State of Tennessee v. Reggie Estes

IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT JACKSON

Assigned on Briefs June 7, 2005

STATE OF TENNESSEE v. REGGIE ESTES

Appeal from the Circuit Court for Haywood County

No. 4944 William B. Acree, Judge, Sitting by Designation

No. W2004-02311-CCA-R3-CD - Filed October 13, 2005

The Appellant, Reggie Estes, was convicted by a Haywood County jury of vehicular homicide by

intoxication and was sentenced to fourteen years as a Range II, multiple offender. On appeal, Estes

raises the following issues for our review: (1) whether the evidence is sufficient to support his

conviction; and (2) whether he was sentenced in violation of Blakely v. Washington. After review

of the record, we affirm.

Tenn. R. App. P. 3; Judgment of the Circuit Court Affirmed

DAVID G. HAYES, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which JOSEPH M. TIPTON and THOMAS

T. WOODALL, joined.

William L. Johnson, Memphis, Tennessee, for the Appellant, Reggie Estes.

Paul G. Summers, Attorney General and Reporter; Benjamin A. Ball, Assistant Attorney General;

Garry Brown, District Attorney General; and Jerald Campbell, Assistant District Attorney General,

for the Appellee, State of Tennessee.

OPINION

Factual Background

On September 22, 2002, at around 2:00 A.M., paramedics and state troopers were called to

the scene of a one car collision on Highway 87, also known as Fulton Road, in Haywood County.

Paramedics discovered the body of the victim, Jeffrey Graves, lying on the ground next to a totally

demolished vehicle. Parts of the vehicle were strewn over a churchyard. The damage was so

massive that the make of the vehicle was not immediately discernible. The Appellant was initially

observed standing near the vehicle but collapsed soon thereafter.

Chris Milton of the Brownsville Fire Department was an initial emergency responder to the

scene. Upon encountering the Appellant, Milton noted the strong odor of alcohol. The Appellant

advised Milton that he was driving the vehicle. Paramedic Donna Conley rode with the Appellant

in the ambulance to the hospital. She testified that, although the Appellant smelled of alcohol, he

appeared alert and coherent when he told her that he was the driver of the vehicle. State Trooper

William (Tommy) Booker was dispatched to the scene and interviewed the Appellant around 3:15

A.M. at the hospital. The Appellant confirmed that he was the driver of the vehicle, but, when asked

whether he remembered what happened, the Appellant stated, “No, I don’t.” A blood alcohol

specimen was obtained from the Appellant. Tests results established that the Appellant’s blood

alcohol level was .12 percent approximately an hour and a half after the crime had occurred.

After receiving a phone call concerning the incident, Erica White, the Appellant’s fiancée,

followed the ambulance from the scene to Haywood Park Hospital in Brownsville. White testified

that when she visited the Appellant in the emergency room, she was unable to communicate with

him:

I went over to him and I tried to touch his hand but he was shaking really badly and

I kept trying to talk to him but I couldn’t get him to really even talk to me. I mean

his teeth were shattering really bad. I mean, he was just really - - he was just shaking

- - his whole body. Everything was shaking.

At trial, Trooper Max Anderson with the Critical Incident Response Team (CRIT) of the

Tennessee Highway Patrol testified as an expert in accident reconstruction. Based upon

measurements from yaw marks left on the roadway by the vehicle and the use of a computerized

sensing diagnostic module which read the car’s air bag, Anderson calculated that the vehicle was

traveling 91 miles per hour five seconds before the crash. Anderson opined that the driver lost

control of the vehicle at a curve in the road and abruptly jerked the car in the opposite direction in

an effort to regain control. As a result, the car skidded off the road, began a clockwise rotation,

became airborne, and hit a tree. Upon impact with the tree, both the driver and the passenger were

ejected from the vehicle.

In November of 2002, a Haywood County grand jury returned a two-count indictment against

the Appellant charging him with vehicular homicide by intoxication and vehicular homicide by

recklessness. Following a jury trial, the Appellant was found guilty of vehicular homicide by

intoxication. The trial court sentenced the Appellant to fourteen years in confinement. The

Appellant’s motion for a new trial was denied with this appeal following.

Analysis

I. Sufficiency of the Evidence

The Appellant contends that the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions.

Specifically he argues “the only information relating to the identity of the driver are the statements

given to the medical personnel and the trooper by the [Appellant]. There was not any other evidence

offered by the [S]tate to determine the identity of the driver of the vehicle involved in the accident.”

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We apply the rule that where the sufficiency of evidence is challenged, the relevant question

for the reviewing court is “whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the

[State], any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a

reasonable doubt.” Jackson v. Virginia, 433 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S. Ct. 2781, 2789 (1979); see also

Tenn. R. App. P. 13 (e). The scope of our examination of the evidence is not equivalent to that of

the jury’s. In a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, this court does not retry the defendant.

We emphasize that our examination in a sufficiency review is not to revisit inconsistent,

contradicting, implausible, or non-credible proof, as these issues are resolved solely by the jury.

Rather, we look to the record to determine whether there was substantive probative evidence to

support the verdict. The second inquiry, the question of legal sufficiency, then follows: whether the

record contains evidence from which the jury could have found the essential elements of the crime

beyond a reasonable doubt. Every reasonable hypothesis of innocence need not be dispelled; it is

only necessary that there exists proof which supports the elements of the crime. The State is entitled

to the strongest legitimate view of the evidence and all reasonable inferences which may be drawn

therefrom. State v. Harris, 839 S.W.2d 54, 75 (Tenn. 1992). All questions involving the credibility

of witnesses, the weight and value to be given to the evidence, and all factual issues are resolved by

the trier of fact. State v. Pappas, 754 S.W.2d 620, 623 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1987). This court will

not reweigh or reevaluate the evidence presented. State v. Cabbage, 571 S.W.2d 832, 835 (Tenn.

1978).

The proof at trial overwhelmingly supports the jury’s verdict. Although the Appellant argues

that the State failed to prove he was the driver of the vehicle because he told Trooper Booker that

he did not remember what had happened and his fiancée testified that he was incoherent at the

hospital, our review of the record indicates that the Appellant told authorities that he was the driver

of the vehicle. After the collision, the Appellant told paramedics and police officers, both at the

scene and in the emergency room, that he was the driver of the vehicle. Blood tests confirmed that

the Appellant’s level of intoxication exceeded the legal limit. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 55-10-401

(a)(2) (2003). From these facts, a rational jury could have concluded: (1) that the Appellant killed

the victim by the operation of a motor vehicle; (2) that the Appellant acted recklessly; and (3) that

the killing was the proximate result of the Appellant’s intoxication. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-

213(a)(2) (2003). Accordingly, we conclude that the evidence at trial is legally sufficient to support

the Appellant’s conviction for vehicular homicide by intoxication.

II. Sentencing

The Appellant also argues that the trial court’s imposition of an enhanced sentence violates

his Sixth Amendment right to trial by jury as recognized by the Supreme Court’s holding in Blakely

v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 124 S. Ct. 2531 (2004).1 First, we would note that this issue is waived

because it was not raised by the Appellant at the sentencing hearing. See State v. Gomez, 163

S.W.3d 632 (Tenn. 2005). Moreover, our supreme court held in Gomez that the Sentencing Reform

1

The Appellant presents no challenge to his enhanced sentences under the 1989 Sentencing Act.

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Act of 1989 does not violate the Sixth Amendment guarantee of a jury trial and was, thus, not

affected by the Blakely decision. Id. Accordingly, this issue is without merit.

CONCLUSION

Finding no reversible error, the judgment of conviction and resulting sentence are affirmed.

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DAVID G. HAYES, JUDGE

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