People v. Williams

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF

CALIFORNIA

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

JEREMIAH IRA WILLIAMS,

Defendant and Appellant.

S262229

Fourth Appellate District, Division One

D074098

San Diego County Superior Court

SCD268493

August 29, 2024

Justice Jenkins authored the opinion of the Court, in which

Chief Justice Guerrero and Justices Corrigan, Kruger, Groban,

and Smith concurred.*

Justice Liu filed a dissenting opinion.

*

Associate Justice of the Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate

District, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI,

section 6 of the California Constitution.

PEOPLE v. WILLIAMS

S262229

Opinion of the Court by Jenkins, J.

Under California’s youth offender parole statute (Pen.

Code,1 § 3051), certain persons incarcerated for crimes

committed at a young age may be eligible for early release on

parole. One factor relevant to the decision to release is the

offender’s amenability to rehabilitation based on recognized

attributes of youth. Section 3051, however, expressly excludes

certain groups from its purview, including defendants convicted

of forcible sexual offenses and sentenced under the One Strike

law (§ 667.61). (§ 3051, subd. (h) (§ 3051(h)).) By contrast, those

convicted of murder (aside from young adults convicted of

special circumstance murder) are not categorically excluded.

(People v. Hardin (2024) 15 Cal.5th 834, 843 (Hardin).)

Defendant Jeremiah Ira Williams was sentenced to an

indeterminate prison term of 100 years to life plus 86 years two

months for One Strike offenses he committed when he was 24

years old. Defendant contends that by categorically excluding

young adults convicted of One Strike offenses, but not young

adults convicted of murder without special circumstance, from

the possibility of early release, section 3051 violates the equal

protection guarantee of the federal Constitution. This unequal

treatment, he asserts, is irrational based, in part, on the high

court’s recognition in the Eighth Amendment context that

1

Further statutory references are to the Penal Code unless

otherwise noted.

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“defendants who do not kill, intend to kill, or foresee that life

will be taken are categorically less deserving of the most serious

forms of punishment than are murderers.” (Graham v. Florida

(2010) 560 U.S. 48, 69 (Graham).)

The Court of Appeal rejected defendant’s equal protection

challenge, finding a rational basis for the differential treatment.

For reasons that follow, we affirm the Court of Appeal’s

judgment.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Over two days in the summer of 2016, then 24-year-old

defendant committed numerous sexual offenses against two

female victims in two separate incidents in San Diego.

On the evening of August 13, Doe 1 returned home after

spending the day with friends. As she headed from the garage

to her apartment, a man approached her and asked if she needed

help carrying the items in her hands. She replied, “No.” But he

followed her, claiming he was looking for a friend’s apartment.

As Doe 1 unlocked her front door, the man rushed toward her,

knocked her down, and held a gun to her head while demanding

money. Doe 1 gave him a necklace, her wallet, and cell phone.

He then forced her into her apartment, where he choked her and

demanded money and other valuables.

The man punched Doe 1 in the face, causing her to fall and

fracture her face. He then removed her pants and dragged her

to the bedroom, where he penetrated her vagina with his penis,

digitally penetrated her vagina, and forced her to orally copulate

him. Thereafter, he forced Doe 1 into her shower where he

wiped her bleeding face and vagina with a washcloth. At some

point, the man closed the shower curtain and left the apartment.

Doe 1 remained in the shower for about 20 minutes, not knowing

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if the man was still inside her apartment. She then got out of

the shower, and went to a neighbors’ apartment. She told her

neighbors about the attack, and they drove her to the hospital.

Doe 1 suffered severe physical and psychological trauma.

During the ensuing police investigation, Doe 1 viewed

individuals at a physical lineup but was unable to identify

defendant. She subsequently identified him at the preliminary

hearing as her assailant. Investigators were also able to match

defendant’s DNA to a sample recovered from Doe 1’s bedroom

comforter.

On August 14, the day after Doe 1 was attacked, Doe 2 was

working as a prostitute at a San Diego motel. She had

previously posted an “ad” on the Internet notifying potential

“clients” of her general location. A man contacted Doe 2 and said

he had $200 and wanted an hour of her time. They agreed to

meet that day at Doe 2’s motel room. When he arrived later that

day, he entered Doe 2’s motel room and immediately asked to

use the restroom. When he came out of the bathroom, he

threatened her, asking if she “wanted to die.” At some point, he

grabbed her neck and choked her repeatedly. Doe 2 lost

consciousness. When she awoke, she was bent over on the side

of the bed and felt the man’s penis inside her anus.

She tried to fight the man off, but he continued to choke

her. At one point during the assault, he pulled out a handgun

and struck Doe 2 on the head with it. She broke free and ran to

the window, which she opened and then screamed for help. The

man grabbed some of his belongings and fled the scene. Doe 2

climbed out the window and called an acquaintance, Henry C.,

for help. Henry C. picked her up from the motel and drove her

back to her apartment. She initially declined to go to the

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Opinion of the Court by Jenkins, J.

hospital because she believed she would get in “trouble” for

engaging in prostitution. However, two days after the attack,

she went with Henry C. to the hospital, where she received

treatment and spoke to a police officer about the attack.

Doe 2 later identified defendant in a photographic lineup

as her attacker. The DNA of blood samples taken from

defendant’s handgun and from his chest matched Doe 2’s DNA.

A jewelry box missing from Doe 1’s apartment was found in a

backpack left in Doe 2’s motel room.

After concluding its investigation of the assaults against

Doe 1 and Doe 2, the prosecution filed a 13-count information

charging defendant for offenses perpetrated against both

victims. The information alleged counts for robbery (§ 211;

count 1); making criminal threats (§ 422; counts 2, 8, 9, 11);

forcible rape (§ 261, subd. (a)(2); counts 3, 6); forcible

penetration (§ 289, subd. (a); count 4); forcible oral copulation

(§ 288a, subd. (c)(2)(A); count 5); burglary (§ 459; count 7);

sodomy by use of force (§ 286, subd. (c)(2)(A); count 10); assault

with a firearm (§ 245, subd. (a)(2); count 12); and false

imprisonment by violence, menace, fraud, and deceit (§§ 236,

237, subd (a); count 13). Counts 1 through 8 were alleged to

have been committed against Doe 1, and counts 9 through 13

were alleged to have been committed against Doe 2.

After presentation of evidence and jury deliberations, the

jury found defendant guilty as charged on counts 1 to 9 and 11

to 13, and it found him guilty as to count 10 on the lesser

included offenses of battery and assault (§§ 240, 242). It also

found that he: (1) personally used a firearm as to counts 1, 3, 4,

5, and 6 (§ 12022.53, subd. (b)), and personally used a firearm

as to counts 2, 7, and 11 (§ 12022.5, subd. (a)); (2) kidnapped Doe

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1, committed the offenses against her in the commission of a

burglary, and inflicted great bodily injury on her as to counts 3,

4, 5, and 6 (§§ 667.61, subds. (a), (c), (d), & (e) & 667.5); and (3)

committed the burglary in count 7 with another person present

other than an accomplice (§ 667.5, subd. (c)(21)). The jury did

not find true the multiple victim allegations attached to counts

3 through 6. When he committed the offenses against Doe 1 and

Doe 2, defendant was on felony probation for a 2013 offense of

inflicting corporal injury on an intimate partner. (§ 273.5, subd.

(a).)

Given the nature of counts 3, 4, 5, and 6 as One Strike

offenses under section 667.61, the trial court sentenced

defendant to four consecutive terms of 25 years to life for each

of those counts. It imposed an additional 10 years pursuant to

section 12022.53, subdivision (b) and 5 years pursuant to section

12022.8, for a total of 15 additional years on counts 3 through 6.

With the remaining determinate terms, defendant’s total

sentence was 100 years to life plus 86 years two months. The

court also imposed fines and fees, including restitution to the

two victims.

Defendant appealed, arguing in part that section 3051’s

categorical exclusion of One Strike offenders, which rendered

him ineligible for a youth offender parole hearing, violated his

equal protection rights under the Fourteenth Amendment to the

federal Constitution. The Court of Appeal rejected defendant’s

claim, finding that the “threat of recidivism by violent sexual

offenders” provides a rational basis for the Legislature to

exclude One Strike offenders from section 3051’s early release

provisions. At least one Court of Appeal has reached the

opposite conclusion, sustaining an equal protection challenge to

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Opinion of the Court by Jenkins, J.

section 3051’s exclusion of One Strike offenders. (See People v.

Edwards (2019) 34 Cal.App.5th 183.)

We granted review to resolve this split of authority.

DISCUSSION

A. Section 3051

Section 3051 offers youth offenders committed for long

prison terms an opportunity for early release on parole. It

requires the Board of Parole Hearings (Board) to conduct a

youth offender parole eligibility hearing to determine if, based

on certain criteria involving the “[c]ontrolling offense,”2 the

offender is eligible for parole during the 15th, 20th, or 25th year

of incarceration. (§ 3051, subd. (b)(1)–(4).) The hearing must

“provide for a meaningful opportunity to obtain release” (id.,

subd. (e)), and includes an assessment of the offender’s “growth

and maturity” that “take[s] into consideration the diminished

culpability of youth as compared to that of adults [and] the

hallmark features of youth.” (Id., subd. (f)(1); see 15 Cal. Code

Regs. §§ 2440–2448; § 4801, subd. (c).)

As we recently explained in Hardin, supra, 15 Cal.5th at

pages 843–845, the Legislature initially crafted this early parole

eligibility mechanism for youth offenders in response to

Graham, supra, 560 U.S. 48, Miller v. Alabama (2012) 567 U.S.

460 (Miller), and People v. Caballero (2012) 55 Cal.4th 262

(Caballero). (Stats. 2013, ch. 312, § 1; see generally People v.

Franklin (2016) 63 Cal.4th 261, 277 (Franklin).) In Graham,

the high court held that the Eighth Amendment protection

2

A “[c]ontrolling offense” is defined as “the offense or

enhancement for which any sentencing court imposed the

longest term of imprisonment.” (§ 3051, subd. (a)(2)(B).)

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against cruel and unusual punishment prohibits life without the

possibility of parole (LWOP) sentences for juveniles who commit

nonhomicide crimes before the age of 18. (Graham, supra, 560

U.S. at p. 82.) In reaching this conclusion, the court recognized

that “defendants who do not kill, intend to kill, or foresee that

life will be taken are categorically less deserving of the most

serious forms of punishment than are murderers,” and that

homicide offenses differ “in a moral sense” from nonhomicide

offenses in terms of “ ‘their “severity and irrevocability.” ’ ” (Id.

at p. 69.) The high court concluded that although a state need

not “guarantee eventual freedom” to such juvenile offenders, it

must provide “some meaningful opportunity to obtain release

based on demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation.” (Id. at p.

75.)

Two years later, in Miller, a homicide case involving two

14-year-old defendants, the high court held “that imposition of

a State’s most severe penalties on juvenile offenders cannot

proceed as though they were not children.” (Miller, supra, 567

U.S. at p. 474.) Although rejecting a categorical bar on LWOP

sentences for juveniles convicted of homicide offenses, the court

equated such severe sentences for juveniles to the death penalty

and reaffirmed the principle that individualized sentencing

when meting out a state’s harshest penalties is not only

paramount but is compelled by the Eighth Amendment. (Miller,

at pp. 474–475.) Accordingly, before imposing an LWOP

sentence on a juvenile convicted of a homicide offense, “a judge

or jury must have the opportunity to consider mitigating

circumstances,” including the juvenile’s “chronological age and

its hallmark features” such as “immaturity, impetuosity, and

failure to appreciate risks and consequences.” (Id. at pp. 477,

489.)

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Within months after the high court’s Miller decision, we

considered whether under Graham a 110-year-to-life sentence

imposed on a 16-year-old defendant for nonhomicide offenses

violated the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and

unusual punishment. (Caballero, supra, 55 Cal.4th at p. 265.)

We observed that the juvenile’s lengthy “term-of-years” sentence

“amount[ed] to the functional equivalent of a life without parole

sentence” (id. at 268), and we held that it constituted cruel and

unusual punishment. We therefore reversed the defendant’s

sentence and directed the sentencing court to “consider all

mitigating circumstances attendant in the juvenile’s crime and

life,” including the juvenile’s chronological age and physical and

mental maturity. (Id. at pp. 268–269.)

At the same time, “we urge[d] the Legislature to enact

legislation establishing a parole eligibility mechanism” that

would afford defendants who are effectively serving an LWOP

sentence for nonhomicide offenses committed as a juvenile “with

the opportunity to obtain release on a showing of rehabilitation

and maturity” consistent with the high court’s Eighth

Amendment jurisprudence. (Caballero, supra, 55 Cal.4th at p.

269, fn. 5.) The Legislature responded to our entreaty by

enacting section 3051 in 2013. (Stats. 2013, ch. 312, § 4; see

Franklin, supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 277 [Legislature sought to

“bring juvenile sentencing into conformity with Graham, Miller,

and Caballero”].) The enactment expressly declared the “intent

of the Legislature to create a process by which growth and

maturity of youthful offenders can be assessed and a meaningful

opportunity for release established.” (Stats. 2013, ch. 312, § 1.)

As originally enacted, section 3051 provided youth

offender parole hearings for offenders who were incarcerated for

crimes committed as juveniles under 18 years old. (Former

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§ 3051, subd. (a)(1), added by Stats. 2013, ch. 312, § 4.) This

ceiling tracked the age limitation the high court had imposed in

juvenile sentencing cases. (See Graham, supra, 560 U.S. at p.

74, quoting Roper v. Simmons (2005) 543 U.S. 551, 574 (Roper)

[“ ‘[t]he age of 18 is the point where society draws the line for

many purposes between childhood and adulthood’ ”]; Roper, at

p. 574 [18 years is “the age at which the line for death eligibility

ought to rest”].)

Although the high court has not extended these parole

opportunities to youthful offenders 18 years and older as a

matter of constitutional law (see United States v. Gates (6th Cir.

2022) 48 F.4th 463, 476), our Legislature has done so twice, as

a matter of statutory law, in amendments to section 3051. In

2015, it raised the age of eligibility for youth offender parole

hearings to most offenders under 23 years old (Stats. 2015, ch.

471, § 1), based on then “ ‘[r]ecent neurological research

show[ing] that cognitive brain development continues well

beyond age 18 and into early adulthood.’ ” (Assem. Com. on

Public Safety, Report on Sen. Bill No. 261 (2015–2016 Reg.

Sess.), as amended June 1, 2015, p. 2; see ibid. [“ ‘For boys and

young men in particular, this process [of development] continues

into the mid-20s’ ”].) The Legislature raised the age limit again

in 2017 to include most offenders 25 years old or younger.

(Stats. 2017, ch. 675, § 1.)

Section 3051 “reflects the Legislature’s judgment that 25

years is the maximum amount of time that [most youth]

offender[s] may serve before becoming eligible for parole.”

(Franklin, supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 278; see id. at p. 281 [§ 3051

“effectively reforms the parole eligibility date of a [youth]

offender’s original sentence”].) By superseding the statutorily

mandated sentences of most prisoners who committed their

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controlling offense before the age of 26, section 3051 “changed

the manner in which the [youth] offender’s original sentence

operates by capping the number of years that he or she may be

imprisoned before becoming eligible for release on parole.”

(Franklin, at p. 278.)

Here, defendant was sentenced to an indeterminate term

of 100 years to life plus a consecutive determinate term of 86

years and two months (see §§ 669, subd. (a); 3046, subd. (b)),

making him eligible for parole after serving 186 years of

imprisonment, a term greatly exceeding his life expectancy. If

eligible under section 3051, defendant could seek parole after 25

years of incarceration. (See § 3051, subd. (b)(3).) However,

because he was sentenced under the One Strike law, he is

categorically excluded from seeking early parole under section

3051(h), while some young adult offenders convicted of murder

remain eligible for parole after serving 25 years. Defendant

maintains this unequal treatment of the two types of offenders

has no rational basis and therefore violates the Fourteenth

Amendment’s guarantee of equal protection.3

Subdivision (h) of section 3051 categorically excludes

certain persons from consideration for youth offender parole

hearings. Those ineligible for early parole include offenders

who, like defendant, are sentenced for felony sex crimes under

the One Strike law (§ 667.61); offenders who are sentenced

under the Three Strikes law (§§ 667, subds. (b)–(i), 1170.12);

offenders who are sentenced to life without parole for an offense

3

Defendant did not raise a challenge to his sentence as

violating the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and

unusual punishment.

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committed after turning 18 years old;4 and offenders who,

“subsequent to attaining 26 years of age, commit[] an additional

crime for which malice aforethought is a necessary element of

the crime or for which the individual is sentenced to life in

prison.” (§ 3051(h).) Although the life without parole exclusion

applies to persons convicted of special circumstance murder

committed after the age of 18, other individuals who are

convicted of murder are not categorically excluded; neither are

those who are sentenced under the habitual sexual offender act

(§ 667.71). The statute itself does not explicitly describe the

underlying purpose for section 3051’s enumerated exclusions

(§ 3051(h)). Although the Legislature has amended section 3051

several times, it has maintained the One Strike exclusion since

the section’s enactment in 2013. (See Hardin, supra, 15 Cal.5th

at p. 846.)

Although “parole is a form of punishment accruing directly

from the underlying conviction” (People v. Nuckles (2013) 56

Cal.4th 601, 609), to a youth offender seeking early release

under section 3051, the prospect of parole serves as a form of

dispensation allowing the offender to demonstrate the requisite

maturity and rehabilitation to return to society after years of

incarceration. Specifically, section 3051 offers youth offenders

“a meaningful opportunity” for release (§ 3051, subd. (e)),

requiring the Board to give “great weight to the diminished

4

In 2017, the Legislature amended section 3051 to allow

youth offender hearings for juveniles (those under 18 years of

age) — but not young adults (those 18 to 25 years of age) —

sentenced to LWOP. (See People v. Acosta (2021) 60 Cal.App.5th

769, 777 [amendment sought to bring California into compliance

with Miller’s prohibition of mandatory LWOP sentences on

juvenile offenders, which was made retroactive].)

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culpability of youth as compared to adults, the hallmark

features of youth, and any subsequent growth and increased

maturity” (§ 4801, subd. (c); see § 3051, subd. (e); see also 15 Cal.

Code Regs. §§ 2440–2448 [Regulations on “Parole Consideration

Hearings for Youth Offenders”]; see ante, at p. 6.)

Because section 3051 “create[s] a process by which growth

and maturity of youthful offenders can be assessed and a

meaningful opportunity for release established” (Stats. 2013, ch.

312, § 1), a denial of parole after a section 3051 proceeding

reflects a determination that, among other things, the youthful

offender has not sufficiently matured and rehabilitated to

warrant release. (See Franklin, supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 284

[Board must determine if youth offender is “ ‘fit to rejoin society’

despite having committed a serious crime ‘while he was a child

in the eyes of the law’ ”].) It follows that the Legislature’s

decision to categorically exclude a class of youth offenders from

such parole reflects, in part, its judgment that the excluded

offenders do not have “greater prospects for reform” (Miller,

supra, 567 U.S. at p. 471) and are, therefore, not amenable for

early release.

We bear in mind, however, that while the Legislature’s

primary purpose in expanding youth offender parole eligibility

was to offer certain young adult offenders “the opportunity to

obtain release based on demonstrated growth and

rehabilitation,” the Legislature also had “other, sometimes

competing, concerns, including concerns about culpability and

the appropriate level of punishment for certain very serious

crimes” that informed the statutory framework. (Hardin, supra,

15 Cal.5th at p. 854.) Here, we consider the exclusion of youth

offenders sentenced for a One Strike offense, which may

similarly reflect a range of “penological considerations,

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including rehabilitative and retributive purposes.” (Hardin, at

p. 857.)

With this understanding of the nature of parole eligibility

under section 3051, we now address the One Strike law and its

amendments and explain how young adults sentenced under

that law are precluded from seeking relief under section 3051.

B. One Strike Law and Its Amendments

The One Strike law provides an alternative, harsher

sentencing scheme for enumerated forcible sex offenses —

including rape, rape or sexual penetration in concert, lewd or

lascivious acts, forcible sexual penetration, sodomy, oral

copulation, or continuous sexual abuse of a child — that are

committed under specified circumstances. (§ 667.61, as

amended by Prop. 83, § 12, as approved by voters, Gen. Elec.

(Nov. 7, 2006), eff. Nov. 8, 2006; see People v. Acosta (2002) 29

Cal.4th 105, 118 (Acosta); People v. Anderson (2009) 47 Cal.4th

92, 102, 108 [“a One Strike allegation exposes a defendant to

greater punishment than would be authorized by a verdict on

the offense alone”].)

Enacted in 1994, the One Strike law sought “to ensure

serious and dangerous sex offenders would receive lengthy

prison sentences upon their first conviction . . . where the nature

or method of the sex offense ‘place[d] the victim in a position of

elevated vulnerability.’ ” (People v. Palmore (2000) 79

Cal.App.4th 1290, 1296, quoting Assem. Com. on Pub. Safety,

Analysis of Sen. Bill No. 26 (1993–1994 1st Ex. Sess.) as

amended May 25, 1994, pp. 2–3.) “ ‘Violent sexual predators

should not be given the opportunity to repeat their crimes. Since

most rapists and child molesters cannot be cured of the aberrant

compulsions, they should not be eligible for probation under any

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circumstances, and their punishment must be separation from

society for life without the possibility of parole.’ ” (Sen. Com. on

Judiciary, Analysis of Sen. Bill No. 26 (1993–1994 1st Ex. Sess.)

as introduced Feb. 2, 1994; see People v. Wutzke (2002) 28

Cal.4th 923, 929–930 (Wutzke).) To implement this purpose, the

One Strike law authorizes lengthy sentences for both “recidivist

sexual offenders and first time offenders who commit certain

sexual offenses under aggravated circumstances.” (People v.

Hammer (2003) 30 Cal.4th 756, 768 (Hammer).)

The One Strike law applies if a trier of fact, upon

convicting a defendant of a triggering offense, also finds true at

least one circumstance specified in subdivisions (d) or (e) of

section 667.61. The specified circumstances, other than prior

convictions (§ 667.61, subd. (d)(1)), relate to the manner in

which the defendant committed the present offense. (See, e.g.,

§ 667.61, subds. (d)(2)–(d)(7) & (e)(1)–(e)(7); see Wutzke, supra,

28 Cal.4th at p. 930 [“Many of these circumstances reflect the

use of violent or predatory means that increase the victim’s

‘vulnerability’ ”]; see also Acosta, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 127.)

In general, the length of a One Strike term depends on the

number and nature of applicable aggravating circumstances

found by the trier of fact. (See § 661.67, subds. (a), (b), (j), (l),

(m).) For instance, a defendant who commits a particular

offense “under one or more of the circumstances specified in

subdivision (d)” of section 667.61 or “under two or more of the

circumstances specified in subdivision (e)” of that section, is

sentenced to 25 years to life. (§ 667.61, subd. (a); see Acosta,

supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 111.) Alternatively, a defendant who

commits a particular offense under only “one of the

circumstances specified in subdivision (e)” is sentenced to 15

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years to life. (§ 667.61, subd. (b); see Acosta, at p. 111.)5

Through the years, the electorate and the Legislature —

concerned about the high rate of recidivism among sex

offenders — have increased the penalties and expanded the

scope of those eligible to be sentenced under the One Strike law.

For example, in 2006, the electorate passed Proposition

83, which amended, among other statutes, the Sexually Violent

Predator Act (SVPA) and the One Strike law.6 (Prop. 83, § 12,

supra.) The initiative was titled “The Sexual Predator

Punishment and Control Act: Jessica’s Law” (Proposition 83 or

Jessica’s Law). Its Findings and Declarations explained: “Sex

offenders have very high recidivism rates. . . . [They] are the

least likely to be cured and the most likely to reoffend, and they

prey on the most innocent members of our society. More than

two-thirds of the victims of rape and sexual assault are under

the age of 18. Sex offenders have a dramatically higher

recidivism rate for their crimes than any other type of violent

5

Originally, the One Strike law provided that the

defendant “shall be punished by imprisonment in the state

prison for life and shall not be eligible for release on parole for”

15 or 25 years. As we shall discuss, the statute now also

authorizes LWOP sentences. (§ 667.61, subds. (j)(1), (l); Stats.

2010, ch. 219, § 6.)

6

Months before the initiative’s passage, the Governor

signed the Sex Offender Punishment, Control, and Containment

Act of 2006 (Sen. Bill No. 1128 (2005–2006 Reg. Sess.)), as

urgency legislation that took immediate effect. (See Bourquez

v. Superior Court (2007) 156 Cal.App.4th 1275, 1280.) Senate

Bill No. 1128 and Proposition 83 made similar changes to

section 667.61, and do not differ in ways that are relevant to the

issue at hand.

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felon.” (Voter Information Guide, Gen. Elec. (Nov. 7, 2006) text

of Prop. 83, p. 127 (Voter Information Guide on Prop. 83).)

Regarding the One Strike law, Proposition 83 expanded its

scope by adding the offense of continuous sexual abuse of a child

(§ 288.5) to the list of offenses eligible for One Strike sentencing

(§ 667.61, subd. (c)(9), as amended by Prop. 83, § 12, supra). It

also added two new circumstances to subdivisions (d) and (e),

respectively, to enhance a defendant’s sentence under the One

Strike law. (Former § 667.61, subds. (d)(5) [defendant

committed violation of §§ 264.1, 286, subd. (d), or former § 288a,

subd. (d), and in committing that offense, also committed any

act described in (2), (3), or (4) of this subdivision]; (e)(8)

[defendant committed violation of §§ 264.1, 286, subd. (d), or

former § 288a, subd. (d), and in committing that offense, also

committed any act described in (1), (2), (3), (4), (6) or (7) of this

subdivision].)

Several years after the voters’ passage of Jessica’s Law,

the Legislature passed the “Chelsea King Child Predator

Prevention Act of 2010” (Chelsea’s Law), making more

significant changes to the One Strike law and other statutes

governing sex offenses. (Stats. 2010, ch. 219, §§ 1, 16; see People

v. Soto (2011) 51 Cal.4th 229, 237, fn. 4.) Chelsea’s Law greatly

enhanced One Strike sentences for all nine triggering offenses,

except a lewd and lascivious act on a child (§ 288, subd. (a)),

based on the victim’s age. (See § 667.61, subd. (j)(1) & (2).)

Accordingly, under Chelsea’s Law, if the victim was a minor

under 14 years of age at the time of the offense, the perpetrator’s

sentence would increase to either 25 years to life or LWOP

depending on the nature and number of the aggravating

circumstances and the defendant’s age. (Compare § 667.61,

subd. (j)(1) & (2) with § 667.61, subds. (a), (b); see People v. Betts

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(2020) 55 Cal.App.5th 294, 301 [§ 667.61 is a “multitiered

sentencing scheme”].) If the victim was a minor 14 years or

older, the defendant likewise was subject to 25 years to life or

LWOP for certain types of offenses. (§ 667.61, subds. (l), (m),

(n).) In addition to these increased sentences, Chelsea’s Law

added two new circumstances to subdivision (d)’s list of

aggravating factors. (§ 667.61, subd. (d)(6) [personal infliction

of “great bodily injury”], (d)(7) [personal infliction of “bodily

harm” against a minor under age 14].)

Observing that “current California law does not

acknowledge or adjust for the true nature of the sexual violent

predator that attacks children,” the legislative history of

Chelsea’s Law explained that One Strike offenders who commit

“the most serious and heinous sex crimes against children are

not able to be rehabilitated” and that these crimes “are a red flag

that the perpetrator is capable of much, much worse.” (Assem.

Com. on Public Safety, Analysis of Assem. Bill No. 1844 (2009–

2010 Reg. Sess.), as amended Apr. 13, 2010, pp. 13; see Sen.

Com. on Public Safety, Analysis of Assem. Bill No. 1844 (2009–

2010 Reg. Sess.), as amended June 2, 2010, p. 17 [offenders

should be “locked up for life without the possibility of parole”].)

Significantly, the Legislature recognized that Chelsea’s Law

would “punish specified sex offenders more severely than

individuals convicted of first-degree, premeditated murder.”

(Assem. Com. on Public Safety, Analysis of Assem. Bill No. 1844,

supra, p. 14.)

C. Facial or As-Applied Challenge

As a threshold matter, we address whether defendant is

contesting the constitutionality of section 3051 as applied or on

its face. Consistent with our grant of review, defendant

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challenges section 3051 insofar as it excludes young adults

sentenced under the One Strike law. In this regard, he appears

to be making an as-applied challenge, which seeks “relief from a

specific application of a facially valid statute or ordinance to an

individual or class of individuals who are under allegedly

impermissible present restraint or disability as a result of the

manner or circumstances in which the statute or ordinance has

been applied.” (Tobe v. City of Santa Ana (1995) 9 Cal.4th 1069,

1084 (Tobe), italics added.)

However, defendant’s counsel asserted at oral argument

that defendant is making a facial challenge to section 3051. “A

facial challenge to the constitutional validity of a statute or

ordinance considers only the text of the measure itself, not its

application to the particular circumstances of an individual.”

(Tobe, supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 1084.) To succeed on such a

challenge, and thus void the statute as a whole, it is not enough

to show “ ‘ “that in some future hypothetical situation

constitutional problems may possibly arise as to the particular

application of the statute . . . . Rather, petitioners must

demonstrate that the act’s provisions inevitably pose a present

total and fatal conflict with applicable constitutional

prohibitions.” ’ ” (Ibid.; see People v. Martinez (2023) 15 Cal.5th

326, 338 [“To prevail on a facial challenge, litigants must show

that the challenged rule creates constitutional problems in ‘at

least “ ‘the generality’ ” [citation] or “vast majority” ’ of cases”].)

Ultimately, even if defendant is making a facial claim in

addition to an as-applied claim, our resolution of the latter may

dispose of the former. If defendant cannot demonstrate that the

law is unconstitutional as applied to him and others similarly

situated, he has necessarily failed to demonstrate that the law

is unconstitutional on its face. (Cf. Fusaro v. Howard (4th Cir.

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2021) 19 F.4th 357, 373–374; United States v. Decastro (2d Cir.

2012) 682 F.3d 160, 163; Harris v. Mexican Specialty Foods, Inc.

(11th Cir. 2009) 564 F.3d 1301, 1313 [“Th[e] mere possibility of

a constitutional application is enough to defeat a facial

challenge to [a] statute”].)

Because consideration of defendant’s claim as a facial or

as-applied challenge does not determine the outcome here, we

proceed to the substance of defendant’s equal protection claim.

D. The Applicable Equal Protection Framework

Defendant asserts that section 3051’s exclusion of young

adults sentenced under the One Strike law violates equal

protection. He maintains that there is neither a rational basis

nor a compelling state interest for excluding young adults

sentenced under the One Strike law but not excluding young

adults convicted of murder without special circumstance from

youth offender parole hearings provided by section 3051. In

support of his claim, he leverages the high court’s

pronouncement made in the context of an Eighth Amendment

cruel and unusual punishment challenge that “defendants who

do not kill, intend to kill, or foresee that life will be taken are

categorically less deserving of the most serious forms of

punishment than are murderers.” (Graham, supra, 560 U.S. at

p. 69.) Defendant observes that because he was convicted of

sexual offenses and sentenced under the One Strike law, he is

categorically ineligible for a youth offender parole hearing.

(§ 3051(h).) Had he been convicted of murder instead of One

Strike sexual offenses, and assuming no other exclusions

applied, he would have been eligible for such a hearing after 25

years of incarceration. This unequal treatment, defendant

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asserts, is in direct tension with the high court’s statement in

Graham.

The Attorney General counters that a plausible basis for a

legislative classification is sufficient to overcome an equal

protection challenge and that the Legislature could rationally

exclude One Strike offenders from early release under section

3051 based on a combination of factors: the increased risk of

recidivism that One Strike offenders pose and the aggravated

nature of their offenses. (See Hammer, supra, 30 Cal.4th at p.

768.) These concerns, the Attorney General asserts, provide at

least a “plausible” basis for the disparity in treatment, “ ‘ “the

wisdom, fairness or logic” ’ ” of which a court “may not second-

guess.” (Johnson v. Department of Justice (2015) 60 Cal.4th 871,

881 (Johnson).) Because these rationales plausibly support the

Legislature’s exclusion of One Strike offenders from the youth

offender parole statute, the Attorney General argues that

defendant’s equal protection challenge to section 3051(h) must

fail.

Under the Equal Protection clause of the Fourteenth

Amendment to the federal Constitution, no state may “deny to

any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the

laws.” (U.S. Const., 14th Amend.) “[T]he requirement of equal

protection ensures that the government does not treat a group

of people unequally without some justification.” (People v.

Chatman (2018) 4 Cal.5th 277, 288 (Chatman).) “Equal

protection does not require that all persons be dealt with

identically, but it does require that a distinction made have

some relevance to the purpose for which the classification is

made.” (Baxtrom v. Herold (1966) 383 U.S. 107, 111.) “Unlike

other provisions of the Constitution, the Equal Protection

Clause confers no substantive rights and creates no substantive

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liberties. The function of the Equal Protection Clause, rather,

is simply to measure the validity of classifications created by

state laws.” (San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez

(1973) 411 U.S. 1, 59 (conc. opn. of Stewart, J.) (Rodriguez), fn.

omitted.)

In resolving an equal protection challenge, we apply

different levels of scrutiny depending on the type of

classification involved. (People v. Wilkinson (2004) 33 Cal.4th

821, 836 (Wilkinson).) “ ‘At a minimum, a statutory

classification must be rationally related to a legitimate

governmental purpose.’ ” (Ibid.) If the unequal treatment

involves a suspect class or fundamental right, then we apply

strict scrutiny and “ ‘ “the state bears the burden of establishing

not only that it has a compelling interest which justifies the law

but that the distinctions drawn by the law are necessary to

further its purpose.” [Citation.]’ ” (Warden v. State Bar (1999)

21 Cal.4th 628, 641.) “The general rule is that legislation is

presumed to be valid and will be sustained if the classification

drawn by the statute is rationally related to a legitimate state

interest.” (City of Cleburne, Tex. v. Cleburne Living Center

(1985) 473 U.S. 432, 440.) The question we must answer is

“whether a statutory distinction is so devoid of even minimal

rationality that it is unconstitutional as a matter of equal

protection.” (Chatman, supra, 4 Cal.5th at p. 289.)

Defendant does not contend that offenders sentenced

under the One Strike law constitute a suspect class; nor does the

right to early release on parole involve a fundamental

constitutional right. (See Jackson v. Jamrog (6th Cir. 2005) 411

F.3d 615, 619 [“there is no fundamental right to parole under

the federal Constitution”].) Nevertheless, defendant asserts

that strict scrutiny applies here because the challenged law

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“determines the length of incarceration” and directly impacts

“the loss of personal liberty,” which is a “fundamental interest.”

He relies, in part, on our statement in People v. Olivas (1976) 17

Cal.3d 236, 251 (Olivas) that “personal liberty is a fundamental

interest, second only to life itself, as an interest protected under

both the California and United States Constitutions.”

We reject defendant’s argument for applying strict

scrutiny to the classification at issue for the same reasons we

rejected a similar argument in Wilkinson. There, the defendant

made an equal protection challenge to the statutory scheme

governing the offense of battery on a custodial officer (see former

§§ 243, 243.1), claiming “it allows the ‘lesser’ offense of battery

without injury to be punished more severely than the ‘greater’

offense of battery with injury” (Wilkinson, supra, 33 Cal.4th at

p. 838). We concluded that rational basis review applied to the

claim because a defendant “ ‘does not have a fundamental

interest in a specific term of imprisonment or in the designation

a particular crime receives.’ ” (Ibid.) We explained that Olivas’s

language should not be interpreted so broadly as to require

strict scrutiny “whenever one challenges upon equal protection

grounds a penal statute or statutes that authorize different

sentences for comparable crimes, because such statutes always

implicate the right to ‘personal liberty’ of the affected

individuals.” (Id. at p. 837.) Indeed, we cautioned that

“[a]pplication of the strict scrutiny standard in this context

would be incompatible with the broad discretion the Legislature

traditionally has been understood to exercise in defining crimes

and specifying punishment.” (Id. at p. 838.)

More recently, in Hardin, supra, 15 Cal.5th at page 847,

after defendant conceded that the rational basis test applied, we

addressed his equal protection challenge to section 3051 similar

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to the one defendant makes here. (See Hardin, supra, 15

Cal.5th at p. 847.) The defendant in Hardin challenged section

3051’s disparate treatment of young adults sentenced to LWOP

for special circumstance murder and of young adults sentenced

to life with the possibility of parole. Applying the rational basis

test, we concluded the Legislature acted rationally by singling

out special circumstance murder as a particularly culpable

offense and making those convicted of that crime ineligible for

early release. (Hardin, at p. 862.) Consistent with Hardin, we

apply the deferential rational basis test in resolving defendant’s

equal protection claim. (See id. at p. 847.)

Traditionally, the rational basis test has been described as

a two-part inquiry, with courts “first ask[ing] whether the state

adopted a classification affecting two or more groups that are

similarly situated in an unequal manner,” and then

“ ‘consider[ing] whether the challenged classification’ is

adequately justified,” i.e., whether it “ ‘bears a rational

relationship to a legitimate state purpose.’ ” (Hardin, supra, 15

Cal.5th at p. 848.) However, in Hardin we held that “when

plaintiffs challenge laws drawing distinctions between

identifiable groups or classes of persons, on the basis that the

distinctions drawn are inconsistent with equal protection,

courts no longer need to ask at the threshold whether the two

groups are similarly situated for purposes of the law in

question.” (Id. at p. 850.) That holding applies in this case,

where the issue presented is whether section 3051(h) violates

equal protection “by excluding young adults convicted and

sentenced for serious sex crimes under the One Strike law

(§ 667.61) from youth offender parole consideration, while young

adults convicted of first degree murder are entitled to such

consideration.” We thus proceed directly to the question

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whether the unequal treatment bears a rational relationship to

a legitimate state purpose.

As in Hardin, the following principles guide our analysis

of that question: “[W]e presume that a given statutory

classification is valid ‘until the challenger shows that no rational

basis for the unequal treatment is reasonably conceivable.’

[Citation.] The underlying rationale for a statutory

classification need not have been ‘ever actually articulated’ by

lawmakers, nor ‘be empirically substantiated.’ [Citation.]

Evaluating potential justifications for disparate treatment, a

court reviewing a statute under this standard must ‘treat the

statute’s potential logic and assumptions far more permissively

than with other standards of constitutional or regulatory

review.’ [Citation.] ‘If a plausible basis exists for the disparity,

courts may not second-guess its “ ‘wisdom, fairness, or logic.’ ”

[Citation.] ‘[T]he logic behind a potential justification need [not]

be persuasive or sensible — rather than simply rational.’ ”

(Hardin, supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 852.) “[T]his high bar helps

ensure that democratically enacted laws are not invalidated

merely based on a court’s cursory conclusion that a statute’s

tradeoffs seem unwise or unfair.” (Chatman, supra, 4 Cal.5th

at p. 289.)

This deferential standard also reflects the Legislature’s

“considerable latitude in defining and setting the consequences

of criminal offenses.” (Johnson, supra, 60 Cal.4th at p. 887.) To

that end, “ ‘[w]hen conducting rational basis review, we must

accept any gross generalizations and rough accommodations

that the Legislature seems to have made.’ [Citation.] ‘A

classification is not arbitrary or irrational simply because there

is an “ ‘imperfect fit between means and ends’ ” [citations], or

‘because it may be “to some extent both underinclusive and

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overinclusive.” ’ ” (Ibid.) “Nothing compels the state ‘to choose

between attacking every aspect of a problem or not attacking the

problem at all’ ” [Citation.] Far from having to ‘solve all related

ills at once’ [citation], the Legislature has ‘broad discretion’ to

proceed in an incremental and uneven manner without

necessarily engaging in arbitrary and unlawful discrimination.”

(People v. Barrett (2012) 54 Cal.4th 1081, 1110 (Barrett).)

However, we have cautioned that “ ‘the realities of the

subject matter cannot be completely ignored.’ ” (Johnson, supra,

60 Cal.4th at p. 881; see Heller v. Doe (1993) 509 U.S. 312, 321

(Heller) [“standard of rationality . . . must find some footing in

the realities of the subject addressed by the legislation”].) The

statutory classification must be rationally related to

“ ‘realistically conceivable legislative purpose[s],’ ” and may not

be based on “invented fictitious purposes that could not have

been within the contemplation of the Legislature.” (Fein v.

Permanente Medical Group (1985) 38 Cal.3d 137, 163 (Fein); see

ibid. [Legislature reasonably limited noneconomic damages to

$250,000 based on “unpredictability of the size of large

noneconomic damages awards”].)

E. Defendant’s Equal Protection Claim

Defendant’s constitutional challenge to section 3051’s One

Strike exclusion is premised on (1) the seriousness of a One

Strike offense as compared to that of first degree murder, which

is not categorically excluded under section 3051, and (2) the

recidivism risk of One Strike offenders when compared to other

defendants who are not similarly excluded under section 3051,

such as habitual sexual offenders. We address each aspect of

this argument in turn.

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First, defendant maintains that there is no rational basis

to exclude One Strike offenders but not those convicted of first

degree murder from parole eligibility consideration because the

high court made clear in Graham that homicide offenses differ

“in a moral sense” from nonhomicide offenses in terms of “ ‘their

“severity and irrevocability.” ’ ” (Graham, supra, 560 U.S. at p.

69.) Defendant suggests that our decision in People v. Contreras

(2018) 4 Cal.5th 349 (Contreras), which referred to the high

court’s observations in Graham, presaged the equal protection

argument he presses here.

In Contreras, we addressed the constitutional implications

under the Eighth Amendment of sentencing two juvenile

defendants convicted of One Strike offenses to 50-year-to-life

terms, which we deemed to be the functional equivalent of

LWOP. (Contreras, supra, 4 Cal.5th at pp. 371–372.) Because

the defendants’ One Strike convictions made them statutorily

ineligible for a youth offender parole hearing under section 3051

(see § 3051(h)), we concluded that our then recent decision in

Franklin, supra, 63 Cal.4th 261 — which held that the

availability of a section 3051 parole eligibility hearing rendered

the defendant’s lengthy sentence “ ‘neither LWOP nor its

functional equivalent’ ” — did not apply. (Contreras, at p. 359.)

Absent the availability of a section 3051 hearing, we concluded

in Contreras that the defendants’ sentences violated the Eighth

Amendment under standards set forth in Graham. (Contreras,

at p. 379.)

As relevant to defendant’s equal protection claim here, at

the end of our Contreras opinion, we noted the defendants’

contention that it was “anomalous” to exclude juvenile One

Strike offenders from section 3051’s purview, while not

excluding juvenile offenders convicted of special circumstance

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murder and sentenced to LWOP. (Contreras, supra, 4 Cal.5th

at p. 382.) We commented that this exclusion of One Strike

offenders “appears at odds” with the high court’s statement in

Graham that nonhomicide offenses are “ ‘less deserving of the

most serious forms of punishment’ ” than murder, and we also

underscored that no other Penal Code provision “treats a

nonhomicide offense more harshly than special circumstance

murder.” (Contreras, supra, 4 Cal.5th at p. 382.) Notably, we

declined to resolve this potential constitutional issue, while

suggesting that the “current penal scheme for juveniles may

warrant additional legislative attention.” (Ibid.) We similarly

decline to consider the issue or its import in this case, which

involves young adults and not juveniles, who are

“constitutionally different” from adults for purposes of

sentencing. (Miller, supra, 567 U.S. at p. 471; Graham, supra,

560 U.S. at p. 74 [“ ‘age of 18 is the point where society draws

the line for many purposes between childhood and adulthood’ ”];

Contreras, supra, 4 Cal.5th at p. 371 [recognizing high court

drew a “ ‘clear line’ ” between juveniles and adults].)

Acknowledging that Graham and Miller are not

controlling because they were Eighth Amendment cases dealing

with the sentencing of juveniles rather than young adults,

defendant nevertheless insists that growing scientific research

“has established a sound basis for extending [the] principles” of

these cases “to young offenders up to the age of 25.” (See Miller,

supra, 567 U.S. at p. 483 [“the principle of Roper, Graham, and

our individualized sentencing cases [is] that youth matters for

purposes of meting out the law’s most serious punishments”].)

Defendant further asserts that our Legislature has already

acknowledged such research by expanding section 3051 parole

eligibility to include young adults between the ages of 18 to 25

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years old. He asks us to similarly hold, based on our

Legislature’s acknowledgement of this research, that the

Legislature is required to treat young adults the same as it

treats juveniles for purposes of the equal protection issue now

before us. We decline to do so.

Our decision in Hardin rejected a similar argument and

provides useful guidance in analyzing defendant’s claim here.

(Hardin, supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 846.) In Hardin, the defendant

argued that section 3051 violated equal protection because it

excluded young adult offenders sentenced to LWOP for special

circumstance murder, but not other young adult offenders

serving parole-eligible sentences for other crimes. The

defendant asserted that when the Legislature decided to extend

section 3051’s reach of early parole eligibility to young adults,

“it could not rationally treat those sentenced to life without the

possibility of parole differently from those convicted of other

serious crimes and serving lengthy parole-eligible sentences.”

(Hardin, at p. 846.) “Once the Legislature decided to include

one class of young adult offenders,” the defendant argued, “it

was obligated to include both.” (Ibid.)

Rejecting the defendant’s argument, we first explained

that the Legislature was under no “constitutional compulsion”

to include young adults up to the age of 25 within section 3051’s

purview, but that it “chose to” do so based on scientific evidence

that neurological development “continues beyond adolescence

and into the mid-20’s.” (Hardin, supra, 15 Cal.5th at pp. 846,

866.) We next explained that the Legislature, having made that

choice, was not thereby constitutionally obligated to treat all

such offenders the same, regardless of the severity or nature of

their crimes, the degree of culpability those crimes

demonstrated, the prospects for rehabilitation, or the sentence

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imposed. (Id. at pp. 855–858.) In expanding section 3051 to

include young adult offenders, the Legislature did not have “ ‘a

single purpose’ ” in mind (id. at p. 853); rather, it “sought to

balance” the statute’s “primary objective” — “giv[ing] these

young persons the opportunity to obtain release based on

demonstrated growth and rehabilitation” — “with other,

sometimes competing, concerns, including concerns about

culpability and the appropriate level of punishment for certain

very serious crimes.” (Id. at p. 854.) “In other words, in

designing section 3051, the Legislature consciously drew lines

that altered the parole component of offenders’ sentences based

not only on the age of the offender (and thus the offender’s

amenability to rehabilitation) but also on the offense and

sentence imposed. The lines the Legislature drew necessarily

reflect a set of legislative judgments about the nature of

punishment that is appropriate for the crime.” (Id. at p. 855.)

Because these “legislative policy choices” are not “irrational,”

they are not “impermissible as a matter of equal protection.” (Id.

at p. 840.)

Regarding the One Strike exclusion at issue here, we

agree with the Attorney General that the Legislature could

rationally exclude One Strike offenders from early parole under

section 3051 based on a combination of concerns: the increased

risk of recidivism that One Strike offenders pose and the

aggravated nature of their offenses.7 It is true that nothing in

7

The dissent tries to cast these twin concerns as part of an

esoteric formulation “(offense severity x recidivism risk)”

designed and “tailor-made to sustain the One Strike exclusion.”

(Dis. opn. of Liu, J., post, at p. 21.) We disagree. These concerns

are conventional “penological considerations” that reflect

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section 3051’s legislative history specifically references the

reason for the One Strike exclusion. But it is well established

that an equal protection claim subject to rational basis review

does not rise or fall based on whether lawmakers expressly

articulated the purpose they sought to achieve with the

challenged legislation. (See ante, at p. 24.) A court conducting

such review “may engage in ‘ “rational speculation” ’ as to the

justifications for the legislative choice [citation] ‘whether or not’

any such speculation has ‘a foundation in the record.’ ” (People

v. Turnage (2012) 55 Cal.4th 62, 75 (Turnage); see Heller, supra,

509 U.S. at p. 320 [state need not “produce evidence to sustain

the rationality of a statutory classification”].)

For example, in Hardin, we identified the rational basis

for the LWOP exclusion there at issue — not in any statutory

language or legislative history explicitly explaining the reason

for the exclusion — but more broadly in the “statutory

framework” (Hardin, supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 855) embodying

“longstanding [legislative] judgments about the seriousness of”

the crimes that authorized an LWOP sentence “and, relatedly,

the punishment for them” (id. at p. 853). This framework, we

reasoned, reflects that the Legislature in enacting section 3051,

“aimed to increase opportunities for meaningful release for

young adult offenders, while taking into account the appropriate

punishment for the underlying crimes, depending on their

severity.” (Hardin, at p. 855.)

So too here, it is not difficult to perceive the basis for the

Legislature’s exclusion of One Strike offenders, particularly

given what is well known about the history of, and motivations

“rehabilitative and retributive purposes.” (Hardin, supra, 15

Cal.5th at p. 857.)

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underlying, the enactment and amendment of the One Strike

law. Contrary to our dissenting colleague’s suggestion (dis. opn.

of Liu, J., post, at pp. 17–18), because the Legislature expressly

incorporated the One Strike law as an exclusion to early parole

eligibility under section 3051, the Legislature is presumed to be

aware of the concerns addressed by the One Strike law

identified not only in its legislative history, including to ensure

that dangerous sex offenders who committed their offenses

under aggravated circumstances would be subject to lengthy

prison terms (see ante, at pp. 13–17), but also in decisions

interpreting that law (see, e.g., Wutzke, supra, 28 Cal.4th at pp.

929–930; Hammer, supra, 30 Cal.4th at p. 768). (Cf. Lorillard

v. Pons (1978) 434 U.S. 575, 581 [when “Congress adopts a new

law incorporating sections of a prior law, Congress normally can

be presumed to have had knowledge of the interpretation given

to the incorporated law, at least insofar as it affects the new

statute”]; see Williams v. Garcetti (1993) 5 Cal.4th 561, 572 [we

commonly “ ‘assume that in passing a statute the Legislature

acted with full knowledge of the state of the law at the time’ ”].)

As section 667.61’s legislative history discloses, the

Legislature had significant concerns regarding recidivism of

One Strike offenders and the serious nature of the offenses they

commit. As explained, before section 3051’s enactment in 2013,

the One Strike law’s reach was expanded twice: by the

electorate’s passage of Jessica’s Law in 2006 and the

Legislature’s enactment of Chelsea’s Law in 2010. The relevant

legislative history expressly identified the nature and

seriousness of the triggering offenses in combination with

significant recidivism concerns as the reason for these

amendments. For instance, the Voter Information Guide on

Proposition 83 and Jessica’s Law underscored that sex offenders

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have “very high recidivism rates,” “are the least likely to be

cured and the most likely to reoffend, and they prey on the most

innocent members of our society.” (Voter Information Guide on

Prop. 83, supra, text of Prop. 83, at p. 127; see ante, at p. 15.)

Likewise, legislative analyses of Chelsea’s Law explained that

sex offenders who commit “the most serious and heinous sex

crimes against children are not able to be rehabilitated” and

that these crimes “are a red flag that the perpetrator is capable

of much, much worse.” (Assem. Com. on Public Safety, Analysis

of Assem. Bill No. 1844, as amended Apr. 13, 2010, p. 18.)8

The Legislature could rationally conclude, based on its

view that a One Strike sex offender’s risk of recidivism is high,

that rehabilitation is unlikely, and therefore these offenders

would not likely be eligible for parole, much less early parole

under section 3051. With this understanding, the Legislature

crafted section 3051(h), balancing a young adult’s capacity for

growth and rehabilitation against the set of concerns that had

prompted the enactment and amendment of the One Strike law

and ultimately deciding that those concerns militate against

offering the possibility of early parole under section 3051.

The exclusion of One Strike offenders from section 3051,

in other words, reflects a legislative judgment that extending

8

The fact that defendant’s victims were not minors does not

foreclose a finding that the Legislature had recidivism concerns,

both about One Strike offenders generally and in particular

those who sexually assaulted children, which provide a rational

basis for the One Strike exclusion. “When conducting rational

basis review . . . [a] plausible reason for distinguishing between

[two groups of individuals] need not exist in every scenario in

which the statutes might apply.” (Turnage, supra, 55 Cal.4th at

pp. 77–78.)

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the possibility of early release to young adult One Strike

offenders would be neither productive nor appropriate. Insofar

as the One Strike law itself reflects significant concerns about

the risk of reoffending, this judgment is consistent with the

common sense view that a defendant who reoffends after a prior

conviction is “less amenable to rehabilitation than a person who

has not done so.” (People v. Towne (2008) 44 Cal.4th 63, 80.)

The judgment that One Strike offenders are less amenable to

rehabilitation is necessarily a generalization — perhaps not

applicable to every person sentenced under the One Strike

law — but it is one the Legislature is entitled to make. (See

Turnage, supra, 55 Cal.4th at p. 77 [“When conducting rational

basis review, we must accept any gross generalizations and

rough accommodations that the Legislature seems to have

made”].)

Excluding youthful One Strike offenders from early parole

consideration is also consistent with the Legislature’s apparent

concern with protecting the public from persons who have

committed serious sex offenses, given the risk of reoffense.

These concerns are “realistically conceivable” and provide a

rational basis for section 3051’s One Strike exclusion. (Fein,

supra, 38 Cal.3d at p. 163.) We also underscore that defendant

does not point to any evidence that the Legislature had similar

recidivism concerns about the class of offenders who commit

murder or that the offense of murder necessarily includes

aggravating factors like those outlined in section 667.61. We

must uphold the Legislature’s classification against an equal

protection challenge unless “it fairly can be said that there is no

‘reasonably conceivable state of facts that could provide a

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rational basis for the classification.’ ” (Warden v. State Bar,

supra, 21 Cal.4th at p. 645.)9

We make a final observation about defendant’s

comparison between a homicide offense and a One Strike offense

before we address defendant’s argument based on the

comparative recidivism rates of groups of offenders. (See post at

p. 39.) Defendant insists that it is irrational to exclude One

Strike offenders but not those convicted of murder from early

parole consideration because the high court deemed murder not

only fundamentally different “in a moral sense” from other

serious offenses, but also incomparable in terms of its “ ‘severity

and irrevocability.” ’ ” (Graham, supra, 560 U.S. at p. 69.) This

argument based on the comparative seriousness of crimes,

however, is premised on concerns relevant in the context of

Eighth Amendment challenges to the death penalty and other

severe criminal penalties, such as juvenile LWOP; such

concerns do not necessarily establish whether a Legislature’s

classification violates equal protection under a rational basis

9

Contrary to our dissenting colleague’s assertion, our

holding here is not inconsistent or in tension with our holding in

Hardin, which dealt with a different exclusion in section

3051(h). (Hardin, supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 839; see dis. opn. of

Liu, J., post, at p. 16.) In Hardin, we rejected the premise that

“ ‘there was only a single purpose underlying’ section 3051”

(Hardin, at p. 853), and instead recognized that section 3051,

like most legislation, reflected multiple objectives. What is true

of section 3051 as a whole is likewise true of its exclusions; there

is no reason to suppose that the Legislature crafted each

exclusion with precisely identical penological interests in mind.

Indeed, we underscored that “ ‘the equal protection clause does

not preclude a . . . legislative measure that is aimed at achieving

multiple objectives, even when such objectives in some respects

may be in tension or conflict.’ ” (Hardin, at p. 854.)

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standard. We acknowledge that section 3051 was crafted to

“bring juvenile sentencing in conformity with Miller, Graham

and Caballero” (Franklin, supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 268), and to

that end, Eighth Amendment “protections outlined in Miller”

are featured in this provision. (Franklin, at p. 276.) However,

despite “language echoing the holdings of these cases” (Hardin,

supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 845), this equal protection analysis of

section 3051 should not be conflated with principles governing

the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and unusual

punishment and its focus on punishment and proportionality in

capital and juvenile LWOP sentencing.

For instance, the high court recently confirmed that the

Eighth Amendment’s ban against cruel and unusual

punishment “ ‘has always been considered, and properly so, to

be directed at the method or kind of punishment’ a government

may ‘impos[e] for violation of criminal statutes.’ ” (City of

Grants Pass v. Johnson (2024) ___ U.S. ___ [144 S.Ct. 2202,

2204].) The Eighth Amendment “ ‘guarantees individuals the

right not to be subjected to excessive sanctions.’ ” (Miller, supra,

567 U.S. at p. 469.) “Embodied in the Constitution’s ban on

cruel and unusual punishments is the ‘precept of justice that

punishment for crime should be graduated and proportioned to

[the] offense.’ ” (Graham, supra, 560 U.S. at p. 59.)

With respect to defendants who commit nonhomicide

offenses, the high court in Graham explained that these

defendants are “categorically less deserving of the most serious

forms of punishment,” and confirmed that they cannot be

sentenced to death. (Graham, supra, 560 U.S. at p. 69, citing

Kennedy v. Louisiana (2008) 554 U.S. 407 (Kennedy); see

Kennedy, at p. 446 [“death penalty is not a proportional

punishment for the rape of a child”]; Coker v. Georgia (1977) 433

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U.S. 584, 592 (Coker) [“sentence of death is grossly

disproportionate and excessive punishment for the crime of

rape”].)10 Defendant argues that he is, therefore, “less deserving

of harsh punishment than a young offender who has committed

murder.”

The comparison is inapt. For one thing, it is not the case

that section 3051 and its exclusions categorically result in

harsher punishment for youthful One Strike offenders than for

youthful offenders who commit murder. As noted, section

3051(h) also excludes from early parole eligibility those young

adults who commit special circumstance murder and are

sentenced to LWOP instead of death. Additionally, because

section 3051 creates a scheme for early parole eligibility, the

exclusion of a particular group of offenders from the statute’s

scope does not necessarily mean they are ineligible for parole at

all. Indeed, many offenders sentenced under the One Strike law

are already eligible for parole after 15 or 25 years. (§ 667.61,

subd. (a).) And One Strike offenders, like defendant, who are

not sentenced to LWOP are entitled to elderly parole

consideration at the age of 50 if they have served a minimum of

20 years continuously on their current sentence. (§ 3055, subds.

(a), (g).) The effects of section 3051(h)’s exclusions are not so

categorical as defendant and the dissent posit.

More fundamentally, we conclude that in distinguishing

between homicides and nonhomicide offenses in terms of their

10

It extended that reasoning to juveniles, holding that they

cannot be sentenced to LWOP, i.e., the “harshest possible

penalty for juveniles” for committing nonhomicide offenses

(Miller, supra, 567 U.S. at p. 489; see Graham, supra, 560 U.S.

at p. 69), or homicides (Miller, supra, 567 U.S. at p. 489), without

first giving due consideration to their attributes of youth.

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“ ‘ “severity and irrevocability” ’ ” (Graham, supra, 560 U.S. at

p. 69, quoting Kennedy, supra, 560 U.S. at p. 438), a

characterization also used to describe the penalty of death, the

high court was outlining the Eighth Amendment’s limits on

excessive punishments. (Graham, at p. 89 [death penalty

“ ‘must be limited to those offenders who commit “a narrow

category of the most serious crimes” and whose extreme

culpability makes them “the most deserving of execution” ’ ”];

Miller, supra, 567 U.S. at p. 476 [“death penalty is reserved only

for the most culpable defendants committing the most serious

offenses”]; see Gregg v. Georgia (1976) 428 U.S. 153, 187 [“death

as a punishment is unique in its severity and irrevocability”].)

Notably, the high court in Kennedy, on which Graham and

Miller heavily rely, emphasized the “distinction between

intentional first-degree murder on the one hand and

nonhomicide crimes against individual persons . . . on the other”

for purposes of “determining whether the death penalty is

excessive.” (Kennedy, supra, 554 U.S. at p. 438, italics added;

see ibid. [the “same distinction between homicide and other

serious violent offenses against the individual” is relevant to

whether death penalty is disproportionate to vicarious felony

murder].) The high court explained: “ ‘We have the abiding

conviction that the death penalty, which “is unique in its

severity and irrevocability,” is an excessive penalty for the

rapist who, as such, does not take human life.’ ” (Id. at pp. 437–

438, quoting Coker, supra, 433 U.S. at p. 598.)

These statements by the high court that homicide is a

more serious crime than a nonhomicide offense must be

considered in their proper context, which was whether the death

penalty is a proportionate punishment to the crime for purposes

of the Eighth Amendment. Contrary to defendant’s contention,

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the court did not advance the comparison in all other contexts,

including for the purpose of evaluating, as a general matter, “the

nature of punishment that is appropriate for [each] crime.”

(Hardin, supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 855; see Coker, supra, 433 U.S.

at p. 597 [“We do not discount the seriousness of rape as a

crime”].) Put another way, the high court did not hold as a

matter of constitutional imperative that “no crime can be

punished more severely than homicide.” (People v. Estrada

(1997) 57 Cal.App.4th 1270, 1281; see id. at p. 1280 [rejecting

defendant’s claim that his 25-year-to-life sentence for rape in

course of burglary (§ 667.61) was cruel and unusual punishment

because it was longer than sentence for “more serious” crime of

second degree murder].) Therefore, contrary to our dissenting

colleague’s suggestion (see dis. opn. of Liu, J., post, at pp. 14–

15), the high court’s statements about homicide do not

undermine our conclusion that, in enacting section 3051, the

Legislature permissibly “exercise[d] its responsibility” “to

increase the opportunities for meaningful release for young

adult offenders, while taking into account the appropriate

punishment for the underlying crimes, depending on their

severity.” (Hardin, supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 855.) The One Strike

exclusion is one such result of this exercise.

In addition, we emphasize that, in contrast to a cruel and

unusual punishment analysis, the equal protection inquiry asks

whether there is a rational basis for the Legislature to treat

certain individuals differently when prescribing the

consequences under an ameliorative statute like section 3051.

“The Equal Protection Clause confers no substantive rights and

creates no substantive liberties. The function of the Equal

Protection Clause, rather, is simply to measure the validity of

classifications created by state laws.” (Rodriguez, supra, 411

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Opinion of the Court by Jenkins, J.

U.S. at p. 59 (conc. opn. of Stewart, J.), fn. omitted.) And, as we

have explained above, the Legislature had a rational reason to

categorically exclude young adult One Strike offenders, but not

young adults convicted of non-special-circumstances murder,

from early parole consideration under section 3051. (See ante,

at pp. 32–33.)

Defendant next contends that recidivism is a legitimate

concern for the Legislature to address “across the board”;

therefore, the inquiry here is not whether recidivism justifies

the early parole ineligibility of young adult One Strike offenders.

Rather, according to defendant, the question is whether the

Legislature may rationally justify the categorical exclusion of

One Strike offenders but not other types of offenders from youth

offender parole hearings. In support of his argument, defendant

focuses on offenders sentenced under the habitual sexual

offender statute (§ 667.71), who are subject to offenses that may

overlap with the One Strike law, but who are not similarly

excluded under section 3051(h). (See People v. Snow (2003) 105

Cal.App.4th 271, 282 [“one strike law and the habitual sexual

offender law continue to be alternative sentencing schemes: a

sentence may be imposed under one of the sentencing schemes,

but not both”].) In particular, defendant argues that the

Legislature’s failure to exclude habitual sexual offenders, who

are by definition recidivists, demonstrates that recidivism

concerns were not a rational basis for the One Strike exclusion.

The Attorney General, however, counters that defendant failed

to raise this issue below and, therefore, has forfeited the issue.

We need not address the Attorney General’s forfeiture

argument because we conclude that defendant’s argument lacks

substantive merit. Contrary to defendant’s assertion, the

exclusion from parole eligibility of offenders sentenced under

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the One Strike law, but not those sentenced pursuant to the

habitual sexual offender statute, does not undermine our

conclusion that the Legislature was at least partially motivated

by concerns of recidivism in enacting the One Strike exclusion.

The One Strike law addresses not only a defendant’s risk of

recidivism but, as important here, the aggravated

circumstances of the underlying crime or crimes, the number

and nature of which determine the length of a One Strike

sentence. (See ante, at pp. 14–15.) In contrast to section 667.61,

the habitual sexual offender statute’s purpose is “to address

solely recidivism.” (Hammer, supra, 30 Cal.4th at p. 768.)

Unlike section 667.61, it is “ ‘not to punish especially aggravated

instances of a particular crime.’ ” (People v. Murphy (2001) 25

Cal.4th 136, 155.) This difference in purpose between the One

Strike law and habitual sexual offender law supports treating

those who fall within these provisions differently.

Defendant, however, maintains that the Legislature

“arbitrarily” distinguished young adult One Strike offenders

from other types of sexual offenders by excluding them from

section 3051’s purview. He points to “numerous long-term

studies and research” on recidivism rates of various offenders

which he claims support his assertion that young adult One

Strike offenders are not more likely to reoffend than other types

of offenders. Our dissenting colleague likewise cites reports

published by the California Department of Corrections and

Rehabilitation that “find that ‘sex offenders consistently

recidivate at lower rates than non-sex offenders’ ” and he posits

that “very few” sex offender registrants who reoffend were

convicted of a new sex crime. (Dis. opn. of Liu, J., post, at p. 19.)

The Attorney General cites an older study by the California

Department of Justice which concluded that “ ‘[s]ex offenders as

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a group are highly recidivistic.’ ” In any event, insofar as there

is conflicting or ambiguous evidence regarding the risk of

recidivism among sex offenders, the Attorney General counters

that pursuant to Johnson, supra, 60 Cal.4th at page 881, “the

reasoning underlying the Legislature’s classification need not

‘ “be empirically substantiated” ’ or have ‘ “ ‘a foundation in the

record.’ ” ’ ”

These studies illustrate the continuing academic and

scientific debate on the issue. We do not opine on any study’s

persuasiveness or question any study’s ultimate conclusions.

We do note, however, that there is an empirical basis to support

the Legislature’s recidivism concerns; this would refute any

suggestion that the Legislature adopted the One Strike

exclusion based solely on a patently false “public perception”

that sex offenders recidivate more than other criminals. This

further undermines our dissenting colleague’s claim that the

Legislature’s actions were based on an “irrational prejudice”

against “an especially despised subset of young offenders” (dis.

opn. of Liu, J., post, at p. 3), rather than on the Legislature’s

concerns about public safety.

We acknowledge and agree with the Attorney General

that in addressing concerns regarding recidivism, the

Legislature may institute reform in an area of law in an

“incremental and uneven manner” without having to “ ‘choose

between attacking every aspect of a problem or not attacking the

problem at all.’ ” (Barrett, supra, 54 Cal.4th at p. 1110; see ante,

at pp. 24–25.) Equal protection “does not prohibit the

Legislature from regulating certain classes of cases in which the

need is deemed most evident.” (People v. Jennings (2000) 81

Cal.App.4th 1301, 1313 (Jennings); see id. at pp. 1312–1313

[Evid. Code § 1109 does not violate equal protection by

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Opinion of the Court by Jenkins, J.

permitting propensity evidence in domestic abuse cases and not

in other cases].) Here, the voters clearly espoused the view that

One Strike offenders “are the least likely to be cured and the

most likely to reoffend, and they prey on the most innocent

members of our society.” (Voter Information Guide on Prop. 83,

supra, text of Prop. 83, p. 127.) We also noted legislative

findings that these offenders “cannot be cured of [their] aberrant

impulses, and must be separated from society to prevent

reoffense.” (Wutzke, supra, 28 Cal.4th at pp. 929–930, italics

added; see Acosta, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 127 [“purpose of the

One Strike law is to provide life sentences for aggravated sex

offenders, even if they do not have prior convictions”], italics

added.) Against this backdrop, it is feasible that the Legislature

adopted a zero tolerance approach — which extends the One

Strike law’s severe punishment to first time offenses — to

reduce recidivism of those sex offenders it deemed particularly

dangerous by incapacitating them through long terms of

imprisonment. (Wutzke, at p. 931 [§ 667.61 expresses

“intolerance toward child sexual abuse”]; see Graham, supra,

560 U.S. at p. 72 [“Recidivism is a serious risk to public safety,

and so incapacitation is an important goal”].)

Although defendant contends that there is no basis for

“singling out” young adult One Strike offenders from other types

of sex offenders for exclusion under section 3051(h), we agree

with the Attorney General that the Legislature could have

rationally concluded — as reflected by the relevant amendments

to the One Strike law — that One Strike offenders posed an

identified recidivism risk of committing aggravated sex offenses

and that allowing these offenders who would likely reoffend to

seek early parole would be inconsistent with the rehabilitative

goal of section 3051. The aggravating circumstances that

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Opinion of the Court by Jenkins, J.

trigger sentencing under the One Strike law provide a rational

basis for distinguishing defendants who have also committed

one of the specified sex offenses apart from other sex offenders.

(See Wutzke, supra, 28 Cal.4th at p. 930; see also ante, at pp. 14–

15.) In any event, to the extent defendant argues that the One

Strike exclusion does not reach those offenders who commit

offenses similar to One Strike offenses, we reiterate that under

the rational basis test, “ ‘we must accept any gross

generalizations and rough accommodations that the Legislature

seems to have made.’ [Citation.] ‘A classification is not

arbitrary or irrational simply because there is an “imperfect fit

between means and ends,” ’ [citation], or ‘because it may be “to

some extent both underinclusive and overinclusive.” ’ ”

(Johnson, supra, 60 Cal.4th at p. 887.)

We conclude that the One Strike exclusion is rationally

related to legitimate state interests in addressing recidivism of

serious and dangerous sex offenders and setting punishments

that are appropriate for the triggering crimes committed under

the specified circumstances. Because a plausible basis exists for

the Legislature’s differential treatment of One Strike offenders,

we may not second-guess whether this decision was wise, fair,

or logical. (Johnson, supra, 60 Cal.4th at p. 881.) This is “ ‘the

very essence of legislative choice.’ ” (Hardin, supra, 15 Cal.5th

at p. 854.) Our conclusion that the Legislature did not act

irrationally in excluding One Strike offenders from the youth

offender parole statute “does not turn on this court’s judgments

about what constitutes sound sentencing policy. It turns on the

deference we owe to the policy choices made through the

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Opinion of the Court by Jenkins, J.

democratic process by the people of California and their elected

representatives.” (Id. at pp. 839–840.)11

Because the Legislature has the prerogative to tackle

societal problems “incremental[ly] and uneven[ly]” (Barrett,

supra, 54 Cal.4th at p. 1110), it is up to the Legislature to

determine where “the need is deemed most evident.” (Jennings,

supra, 81 Cal.App.4th at p. 1313; see ibid. [“that other crimes

such as murder and mayhem may be more serious and that

credibility contests are not confined to domestic violence cases

do not demonstrate the absence of the required rational basis

for the Legislature’s distinction between these crimes”].) It is

not unreasonable that the Legislature focused on One Strike

offenders for exclusion from section 3051 given that it

considered such offenders to pose an elevated risk of recidivism

and to have committed particularly severe offenses. Thus, we

cannot say this classification is “devoid of any conceivable

degree of coherent justification” such that it violates equal

protection. (Chatman, supra, 4 Cal.5th at p. 291.)

11

Our dissenting colleague concedes he “would not hold that

the Legislature may never exclude One Strike offenders from

youth offender parole eligibility.” (Dis. opn. of Liu, J., post, at

p. 25.) However, he asserts that “as the statute comes to us, the

legislative record and relevant policymaking context leave me

unable to conclude that the exclusion emanated from a rational

policy judgment.” (Ibid.) Suffice it to say, our court’s equal

protection jurisprudence neither demands nor permits such a

rigorous or searching review of rationality. Indeed, as we have

explained (see ante, at p. 24), “the underlying rationale for a

statutory classification need not have been ‘ever actually

articulated’ by lawmakers, nor ‘be empirically substantiated.’ ”

(Hardin, supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 852.)

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Opinion of the Court by Jenkins, J.

Nor can we say that this justification has no “footing in the

realities of the subject addressed by the legislation.” (Heller,

supra, 509 U.S. at p. 32.) As the amendments to the One Strike

law reflect, the Legislature and electorate sought to address the

recidivism concerns wrought by One Strike offenders, adding

that an ancillary goal was to eliminate the availability of early

parole for these offenders. (See, e.g., Voter Information Guide

on Prop. 83, supra, argument in favor of Prop. 83, at p. 46 [Prop.

83 would “[r]equire dangerous sex offenders to serve their entire

sentence and not be released early for any reason”].) In light of

this purpose of the One Strike law, it is reasonable that the

Legislature excluded those offenders it considered serious and

dangerous from seeking early release under section 3051 even

though they committed the controlling offense as young adults

below the age of 26.

CONCLUSION

In sum, we conclude that the Legislature may reasonably

have found that One Strike offenders pose an increased risk of

recidivism and that the aggravated nature of their offenses

diminishes their prospects for rehabilitation. Such concerns are

sufficient to justify the Legislature’s decision to make One

Strike offenders categorically ineligible for youth offender parole

consideration under section 3051(h). In creating a mechanism

for youth offenders to be considered for early release under

section 3051, the Legislature rationally chose not to extend that

opportunity to young adult One Strike offenders like defendant,

whom it considered the most likely to reoffend and the least

likely to rehabilitate. Therefore, whether considered an as-

applied or facial challenge, defendant’s equal protection claim

fails.

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We reiterate that “[i]t is not for us to pass judgment on the

wisdom or desirability of [the Legislature’s] policy choices.”

(Hardin, supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 864.) Our task is “limited” (id.

at p. 866) to determining whether the Legislature’s decision to

exclude One Strike young adult offenders but not young adults

convicted of murder from youth offender parole hearings under

section 3051 violates equal protection under a rational basis

test. We conclude that it does not.12

DISPOSITION

We affirm the Court of Appeal’s judgment, but remand the

matter to the Court of Appeal with directions to determine

whether to consider any briefing on defendant’s entitlement to

the benefit of any ameliorative legislation enacted during the

pendency of his appeal before this court.

JENKINS, J.

We Concur:

GUERRERO, C. J.

CORRIGAN, J.

KRUGER, J.

GROBAN, J.

SMITH, J.*

12

We disapprove People v. Edwards, supra, 34 Cal.App.5th

183 and In re Woods (2021) 62 Cal.App.5th 740, to the extent

they are inconsistent with this opinion.

*

Associate Justice of the Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate

District, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI,

section 6 of the California Constitution.

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PEOPLE v. WILLIAMS

S262229

Dissenting Opinion by Justice Liu

Defendant Jeremiah Williams is serving a sentence

beyond his life expectancy for sex offenses he committed when

he was 24 years old. The Legislature, recognizing that brain

development affecting judgment and decision-making is still

ongoing in young adults, enacted the youth offender parole

statute to account for “the diminished culpability of youth.”

(Pen. Code, § 3051, subd. (f)(1); all undesignated statutory

references are to this code.) The statute is intended to provide

a parole mechanism “in accordance with” key precedents

limiting punishment for youth offenders, including Miller v.

Alabama (2012) 567 U.S. 460, 473 (Miller), which explained that

the attributes of youth are not “crime-specific.” (Stats. 2013,

ch. 312, § 1.) Despite this stated intent and Williams’s age at

the time of his offenses, he is not eligible for a youth offender

parole hearing because he was sentenced under the One Strike

law. (§ 667.61; see § 3051, subd. (h).) The question is whether

the Legislature had a rational basis for excluding young adult

One Strike offenders from a parole scheme that gives other

young adult offenders, including many convicted of murder, a

meaningful opportunity for release.

From a certain point of view, this might be considered an

easy question. No one disputes that the aggravated sex offenses

covered by the One Strike law, including the crimes Williams

committed, are abhorrent and deserve harsh punishment. Sex

crimes evoke public outrage, disgust, and condemnation. And

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PEOPLE v. WILLIAMS

Liu, J., dissenting

sex offenders are surely among the most despised groups in our

society. One might think it is perfectly rational for the

Legislature to give effect to these public attitudes by excluding

One Strike offenders like Williams from the youth offender

parole scheme.

But the rational basis test in equal protection doctrine

does not deem it “rational” for the Legislature to simply act on

public fears or perceptions. Under rational basis review, a law

that disadvantages a particular group cannot be justified on the

basis of “mere negative attitudes,” “fear [that is]

unsubstantiated,” or “irrational prejudice” directed against that

group. (City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center (1985)

473 U.S. 432, 448, 450 (Cleburne); see Parr v. Municipal Court

(1971) 3 Cal.3d 861, 865 (Parr).) A challenged classification

must instead serve a legitimate public purpose and reflect a

rational policy judgment.

Whether the One Strike exclusion reflects such rationality

does not appear to be an easy question, judging from the length

of today’s opinion. In my view, the court’s labored effort to

rationalize the One Strike exclusion does not bear fruit. The

problem begins — and largely ends — with the Legislature’s

express recognition that young adult offenders, whatever their

crime, have diminished culpability and are capable of growth

and rehabilitation. The Legislature made clear its intent to

create a parole scheme in accordance with that insight. That

being the case, how was it rational for the Legislature to exclude

One Strike offenders from youth offender parole eligibility? The

court hypothesizes a rationale that fuses concerns about the

aggravated nature of One Strike offenses with concerns about

recidivism. As I explain below, this hypothesis does not

withstand scrutiny and does not dispel the genuine risk that the

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PEOPLE v. WILLIAMS

Liu, J., dissenting

One Strike exclusion has more to do with irrational prejudice

than rational policy judgment.

The defendant in this case stands convicted of heinous

crimes, and public hostility toward sex offenders is palpable in

the history of the One Strike law. (See maj. opn., ante, at pp. 13–

17.) But public hostility, the court agrees, does not itself supply

a rational basis for the Legislature to exclude One Strike

offenders from youth offender parole eligibility. Equal

protection of the laws requires more. As the statute comes to us,

there is nothing more that shows the Legislature properly

discharged its “duty to govern impartially” (Cleburne, supra,

473 U.S. at p. 452 (conc. opn. of Stevens, J.)) when it excluded

an especially despised subset of young offenders from the parole

scheme. I respectfully dissent.

I.

As the court acknowledges (maj. opn., ante, at p. 25), equal

protection analysis “must find some footing in the realities of the

subject addressed by the legislation.” (Heller v. Doe (1993)

509 U.S. 312, 321; see Johnson v. Department of Justice (2015)

60 Cal.4th 871, 881.) So I begin with some realities of which we

must take cognizance in order to conduct an appropriate

analysis in this case.

There can be no dispute that the crimes covered by the

One Strike law, including those committed by Williams, are

serious, violent, and deserving of strict punishment. “Along

with other forms of sexual assault, rape belongs to that class of

crimes against the person that can never adequately be

redressed. It is the quintessential ‘violation of the self’

[citation], the ultimate affront to the dignity of the human spirit.

As such, it is an offense against all humanity.” (People v.

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PEOPLE v. WILLIAMS

Liu, J., dissenting

Escobar (1992) 3 Cal.4th 740, 743.) Rape “is widely viewed as

the most atrocious of intrusions upon the privacy and dignity of

the victim; never is the crime committed accidentally; rarely can

it be said to be unpremeditated; often the victim suffers serious

physical injury; the psychological impact can often be as great

as the physical consequences; in a real sense, the threat of both

types of injury is always present.” (Furman v. Georgia (1972)

408 U.S. 238, 458–459 (dis. opn. of Powell, J.).)

Although many crimes against persons involve severe

injury and gross violations of personal autonomy, sex crimes are

regarded as particularly depraved, “frequently inspiring

extreme negative emotional reactions, such as disgust, fear, and

moral outrage.” (Olver & Barlow, Public Attitudes Toward Sex

Offenders and Their Relationship to Personality Traits and

Demographic Characteristics (2010) 28 Behavioral Science & L.

832; ibid. [“Sex offenders tend to be a particularly reviled group

of individuals in the public eye . . . . This is particularly well

exemplified by disparaging terms that abound in the media such

as ‘predator,’ ‘monster,’ or ‘psychopath.’ ”].) In one study, 50

California residents were interviewed regarding their attitudes

toward “sexually violent predators” (SVPs). (Williams,

Constructing Hysteria: Legal Signals as Producers of Siting

Conflicts Over Sexually Violent Predator Placements (2018)

43 L. & Social Inquiry 706, 706, 711–713.) Some of the

participants compared SVPs to “wild animals” and “pit bulls

that repeatedly attack people.” (Id. at p. 720.) Others

“perceived fundamental flaws in SVPs’ biological makeup,”

describing “the problem with SVPs as ‘something in their DNA,’

‘something [that] short-circuited in their brain,’ and as having

‘arrested development’ and ‘a sickness.’ ” (Ibid.) In short, “sex

offenders are one of the most disfavored groups in our society.”

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Liu, J., dissenting

(Gundy v. United States (2019) 588 U.S. 128, 172 (dis. opn. of

Gorsuch, J.).)

The point is echoed by many commentators. (See Klein &

Cooper, Punitive Attitudes Toward Sex Offenders: Do Moral

Panics Cause Community Members to Be More Punitive? (2019)

30(6) Crim. J. Policy Review 948, 952 [collecting studies

showing that “[s]ex offenders are often considered some of the

most hated and feared criminal offenders” and a “commonly

vilified population”]; Fox, Incurable Sex Offenders, Lousy Judges

& the Media: Moral Panic Sustenance in the Age of New Media

(2012) 38 Am. J. Crim. J. 160, 161 [observing that sex offenders

are characterized as “ ‘folk devils’ ” in the media]; Farkas &

Miller, Sex Offender Treatment: Reconciling Criminal Justice

Priorities and Therapeutic Goals (2008) 21(2) Fed. Sentencing

Rep. 78, 79 (Farkas & Miller) [sex offenders “are viewed by

society with repugnance”]; O’Hear, Perpetual Panic (2008)

21 Fed. Sentencing Rep. 69, 71 [observing the public perception

that “sex offenders are uniquely dangerous”]; Geraghty,

Challenging the Banishment of Registered Sex Offenders from

the State of Georgia: A Practitioner’s Perspective (2007) 42 Harv.

Civ. Rights-Civ. Liberties L.Rev. 513, 514 [“Sex offenders are

arguably the most despised members of our society”]; Logan,

Liberty Interests in the Preventative State: Procedural Due

Process and Sex Offender Community Notification Laws (1999)

89(4) J. Crim. L. & Criminology 1167 [“Sex offenders are the

scourge of modern America”].)

Public outrage is especially intense with regard to sex

crimes against minors (though Williams’s crimes did not involve

minors). (See Rosselli & Jeglic, Factors Impacting upon

Attitudes Toward Sex Offenders: The Role of Conservatism and

Knowledge (2017) 24(4) Psychiatry, Psychology & L., 496, 499

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Liu, J., dissenting

(Rosselli & Jeglic) [“[A]lthough public fear about sex offenders

is generally high, the highest level of fear is directed toward

those who offend against children.”]; Kernsmith et al., Public

Attitudes Toward Sexual Offenders and Sex Offender

Registration (2009) 18 J. Child Sexual Abuse 290, 295 [out of

seven categories of sexual offenders, people most feared those

whose offenses were against minors].) In barring the death

penalty as punishment for rape of a child, the high court said

“we have no confidence that the imposition of the death penalty

would not be so arbitrary as to be ‘freakis[h]’ ” because the

“context” of such a case “involves a crime that in many cases will

overwhelm a decent person’s judgment.” (Kennedy v. Louisiana

(2008) 554 U.S. 407, 439.)

Such fear and outrage are reflected in the history of

Jessica’s Law (Prop. 83, as approved by voters, Gen. Elec. (Nov.

7, 2006), eff. Nov. 8, 2006) and Chelsea’s Law (Stats. 2010,

ch. 219, § 1, eff. Sept. 9, 2010), both of which toughened the One

Strike law in the wake of highly publicized offenses against

children. (Maj. opn., ante, at pp. 15–17.) The legislative history

of Chelsea’s Law said, “ ‘The violent sexual predator that

attacks children is a particular type of evil and should be treated

as such.’ ” (Assem. Com. on Public Safety, Analysis of Assem.

Bill No. 1844, as amended April 13, 2010, p. 14.) The law’s

author said, “ ‘[T]hose [who] have committed the most serious

and heinous sex crimes against children are not able to be

rehabilitated.’ ” (Id. at p. 13; see also Voter Information Guide,

Gen. Elec. (Nov. 7, 2006) text of Prop. 83, p. 127 [sex offenders

“are the least likely to be cured and the most likely to reoffend,

and they prey on the most innocent members of our society”].)

At the same time, it has been shown that public revulsion

toward sex offenders and ensuing legislative responses “may be

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Liu, J., dissenting

based upon myths and misperceptions about sex offenders, such

as the notion that sex offenders have very high recidivism rates

and that strangers commit most sex crimes.” (Rosselli & Jeglic,

supra, at p. 496.) A 2010 survey by the United States

Department of Justice, with over 1,000 respondents “presumed

to be largely representative of community members,” found that

“the public believes sexual reoffense rates are markedly higher”

than they actually are. (Center for Sex Offender Management,

U.S. Dept. of Justice, Exploring Public Awareness and Attitudes

about Sex Offender Management: Findings from a National

Public Opinion Poll (2010) pp. 1–2 (U.S. Dept. of Justice).)

Consistent with these findings, the Attorney General in this

case acknowledges that “[t]he Legislature’s actions in this area

were presumably informed by the widespread ‘public perception’

that ‘recidivism is a more serious problem among sex offenders

than other criminals,’ ” even as the sources he cites show that

this perception is out of proportion with reality. (See Ahluwalia,

Civil Commitment of Sexually Violent Predators: The Search for

a Limiting Principle (2006) 4 Cardozo Pub. L. Policy & Ethics J.

489, 494 (Ahluwalia) [“The notion that sex offenders are a class

of offenders with unusually high rates of recidivism is one that

has great political and emotional appeal, but little empirical

substantiation.”]; Comment, Examining Sex Offender

Community Notification Laws (1995) 83 Cal. L.Rev. 885, 897–

898 [“Despite studies indicating low recidivism rates, the public

continues to perceive, as it has for decades, that the threat from

sex offenders is greater than it actually is.”]; see also Farkas &

Miller, supra, at p. 78 [“Despite the reality that the rates of

recidivism for sex offenders are actually lower than most

commonly thought, sex offenders are still perceived as a high-

risk type of offender.”]; Socia & Harris, Evaluating Public

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Liu, J., dissenting

Perceptions of the Risk Presented by Registered Sex Offenders:

Evidence of Crime Control Theater? (2016) 22(4) Psych. Pub. Pol.

& L., 375, 378–380 [nationally representative survey of 1,000

adults showed that respondents significantly overestimated the

percentage of sex offenders who were strangers to their victims

and their likelihood of recidivism].)

In the United States Department of Justice study, “the

clear majority of respondents (74%) reported that the news

media was the predominant source from which they received

most of their information and knowledge about sex offenders.”

(U.S. Dept. of Justice, supra, at p. 2.) The study observed:

“Media portrayals of sex crimes and the individuals who commit

these offenses are not always grounded in current statistics,

research, and accurate information which, in turn, can create

perceptions, expectations, and demands for public policies that

may not be well informed and which may not result in the

desired outcomes. Indeed, many sex offender-specific laws have

been developed in reaction to individual cases that generate

attention and debate at state and national levels, and which

often involve the abduction, sexual assault, and murder of

children committed by repeat sex offenders who were not known

to the victims or their families.” (Ibid., fn. omitted.) “Those

specific crimes statistically represent only a very small fraction

of all sex crimes and other violent crimes that come to the

attention of the authorities, and the victim-offender relationship

is not typical of most sex offenses. Nonetheless, such cases often

serve as a catalyst for sweeping legislative reforms . . . .” (Ibid.,

fn. omitted.)

The California Sex Offender Management Board has

made similar findings. The Board was created in 2006 “to

provide the Governor, the State Legislature and relevant state

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Liu, J., dissenting

and local agencies with an assessment of current sex offender

management practices and recommended areas of

improvement.” (Cal. Sex Offender Management Board,

Recommendations Rep. (Jan. 2010) p. 7 (CASOMB); see, e.g.,

Assem. Com. on Appropriations, Analysis of Assem. Bill No.

1844 (2009–2010 Reg. Sess.) May 19, 2010, p. 9 [discussing the

Board’s 2010 report in the legislative history of Chelsea’s Law].)

The Board’s membership reflects, “to the extent possible,

representation of northern, central, and southern California, as

well as both urban and rural areas,” and consists of members

from government and nongovernment agencies, including the

Office of the Attorney General, California Department of

Corrections and Rehabilitation, California Department of State

Hospitals, criminal defense attorneys, and two recognized

experts in the field of sexual assault. (§ 9001, subds. (a) & (b).)

The Board in 2010 summarized the policymaking context as

follows: “Sexual crimes rightly outrage communities. The

legacy of sexual assault in the lives of victims is often profound

and long-lasting. In the aftermath of an assault, communities

often demand with great vehemence that policymakers and

public safety professionals DO SOMETHING. The root of the

desire to acknowledge the serious nature of the crime is difficult

to disparage but, when combined with fear, misinformation and

the heat of media inquiry, the flame of community outrage can

create a political environment that rewards swift action over

more methodical, effective approaches. On occasion, these swift

approaches may address short-term community outrage at the

cost of directing resources and skilled personnel away from

investments in strategies for long-term safety.” (CASOMB, at

pp. 8–9.)

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Liu, J., dissenting

II.

I mention this context not to suggest that this court should

opine on how dangerous sex offenders are or what punishment

they deserve. That is not our role in deciding the equal

protection issue before us. The Legislature has wide latitude in

defining crimes and punishments, and may appropriately give

expression to the public’s strong condemnation of certain crimes

and its desire for retribution, although that latitude is bounded

by “the basic ‘precept of justice that punishment for [a] crime

should be graduated and proportioned to [the] offense’ ”

(Kennedy v. Louisiana, supra, 554 U.S. at p. 419; see id. at

p. 421 [prohibiting death penalty for rape of a child victim under

Eighth Amendment]; Coker v. Georgia (1977) 433 U.S. 584

[same holding for rape of an adult victim]) and by the principle

that a juvenile offender’s “capacity for change and limited moral

culpability” limit the range of permissible punishment even for

the worst crimes (Graham v. Florida (2010) 560 U.S. 48, 74

(Graham); see id. at p. 82 [prohibiting life imprisonment

without parole (LWOP) for juvenile nonhomicide offenders];

Miller, supra, 567 U.S. 460 [prohibiting mandatory LWOP for

juvenile homicide offenders]; Roper v. Simmons (2005) 543 U.S.

551 [prohibiting death penalty for crimes committed by

juveniles]).

The One Strike law imposes harsh punishments for

certain aggravated sex offenses (maj. opn., ante, at pp. 14–17),

and its constitutionality is not at issue here. This case concerns

section 3051, the youth offender parole statute. The question is

not whether One Strike offenders between the ages of 18 and 25

have a freestanding constitutional right to parole eligibility.

The question is whether the Legislature, having created a parole

eligibility scheme premised on youth offenders’ diminished

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Liu, J., dissenting

culpability and capacity for rehabilitation, had a rational basis

for excluding One Strike offenders from the scheme. In

answering that question, we must consider the nature of the

group affected and the real risk, given the group affected here,

that the exclusion reflects “irrational prejudice” (Cleburne,

supra, 473 U.S. at p. 450) or “irrational fears” (id. at p. 455 (conc.

opn. of Stevens, J.). (See id. at p. 448 (maj. opn.) [“[T]he

[government] may not avoid the strictures of [the Equal

Protection] Clause by deferring to the wishes or objections of

some fraction of the body politic. ‘Private biases may be outside

the reach of the law, but the law cannot, directly or indirectly,

give them effect.’ ”].)

In enacting the youth offender parole statute in 2013, the

Legislature stated its purpose in the law’s opening provision:

“The Legislature recognizes that youthfulness both lessens a

juvenile’s moral culpability and enhances the prospect that, as

a youth matures into an adult and neurological development

occurs, these individuals can become contributing members of

society. The purpose of this act is to establish a parole eligibility

mechanism that provides a person serving a sentence for crimes

that he or she committed as a juvenile the opportunity to obtain

release when he or she has shown that he or she has been

rehabilitated and gained maturity, in accordance with the

decision of the California Supreme Court in People v. Caballero

(2012) 55 Cal.4th 262 [(Caballero)] and the decisions of the

United States Supreme Court in [Graham] and [Miller].” (Stats.

2013, ch. 312, § 1.)

Soon after, in light of more “ ‘[r]ecent scientific evidence on

adolescent and young adult development and neuroscience

show[ing] that certain areas of the brain — particularly those

affecting judgment and decision-making — do not fully develop

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Liu, J., dissenting

until the early- to mid-20s’ ” (Sen. Com. on Public Safety, Rep.

on Sen. Bill No. 261 (2015–2016 Reg. Sess.) Apr. 28, 2015, p. 3),

the Legislature amended the parole eligibility scheme to include

adults who committed crimes before the age of 23 (Stats. 2015,

ch. 471, § 1) and then to include adults who committed crimes

before age 26 (Stats. 2017, ch. 675, § 1). A committee report on

the latter bill states: “The rationale, as expressed by the author

and supporters of this bill, is that research shows that cognitive

brain development continues into the early 20s or later. The

parts of the brain that are still developing during this process

affect judgment and decision-making, and are highly relevant to

criminal behavior and culpability. (See Johnson et al.,

Adolescent Maturity and the Brain: The Promise and Pitfalls of

Neuroscience Research in Adolescent Health Policy, Journal of

Adolescent Health (Sept. 2009); National Institute of Mental

Health, The Teen Brain: Still Under Construction (2011).) ‘The

development and maturation of the prefrontal cortex occurs

primarily during adolescence and is fully accomplished at the

age of 25 years. The development of the prefrontal cortex is very

important for complex behavioral performance, as this region of

the brain helps accomplish executive brain functions.’ ” (Sen.

Rules Com., Off. of Sen. Floor Analyses, Analysis of Assem. Bill

No. 1308 (2017–2018 Reg. Sess.) Sept. 4, 2017, pp. 4–5, quoting

Arain et al., Maturation of the Adolescent Brain (2013) 9

Neuropsychiatric Disease & Treatment 449.)

As this court said in People v. Hardin (2024) 15 Cal.5th

834, 845 (Hardin), “The Legislature enacted section 3051 to

bring California juvenile sentencing law into line with Graham,

Miller, and Caballero.” The Legislature subsequently expanded

the parole scheme to 18- to 25-year-olds based on the same

observations about diminished culpability and capacity for

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Liu, J., dissenting

maturation that apply to juveniles. (Id. at pp. 845–846.) Here,

as in Hardin, “there is no dispute that the scientific evidence

cited by the Legislature [in enacting and expanding section

3051] applies to young offenders across the board. Nothing

about the ‘distinctive (and transitory) mental traits and

environmental vulnerabilities’ of youth offenders ‘is crime-

specific’ (Miller, supra, 567 U.S. at p. 473), and the Legislature

nowhere suggested that young offenders who commit certain

crimes . . . are immune to those vulnerabilities or incapable of

reform. There is also no dispute that providing young offenders

with a meaningful opportunity for release in light of their

capacity for change is the only purpose stated by the Legislature

in creating and expanding the parole scheme. No other purpose

is stated in the statute or legislative history.” (Id. at p. 881 (dis.

opn. of Liu, J.).)

In Hardin, we addressed a different exclusion from the

youth offender parole scheme. The question was whether the

Legislature had a rational basis for excluding 18- to 25-year-olds

convicted of special circumstance murder and sentenced to

LWOP. In upholding the exclusion, the court said “[i]t may be

true, as Hardin argues, that [the statute’s] crime-based

categories” for differentiating between eligible and ineligible

defendants (and among eligible defendants as to timing of

eligibility) “are not rationally related to the Legislature’s

purpose of expanding opportunities for early release based on

the attributes of youth since, as Miller explained, the attributes

of youth are not ‘crime-specific.’ (Miller, supra, 567 U.S. at

p. 473.) No doubt the Legislature — which consciously enacted

section 3051 in language that borrowed from Miller and other

Eighth Amendment juvenile sentencing cases — was aware of

this point.” (Hardin, supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 855.) The court

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Liu, J., dissenting

nonetheless posited, based on the statute’s repeated use of

crime-based categories, that “the Legislature sought to balance

[its] primary objective” of providing “young persons the

opportunity to obtain release based on demonstrated growth

and rehabilitation” with “competing . . . concerns about

culpability and the appropriate level of punishment for certain

very serious crimes.” (Id. at p. 854; see id. at p. 855 [“The

statutory framework indicates that the Legislature aimed to

increase opportunities for meaningful release for young adult

offenders, while taking into account the appropriate

punishment for the underlying crimes, depending on their

severity.”].)

Notably, today’s opinion does not uphold the One Strike

exclusion based on Hardin’s reasoning. The court does not posit,

as it did with regard to the exclusion of young offenders

sentenced to LWOP for special circumstance murder, that the

exclusion of One Strike offenders reflects a “legislative

judgment[]” that a competing interest in “appropriate

punishment” for their crimes outweighs the Legislature’s stated

interest in providing young offenders a meaningful opportunity

for release in light of the non-“ ‘crime-specific’ ” attributes of

youth. (Hardin, supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 855.) This is no surprise

because such reasoning would run headlong into the high court’s

statement in Graham that “defendants who do not kill, intend

to kill, or foresee that life will be taken are categorically less

deserving of the most serious forms of punishment than are

murderers. [Citations.] There is a line ‘between homicide and

other serious violent offenses against the individual.’ [Citation.]

Serious nonhomicide crimes ‘may be devastating in their harm

. . . but “in terms of moral depravity and of the injury to the

person and to the public,” . . . they cannot be compared to

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Liu, J., dissenting

murder in their “severity and irrevocability.” ’ ” (Graham,

supra, 560 U.S. at p. 69; see Stats. 2013, ch. 312, § 1 [“The

purpose of this act is to establish a parole eligibility mechanism

. . . in accordance with . . . Graham . . . .”].) Rationalizing the

One Strike exclusion on the basis of offense severity would

suggest that One Strike offenses, which (as this case illustrates)

often result in a de facto LWOP sentence, are as deserving of

punishment as special circumstance murder and more

deserving than simple first degree murder, a crime that does not

result in ineligibility for youth offender parole (§§ 190, subd. (a),

3051, subd. (b)(3)) — all of which would defy what Graham

plainly said.

The court attempts to minimize Graham’s statement that

nonhomicide offenses are “categorically less deserving” of

punishment than murder by saying the statement must be

considered in the context of “whether the death penalty is a

proportionate punishment to the crime for purposes of the

Eighth Amendment.” (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 37.) But Graham

was a case about whether LWOP, not the death penalty, is a

permissible punishment for nonhomicide offenses committed by

juveniles. In Graham itself, the quoted statement had relevance

beyond the death penalty (Graham, supra, 560 U.S. at pp. 69–

70 [discussing LWOP]), and it is equally relevant here, where

the issue concerns parole eligibility for a defendant who is

otherwise serving de facto LWOP and who, the Legislature has

found, possesses the same youth-related traits as juveniles.

Further, today’s opinion says that Graham’s statement about

“the comparative seriousness of crimes . . . is premised on

concerns relevant in the context of Eighth Amendment

challenges . . . ; such concerns do not necessarily establish

whether a Legislature’s classification violates equal protection

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Liu, J., dissenting

under a rational basis standard.” (Maj. opn., ante, at pp. 34–35.)

But why not? As the court acknowledges, “section 3051 was

crafted to ‘bring juvenile sentencing in conformity with Miller,

Graham, and Caballero.’ ” (Ibid.) Surely one indicator of

irrationality in a parole eligibility scheme — especially a scheme

expressly intended to conform to Eighth Amendment

jurisprudence and to extend the same principles to young

adults — is the treatment of different offenses without regard to

proportionality concerns.

Realizing that Hardin’s thesis about offense severity

cannot supply a rational basis for the One Strike exclusion, the

court hypothesizes that the Legislature “could rationally

conclude, based on its view that a One Strike sex offender’s risk

of recidivism is high, that rehabilitation is unlikely, and

therefore these offenders would not likely be eligible for parole,

much less early parole under section 3051.” (Maj. opn., ante, at

p. 32.) But didn’t this court just say in Hardin, six months ago,

that section 3051’s “crime-based categories are not rationally

related to the Legislature’s purpose of expanding opportunities

for early release based on the attributes of youth since, as Miller

explained, the attributes of youth are not ‘crime-specific.’ (Miller,

supra, 567 U.S. at p. 473.) No doubt the Legislature — which

consciously enacted section 3051 in language that borrowed from

Miller and other Eighth Amendment juvenile sentencing cases —

was aware of this point”? (Hardin, supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 855,

italics added; see also Graham, supra, 560 U.S. at p. 73

[“ ‘incorrigibility is inconsistent with youth’ ”].) Today’s opinion

now suggests the Legislature rejected Miller’s statement that

the attributes of youth are not “crime-specific” and instead

believed that the capacity of youth offenders for maturation and

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Liu, J., dissenting

rehabilitation does not apply to young adult One Strike

offenders. Well, which is it?

The answer is straightforward from section 3051’s express

statement of purpose and its legislative history, which

“consciously” endorsed Miller and Graham (Hardin, supra,

15 Cal.5th at p. 855) and highlighted the reduced culpability

and natural capacity for change of young offenders across the

board. (Ante, at pp. 11–12.) Nothing in the statute’s findings,

statement of purpose, or “framework” (Hardin, at p. 855)

suggests that One Strike offenders, unlike other young adult

offenders, are incapable of change. And “nothing in section

3051’s legislative history specifically references the reason for

the One Strike exclusion.” (Maj. opn., ante, at pp. 29–30.)

Finding no support in the text or legislative history of

section 3051 for the theory that the One Strike exclusion reflects

rational concerns about recidivism, today’s opinion purports to

identify such support in the history of the One Strike law. (Maj.

opn., ante, at pp. 30–33.) The court cites various assertions in

the Voter Guide on Proposition 83 (Jessica’s Law) and the

legislative history of Chelsea’s Law (e.g., maj. opn., ante, at

pp. 31–32 [“sex offenders have ‘very high recidivism rates’ [and]

‘are the least likely to be cured and the most likely to reoffend’ ”];

id. at p. 32 [“sex offenders who commit ‘the most serious and

heinous sex crimes against children are not able to be

rehabilitated’ ”]), and posits that the Legislature, in enacting

the youth offender parole scheme, had those same concerns (id.

at pp. 32–33).

As an initial matter, it is rather unorthodox to ascribe to

the Legislature that enacted and expanded the youth offender

parole scheme from 2013 to 2017 the beliefs of the voters who

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Liu, J., dissenting

enacted Jessica’s Law in 2006 or the views of the Legislature

that enacted Chelsea’s Law in 2010. Because the Legislature’s

membership, knowledge base, and priorities can change over

time, a statute’s meaning “must be closely related to the time

and circumstance of its use.” (United States v. Stewart (1940)

311 U.S. 60, 69.) It is especially unconvincing to impute the

views of the electorate that amended the One Strike law in 2006

to an entirely different legislative body (i.e., the Legislature that

enacted the youth offender parole statute seven years later),

particularly when that legislative body was considering a

distinct subset of offenders (i.e., youth offenders) with unique

attributes.

The Legislature that enacted section 3051 did not refer to

the legislative history of the One Strike law, and it is telling that

the Legislature said nothing at all about its reason for the One

Strike exclusion. The California Sex Offender Management

Board, the state’s official authority on sex offenders, had

observed in a 2010 report that “[p]olicy makers have insufficient

resources for obtaining reliable information about recidivism

nor do they have ready access to expert assistance in

interpreting the complex recidivism data available from

multiple sources.” (CASOMB, supra, at p. 77.) The Board also

reported that “[n]o information is available at this time

regarding sexual recidivism for sex offenders on probation in

California.” (Ibid.) And while the Attorney General says

“[s]tudies in the 1980s” demonstrated that “ ‘[s]ex offenders as a

group are highly recidivistic,’ ” he acknowledges that more

recent studies have shown that this “commonly held belief . . . is

not supported by the evidence.” (Lave, Arizona’s Sex Offender

Laws: Recommendations for Reform (2020) 52 Ariz. State L.J.

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Liu, J., dissenting

925, 926, citing Ahluwalia, supra, 4 Cardozo Pub. L. Policy &

Ethics J. at p. 494.)

More recently, the California Department of Corrections

and Rehabilitation (CDCR) has published reports on the

reconviction rates of individuals released from California

prisons, including those released on parole. Although the

reports track reconviction rates for only a three-year period

following release, they provide the only comprehensive

California-specific data available, and they find that “sex

offenders consistently recidivate at lower rates than non-sex

offenders.” (CDCR, Recidivism Rep. for Individuals Released

from the Cal. Dept. of Corrections and Rehabilitation in Fiscal

Year 2017–18 (2023) p. 26 (2017–2018 CDCR Report); see ibid.

[“According to historical data, the conviction rate for sex

registrants is regularly at least 15 percentage points lower than

the rate for non-sex registrants”]; CDCR, Recidivism Rep. for

Individuals Released from the Cal. Dept. of Corrections and

Rehabilitation in Fiscal Year 2018–19 (2024) p. 23 (2018–2019

CDCR Report) [same]; CDCR, Recidivism Report for Individuals

Released from the Cal. Dept. of Corrections and Rehabilitation

in Fiscal Year 2011–12 (2017) p. 33 (2011–2012 CDCR Report)

[same].)

This pattern holds for persons released after serving

sentences for the most serious sex offenses. For example, the

three-year reconviction rates for any crime, not necessarily a sex

crime, among persons released in 2017–2018 whose

commitment offense was penetration with an object (11.9%),

rape (10.3%), or lewd act with a child (7.1%) were far lower than

the rates among persons whose commitment offense was

residential burglary (48.7%), assault with a deadly weapon

(43.4%), arson (42.0%), or robbery (41.6%). (2017–2018 CDCR

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Liu, J., dissenting

Report, at pp. 39–40.) Moreover, the vast majority of sex

registrants who were reconvicted were convicted of a non-sex

crime or failure to register; very few were convicted of a new sex

crime. (See 2011–2012 CDCR Report, at p. 35 [2.2% of

reconvicted sex registrants were convicted of a felony sex crime

and 1.0% were convicted of a misdemeanor sex crime]; 2017–

2018 CDCR Report, at p. 26 [4.8% and 1.5%, respectively];

2018–2019 CDCR Report, at p. 23 [5.2% and 2.7%,

respectively].)

Whether or not the Legislature was aware of such data, I

mention them to rebut the court’s casual assertion that the

Legislature, in enacting and expanding the youth offender

parole scheme from 2013 to 2017, could rationally have been

concerned about recidivism among One Strike offenders despite

its express recognition of the non-crime-specific capacity of

young offenders to mature and rehabilitate. If, contrary to the

fundamental premise of the youth offender parole scheme,

recidivism was the Legislature’s concern, it is not clear why the

Legislature would have singled out One Strike offenders for

exclusion over other types of offenders. It is especially unclear

why the Legislature did not exclude persons sentenced under

the Habitual Sexual Offender law (§ 667.71), which “target[s]

only recidivist sexual offenders” (People v. Hammer (2003)

30 Cal.4th 756, 768). Such an exclusion would be “consistent

with the common sense view that a defendant who reoffends

after a prior conviction is ‘less amenable to rehabilitation than

a person who has not done so.’ ” (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 33.)

The court’s ultimate contention is that the One Strike

exclusion reflects the Legislature’s concern not for offense

severity alone and not for recidivism risk alone, but instead for

an amalgam of those two concerns. (See maj. opn., ante, at p. 40

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Liu, J., dissenting

[distinguishing Habitual Sexual Offender law on the ground

that “[t]he One Strike law addresses not only a defendant’s risk

of recidivism but, as important here, the aggravated

circumstances of the underlying crime”]; id. at p. 45 [“In sum,

we conclude that the Legislature may reasonably have found

that One Strike offenders pose an increased risk of recidivism

and that the aggravated nature of their offenses diminishes

their prospects for rehabilitation.”].) This amalgam fares no

better than its individual components as a basis for the One

Strike exclusion.

The court seems to posit that the Legislature applied some

kind of (offense severity x recidivism risk) calculus that yields a

judgment of ineligibility for young One Strike offenders. This

approach might have some plausibility were it not for the fact

that it appears tailor-made to sustain the One Strike exclusion,

with no discernible application to the vast range of other

offenses covered by the parole scheme. As noted, the CDCR

studies observe that persons convicted of first degree burglary,

robbery, arson, or assault with a deadly weapon tend to

recidivate at much higher rates than persons convicted of rape.

(See 2018–2019 CDCR Report, at p. 36; 2017–2018 CDCR

Report, at p. 39.) Many of those offenses are “serious” and

“violent” felonies under our sentencing laws. (§§ 667.5,

subd. (c), 1192.7, subd. (c); see People v. Cruz (1996) 13 Cal.4th

764, 772–773 [voters who enacted section 1192.7 believed

residential burglaries “are so inherently dangerous that persons

who repeatedly commit this type of offense should be punished

as harshly as violent recidivists”]; see also Graham, supra, 560

U.S. at p. 69 [“an offense like robbery or rape is ‘a serious crime

deserving serious punishment’ ”].) Given the comparatively

high rates of reconviction among those who have committed

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Liu, J., dissenting

serious and violent non-sex crimes against persons, is it

realistically conceivable that the Legislature applied an (offense

severity x recidivism risk) calculus so exquisitely calibrated that

it produced an answer of “ineligible” for One Strike offenders

and no others?

In Hardin, this court inferred from the Legislature’s use

of numerous “crime-based distinctions” throughout the

“statutory framework” that it sought to balance parole eligibility

with considerations of offense severity and appropriate

punishment. (Hardin, supra, 15 Cal.5th at pp. 854–855.) Here,

apart from the One Strike exclusion itself, the court points to

nothing in section 3051 or its legislative history suggesting that

an (offense severity x recidivism risk) calculus informed the

Legislature’s crafting of the youth offender parole scheme. To

my mind, the single-use nature of this hypothesized rationale

makes it less than plausible. (See Hays v. Wood (1979) 25 Cal.3d

772, 790 (Hays) [holding that, under an “application of the equal

protection provisions of our state Constitution,” the

“ ‘underinclusive’ aspect” of the law at issue could not be

justified on the ground that “a legislative body, in addressing a

particular problem area, need not attack all phases at once”].)

III.

I conclude with a few words about the court’s treatment of

the standard of review. In reaching today’s holding, the court

recites and applies the most deferential formulations of rational

basis review: “ ‘The underlying rationale for a statutory

classification need not have been “ever actually articulated” by

lawmakers, nor “be empirically substantiated.” ’ ” (Maj. opn.,

ante, at p. 24.) “A court . . . ‘may engage in “ ‘rational

speculation’ ” as to the justifications for the legislative choice . . .

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Liu, J., dissenting

“whether or not” any such speculation has “a foundation in the

record.” ’ ” (Id. at p. 30.) “ ‘ “[W]e must accept any gross

generalizations and rough accommodations that the Legislature

seems to have made.” ’ ” (Id. at pp. 24, 33, 43.) The state need

not “ ‘ “choose between attacking every aspect of a problem or

not attacking the problem at all.” ’ ” (Id. at pp. 25, 41.)

As I explained at length in Hardin, these formulations

originated in federal equal protection cases addressing economic

legislation (see Hardin, supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 876 (dis. opn. of

Liu, J.) [discussing Warden v. State Bar (1999) 21 Cal.4th 628

(Warden) and its reliance on United States Railroad Retirement

Board v. Fritz (1980) 449 U.S. 166, FCC v. Beach

Communications, Inc. (1993) 508 U.S. 307, and Williamson v.

Lee Optical (1955) 348 U.S. 483 (Lee Optical)]), and the court’s

recitation of these principles “ignores the considerable variation

and nuance in our case law applying rational basis review” (id.

at p. 867; see id. at pp. 868–879 [extensively reviewing our case

law on rational basis review].) “[T]his court’s articulation and

application of rational basis review has not marched in lock step

with federal authority. Our approach is deferential but far from

toothless; our case law, though not entirely uniform, reveals

several recurring themes: [We have required] ‘ “a serious and

genuine judicial inquiry into the correspondence between the

classification and the legislative goals” ’ [(Newland v. Board of

Governors (1977) 19 Cal.3d 705, 711)], [and] we have focused on

actual legislative purposes instead of imputing hypothetical

ones, and we have looked for empirical support instead of relying

on conjecture or unsubstantiated assertions. Although we ‘do

not require absolute precision in the designation of

classifications,’ we also ‘do not tolerate classifications which are

so grossly overinclusive as to defy notions of fairness or

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PEOPLE v. WILLIAMS

Liu, J., dissenting

reasonableness.’ [(Brown v. Merlo (1973) 8 Cal.3d 855, 877.)]

And while the Legislature may proceed incrementally, we have

said it must do so rationally in light of the legislative objectives

and ‘not . . . wholly at its whim.’ (Hays, supra, 25 Cal.3d at

p. 790.)” (Id. at p. 879 (dis. opn. of Liu, J.).)

“ ‘[A] serious and genuine judicial inquiry into the

correspondence between the classification and the legislative

goals’ ” (Newland v. Board of Governors, supra, 19 Cal.3d at

p. 711) is especially warranted where, as here, there is a genuine

risk that a legislative classification reflects irrational fears or

prejudice rather than a rational policy judgment. (See

CASOMB, supra, at pp. 8–9.) No “rigorous or searching review”

(maj. opn., ante, at p. 44, fn. 11) is needed to account for “the

realities of the subject addressed by the legislation.” (Heller v.

Doe, supra, 509 U.S. at p. 321.) Yet today’s opinion overlooks

the realities of the policymaking context with regard to

aggravated sex offenses in its uncritical application of equal

protection standards derived from cases involving economic

legislation. The reality is that opticians are not a reviled group.

(See Lee Optical, supra, 348 U.S. 48.) Nor are satellite master

antenna television operators. (See FCC v. Beach

Communications, Inc., supra, 508 U.S. 307.) Nor are attorneys

seeking exemption from continuing education requirements.

(See maj. opn., ante, at pp. 33–34 [citing Warden].) But One

Strike offenders most certainly are, as the strongly worded fears

and condemnations in the law’s history make clear.

In every equal protection case, the appropriate degree of

vigilance requires consideration of what group is affected and

whether, from the standpoint of “an impartial lawmaker”

(Cleburne, supra, 473 U.S. at p. 452 (conc. opn. of Stevens, J.)),

the classification serves a legitimate public purpose and

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Liu, J., dissenting

rationally targets that group for disparate treatment in light of

that purpose. In enacting and expanding the youth offender

parole scheme, the Legislature said much about the reduced

culpability of young offenders and their capacity for growth and

rehabilitation, and it said nothing about the reason for

excluding One Strike offenders from eligibility. In the face of

this silence, hypothesized concerns about offense severity,

recidivism risk, or a combination of both do not rationally

explain the exclusion. It strikes me as particularly dubious to

ascribe recidivism concerns to the Legislature that enacted

section 3051 — especially because, as the Attorney General

concedes, public perceptions lack support in current evidence,

and because the Legislature “consciously” anchored the parole

scheme in high court precedent observing that the attributes of

youth are not “ ‘crime-specific’ ” (Hardin, supra, 15 Cal.5th at

p. 855, quoting Miller, supra, 567 U.S. at p. 473) and then

buttressed that premise with its own findings regarding brain

development in young adults (ante, at pp. 11–12 [citing

legislative history]). To be clear, I would not hold that the

Legislature may never exclude One Strike offenders from youth

offender parole eligibility. But as the statute comes to us, the

legislative record and relevant policymaking context leave me

unable to conclude that the exclusion emanated from a rational

policy judgment. (Cf. United States Steel Corp. v. Public

Utilities Com. (1981) 29 Cal.3d 603, 614; Parr, supra, 3 Cal.3d

at pp. 873–874 (dis. opn. of Burke, J.).)

In light of today’s decision and Hardin, I am concerned

that our equal protection jurisprudence is evolving in a manner

that ignores Justice Mosk’s prescient warnings decades ago.

“One feature that distinguishes our equal protection doctrine

from its federal counterpart is that the standards of review

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Liu, J., dissenting

under our doctrine are limited to two: rational basis review and

strict scrutiny. (See In re Marriage Cases (2008) 43 Cal.4th 757,

832.) Unlike the federal courts, we have declined to adopt

intermediate scrutiny as a third standard of review. (See

Hawkins v. Superior Court (1978) 22 Cal.3d 584, 595–603 (conc.

opn. of Mosk, J.); id. at pp. 607–610 (conc. opn. of Bird, C. J.).)

This means that rational basis review, in our doctrine, covers a

wide range of cases and must be applied with nuance and

sensitivity if we are to avoid the ‘rigidity of [a] two-tiered

framework’ that ‘applies either a standard that is virtually

always met [rational basis] or one that is almost never satisfied

[strict scrutiny].’ (Id. at p. 598 (conc. opn. of Mosk, J.).)”

(Hardin, supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 868 (dis. opn. of Liu, J.).)

Something is awry when the level of vigilance we apply to

a law that exempts certain members of the bar but not others

from continuing education requirements (Warden, supra, 21

Cal.4th 628) is also what we apply to a law that gives young

offenders a meaningful opportunity to avoid life imprisonment

but denies that opportunity to an especially despised subset.

Our case law applying rational basis review has not always been

so rigid. (Hardin, supra, 15 Cal.5th at pp. 868–879 (dis. opn. of

Liu, J.).) Yet today’s decision does not account for the relevant

policymaking context and falls short of its own demand that the

“ ‘standard of rationality . . . must find some footing in the

realities of the subject addressed by the legislation.’ ” (Maj. opn.,

ante, at p. 25.)

I respectfully dissent.

LIU, J.

26

See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who

argued in Supreme Court.

Name of Opinion People v. Williams

__________________________________________________________

Procedural Posture (see XX below)

Original Appeal

Original Proceeding

Review Granted (published) XX 47 Cal.App.5th 475

Review Granted (unpublished)

Rehearing Granted

__________________________________________________________

Opinion No. S262229

Date Filed: August 29, 2024

__________________________________________________________

Court: Superior

County: San Diego

Judge: Kenneth K. So

__________________________________________________________

Counsel:

Nancy J. King and Rebecca P. Jones, under appointments by the

Supreme Court, for Defendant and Appellant.

Xavier Becerra and Rob Bonta, Attorneys General, Michael J. Mongan,

State Solicitor General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney

General, Julie L. Garland, Assistant Attorney General, Joshua

Patashnik, Deputy State Solicitor General, Daniel J. Hilton and Steve

Oetting, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

Richard J. Sachs, retired Deputy District Attorney (San Diego), and

Gregory D. Totten for the California District Attorneys Association as

Amicus Curiae on behalf of Plaintiff and Respondent.

Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for

publication with opinion):

Rebecca P. Jones

Attorney at Law

3549 Camino del Rio South, Suite D

San Diego, CA 92108

(619) 549-2392

Joshua Patashnik

Deputy State Solicitor General

600 West Broadway, Suite 1800

San Diego, CA 9201

(619) 738-9628