State of Tennessee v. Leah Joy Ward

IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT JACKSON

Assigned on Briefs February 6, 2007

STATE OF TENNESSEE v. LEAH JOY WARD

Direct Appeal from the Criminal Court for Shelby County

No. 03-04434 James C. Beasley, Jr., Judge

No. W2005-02802-CCA-R3-CD - Filed May 30, 2007

The defendant, Leah Joy Ward, was found guilty by a jury of first degree premeditated murder. She

was sentenced to life imprisonment. The only issue presented on appeal is whether the evidence

supports the element of premeditation. After review, we conclude the evidence was sufficient and

affirm the conviction.

Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Criminal Court Affirmed

JOHN EVERETT WILLIAMS, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which JOSEPH M. TIPTON , P.J.,

and D. KELLY THOMAS, JR., J., joined.

Robert Wilson Jones, District Public Defender; Tony N. Brayton (on appeal), Mary Kathryn Kent

and Harry E. Sayle, III (at trial), Assistant District Public Defenders, for the appellant, Leah Joy

Ward.

Robert E. Cooper, Jr., Attorney General and Reporter; Sophia S. Lee, Assistant Attorney General;

William L. Gibbons, District Attorney General; and Patience R. Branham and Pamela Fleming,

Assistant District Attorneys General, for the appellee, State of Tennessee.

OPINION

This case concerns the death of Ejaz Ahmad at the hands of his wife, the defendant. The

victim was a Pakistani immigrant who had married the defendant approximately six months before

his death after a brief acquaintanceship. The defendant admitted shooting the victim but claimed that

she acted in self-defense.

Kafait Malik, a pharmacology professor, had known the victim approximately fifteen years

since first meeting him in a Memphis mosque. Malik performed a Muslim wedding ceremony when

the victim and defendant were married. Not long after the wedding, the victim complained to Malik

that the defendant was keeping him from tending to his business. The victim had learned that the

defendant was on probation and was in violation of the terms of her probation. Malik described her

behavior as paradoxical. She was obsessed with the victim but would disappear without explanation

and would exhibit other strange behavior. He stated that the victim was extremely kind.

Naseer Meer lived with the victim, at the victim’s residence, for four years until Meer’s

family came from Pakistan. Meer attended the victim’s and defendant’s Muslim wedding on

October 5, 2002. Meer had no knowledge of the defendant prior to the night of the wedding. Meer

said he had never seen the victim act violently or display anger.

Johnny Smith, Jr. had known the victim for fourteen or fifteen years and had stayed at the

victim’s house on an irregular basis. The victim had allowed the defendant to move into his house

due to her being homeless. The victim stayed with friends for a few weeks before the marriage and

then moved back into his home with the defendant. Smith described the defendant as very jealous

and demanding toward the victim. The victim had a son, Tarik, by a former marriage. Tarik often

spent weekends with the victim. Smith was present on one occasion when Tarik’s mother called to

check on him, and the defendant became very angry and attempted to take the phone. The defendant

acted as if she were leaving, and the victim followed her outside. The victim came back immediately

with a mark under his eye and said the defendant had hit him. Smith went outside to talk with the

defendant. The defendant was still angry and stated that she could kill the victim. Smith did not take

the statement seriously at that time.

On two occasions, the victim complained to Smith of the defendant withdrawing money from

the victim’s account. The second occasion was only a month after the wedding. In both

conversations, the victim asked Smith if the victim should tell the defendant to leave. Smith

attempted to call the victim the latter part of April 2003. The defendant answered, told Smith that

the victim had gone to Pakistan, and hung up the phone.

Lori Peeper had been married to the victim twice. She obtained both divorces, the first on

grounds of cruel and inhuman treatment and the second for desertion. However, she said the victim

was never violent or abusive and had never hurt her. The victim was also a good father to their son,

Tarik, and was very protective of him. The victim frequently talked and visited with Tarik. In April

2003, Peeper and Tarik lost contact with the victim. The defendant told her that he had gone to

Pakistan. She went to the victim’s home and knocked without receiving a response. She made

inquiries at a mosque and was told that the victim had not been seen there for two weeks. She

attempted but was not allowed to file a missing person report.

Ernestine Marsh, the mother of Lori Peeper, described the victim as a good father to her

grandson, Tarik. She never knew the victim to be violent toward her daughter. During a period in

April 2003, the victim had not called Tarik and calls to the victim were unanswered. Mrs. Marsh

overheard the defendant tell Tarik on one occasion that the victim was in West Memphis. In a later

conversation, the defendant claimed he had gone to Pakistan. This caused Mrs. Marsh to become

more concerned. On May 1, she took Tarik to the victim’s residence. They were able to see through

the windows that the furniture and other belongings were gone. They noticed a foul odor present on

the premises. Tarik removed boards that were blocking an entrance to a shed in the backyard. There

-2-

they discovered the victim’s body covered by a foam eggcrate mattress. Mrs. Marsh immediately

called 9-1-1 from a neighbor’s residence.

Tarik Ahmad was fourteen at the time of trial. He testified to the close relationship he shared

with his father, the victim. Tarik was with his father on most weekends, and they talked frequently

during the week. Tarik estimated that the defendant lived with his father about six months. He

witnessed some arguments between the victim and the defendant, but he never saw the victim be

physical toward the defendant. On one occasion, when the defendant returned home at

approximately 3:00 a.m., the victim shouted at her and the defendant beat the victim on the chest.

He stated that the victim owned a lot of jewelry. The victim also kept “lots” of money in various

hiding places in the house. Tarik recovered none of the victim’s possessions, except for a bedroom

suite that was reclaimed at a storage facility.

In April of 2003, Tarik had not heard from the victim for about three weeks. On May 1,

Tarik and his grandmother, Mrs. Marsh, went to the victim’s house. Tarik removed large boards that

were covering the entrance to a shed in the rear of the premises. Within the shed, they found the

victim’s body covered by a foam eggcrate mattress.

Tarsha Lilly lived across the street from the victim. She stated that, in April 2003, the

defendant approached her concerning selling the furniture in the victim’s house. The defendant said

that her husband was out of town. Later, Ms. Lilly observed a rental truck at the victim’s residence.

The victim’s body was discovered two to three weeks after the defendant had proposed selling the

furniture.

Deborah Moore, another neighbor, testified that a “moving panel truck” was at the victim’s

residence for about a week. Ms. Moore had not seen the victim as usual during a period in April

2003.

Walid Salam, a used car dealer, had known the victim since 2002. He also knew the

defendant. He described seeing the defendant on two occasions when she appeared angry. On the

first occasion, Salam, his female employee, and the victim were at a restaurant when the defendant

came in. The defendant took the victim aside, and they talked. Later, the victim told Salam that the

defendant was very jealous and was causing him problems. On the second occasion, the defendant

showed up at a thrift store where Salam and the victim were. The defendant appeared angry at that

time as well.

On a later date, the defendant came to Salam’s business. He described the defendant as

“very, very sweaty and very hyperactive and shaking extremely . . .” She told Salam that the victim

had gone to Pakistan and had left her no money. Salam paid the defendant $300 for the car she was

driving. The next day, at the defendant’s request, Salam took a mechanic to the victim’s residence

to repair a Lincoln automobile. The defendant then asked the men for help in moving some boxes.

Salam noticed an odor that the defendant explained as bad food in the refrigerator. The victim

wanted to sell other cars at the residence. Salam described them as salvage vehicles but moved them

-3-

to his lot. He produced copies of bills of sale dated April 28, 2003, showing that he paid a total of

$675 for five cars. Salam observed no marks or bruises on the defendant. Salam heard of the

victim’s death shortly after these events and notified police.

In late April 2003, the defendant pawned a ring, which was later identified as belonging to

the victim. The defendant signed a document stating that the ring was hers and received $40 in

exchange.

On April 28, the defendant rented a moving truck and storage space from Storage USA. She

rented the 10' x 15' space for six months and paid $400 in cash for the rental term. A man and

woman were with the defendant while she was unloading the belongings.

Mary Rogers, the defendant’s mother, had accompanied the defendant to a probation

violation hearing in the federal court in Jackson, Tennessee. The victim also went along but

remained in the car during the hearing. The defendant was sentenced to six months of incarceration

but was given until May 1, 2003, to report. Mrs. Rogers received a call from the defendant on May

2. The defendant told her that the victim was dead and that she, the defendant, was a suspect.

Members of the Memphis Police Department responded to the victim’s residence on May 1.

The area was secured, and crime scene investigators began processing the scene for evidence. Inside

the residence, officers took samples of suspected blood stains in different locations. Later testing

of these did not indicate the presence of blood.

Officer James Fitzpatrick, a Memphis Police Department homicide investigator, was the

crime scene coordinator. He observed that the partially decomposed body’s head had been severed

and was missing. Some swords were found in the residence. Investigators found no evidence of

forced entry on interior or exterior doors of the residence. Officer Fitzpatrick said the odor in the

house, especially in one bedroom and in a bathroom, was very bad. The victim was later identified

by means of a thumb print. Dr. O. C. Smith, the Shelby County Medical Examiner, was called to

the scene.

Dr. O. C. Smith was accepted as an expert in forensic pathology. He observed the crime

scene on May 1. He noted that there was skin tissue from the victim’s hand on the concrete pad of

the shed where the victim’s body was found. This tissue was used to obtain a finger print and to

ultimately identify the victim. Dr. Smith noted that a wire cable was wrapped around one leg of the

victim and a red rope was wrapped around one arm. From the state of the victim’s decomposition,

Dr. Smith estimated that the victim had been dead for two to three weeks. Due to the light level of

insect activity present, he opined that the body had been outside for a relatively short period.

Dr. Teresa Campbell, a forensic pathologist, performed an autopsy on the victim. She

determined the cause of death to be a gunshot wound to the chest. An x-ray revealed a bullet over

the spine in the abdominal area. Despite the decomposition, she was able to discern a track from the

point of entry to the bullet. There were knife wounds on the victim’s body, which were inconclusive

-4-

as to being made before death. Dr. Campbell also opined that the body had been in a protected area

before it was removed to the scene where it was found.

Dr. Jennifer Love, a forensic anthropologist, testified concerning her findings from the

examination of the victim’s bones. She stated that the markings on the cervical vertebrae indicated

a cut with a straight-edged type of knife. Her examination of the head and neck of the left femur

indicated there had been an attempt to cut off the left leg. The victim’s forearm had marks consistent

with rodent activity.

After the defendant was located in federal custody, she was questioned by two Memphis

Police Department homicide detectives. The defendant gave a voluntary statement on May 5. The

defendant stated she had shot the victim at least three weeks earlier. In her statement, the defendant

said that the it was “at least two-thirty in the evening” when the shooting took place. On the day prior

to the shooting, she had taken the victim’s bag concerning his papers. She said the victim was mad

prior to this, and she took the bag so he would be forced to talk with her. She went to a friend’s

residence after her work shift that night and then returned home at about midnight or 1:00 a.m. The

victim asked her about the bag, and she denied any knowledge of its location. The victim said he

would kill her if she touched the bag again. The defendant had kept a gun on a top shelf of her

daughter’s bedroom. She took the gun into the bedroom and put it under her bed.

The defendant stated that “around six or seven,” the victim, speaking through the locked

bedroom door, asked her if she was going to school. She said the victim then “busted the door,”

started beating the defendant, and asked her where the gun was. The defendant said she did not

know if the victim “busted the door” the first or second time but he tried to enter the room through

a window. She hid in the bathroom closet with the bathroom door locked. The victim sprayed water

into the bathroom with a hose from outside. The defendant said she ran to the bedroom and got the

gun. The victim came through the door and grabbed her by the throat. The defendant pulled the

trigger once, and the gun did not fire. The defendant said, “Then I pulled the trigger again. The gun

went off. Okay. And I pulled the trigger again. The gun went off.” She stated the bullets hit the

victim in the heart and in the stomach. The victim fell on the bed, then to the floor. The defendant

went to the living room and prayed for the victim. When she returned to the bedroom, he was dead.

The defendant said she did not know where she disposed of the gun. Later, she

unsuccessfully attempted to put the victim’s body in the bathtub. After “weeks,” the odor was strong

and she saw worms coming from the victim’s head. She stated that she panicked and cut the victim’s

head off with a sword. She disposed of the head in a dumpster. Eventually, she drug the body out

to the shed and covered it with a “foam thing.” She estimated the body was outside for two or three

days before it was discovered.

The defendant denied trying to gain from disposing of the victim’s property. She sold a

couple of cars for fifty dollars. She “gave away almost everything” and placed some items in

storage. She pawned only one ring. The defendant said she did not notify police because she was

-5-

on probation, a gun was present in the house, and she was scared. She concluded by saying she had

not intended to kill the victim but was only protecting herself.

After the State rested, the defense presented one witness, Marc Caudel, an investigator for

the Public Defender’s Office. Mr. Caudel related that Walid Salam had informed him that the victim

had a temper and that he had seen the victim be aggressive on occasions.

Based on the above evidence, the jury returned a guilty verdict of first degree premeditated

murder.

Sufficiency of the Evidence

The sole issue presented for our review is whether the evidence was sufficient to support the

defendant’s conviction for first degree premeditated murder. The defendant contends that the

evidence supporting premeditation was insufficient. The State argues that both direct and

circumstantial evidence of premeditation were sufficiently established to support the jury’s verdict.

Our standard of review is “whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable

to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime

beyond a reasonable doubt.” Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S. Ct. 2781 (1979); State

v. Goodwin, 143 S.W.3d 771, 775 (Tenn. 2004). During review of the evidence, “the State is

entitled to the strongest legitimate view of the evidence and to all reasonable and legitimate

inferences that may be drawn therefrom.” State v. Smith, 24 S.W.3d 274, 279 (Tenn. 2000). Any

questions concerning the credibility of witnesses, the weight and value of the evidence, or other

factual issues raised by the evidence are resolved by the fact finder and are not re-weighed or re-

evaluated by this court. State v. Evans, 108 S.W.3d 231, 236 (Tenn. 2003).

The statutory definition of first degree premeditated murder is “a premeditated and

intentional killing of another.” T.C.A. § 39-13-202(a)(1) (2006). An act is premeditated if the act

is “done after the exercise of reflection and judgment.” Id. at (d).

“Premeditation” means that the intent to kill must have been formed prior to the act

itself. It is not necessary that the purpose to kill pre-exist in the mind of the accused

for any definite period of time. The mental state of the accused at the time the

accused allegedly decided to kill must be carefully considered in order to determine

whether the accused was sufficiently free from excitement and passion as to be

capable of premeditation.

Id.

The issue as to the presence of premeditation in a given case is a question of fact for the jury

to determine from all the circumstances surrounding the killing. State v. Davidson, 121 S.W.3d 600,

614 (Tenn. 2003). Because the element of premeditation involves the defendant’s state of mind, a

factor which is not always shown by direct evidence, circumstantial evidence may be used to prove

premeditation. Id. at 614-15.

-6-

Our supreme court has provided a list of non-exclusive circumstances that would justify a

jury in finding or inferring premeditation: the use of a deadly weapon on an unarmed victim; the

particular cruelty of a killing; the defendant’s threats or declarations of intent to kill the victim; the

defendant’s procurement of a weapon; preparations taken to conceal the crime undertaken before the

crime is committed; destruction or secretion of evidence of the killing; and the defendant’s calm

demeanor immediately after the killing. State v. Bland, 958 S.W.2d 651, 660 (Tenn. 1997); State

v. Pike, 978 S.W.2d 904, 914-15 (Tenn. 1998). These factors are demonstrative that premeditation

may be established by any evidence from which a rational trier of fact could infer that the killing

occurred after the exercise of reflection and judgment. Davidson, 121 S.W.3d at 615. In addition,

evidence which establishes a motive by the defendant will warrant an inference of premeditation.

State v. Leach, 148 S.W.3d 42, 54 (Tenn. 2004).

After reviewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, we conclude that the

evidence was sufficient to support a finding of premeditation. The defendant’s claim of killing in

self-defense was rejected by the jury, a prerogative within the jury’s province. There was evidence

by a witness who had heard the defendant state that she could kill the victim. Although the witness

placed little importance on the assertion at the time, it assumed a more sinister tone in light of

subsequent events. The witness did not provide a date for this event; however, the defendant and

victim were together for only a six-month period.

On the day before the killing, the defendant took the victim’s bag containing his personal

papers. The defendant was aware that this would provoke the victim. The defendant then procured

a handgun, which she had secreted in the residence, and placed it under her bed. She admittedly shot

the unarmed victim with this gun and claimed self-defense. Despite the defendant’s claims that the

victim “busted the door” to her bedroom, investigators found no evidence of forced entry on the

exterior or interior doors of the residence.

Her subsequent actions consisted of a systematic effort to dispose of the victim’s belongings

by selling, pawning, or placing them in storage for her later retrieval. The defendant deflected all

inquiries concerning the victim’s whereabouts with knowing falsehoods. The defendant disposed

of the weapon, and it was never located. She further attempted to dismember the body and was

successful in severing the head, which she deposited in a dumpster. Standing alone, the concealment

of evidence of a crime is insufficient to prove premeditation. See State v. West, 844 S.W.2d 144,

148 (Tenn. 1992) (“The concealment of evidence . . . may be associated with the commission of any

crime and the accompanying fear of punishment.”)

In the instant case, the prosecution was not limited to the defendant’s efforts at concealment

of the evidence to prove premeditation. Other circumstances existed from which one could infer

premeditation: the defendant’s homicidal statement and the procurement and use of a deadly weapon

on an unarmed victim. Additionally, the jury would have been warranted in finding the defendant

was motivated by personal gain. No accounting was ever made of the money stored in the residence

by the victim. Some sales of the victim’s personal goods were documented, although all were not

fully accounted for.

-7-

Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that the evidence sufficiently supported the finding

that the defendant committed a premeditated first degree murder. We therefore affirm the conviction

and order of judgment.

______________________________

JOHN EVERETT WILLIAMS, JUDGE

-8-