Sandra Joyce Hayes v. William Tyson

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT JACKSON

February 16, 2005 Session

SANDRA JOYCE HAYES v. WILLIAM TYSON, ET AL.

Direct Appeal from the Chancery Court for Shelby County

No. CH-04-0071-1 Walter L. Evans, Chancellor

No. W2004-00750-COA-R3-CV - Filed April 19, 2005

The trial court dismissed Plaintiff’s causes of action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. We

affirm.

Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Chancery Court Affirmed; and

Remanded

DAVID R. FARMER , J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which ALAN E. HIGHERS, J. and HOLLY

M. KIRBY , J., joined.

Glenwood P. Roane, Sr., Memphis, Tennessee, for the appellant, Sandra Joyce Hayes.

Richard D. Bennett and Louis Jay Miller, Memphis, Tennessee, for the appellees, William Tyson,

N. D. Sanders and First Baptist Church Chelsea.

MEMORANDUM OPINION1

Petitioner Sandra Hayes (Rev. Hayes) was hired to serve as pastor of First Baptist Church

Chelsea (First Baptist) in January 2003. On December 31, 2003, William Tyson (Mr. Tyson),

Chairman of the Board of Deacons, and Norvelle Sanders (Mr. Sanders), Chairman of the Board of

Trustees, informed Rev. Hayes, in writing, that the members of First Baptist had voted to terminate

her employment effective January 2, 2004. On January 12, 2004, Rev. Hayes petitioned the Shelby

County Chancery Court for a temporary restraining order and permanent injunction enjoining First

1

Rule 10 of the Tennessee Court of Appeals provides:

This Court, with the concurrence of all judges participating in the case, may affirm, reverse

or modify the actions of the trial court by memorandum opinion when a formal opinion would have

no precedential value. W hen a case is decided by memorandum opinion it shall be designated

"MEMORANDUM O PINION", shall not be published, and shall not be cited or relied on for any

reason in any unrelated case.

Baptist, Mr. Tyson, and Mr. Sanders (collectively, Respondents) from prohibiting her from preaching

and performing pastoral functions. In her petition, Rev. Hayes asserted that, prior to termination,

a member of First Baptist’s Board of Deacons had prevented her from ministering to the

congregation by defaming her in church. She further asserted she was terminated without the

requisite number of votes from church membership.

On January 26, 2004, Respondents moved the court to dismiss Rev. Hayes’ petition for lack

of subject matter jurisdiction. In their motion, Respondents asserted First Baptist had hired Rev.

Hayes for an indefinite period of time and without a written contract. They further asserted First

Baptist’s decision to terminate Rev. Hayes’ employment was an ecclesiastic matter over which the

court had no subject matter jurisdiction under the First Amendment to the United States Constitution.

On January 28, Respondents filed an answer reiterating their position that the trial court lacked

subject matter jurisdiction and further asserting, as an affirmative defense, Rev. Hayes’ failure to

state a claim for which relief may be granted.

The trial court dismissed the matter on February 19, 2004. In its order, the trial court

determined that Rev. Hayes had not alleged any specific claims against Mr. Tyson or Mr. Sanders

in their individual capacity. The trial court found that, although Rev. Hayes alleged a member of the

church had defamed her, she did not allege that either Mr. Sanders or Mr. Tyson had made

defamatory remarks against her. The court dismissed the matter insofar as it related to defamation

for lack of jurisdiction under Tennessee Code Annotated § 16-11-102. The trial court dismissed the

matter regarding allegations of wrongful discharge for lack of subject matter jurisdiction over an

ecclesiastic matter. Rev. Hayes filed a timely notice of appeal to this Court.

Issues Presented

Rev. Hayes raises the following issues for our review:

(1) Whether Petitioner has met her burden of establishing subject matter

jurisdiction in the chancery court.

(2) Whether the chancery court erred in failing to transfer the case to circuit

court.

Standard of Review

The issues raised for our review present questions of law. Our review of the trial court's

conclusions on matters of law is de novo with no presumption of correctness. Bowden v. Ward, 27

S.W.3d 913, 916 (Tenn. 2000); Tenn. R. App P. 13(d).

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Analysis

Rev. Hayes asserts the trial court had subject matter jurisdiction to enjoin Respondents from

terminating her employment. We disagree.

In her petition, Rev. Hayes asserts Respondents terminated her in violation of church

procedure. The courts have no jurisdiction over ecclesiastic matters. Lewis v. Partee, 62 S.W. 328,

333 (Tenn. 1901). With the exception of actions of a church affecting property or civil rights, the

courts will not “revise or . . . inquire into the propriety or justice of the action of a church.” Id.

However, a court

will inquire into the fact [of] whether a certain person has been elected pastor or is

pastor, or whether certain persons are deacons or trustees, or whether certain persons

have been excommunicated from the church or are still members of the church, in

order to protect the church and its membership in the enjoyment of their property

rights, and their civil liberty to worship undisturbed by threats and violence, or from

trespasses by those who are not officers and members of the church.

Id. On the other hand, the removal of a pastor from a church is an ecclesiastic matter over which the

civil courts have no jurisdiction. Mason v. Winstead, 265 S.W.2d 561, 563 (Tenn. 1954). Further,

matters of church discipline, even where arguably procedurally flawed, are not within the jurisdiction

of the civil courts. Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696, 713-14 (1976).

Thus, the trial court did not err in determining it lacked subject matter jurisdiction to enjoin

Respondents from terminating Rev. Hayes’ employment as pastor of First Baptist.

Rev. Hayes further asserts the trial court erred by not transferring her defamation claims to

circuit court. We find this argument unconvincing. We first note that Rev. Hayes did not commence

a cause of action seeking damages for defamation, nor did she seek to enjoin the actions of any

person in particular. She merely petitioned the trial court to enjoin the acts of unnamed persons who,

she alleges, prohibited her from performing her pastoral duties by making disparaging remarks in

church. Rev. Hayes does not allege that either Mr. Tyson or Mr. Sanders made the allegedly

defamatory remarks. In light of our holding above, we find this issue moot. There is simply nothing

remaining for the court to enjoin.

Holding

In light of the foregoing, judgment of the trial court dismissing this matter is affirmed. Costs

of this appeal are taxed to the Appellant, Sandra Joyce Hayes, and her surety, for which execution

may issue if necessary.

___________________________________

DAVID R. FARMER, JUDGE

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