Thomas Earl Williams v. State of Tennessee

IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT JACKSON

Assigned on Briefs August 7, 2007

THOMAS EARL WILLIAMS v. STATE OF TENNESSEE

Appeal from the Criminal Court for Shelby County

No. P-07638 Paula Skahan, Judge

No. W2006-00875-CCA-R3-HC - Filed September 27, 2007

The pro se Petitioner, Thomas Earl Williams, appeals the habeas corpus court’s order summarily

dismissing his petition, arguing that the dismissal was erroneous for several reasons. Principally,

he contends that he is entitled to relief because the sentencing statutes under which he was sentenced

in 1974 were later found to be unconstitutional. Following our review, we conclude that his

sentences are lawful and have not expired, and that his judgments are not void. Consequently, we

affirm the habeas corpus court’s order of summary dismissal.

Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Criminal Court Affirmed

DAVID H. WELLES, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which JAMES CURWOOD WITT , JR.,

and D. KELLY THOMAS, JR., JJ., joined.

Thomas Earl Williams, Pro Se.

Robert E. Cooper, Jr., Attorney General and Reporter; David H. Findley, Assistant Attorney

General; William L. Gibbons, District Attorney General; and Anita Spinetta, Assistant District

Attorney General, for the appellee, State of Tennessee.

OPINION

FACTS

On July 2, 1973, the Petitioner was sentenced for three counts of first degree burglary and

one count of assault with a deadly weapon; he received a five-year sentence for each crime.

Subsequently, on May 20, 1974, he received a three-year sentence for assault with intent to murder,

as well as three determinate life sentences for one count of robbery armed with a deadly weapon and

two counts of murder during the perpetration of a robbery. All of the foregoing sentences were

ordered to be served concurrently.

It appears from the record before this Court that the Petitioner was found guilty of these

crimes by a jury and that the jury—rather than the trial court—imposed the three determinate life

sentences. One of the docket entries in the record contains the following handwritten statement

signed by the foreman of the Petitioner’s jury: “We [t]he jury find the defendant[,] Thomas Earl

Williams[,] guilty of murder in the perpetration of a [r]obbery as charged in the first count of the

indictment, and fixes [sic] his punishment at imprisonment for life in the [s]tate [p]enitentiary.” Two

other docket entries contain substantially identical notations regarding verdicts of guilty for murder

and sentencing to life imprisonment. All three offenses for which he received life sentences were

committed on June 25, 1972.

On April 5, 1989, he was sentenced to five years for escaping from prison. This sentence was

ordered to be served consecutively to the determinate life sentence he received for robbery armed

with a deadly weapon.

It does not appear that the Petitioner pursued a direct appeal of or post-conviction relief from

these convictions or sentences. He filed a pro se petition for a writ of habeas corpus on October 17,

1989. In this petition, he alleged that he had “completed the terms” of his determinate life sentences

but was being held unlawfully for an additional crime (second degree murder) for which he was

never “formally indicted, arrested, charged, arrainged [sic], tried, nor sentenced . . . .” This petition

was not supported by any documentation and was summarily dismissed on May 17, 1990.

The Petitioner filed a second petition for habeas corpus relief, and although there is no

official file stamp date on this petition, the notarization indicates that it was signed by the Petitioner

in February of 2006. This petition was supported by a memorandum of law, the three

aforementioned docket entries of conviction, and an “Offender Sentence Letter,” generated by the

Tennessee Offender Management Information Systems (TOMIS) computer program, which details

his convictions and sentences.

In his memorandum of law, the Petitioner sets out a number of arguments in support of his

claim that he is entitled to habeas corpus relief. Although this Court is unable to comprehend some

of these arguments, it appears that his principal contention is that he was sentenced pursuant to a

statutory scheme that was later declared unconstitutional and that therefore his sentence is void and

illegal.

The State responded that the Petitioner’s allegations lacked merit because a life sentence

“was and is a valid sentence for murder in the perpetration of a robbery.” The Petitioner then entered

a written response to the State’s response. In this pleading, he contended that the State misquoted

the law and that his “determinate life sentence is illegal.”

On March 10, 2006, the habeas corpus entered an order finding that the Petitioner had been

convicted by a jury of murder in the perpetration of a robbery and that the jury fixed his punishment

at imprisonment for life. The habeas corpus court further found that the Petitioner was not eligible

-2-

for habeas corpus relief “because his judgment is facially valid and is not void.” The habeas corpus

court summarily dismissed the petition.

This appeal followed.

ANALYSIS

On appeal, the Petitioner puts forth five arguments: (1) whether the habeas corpus court

abused its discretion in denying the Petitioner relief “from void and illegally imposed judgment to

conviction sentences declared unconstitutional [sic]”; (2) “[w]hether state statutory provisions of

1974 Act imposing life imprisonment sentence violated the United States Constitution Sixth

Amendment right to a fair and impartial trial by jury deliberation upon sentencing of murder in

perpetration of a robbery [sic]”; (3) whether the State’s response to his petition “improperly had trial

court deny habeas petition for relief of constitutional state statutory provisions of 1974 Act imposing

jurors to make a mandatory life imprisonment verdict later declared unconstitutional [sic]”; (4)

whether the habeas corpus court erred when it did not appoint counsel to assist the Petitioner in

amending his petition; and (5) whether the Petitioner’s original “indictment failed to allege an

offense required for murder in the perpetration of robbery, that a jury could return a proper verdict

and in compliance with Due Process of Law and Equal Protection of Law?”

The determination of whether to grant habeas corpus relief is a question of law this Court

reviews de novo. McLaney v. Bell, 59 S.W.3d 90, 92 (Tenn. 2001), overruled in part by Summers

v. State, 212 S.W.3d 251, 262 (Tenn. 2007). The Tennessee Constitution guarantees the right to

seek habeas corpus relief. See Tenn. Const. art. I, § 15. However, the grounds upon which relief

will be granted are narrow. Taylor v. State, 995 S.W.2d 78, 83 (Tenn. 1999). Relief is warranted

only when the judgment of conviction by which a petitioner is being held is shown to be void, rather

than merely voidable. Id. A judgment is void only when it appears upon the face of the judgment

or the record of the proceedings upon which the judgment is rendered that the convicting court was

without jurisdiction or authority to sentence a petitioner or that a petitioner’s sentence has expired.

Archer v. State, 851 S.W.2d 157, 164 (Tenn. 1993).

A sentence imposed in direct contravention of a statute is illegal and thus void. Stephenson

v. Carlton, 28 S.W.3d 910, 911 (Tenn. 2000). On the other hand, a voidable judgment or sentence

is one which is facially valid and which requires evidence beyond the face of the judgment or the

record of the proceedings to establish its invalidity. Taylor, 995 S.W.2d at 83. A petitioner bears

the burden of establishing a void judgment or illegal confinement by a preponderance of the

evidence. Wyatt v. State, 24 S.W.3d 319, 322 (Tenn. 2000). Furthermore, it is permissible for a

habeas corpus court to summarily dismiss a petition—without appointment of counsel and without

an evidentiary hearing—if there is nothing on the face of the record or judgment to indicate that the

convictions or sentences addressed therein are void. Passarella v. State, 891 S.W.2d 619, 627 (Tenn.

Crim. App. 1994).

-3-

In his first and fourth arguments, the Petitioner apparently contends that the habeas corpus

court abused its discretion and erred by failing to appoint counsel who could file an amended petition

on his behalf.

Initially, we note that the Petitioner received three determinate life sentences, and although

he may be eligible for parole,1 his sentences will only expire upon his death. Consequently, he is not

entitled to habeas corpus relief on the ground that his sentences have expired. Therefore, habeas

corpus relief is only warranted in the Petitioner’s case if he shows by a preponderance of the

evidence that his judgments are void. If it is not apparent from the face of his judgments or the

record of the proceedings that they are void, then it was not error for the habeas corpus court to

dismiss his petition without appointing counsel. See id.; Wyatt, 24 S.W.3d at 322.

His three concurrent life sentences were imposed by a jury on May 20, 1974. However, the

Petitioner was sentenced pursuant to the statutory sentencing scheme enacted by the Tennessee

General Assembly in 1919, see 1919 Tenn. Pub. Acts ch. 5, § 1, because this was the sentencing

scheme in effect when his crimes were committed in 1972. At that time, murder committed in the

perpetration of a robbery was considered murder in the first degree. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-2402

(1955) (repealed). Also under the 1919 Act, a jury was directed to determine the sentence for a

person convicted of murder in the first degree:

When any person is convicted of the crime of murder in the first degree, or

as an accessory before the fact of such a crime, it shall be the duty of the jury

convicting him in their verdict to fix his punishment, which punishment shall be

death in the mode prescribed by law for the infliction of the death penalty in capital

cases, or the jury may, if they are of the opinion that there are mitigating

circumstances, fix the punishment at imprisonment in the penitentiary for life, or for

some period over twenty (20) years.

Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-2406 (1955) (repealed).

As stressed by the Petitioner, this statutory sentencing scheme was declared unconstitutional

in Miller v. State, 584 S.W.2d 758, 765 (Tenn. 1979). See Taylor v. State, 995 S.W.2d 78, 81–82

(Tenn. 1999) (providing a detailed chronology of the legislative and judicial actions that culminated

in our supreme court’s decision in Miller). By declaring the 1919 sentencing scheme

unconstitutional, Miller “had the effect of reviving the 1915 Act which provided a mandatory

sentence of life imprisonment for all persons convicted of first degree murder.” Id. at 82. However,

the fact that the sentencing statute under which the Petitioner was sentenced was later declared

unconstitutional does not render his judgments void:

1

In the Petitioner’s response to the State’s response to his petition for habeas corpus relief, he noted that he

had unsuccessfully appeared before the parole board seven times.

-4-

The 1919 Act was presumptively constitutional until declared unconstitutional by this

Court’s decision in Miller. While a trial court has no legal authority to impose a

sentence that is contrary to governing law, a sentence imposed in accordance with the

statute in effect at the time of its imposition is not void merely because the statute is

later declared unconstitutional. Such a sentence is instead voidable if timely

challenged in a post-conviction proceeding.

Id. at 85–86 (footnotes and citations omitted).

In an effort to fully address this issue, we note that—to the extent that the Petitioner’s

arguments can be considered a request for post-conviction relief—they are untimely. See id. at

86–87 (explaining that the petitioners in that case, who were similarly situated to the Petitioner in

the instant case, had until July 1, 1989, to file a petition for post-conviction relief challenging a

voidable judgment).

Accordingly, because the Petitioner’s jury-imposed life sentences were lawful when he

received them, his judgments of conviction are not facially void, and it was not error for the habeas

corpus court to summarily dismiss his petition without appointing counsel.

Secondly, the Petitioner argues that his Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendment

rights guaranteed by the United States Constitution were violated by the “State Statutory Provision

of 1974 Act [sic] . . . .” Although this argument is difficult for this Court to follow, he seems to

argue that he was sentenced under Tennessee’s 1974 sentencing statutes and that his rights were

violated because, pursuant to those statutes, he was denied the right to a trial by jury and the effective

assistance of counsel.

This argument also lacks merit because it is apparent that the Petitioner was not sentenced

under the 1974 Act. Under that provision, a conviction for first degree murder carried a mandatory

sentence of death. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-2406 (1974 Supp.) (repealed) (stating that, “[w]hen

a person is convicted of the crime of murder in the first degree, . . . it shall be the duty of the jury

convicting him in their verdict to fix his punishment at death as provided by law”). Because the

Petitioner was sentenced under the 1919 Act, his complaints regarding the 1974 Act are misplaced.

Thirdly, the Petitioner takes issue with the State’s response to his petition. Specifically, he

seems to contend that, because the State referred to his allegations as “unintelligible,” it is apparent

that the habeas corpus court erred by not appointing counsel. We disagree. Indeed, we agree with

the State that some of the Petitioner’s claims are unintelligible. However, the fact that the

Petitioner’s petition lacked clarity was not a sufficient reason for the habeas corpus court to appoint

counsel.

Lastly, we note that the Petitioner’s fifth argument, regarding the integrity of his indictments,

was not presented to the habeas corpus court. As such, this argument is waived and will not be

-5-

addressed on appeal. See State v. Turner, 919 S.W.2d 346, 356–57 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1995) (stating

that an issue which was neither raised nor litigated in the trial court is waived; party may not raise

an issue for the first time in appellate court) (citing Lawrence v. Standford, 655 S.W.2d 927, 929–30

(Tenn. 1983) (other citation omitted).

CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing authorities and reasoning, we affirm the habeas corpus court’s order

summarily dismissing the petition.

______________________________

DAVID H. WELLES, JUDGE

-6-