Neil Lincoln Miller v. Howard Carlton, Warden

IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT KNOXVILLE

Assigned on Briefs May 22, 2007

NEIL LINCOLN MILLER v. HOWARD CARLTON, WARDEN

Appeal from the Criminal Court for Johnson County

No. 4933 Lynn W. Brown, Judge

No. E2006-02348-CCA-R3-HC - Filed August 30, 2007

The petitioner, Neil Lincoln Miller, appeals the summary dismissal of his petition for habeas corpus

relief. He contends that his sentence is illegal. Because the record and law establish that the

petitioner is not entitled to habeas corpus relief, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Tenn. R. App. P. 3; Judgment of the Criminal Court is Affirmed.

JAMES CURWOOD WITT , JR., J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which JOHN EVERETT

WILLIAMS, and ALAN E. GLENN , JJ., joined.

Neil Lincoln Miller, Mountain City, Tennessee, Pro Se.

Robert E. Cooper, Jr., Attorney General and Reporter; and Cameron L. Hyder and John H. Bledsoe,

Assistant Attorneys General, for the Appellee, State of Tennessee.

OPINION

On February 22, 1999, the petitioner, who was originally charged with first degree

murder, entered a plea of guilty to second degree murder and received a Range I sentence of twenty-

five years’ incarceration. On August 8, 2006, the petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus

alleging that his sentence was illegal. The petitioner asserted that the sentence imposed by the trial

court provided for an eighty-five percent release eligibility date in contravention of Tennessee Code

Annotated section 40-35-501, which provides for one hundred percent service of a second degree

murder conviction. See T.C.A. § 40-35-501(i)(1) (2006). The habeas corpus court dismissed the

petition without a hearing, ruling that the petitioner had failed to established that he was serving an

illegal sentence. In this appeal, the petitioner reasserts his illegal sentence claim.

“The determination of whether habeas corpus relief should be granted is a question

of law.” Faulkner v. State, 226 S.W.3d 358, 361 (Tenn. Apr. 27, 2007) (citing Hart v. State, 21

S.W.3d 901, 903 (Tenn. 2000)). Our review of the habeas corpus court’s decision is, therefore, “de

novo with no presumption of correctness afforded to the [habeas corpus] court.” Id. (citing

Killingsworth v. Ted Russell Ford, Inc., 205 S.W.3d 406, 408 (Tenn. 2006)).

The writ of habeas corpus is constitutionally guaranteed, see U.S. Const. art. 1, § 9,

cl. 2; Tenn. Const. art. I, § 15, but has been regulated by statute for more than a century, see Ussery

v. Avery, 432 S.W.2d 656, 657 (Tenn. 1968). Tennessee Code Annotated section 29-21-101

provides that “[a]ny person imprisoned or restrained of liberty, under any pretense whatsoever,

except in cases specified in § 29-21-102, may prosecute a writ of habeas corpus, to inquire into the

cause of such imprisonment and restraint.” T.C.A. § 29-21-101 (2000). Despite the broad wording

of the statute, a writ of habeas corpus may be granted only when the petitioner has established a lack

of jurisdiction for the order of confinement or that he is otherwise entitled to immediate release

because of the expiration of his sentence. See Ussery, 432 S.W.2d at 658; State v. Galloway, 45

Tenn. (5 Cold.) 326 (1868). The purpose of the state habeas corpus petition is to contest a void, not

merely a voidable, judgment. State ex rel. Newsom v. Henderson, 424 S.W.2d 186, 189 (Tenn.

1968). A void conviction is one which strikes at the jurisdictional integrity of the trial court. Archer

v. State, 851 S.W.2d 157, 164 (Tenn. 1993); see State ex rel. Anglin v. Henderson, 575 S.W.2d 284,

287 (Tenn. 1979); Passarella v. State, 891 S.W.2d 619, 627 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1994). Because in

the petitioner’s case the trial court apparently had jurisdiction over the actus reus, the subject matter,

and the person of the petitioner, the petitioner’s jurisdictional issues are limited to the claims that

the court was without authority to enter the judgments. See Anglin, 575 S.W.2d at 287

(“‘Jurisdiction’ in the sense here used, is not limited to jurisdiction of the person or of the subject

matter but also includes lawful authority of the court to render the particular order or judgment

whereby the petitioner has been imprisoned.”); see also Archer, 851 S.W.2d at 164; Passarella, 891

S.W.2d at 627.

Here, the petitioner’s sole claim is that his sentence is illegal because it included an

eighty-five percent release eligibility date in direct contravention of Tennessee Code Annotated

section 40-35-501. That statute provides, in pertinent part, as follows:

There shall be no release eligibility for a person committing an offense, on or after

July 1, 1995, that is enumerated in subdivision (i)(2). The person shall serve one

hundred percent (100%) of the sentence imposed by the court less sentence credits

earned and retained. However, no sentence reduction credits authorized by §

41-21-236, or any other provision of law, shall operate to reduce the sentence

imposed by the court by more than fifteen percent (15%).

T.C.A. § 40-35-501(i)(1) (2006). Second degree murder is one of the offenses enumerated in

subsection (i)(2). Id. § 40-35-501(i)(2). The petitioner contends that the erroneous release eligibility

date was a bargained-for component of his plea agreement.

Initially, the petitioner’s judgment reflects an accurate release eligibility date of one

hundred percent. The only reference to the eighty-five percent release eligibility date appears on the

plea submission form. The transcript of the plea submission hearing has not been made a part of the

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record. Although it is certainly true that “as a general rule, when a plea agreement includes an illegal

sentence, a defendant is entitled to withdraw the guilty plea,” Summers v. State, 212 S.W.3d 251, 258

(Tenn. 2007) (citing McLaney v. Bell, 59 S.W.3d 90, 94-95 (Tenn. 2001)), it is also true that “[i]n

the case of an illegal sentence claim based on facts not apparent from the face of the judgment, an

adequate record for summary review must include pertinent documents to support those factual

assertions,” Summers, 212 S.W.3d. at 261. “When such documents from the record of the

underlying proceedings are not attached to the habeas corpus petition, a trial court may properly

choose to dismiss the petition without the appointment of counsel and without a hearing.” Id. Faced

with a valid judgment form and no documentary evidence to support the petitioner’s claim that an

erroneous release eligibility date was a material element of his plea agreement, we must affirm the

trial court’s summary dismissal of his petition for habeas corpus relief.

Additionally, we note that although the plea submission form contains the notation

“85%,” this notation alone does not render the sentence illegal. Section 40-35-501 specifically

provides that a sentence including a one hundred percent release eligibility date may be reduced by

sentence reduction credits by up to fifteen percent. T.C.A. § 40-35-501(i)(1) (2006). A notation that

the petitioner might be eligible for release after serving only eighty-five percent of his sentence,

therefore, does not contradict any statutory provision. Thus, the petitioner’s claim, even if true and

supported by the appropriate documentation, would not entitle him to habeas corpus relief.

Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

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JAMES CURWOOD WITT, JR., JUDGE

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