5717.01, formerly
permitted decisions of a county board of revision to be appealed to the Board of Tax
Appeals “by the county auditor, the tax commissioner, or any board, legislative
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Case Nos. 14-24-02, 03, 04, 05, 06, 07, 08, 09
authority, public official, or taxpayer authorized by section 5715.19 of the Revised
Code to file complaints against valuations or assessments with the auditor.”
However, H.B. 126 amended R.C. 5717.01 to limit the parties authorized to file
such appeals, with the amended version of R.C. 5717.01 reading in relevant part as
follows:
An appeal from a decision of a county board of revision may be taken
to the board of tax appeals within thirty days after notice of the
decision of the county board of revision is mailed * * *. Such an
appeal may be taken by the county auditor, the tax commissioner, or
any board, legislative authority, public official, or taxpayer authorized
by section 5715.19 of the Revised Code to file complaints against
valuations or assessments with the auditor, except that a subdivision
that files an original complaint or counter-complaint under that
section with respect to property the subdivision does not own or lease
may not appeal the decision of the board of revision with respect to
that original complaint or counter-complaint. (Emphasis added.)
{¶7} Thus, pursuant to R.C. 5717.01 as amended, in order to now appeal a
county board of revision decision to the Board of Tax Appeals, the appellant cannot
be an entity, such as a board of education, that does not own or lease the property at
issue in the original complaint.
{¶8} Once the amendment to R.C. 5717.01 foreclosed the right of a board of
education to appeal county board of revision decisions regarding property not
owned or leased by the school board to the Board of Tax Appeals, boards of
education have begun to litigate the impact of the restriction on appeals effectuated
by H.B. 126.
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Case Nos. 14-24-02, 03, 04, 05, 06, 07, 08, 09
{¶9} In particular, as is presented here, one issue raised in recent cases filed
by boards of education throughout Ohio is whether a school board is now able to
file appeals in courts of common pleas of BOR decisions involving property not
owned or leased by the school board. In the cases before us, the school boards assert
they have standing to file such appeals in a court of common pleas pursuant to R.C.
2506.01 and argue that the Union County Court of Common Pleas erred in ruling to
the contrary and in dismissing their appeals.
{¶10} We begin our analysis by noting that R.C. 5717.05 provides an
alternative right to appeal decisions of a county BOR to a court of common pleas,
instead of to the Board of Tax Appeals, but R.C. 5717.05 limits that right to persons
“in whose name the property is listed or sought to be listed.”
{¶11} As a school board can no longer appeal BOR decisions relating to
property not owned or leased by the school pursuant to R.C. 5717.01 as amended
by H.B. 126, and because R.C. 5717.05 similarly limits BOR appeals to a court of
common pleas to potential appellants who own the real property at issue, the school
boards in this case assert that they now have standing to appeal to a court of common
pleas in such instances pursuant to R.C. 2506.01. We disagree.
{¶12} “Standing determines ‘whether a litigant is entitled to have a court
determine the merits of the issues presented.’” Moore v. Middletown, 2012-Ohio-
3897, ¶ 20, quoting State ex rel. Teamsters Local Union No. 436 v. Cuyahoga Cty.
Bd. of Commrs., 2012-Ohio-1861, ¶ 10. “Whether a party has established standing
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Case Nos. 14-24-02, 03, 04, 05, 06, 07, 08, 09
to bring an action before the court is a question of law, which we review de novo.”
Id., citing Cuyahoga Cty. Bd. Of Commrs. v. State, 2006-Ohio-6499, ¶ 23.
{¶13} R.C. 2506.01 governs appeals from administrative decisions of
agencies of political subdivisions, and provides:
(A) Except as otherwise provided in sections 2506.05 to 2506.08 of
the Revised Code, and except as modified by this section and
sections 2506.02 to 2506.04 of the Revised Code, every final order,
adjudication, or decision of any officer, tribunal, authority, board,
bureau, commission, department, or other division of any political
subdivision of the state may be reviewed by the court of common
pleas of the county in which the principal office of the political
subdivision is located as provided in Chapter 2505. of the Revised
Code.
(B) The appeal provided in this section is in addition to any other
remedy of appeal provided by law.
(C) As used in this chapter, “final order, adjudication, or decision”
means an order, adjudication, or decision that determines rights,
duties, privileges, benefits, or legal relationships of a person, but does
not include any order, adjudication, or decision from which an appeal
is granted by rule, ordinance, or statute to a higher administrative
authority if a right to a hearing on such appeal is provided, or any
order, adjudication, or decision that is issued preliminary to or as a
result of a criminal proceeding.
{¶14} Pursuant to Article IV, Section 4(B) of the Ohio Constitution, “[t]he
courts of common pleas and divisions thereof shall have such original jurisdiction
over all justiciable matters and such powers of review of proceedings of
administrative officers and agencies as may be provided by law.” “[There is no
inherent right to appeal an administrative decision; rather, the right must be
conferred by statute.” Yanega v. Cuyahoga Cty. Bd. of Revision, 2018-Ohio-5208,
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Case Nos. 14-24-02, 03, 04, 05, 06, 07, 08, 09
¶ 10, citing Midwest Fireworks Mfg. Co., Inc. v. Deerfield Twp. Bd. of Zoning
Appeals, 91 Ohio St.3d 174, 177, 743 N.E.2d 894 (2001).
{¶15} The precise issue raised in the instant appeals was recently addressed
in Westerville City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Delaware Cty. Bd. of Revision, 2024-
Ohio-1567 (5th Dist.). In that case, our colleagues in the Fifth District set forth the
following analysis:
This Court recognizes that R.C. § 2506.01 “‘does not address the
question of who has standing to bring such an appeal.’” (Emphasis
sic.) Myers v. Clinebell, 6th Dist. Sandusky No. S-98-048, 1999 WL
300620, (May 14, 1999), quoting Willoughby Hills v. C. C. Bar’s
Sahara, Inc., 64 Ohio St.3d 24, 26, 591 N.E.2d 1203 (1992). We
construe the plain, clear and unambiguous language of R.C. § 2506.01
its usual and customary meanings. Medcorp, Inc. v. Ohio Dept. of Job
& Family Servs., 121 Ohio St.3d 622, 2009-Ohio-2058, 906 N.E.2d
1125, ¶ 9. “‘[I]t is the duty of the court to give effect to the words
used, not to delete words used or insert words not used.’” Westgate
Shopping Village v. Toledo, 93 Ohio App.3d 507, 517-18, 639 N.E.2d
126 (6th Dist.1994), quoting Cline v. Ohio Bur. of Motor Vehicles, 61
Ohio St.3d 93, 97, 573 N.E.2d 77 (1991).
R.C. § 2506.01 does not create a cause of action where none otherwise
exists. Regarding administrative appeals under R.C. § 2506.01, Ohio
courts require a party to identify a statutory provision that expressly
authorizes the filing of an appeal. Yanega v. Cuyahoga Cty. Bd. of
Revision, 156 Ohio St.3d 203, 2018-Ohio-5208, 124 N.E.3d 806, ¶ 10
(“there is no inherent right to appeal an administrative decision;
rather, the right must be conferred by statute”). This statutory
permission cannot come from R.C. § 2506.01 itself. JRB Holdings,
LLC v. Stark Cty. Bd. of Revision, 5th Dist. Stark No. 2021CA00144,
2022-Ohio-1646, ¶11-18, (looking beyond R.C. Chapter 2506 to
determine whether an appeal from a board of revision is permitted).
Rather, that authority must arise from another statutory provision. See
also Hamer v. Danbury Twp. Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 6th Dist. Lucas
No. L-19-1210, 2020-Ohio-3209, 155 N.E.3d 218, 155 N.E.3d 218,
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Case Nos. 14-24-02, 03, 04, 05, 06, 07, 08, 09
¶10 (“jurisdiction over an administrative appeal is improper unless
granted by R.C. 119.12 or other specific statutory authority”), quoting
Nkanginieme v. Ohio Dept. of Medicaid, 10th Dist. Franklin No.
14AP-596, 2015-Ohio-656, 29 N.E.3d 281, ¶ 15.
R.C. § 2506.01 is a general statute dealing with appeals from various
bodies. R.C. § 5717.01, on the other hand, is a special statute
specifically dealing with board of revision property valuations and
rights of appeal therefrom. Under such circumstances, R.C. § 5717.01
prevails and is exclusively applicable. As set forth by the Ohio
Supreme Court in Acme Engineering Co. v. Jones (1948), 150 Ohio
St. 423, 83 N.E.2d 202:
A special statutory provision which applies to a specific
subject matter constitutes an exception to a general statutory
provision covering other subjects as well as the specific
subject matter which might otherwise be included under the
general provision. (State, ex rel. Steller et al., Trustees v.
Zangerle, Aud., 100 Ohio St. 414, 126 N.E. 413, and
paragraph one of the syllabus in State, ex rel. Elliott Co. v.
Connar, Supt., 123 Ohio St. 310, 175 N.E. 200, approved and
followed.)
See also Ruprecht v. City of Cincinnati, 64 Ohio App.2d 90, 92–93,
411 N.E.2d 504, 507 (1st Dist.1979).
We further find that the Supreme Court of Ohio’s holdings in Nuspl
v. City of Akron and Anderson v. City of Akron, 61 Ohio St.3d 511,
575 N.E.2d 447 (1991), Sutherland–Wagner v. Brook Park Civil
Service Commission, 32 Ohio St.3d 323, 512 N.E.2d 1170 (1987) and
Walker v. Eastlake (1980), 61 Ohio St.2d 273, 275, 400 N.E.2d 908,
909-910, provide that “an appeal is available from a final order of a
commission of a political subdivision of the state unless another
statute, enacted subsequent to the enactment of R.C. 2506.01, clearly
prohibits the use of this section.” The Nuspl court specifically held
R.C. § 2506.01 “provides an aggrieved party an additional avenue of
relief that is not expressly prohibited by a subsequently enacted
statute.” Id. at 515.
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Case Nos. 14-24-02, 03, 04, 05, 06, 07, 08, 09
Here, we find that R.C. § 5717.01 (and R.C. § 5717.05) was enacted
subsequent to R.C. § 2506.01 and that such statute, through its newly
enacted revisions, prohibits an appeal from a decision of the board of
revision by a board of education to either the BTA or the common
pleas court.
Westerville City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., supra, at ¶¶ 38-44.
{¶16} We find the analysis of the Fifth District to be both thorough and
persuasive, and therefore adopt and incorporate that reasoning in our review of the
cases before us. We further note that the Eighth District Court of Appeals has also
reviewed this issue and similarly held that R.C. 2506.01 does not confer standing
on a school board to appeal a board of revision decision to the court of common
pleas when the school board does not own the real property at issue. Bedford City
Schools Bd. of Edn. v. Cuyahoga Cty. Bd. of Revision, 2014-Ohio-1894 (8th Dist.).
{¶17} For the above-stated reasons, and upon the basis of the authority cited,
we find that R.C. 2506.01 does not confer standing upon the school boards in these
cases to appeal the board of revision decisions to the common pleas court.
{¶18} Thus, having determined that the school boards in these cases are
without standing to appeal pursuant to R.C. 2506.01, we find no error in the trial
court’s decisions dismissing the appeals filed in that court by appellants. The two
assignments of error are overruled.
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Case Nos. 14-24-02, 03, 04, 05, 06, 07, 08, 09
Conclusion
{¶19} Having found no error prejudicial to the appellants in the particulars
assigned and argued, the judgments of the Union County Court of Common Pleas
are affirmed.
Judgments affirmed.
ZIMMERMAN and MILLER, J.J., concur.
/jlm
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